*1 in- on the appeared name witness whose potential dictment. concur. All the Justices
Judgment affirmed. 7, 1977. September Argued 1977 Decided June Nodvin, Worozbyt, Theodore S. for Worozbyt & appellant. ne, Stroberg, H. Attorney, District Roland Way JeffC. Bolton, Attorney K. Arthur Attorney,
Assistant District General, Atkinson, General, Attorney Kirby G. Assistant for appellee.
32402. TAYLOR v. RICKETTS. Justice.
Bowles, the denial probable appeal court found cause This on the issue Erwin Green corpus of habeas California, 422 of Faretta v. in light waiver of 562) (1975). LE2d U. S. 806 SC County Muscogee The indicted appellant by was Jury felony-murder Grand counsel was indigent, Because he was an robbery. trial with him. The came to case appointed After the by his represented appointed appellant struck, in order the court recessed jury appellant At this time to address the appellant judge. dismissed, and he be asked that counsel be appointed himself. allowed to represent informed the that his appellant
The court afford a capable and would extremely counsel was that there appellant told The court also vigorous defense. him, he would forcing was no law counsel insistence. upon appellant’s only dismiss insisted, that he felt stating Appellant The assured best favor.” court "might my not be true, asked and again this was not appellant himself. if he still elected appellant ap- point, At this the affirmative. Appellant replied pointed counsel was excused from case. applicable
The Sixth Amendment as made to the guarantees Amendment, states Fourteenth that a independent a state criminal trial has an self-representation constitutional and that he may proceed to defend without counsel when he *2 voluntarily intelligently and to elects do so. A state lawyer upon appellant a not force an when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. Faretta v. supra. California, appointed attorney appellant Taylor
An for arraignment By the time of October, his in 1975. the time April appellant attorney in of trial of and his had they had five or six conferences, at which times discussed charges pending against appellant. Appellant’s the appointed attorney corpus hearing testified at the habeas professional opinion, appellant very that, in his a had because, difficult arrest, case at the time of his he had police. Negotiations amade confession to the were made plea attorney bargaining, with the district appellant plea guilty. refused enter a At of no time did appointed suggesting counsel exert force that appellant plead guilty, although explain try he did appellant guilty that he could be found of murder although appellant pull trigger. go himself did not the
When made trial, the decision to appointed explained they counsel three defenses would (1) appellant’s rights use: constitutional had been denied (2) speedy appellant’s in that he trial; was not afforded a police freely statement to the had not been and (3) appellant made; and lacked criminal (After being intent. leaving dismissed as but before appointed courtroom, the counsel raised behalf.) appellant’s issues one and two oral on motion Although hearing corpus application at the on his habeas appellant complained appoint- he did believe his subpoena him, ed would alibi witnesses it is undisputed appellant never mentioned the existence any possible of alibi defense and he admitted to counsel Appellant that he was at the scene of the crime. was 20 years high old and had a school education. He had been in previous court on a occasion. re- intentional ordinarily an
"A waiver priv- or right a known or abandonment linquishment has been there of whether The determination ilege. depend, must right an intelligent waiver facts and circumstances case, particular in each case, including background, surrounding v. Johnson the accused.” conduct of and experience, (1937). the circum- Under S. Zerbst, 304 U. Taylor effec- case, appellant find that we stances of of assis- Amendment his Sixth tively waived his repre- in fact invoked and tance of counsel sent himself. early capable attorney
Taylor was conferences, he In a series of his imprisonment. stages at trial and facing he the difficulties would was told of Considering age use. intended to the defenses counsel problems of these education, and informed being defenses, intelligent to make he was able possible United States As the of counsel. waiver voluntary California, supra (p. Faretta Court stated prosecutions in most criminal 834), "It is undeniable *3 guidance defend with counsel’s could better defendants But the where unskilled efforts. than their own by by accept representation will not training lawyer’s of a counsel, advantage potential the realized, all, only imperfectly.” if can be at and experience 916) State, SE2d App. v. 138 Ga. See also Gould (1976). urged appellant strongly the trial court
Although not it could make of his to use in find no error him do so. We force to constitutionally himself at represent to appellant Taylor allowing court, denying appellant’s in the trial trial. The order of is affirmed. corpus habeas for a writ of application concur, except the Justices All Judgment affirmed. Hill, J., who dissents. Hall, J., specially, who concurs Decided June Submitted September 7, 1977. pro
Ervin se. Taylor, Bonner, Jr., C. appellant. James Bolton, General, Attorney Arthur K. Harrison Kohler, General, Attorney appellee. Assistant Justice, concurring specially.
Hall, Faretta’s conviction of theft was vacated grand the United States Court which ruled on court, certiorari the trial Faretta to forcing accept public defender, had services of the erroneously him right denied his Sixth Amendment himself.
We must be careful that trial courts are caught If impossible an squeeze: they refuse allow a defendant convicted, and he represent himself the conviction may be reversed on that he was denied his right self-representation; but if the court him does allow convicted, appellate he is court reverse finding his choice was not intelligently made. we must take Accordingly, care what tests we apply. plain choice,
Faretta for a makes valid only defendant must not waive counsel under the Johnson waiver, Zerbst standard but must affirmatively self-representation. choose U. S. at 836. "We do not suggest self-representation] [of arises mechanically from power a defendant’s the right waive to the assistance . . On the contrary, independently must be found in the structure and history of the constitutional text.” 422 U. S. n. 15. In electing self-representation, a defendant must act "competently and intelligently” choice making 835), U. S. but "a defendant need not himself have the skill experience Therefore, of a . .” Id. lawyer. cannot agree with the result theory or of the dissenting opinion which suggests that a defendant must be able to at trial function as adequately as an invoke successfully *4 represent himself. This reasoning conflicts with Supreme warnings Court’s in Faretta such, defendant’s "technical legal knowledge, as was not relevant to an assessment of his exercise of the knowing himself,” 836, to defend Id. at and that "although he conduct ultimately detriment, his defense to his own
505
. .” Id. at 834.
honored.
choice must be
his
that defendant must
Court has stated
The
doing
make his choice of
and must
what he is
know
eyes open.
self-representation
to the form of the and it is going going you taken, it is to be sustained. We are to treat gentleman. going respect you. like a We are We are going give you every you going play chance, are ground anybody you plays. with the same And rules that don’t know those rules.” Here, after trial commenced the addressed the court and the court advised the defendant as follows: Taylor:... Honor, "Mr. Your Mr. Mr. A.,D. I wish ... me. The Court: You wish to yourself? Taylor: right, Yes, Mr. All would. The Court: *5 right. mighty competent You
he has Mr. have Taylor. any competent You have hired couldn’t more vigorous represent you vigorously or counsel.... He would any you reservations, ... without but do have the choice of yourself. representing IBut want the record to show . '. . up represented that Mr... is and available has him to this point willing representing and is to continue him. However, there is no law that allows us to force counsel your on a if defendant. And it’s choice to yourself, you doing point, are at and I you your will insist, relieve Mr... if but it’s at insistence. Taylor: just might Well, Mr. in questioning Y Honor, our like it’s he not be my Taylor, Well, best favor. The Court: Mr. I’m not might your opinion, I be can state your know that true. But it’s still choice to represent yourself you represent yourself if want you may Taylor: Yes, sir, do so. Mr. I would like to.”
Here the defendant was not that he would warned required ground procedure.1 to follow all the rules of trial warning, Absent that decision being dangers was made without his "made aware disadvantages self-representation.” Faretta, U. result, S. at 835. As a this defendant was sentenced to years robbery serve 10 which an prevented. State, could have Burke v. 234 Ga. 812) (1975); (1) Farley State, SE2d 238 Ga. 761) (1977). I SE2d therefore dissent. 1 Although in conferences trial before the defendant was told his counsel of the difficulties he would be facing trial at use, the defenses counsel intended (if expected try that time the case plead guilty) did not as to the and the defendant was not informed
legal meeting rules for his difficulties and presenting his defenses.