50 F. 755 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio | 1892
The ’«intifi' instituted this suit to recover
That the accident occurred substantially as above described is clearly established by the evidence. The two important issues of fact submitted to the jury were: First, did the defendant exercise ordinary care in providing a suitable force of officers and employes to properly control and direct the movement of the unprecedented throng which it was advised would crowd through its depot rooms, vestibule, corridors, and gates to reach its trains? and, second, did the defendant, regardless Of the unusual crowd to be cared for and controlled, undertake to force it through one exit gate to the trains, and thereby cause unnecessary jamming and jostling and violence, and, without fault on the plaintiff’s part, force her against the railing;- and injure her, as already stated?
The only remaining question, therefore, is, did the defendant exercise ordinary care in providing a suitable force to properly control and direct the movements of the unprecedented crowd then in its custody? The evidence offered by the defendant was that it made application to the chief of police of Pittsburgh for an extra force of patrolmen, and got all it wanted, and that at the time of the accident it had from 20 to 40 policemen, and, with its own employes, had about 100 men in and about the depot to direct and control the crowd in its approach to the depot, while in the depot, and while going to the trains. Upon the subject of the defendant’s duty to care for this crowd, the jury were given the following instructions:
“The plaintiff was injured within the depot inclosures of the defendant, and while she was making her way to her train, as one of a very large crowd of passengers. The first important question to determino is, what was the kind and degree of care and protection which the defendant owed to her under the circumstances shown in evidence and at the time of the injury? A passenger while in actual progress on his journey is necessarily exposed to innumerable hazards; is wholly under the care of the carrier; and in view of these dangers, which he can in no respect control, the law imposes upon such carrier the greatest possible vigilance as to the passenger’s safety, and holds it responsible for the slightest negligence. This degree of care is fixed not solely because of the relation of carrier and passenger; it is measured by the consequences which may follow the want of care. A carrier is held to this highest degree of care as to the condition of its engines, ears, roadway, bridges, and other appliances, because negligence as to any of them involves extreme peril to passengers, against which they cannot protect themselves. But a rule properly ceases with the reason for it. Therefore, as a passenger’s*758 detention at a station, or his exit to his train, is not attended with the hazards pertaining to the journey on the ears, running at a rapid rate of speed, the degree of care above defined is justly lessened to the extent that in such a place and at such a time the carrier is bound to exercise only a reasonable degree of care for the protection of its passengers. This reasonable and ordinary care depends largely upon the circumstances of each particular case, and is such care as a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence and skill would usually exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Now, apply this rule to this case. The defendant was bound to hse such reasonable care, as above indicated, in providing for the safety and protection of its passengers while in its inclosures, and while being conducted to its trains, with due regard to the numbers and character of those on its premises, and with due reference to the risks and dangers to which they were exposed. It was bound to provide a suitable number from its own officers and employes, or from the city police furnished, to assist it in properly controlling said crowd, and protecting men, women, and children in it from violence because of the unruly character or boisterous conduct of any members thereof. But it was not bound to do this to the extent of furnishing a guard of policemen for every passenger, or for every small group of passengers, to protect them from physical injury because of the violence of some of their own number. It was only bound to furnish such suitable number of officers and guards as would insure order, and preserve the peace, and keep the crowd in proper control, so as to direct their movements towards the train. Whether such suitable number of officers and guards was furnished in this case is for you, gentlemen of the jury, to determine from the circumstances as they existed at and about the time of the accident. What was the temper and character of the crowd? Was it boisterous and unruly, composed of drunken or excited men, bent on violence and disorder, or was it a good-natured, orderly crowd, willing to be controlled and directed in its movements? The witnesses for the plaintiff characterize the crowd as orderly and jolly. If this was its spirit and disposition, was there a sufficient number of guards and officers to direct and control it? You have heard the evidence as to the number of these employes of the defendant, of the extra force on duty, and of the detail of city police, as to how they were stationed, what duties were assigned to each, and how they discharged those duties. The defendant was as much obligated to protect passengers from pickpockets and roughs as from violence from the sudden, movements of their passengers. If you think the special and extra precautions taken by defendant were proper and sufficient to control and direct that crowd collectively, and to insure to them as a body that kind of care which I have defined, then the defendant would not be liable for an injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by a sudden and unexpected jam or surging of some of the passengers about the plaintiff, who were not within the immediate control or reach of defendant’s employes or the police, so that they could have anticipated it and guarded against it. As I have stated, the defendant could not be held to that degree of diligence that called for a guard for every passenger. It was not bound to provide a policeman for each person, to protect and defend him or her from violence of fellow passengers. But it was bound to furnish a suitable number of its own officers or police to properly control, as a body, such a crowd of passengers to the extent already stated. If you find it did this, then it discharged its duty to the plaintiff, and cannot be held liable for this injury.”
These instructions correctly state the law as applicable to the case. The degree of care to which the defendant was held in its relation and duty to the plaintiff at the time of the accident was just. Under these instructions, the jury must have found that the defendant did not use such ordinary care in its precautions and preparations to control that crowd
The result may have a wholesome effect. If railroads make prodigious efforts, by offering low rates, and by extended and captivating advertisements, to secure a greater number of passengers to travel over their lines than they can safely and reasonably care for at their terminal points, and accidents follow, they must answer for the risks thus assumed. The traveling public may be justly subject to criticism for going in such
The motion will therefore be overruled, and judgment entered.