3 Ark. 238 | Ark. | 1841
delivered the opinion of the court:
Taylor sold his improvement upon which he claimed a pre-emption right under the act of eighteen hundred and twenty-nine, and covenants to prove up the pre-emption, according to law, and convey it to Hamilton. He was also to deliver him possession of the improvements within twenty days from the date of the contract. And Hamilton was to make Taylor a warrantee deed for an adjoining quarter section, (which Taylor was, at this time, improving for the benefit of Hamilton,) as soon as he could get a right from government. If Hamilton failed so to do, he was to re-deliver the possession of the fractional quarter to Taylor, and receive from him that of the quarter section. If the pre-emption right was affected by the sale, he was to pay Taylor the additional sum of fifty dollars for the labor done on the quarter section, previous to the contract. It was further covenanted that, in the event of a failure on the part of Hamilton to make the deed, each party should pay rent to the other. Hamilton from the date of the contract, Taylor while in possession, and each to pay the other for improvements made during the time.
The contract is ambiguous, but such is the only reasonable and common-sense construction, that can be given, to carry into effect the intention of the parties. The covenants cannot be dependent; the performance of the one does not depend upon the performance of the other, for Taylor covenants that he has a pre-emption right, and that he will prove up and convey it. Whereas, Hamilton only agrees that he will convey so soon as he can procure a title from government. The period for the performance of one, may arive before it is possible that the other can contract; therefore, it is not a prior condition, that Hamilton shall convey first. They are not mutual and concurrent, because the first act is contemplated to be done by himself, by proving up and conveying the pre-emption. They must, therefore, be independent, and either may recover damages for a breach of the covenant in his favor, and the non-performance of one, is no excuse for the other.
The whole question turns upon the breach, which must be governed by the nature of the stipulation. It should be assigned in the words of the contract, or in words co-extensive with the import and meaning of it, if, in so doing, a distinct breach is thereby shown, but must not vary from the substance and effect of it. The covenant is, “ That Hamilton will make a warrantee deed as soon as he can gat a right from government; and upon this covenant the whole question turns. The breach is, “That he did not make the plaintiff a warrantee deed to the quarter section, in said covenant mentioned; nor hath said defendant procured any title from government for said quarter.” There is no allegation in the declaration, that Hamilton has ever procured the title, or of his inability to do so, in consequence of the land not being subject to sale, or that it was owned by another person ; or that he neglected and refused to procure the title when he could have done so; and,it is therefore, clearly insufficient., Nor is there any notice of request. In all cases where actual notice of any fact is necessary, or a special request is, either by the terms or by the nature of the contract, the condition of the liability, such notice in the one case, and such request in the other, must be specially averred in the declaration. Com. Dig. Pl. C. 69, 73; 14 East 500; 5 T. R. 409.
For without such averments, no complete right of action can appear from the declaration. The want of such a special averment is also fatal. When such an averment is necessary to be stated, the general averment, although often requested, is not sufficient. 1 Saund. 33, n. 2; Wallis vs. Scott; 1 Strange, 88; that being but matter of form. As the declaration shows neither a sufficient breach, nor a special averment of request, the judgment is affirmed.