OPINION OF THE COURT
The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether a local rule of court that provides for the automatic termination of cases in which there has been no activity of record for a period of two years or more, without notice of an opportunity for a pre-termination hearing, is inconsistent with Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(c) so as to render the local rule ineffective and unenforceable. The trial court held that its local rule was not inconsistent with Rule 1901(c) and denied appellant’s petition to “reactivate” his case. After consideration of the arguments presented, we hold that the local rule is inconsistent with Rule 1901(c) and reverse.
Appellant’s cause of action is for an alleged breach of a contract wherein he sold certain real estate to the appellee. According to the complaint, appellant retained the ownership of certain pipe buried in the ground. The agreement provided that the appellant was to be given written notification prior to the removal of the pipe from the ground. Alleging that appellee failed to provide such notification, appellant instituted this action for his resulting damages.
The action was instituted by the filing of a complaint on November 19, 1968. The docket reflects that there was activity until March 31, 1969. No further action is reflected on the docket until September 2, 1980. However, according to the record before us, appellant, on June 22, 1970, filed a petition for arrangement under the National Bankruptcy Act. Although a trustee was appointed in the bankruptcy
*611 proceedings, neither appellant nor his trustee undertook any activity in this case. Eventually the bankruptcy proceedings were terminated on December 13, 1978.
On September 2, 1980, the case was placed at issue by appellant. Jury selection was scheduled to commence on March 15, 1982. On February 19, 1982, appellant filed his pre-trial statement. However, on March 12, 1982, following oral argument by the parties, the trial court entered an order stating that the case was terminated by reason of Allegheny County Local Rule 229(e). Subsequently, on May 12, 1982, appellant filed a petition to reactivate the case. The trial court entered an order denying that petition and this appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant raises several issues. He questions whether his cause of action could have been terminated without notice to the bankruptcy court, whether the local rule providing for automatic termination without notice conflicts with Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 1901(c) and whether the local rule violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Since we have determined that the local rule conflicts with Rule 1901 promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it is not necessary to reach the other issues presented.
On June 26, 1974, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas promulgated Local Rule 229, to become effective on January 1, 1975. Rule 229 provides for the automatic termination “by operation of law” of any matter in which there has been no activity of record for two years or more. The rule contains a provision for reactivation of a case by the court for “good cause” shown. The first period of two years was to commence retroactively on January 1, 1973. In a note accompanying the rule, the court stated that the local rule was adopted pursuant to Rule 1901 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration.
Rule 1901(c) provides in relevant part,
(c) Minimum standards. Before any order terminating a matter on the ground of unreasonable inactivity is entered, the parties shall be given at least 30 days’ *612 written notice of opportunity for hearing on such proposed termination, ____ (emphasis added)
Thus, appellant argues, the Allegheny County rule is inconsistent with the general rule promulgated by the Supreme Court because it does not contain a provision for “at least 30 days’ written notice of opportunity for hearing on such proposed termination,”.
Allegheny County’s Rule 229 has been considered by our Court on three prior occasions. However, at no time was the precise issue presented here reached or decided. In
Jay Dee Contractors, Inc. v. National Mine Service Co.,
Our attention has been called to a number of cases dealing with Philadelphia County Local Rule 130, which similarly provides for termination of inactive cases.
See
*613
Wurster v. Peters,
In interpreting Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 1901, we look to the language used by the Supreme Court in promulgating the rule as well as the Court’s intent and purpose in promulgating it. It is clear that the rule is intended to eliminate from the judicial system those stale claims which have apparently been abandoned or resolved by the parties without any entry on the court’s docket. The rule constitutes an attempt to establish a system whereby the dockets of the Commonwealth’s trial courts contain, with a reasonable degree of certainty, only those cases in which there is an ongoing dispute. It is important for the proper management of a court docket to eliminate periodically those cases which no longer require the court’s time or attention. The Supreme Court has, by language which we find to be clear and unambiguous, provided for such an effective management tool.
Although the rule was not intended to achieve a substantive disposition of cases on their merits, the fact is that its application may have such a practical effect. See, e.g., Stawiarski v. Hall, supra. Because the application of the rule may have such an effect, we believe the Supreme Court intended clearly, unambiguously and unmistakeably, that the trial court provide pre-termination notice to the parties before it clears its docket of such cases. Rule 1901(c) starts with a provision that before “any order terminating a matter on the ground of unreasonable activity is entered, the parties shall be given notice of the proposed termi *614 nation.” The Court’s use of the terms “shall” and “proposed” makes such notice a prerequisite to the “termination” of stale cases. It is difficult to imagine any clearer command than that used by the Supreme Court.
Appellee, however, relies on a statement contained in the Comment to Rule 1901:
Under Rule 1901(c)(2), in those cases where it is unduly burdensome to research the captions, parties and mailing addresses of cases which have been inactive for two years or more, the moribund matters may be terminated by the adoption and publication of a general refiling requirement, without service of individual notice. Under such a local rule, matters in which no paper has been filed within the previous two years would be terminated without any further entry in the docket,____
Appellee argues that this statement contained in the Comment authorizes the adoption of a local rule which eliminates entirely the pre-termination notice required in the Rule itself. Even if we were to conclude that the Comment has the meaning ascribed to it by appellee, we could not ignore the plain and clear language of the Rule. While comments may be a useful aid in interpreting the purpose or meaning of a rule of procedure, they cannot change the plain meaning of the rule. Thus, if there is a conflict between the rule and a statement contained in the comment, the rule must govern.
In any event, we do not construe the comment to have the meaning ascribed to it by appellee. Rule 1901(c) provides, two methods of giving the prescribed pre-termination notice. Notice must be given in person or by mail, or by publication “in the manner provided by rule of court----” The statement contained in the Comment clearly refers to the second method of providing notice, that is, by publication. As we understand it, the 30 days prior notice may be given periodically, by the trial court’s entry of an order or adoption of a general rule providing for the publication of a list of cases by name and docket number in which there has been no activity for a period in excess of two years. After *615 such publication, those cases listed in the notice will then be considered terminated if no action is taken within the 30 days provided. Such an interpretation thus gives meaning to both the rule and the comment. A contrary interpretation, as urged on us by appellee, however, would effectively rewrite the rule and eliminate the requirement for pre-ter-mination notice. Such an interpretation would render subsection (c) utterly meaningless and without effect. We do not believe that the Supreme Court, in adopting Rule 1901(c), intended to perform a useless act.
Therefore, since we have concluded that the clear language of Rule 1901 requires pre-termination notice and because the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas’ local rule fails to provide for such notice, it is ineffective and unenforceable. Therefore, appellant’s case was not “automatically” terminated and the order is reversed.