83 Tenn. 725 | Tenn. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the court.
On January 11, 1875, W. J. Sweeny, E. A. Sweeny, Ermine Sweeny, W. B. Mitchell and E. V. Mitchell executed their promissory note to respondent, Rountree, for $6,415.20. This, while the joint note of all the makers upon its face, was given for money borrowed by W. J. Sweeny, the others being, in fact, his sureties. And to secure this note said W. J., E. A. and Ermine
Many errors ■ were assigned as apparent upon the face of said decree and proceedings, but two of which, ■however, are now seriously insisted upon, and which, in our judgment, are all that need be noticed. In the first place it is insisted that as the respondents, Taylor and wife, were non-residents, and brought in un■der that bill by publication alone, there being no personal service upon them, the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction as to them, and that the decree .as against them upon said note, except to the extent of subjecting the lands conveyed in the mortgage, was erroneous upon its face, the court having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against them. And this was so held by the Supreme Court of the United •States in the case of Pennoyes v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714. However, under our statute, old Code, sec. 4352,.sub-sec. 1, and 4357, the law has been held different in this State, and such a judgment has been directly held to be valid and proper: Kyle v. Philips, 6 Baxt., 43. The only difference between that case and the one now under consideration is, that was a proceeding by publication against a non-resident to enforce a vendor’s lien, and a personal judgment was rendered for
On March 19, 1877, which was after the bill was filed, but before the decree sought to be reversed was rendered, the Legislature passed an act, entitled an act to amend the law in regard to the property of married women, by which it was enacted, "that hereafter no husband shall be liable for the debts, contracts or obligations of his wife, incurred by her previous to her marriage ,• provided, however, that the marital rights of the husband shall not attach to the property of the wife, owned by her at the time of marriage, or which she may become owner of subsequent to her marriage, as heir or distributee, so as to prevent the creditors of the wife from subjecting her property to the satisfaction of their debts ”: Acts of 1877, p. 104. It is insisted, in the next place, that under and by virtue of this act, although passed subsequent to the execution by the wife of the note sued upon, while a feme sole, as well as subsequent to the marriage, and the institution of the suit upon it, against the husband and wife, the liability of the husband for
These authorities are amply sufficient to show that the husband’s liability for the debts of the wife attaches, and is fixed at once upou the marriage, and a right of action immediately accrues in favor of her creditors against him, in which she must be joined, for the recovery of the same. This right is absolute and perfect during the continuance of the coverture; is vested and cannot be taken away by statute, even if the Legislature had so intended. “A vested right of action is property in the same 0 sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Where it, springs from contract, ■or from the principles of the common law, it is not ■competent for the Legislature to take it away: Cooley Const. Lim., 449, citing a great many authorities, and among others, 4 Met. (Ky.), 385. But if this were not the case, it was not the intention, as we think, of the Legislature that the statute in question should have any retroactive force, or any other than prospective effect. This is indicated by the use of the word “hereafter” at the beginning of the section containing the provision above cited. Besides, the universal rule of construction- is that statutes shall be taken to be prospective in their operation, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed upon their face. And Mr. Bishop, after citing the case of Fultz and wife v. Fox, above referred to, concludes as follows: “The doc
We conclude, therefore, that respondent, .Rountree’s right of action, or his suit then pending against Taylor and wife, was not affected by the passage of the statute in question, and there was no error apparent upon the face of the decree, or proceedings sought to be reviewed, which entitled the complainants to any relief.
The chancellor dismissed the bill, and the Bef-erees have reported that his decree should be affirmed, and ive are satisfied of the correctness of their conclusions.
The exceptions to the report will be overruled, the report confirmed, and the chancellor’s decree affirmed Avith costs.