Lead Opinion
Dоuglas County Deputy Sheriff Morris Taylor was shot and killed in the line of duty by Korry Jones, a felon who was being supervised by defendant Lane County’s employees at the time of the shooting. Plaintiff is the personal representative of Deputy Taylor’s estate. She appeals from a judgment dismissing her claims for wrongful death and negligence against defendant. She contends that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was immune from liability under ORS 30.265(3)(a). Plaintiff also contends that the application of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, specifically ORS 30.265(1) and ORS 30.265(3)(a), denies her the right to an adequate remedy under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. We affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Deputy Taylor was employed as a deputy sheriff by Douglas County. While acting within the scope of his employment, Deputy Taylor responded
Douglas County determined that Deputy Taylor’s death was compensable under the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS chapter 656. Plaintiff, as Deputy Taylor’s spоuse, received workers’ compensation benefits under ORS 656.204.
Plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate, filed a complaint alleging wrongful death and negligence claims against defendant Lane County, and individually named employees of Lane County Community Corrections who were responsible for supervising Jones.
Lane County moved for an order substituting it as the only defendant. ORS 30.265(1).
On appeal, plaintiff raises three assignments of error. First, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding that Lane County was immune from liability under ORS 30.265(3)(a). In her second and third assignments, she contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the immunity provision of ORS 30.265(3)(a), as applied to her wrongful death and negligence claims, respectively, did not violate the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. We consider those assignments in turn to determine whether Lane County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C.
As to the first assignment, plaintiff argues that defendant is not entitled to immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(a), because her claims were not “covered by any workers’ compensation law” within the meaning of that statute.
ORS 30.265(3)(a) provides:
“Every public body and its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties * * * are immune from liability for:
“(a) Any claim for injury to or death of any person covered by any workers’ compensation law.”
In Moustachetti v. State of Oregon,
“ORS 30.265(3)(a) establishes that every public body (and its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties) is immune from liability in a civil action (1) when the civil action states a claim for injury to or death of any person, and (2) when the injury toor death of that person occurred while that person and that injury were covered by (or under) any Workers’ Compensation Law.”
As the court explained in Moustachetti, to determine whether a claim is “covered by any workers’ compensation law” under ORS 30.265(3)(a), the correct focus is on the nature of the “legal injury” at issue. See id. at 325-27. A “legal injury” is “any harm or wrong to absolute rights for which a cause of action existed.” Stone v. Finnerty,
Applying those principles to this case suggests that Lane County was entitled to immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(a). First, plaintiffs civil action states a claim for the injury and death of Deputy Taylor. Second, the injury and death of Deputy Taylor occurred while he was covered by Oregon workers’ compensation law. It is undisрuted that Deputy Taylor’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. Deputy Taylor’s legal injury is precisely the type of legal injury that workers’ compensation laws are designed to cover. See ORS 656.005(7) (defining compensable injury).
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that her claims are not “covered by any workers’ compensation law” within the meaning of ORS 30.265(3)(a). According to plaintiff, ORS 30.265(3)(a) grants immunity only in lawsuits filed against a public body by its own employees; that is, ORS 30.265(3)(a) does not apply to claims in which the public body is a third party.
Plaintiffs interpretation of ORS 30.265(3)(a) stems from this court’s opinion in Stone. In Stone we stated,
“the word ‘covered’ in ORS 30.265(3)(a) does not refer to the kinds of injuries, mental or physical, for which аn employee can be recompensed under the workers’ compensation law. Rather, it refers to the types of claims for legal wrongs that were included in the quid pro quo substitution of workers’ compensation coverage for common-law claims that could have been brought against an employer by employees for work-related harms.”
Whether ORS 30.265(3)(a) applies to only claims against a public body by its own employees or whether it also applies tо claims against a public body even if the injured person was employed by someone other than the defendant public body is a question of statutory construction. We utilize the familiar methodology in
Next, in Granato / Strader v. City of Portland,
“If the exception were intended to apply only to employees of the defendant municipality, surely the significance of substituting words such as ‘any municipal employee’ for ‘any person’ would not have been overlooked by the legislature. The weakness of plaintiffs argument is that essentially it is directed at the wisdom of the limitation embodied in language which, it must be acknowledged, is clear and free from ambiguity * *
Id. at 574 (quoting McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk, 286 Minn 240,
Plaintiff raises three separate arguments as to why Granato does not control the outcome of this case: (1) Moustachetti and Stone changed the focus of the inquiry under ORS 30.265(3)(a) “from the compensability of a particular injury to the type of legal harm at issue” thereby making Granato inapplicable; (2) Granato “neither discussed, analyzed, nor considered the specific provisions of the workers’ compensation laws relating to third party claims” and had the court addressed that issue the result in Granato would have been different; and (3) the court’s analysis in Granato was “simply wrong.” We find plaintiffs reasoning unavailing.
Primarily, we fail to see, and plaintiff does not explain, how Moustachetti and Stone affect
Next, plaintiff argues that Granato is not controlling because the court did not address the relationship between ORS 30.265(3)(a) and the provisions of the workers’ compensation law that expressly preserve an injured worker’s claims against third parties, ORS 656.154.
Further, although Granato predates PGE, its interpretation of the statute is not to be disregarded. See Mastriano v. Board of Parole,
Finally, plaintiff contends that Granato was “simply wrong.” In Granato, we stated:
“To accept the interpretation plaintiff would have us adoрt would render [ORS 30.265(3)(a)] redundant. Any person who sustains a work-related injury while employed by a municipality is precluded by * * * the Workmen’s Compensation Act from bringing a tort action for damages against his employing municipality.”
Granato,
We conclude that ORS 30.265(3)(a) grants immunity to all public bodies, including third-party public bodies, in defending against a civil claim brought against them for the injury to or death of any person covered by any workers’ compensation law. That conclusion is consistent with prior cases acknowledging the immunity of third-party public bodies under ORS 30.265(3)(a). See Storm v. McClung,
We turn to рlaintiffs second assignment of error, in which she contends that application of ORS 30.265(3)(a) to her wrongful death claim violates the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.
In plaintiffs third assignment of error, she contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the individual defendants, because her claim for injury suffered by Deputy Taylor prior to his death existed at common law and the application of ORS 30.265(3)(a) to that claim denied her the right to an adequate remedy under Article I, section 10. Lane County disagrees; it argues that, at common law, plaintiffs claims for Deputy Taylor’s injuries would have terminated at his death. Further, Lane County contends that any survival of that claim beyond Deрuty Taylor’s death is based on ORS 30.075, which provides, in part, “[clauses of action arising out of injuries to a person * * * shall not abate upon the death of the injured person.” ORS 30.075(1). Because the extension of plaintiffs injury claim was legislatively created, Lane County argues that the legislature could limit the extension without violating the remedy clause. We agree with Lane County.
As the Supreme Court explained in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.,
Plaintiffs claim, as opposed to any claim Deputy Taylor might have asserted had he survived, for injuries suffered by Deputy Taylor prior to his death is not a claim that existed at common law. “At common law an action for bodily injury abated upon the death of either the injured party or the tortfeasor.” Mendez v. Walker,
Moreover, ORS 30.075(3) provides, in part:
“If an action for wrongful death under ORS 30.020 is brought, recovery of damages for disability, pain, suffering and loss of income during the period between injury to the decedent and the resulting death of the decedent may only be recovered in the wrongful death action [.]”
Here, plaintiffs complaint seeks compensation for Deputy Taylor’s conscious pain and suffering prior to his death, within her wrongful
Affirmed.
Notes
Margaret Taylor, Deputy Taylor’s spouse, filed the complaint as the personal representative of the estate of Morris Taylor and also on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of Deputy Taylor’s parents.
ORS 30.265(1) provides, in part:
“The sole cause of action for any tort of officers, employees or agents of a public body acting within the scope of their employment or duties and eligible for representation and indemnification under ORS 30.285 or 30.287 shall be an action against the public body only. The remedy provided by ORS 30.260 to 30.300 is exclusivе of any other action or suit against any such officer, employee or agent of a public body whose act or omission within the scope of the officer’s, employee’s or agent’s employment or duties gives rise to the action or suit. No other form of civil action or suit shall be permitted. If an action or suit is filed against an officer, employee or agent of a public body, on appropriate motion the public body shall be substituted as the only defendant.”
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the сompensability of Deputy Taylor’s injuries and death establishes that he was covered by workers’ compensation law at the time of his injury. Also, Ms legal Mjuries were “covered by any workers’ compensation law” because the nature of the legal mjuries alleged M plamtiffs complamt are the same type of legal wrongs that were included in the quid pro quo substitution of common-law claims for workers’ compensation rights. Stone,
For ease of reference, we refer to those public bodies that did not emрloy the mjured worker as “third-party public bodies.”
The concurrence contends that our analysis “goes astray in framing the different potential meanings of ORS 30.265(3)(a).”
OES 656.154 provides:
“If the injury to a worker is due to the negligence or wrong of a third person not in the same employ, the injured worker, or if death results from the injury, the spouse, children or other dependents, as the case may be, may elect to seek a remedy against such third person.”
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
“* * * every man shall have remedy by due сourse of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.”
The court decided that it need not resolve the question of whether the common law recognized a cause of action for wrongful death because the plaintiff did not allege the proper type of injury. Juarez,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s determinations on the second and third assignments of error and with the result reached on the first assignment of error, relating to the meaning of ORS 30.265(3)(a). However, I do not agree entirely with the reasоning used by the majority in its construction of ORS 30.265(3)(a), which provides:
“Every public body and its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties, or while operating a motor vehicle in a ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598, are immune from liability for:
“(a) Any claim for injury to or death of any person covered by any workers’ compensation law.”
The statute then lists five other types of claims for which “every public body” is immune from liability.
Plaintiff contends that the workers’ compеnsation law coverage immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(a) should apply only to claims where the plaintiff otherwise has a remedy under the Workers’ Compensation Law against this public body defendant. Lane County argues for a broader scope of the immunity — that ORS 30.265(3)(a) immunizes against claims where the plaintiff has a remedy under the Workers’ Compensation Law for the same harm against any employer.
We decided this question in Granato / Strader v. City of Portland,
To the extent a reexamination of the text and context of ORS 30.265(3)(a) is necessary, its meaning is plain. The immunity exists whenever “any” workers’ compensation law provides coverage to a claimant, not just when particular workers’ compensation law coverage exists because the claimant was employed by the alleged public tortfeasor. The narrow construction of ORS 30.265(3)(a) advanced by plaintiff makes ORS 30.265(3)(a) redundant of ORS 656.018 (workers’ compensation liability exclusive of all other remedies against employer) and ORS 30.265(3)(d) (public body tort claim immunity for “[a]ny claim that is limited or barred by the provisions of any other statute”). The construction of ORS 30.265(3)(a) that was settled in
The majority goes astray in framing the different potential meanings of ORS 30.265(3)(a). It states the choicеs to be whether the immunity arises only when workers’ compensation coverage exists because plaintiff was employed by the defendant public body or because plaintiff was employed by any public body. So framed, the majority prefers the latter interpretation because the tort immunities listed in ORS 30.265(3), according to its terms, apply to “ ‘every5 public body, not just to those public bodies that employed the injured person.”
Again, I believe the issue is whether ORS 30.265(3)(a) creates an immunity whenever workers’ comрensation coverage exists, whether the employer is a public entity or a private person. The choice is whether the coverage providing immunity is a defendant’s workers’ compensation coverage or that of any employer. The textual application of the set of ORS 30.265(3) tort immunities to “every public body” is irrelevant to that issue.
More generally, however, the application of the entirety of ORS 30.265(3) and its package of immunities to “every public body’ is immaterial to the mеaning of any particular conferred immunity. Whatever the meaning of ORS 30.265(3)(a) on workers’ compensation coverage immunity, whether the immunity is construed broadly or narrowly, the statutory subsection will apply to “every public body.” “Every public body’ can obtain the workers’ compensation coverage immunity whether that immunity exists only for torts against the public bodys employees or if it exists for torts against those employees and others. Who is entitled to invoke the ORS 30.265(3) immunities of “every public body’ is not relevant to what the nature of any particular immunity might be.
This quibble is not mere hairsplitting. The method of construing ORS 30.265(3)(a) adopted by the majority reads the scope of the workers’ compensation coverage immunity broadly because the set of listed immunities applies to “every public body.” If this logic is correct, then the discretionary function immunity stated in ORS 30.265(3)(c) also should be construed expansively in favor of public bodies because it too is available to “every public body.” I do not believe that this legislative intent can be inferred from the language of ORS 30.265(3). “Every public body” is accountable for its torts under ORS 30.265(1), and there is no reason to read the exceptions to this rule more broadly because they too apply to “every public body.”
The holding of the majority opinion, reaffirming the teachings of Granato / Strader on the meaning of the workers’ compensation coverage immunity, is correct. I write separately only to disagree with any implication that the availability of any particular tort immunity to “every public body” is a clue to the scope of the immunity itself.