This сase involves the following factors, viz.: (1) Was the notice given the defendant city sufficient under Code § 69-308, as amended? (2) If so, was the dеfendant city exercising a ministerial function under these facts? and (3) Is the defendant King, the airport manager, personаlly liable? These points will be considered in the above order.
Idle plaintiff attached a copy of a letter to his petition which he contends was sufficient notice to the defendant city. Tbz letter was sent to the Mayor of Columbus аnd set forth the details of the occurrence including the alleged negligence of the defendant city. However, thе letter was sent by the insurance carrier for the plaintiff and the amount specified was less than the damages claimed in the petition.
The applicable law is contained in Code § 69-308 as amended (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dee. Sess., p. 338; 1956, p. 183) which provides in part: “No person, firm or corporation, having a claim for money damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries to рerson or property, shall bring any suit at law or equity against said municipal corporation for the same, without first, and within six mоnths of the happening of the event upon which such claim is predicated, presenting in writing such claim to the governing authority of said municipality for adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of such injury, a's nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the same, and no such suit shall be entertained by the courts against *591 such municipality until the сause of action therein shall have been first presented to said governing authority, for adjustment. . .”
It has been held many timеs that a substantial compliance with this section is all that is necessary, the purpose of the notice requiremеnt being to apprize the city of the claim in order that it may determine whether or not to adjust the claim without suit.
Code Ann.
§ 69-308, catсhword “Substantial Compliance.” The variation in amounts claimed is immaterial.
City of Griffin v. Stewart,
The defendant city relies on the case of
Jones v. City Council of Augusta,
Furthermore, as was said in that case at page 270: “The notice must be given by somebody. The Code does not specify who shall give it.” We thus hold that it was not necessary that the notice bе given by plaintiff himself. The notice given the defendant city here was a substantial compliance with the Code.
Next we have the question of whether the defendant city was engaged in a ministerial or a governmental function in the operаtion of this airport. The plaintiff’s allegations are: “5. That the city leased space at this airport to privatе companies engaged in commercial operations for profit; that the revenues thereby obtained аre substantial, and not incidental revenue, and that said airport is operated by the city as a source of revеnue. 6. That the city by lease agreement with the private enterprises therein covenants to maintain runways and thus undertakes by private contractual obligation the responsibilities and obligations which the said business enterprises are bound to fulfill as part of their operation for profit. 7. That in so doing the city is performing a ministerial function of a privatе na *592 ture for the use of its lessees as an obligation of its leases, from which it obtains substantial revenue.”
Generally, municiрalities are not liable for negligence in the performance of governmental (or legislative) functions but are chargeable for negligence in connection with ministerial (or proprietary) duties.
Code
§ 69-301. While municipal operаtion of airports is a relatively new development, plaintiff has gathered a number of foreign cases holding that аn airport operation by a municipality is a ministerial or proprietary function. Mollencop v. Salem,
The Caroway case involved the city’s liability for alleged negligence in the maintenance of a passenger terminal at the municipal airport. There, the petition- alleged that the city leased portions of the terminal for substantial income but retained control of t'he remainder including the portion where the plaintiff was injured. This cоurt held that it was error to- sustain a general demurrer to- the petition.
The Caroway case is directly in point. Here the plaintiff allеged “substantial revenue” and that the defendant city leased a portion of the premises to private partiеs. Further, the alleged negligence occurred on that portion of the airport over which the defendant city rеtained control. Questions relative to plaintiff’s variation from the runway are for the jury.
*593 Therefore, it was error to sustain, the general demurrer of the defendant city.
Since we have held that the city would be liable under the allegations of this petition, one of the possible grounds for sustaining the general demurrer of the defendant King has been eliminated. It is common practice for the agent to be joined in a suit against the principal and, while the defendant King may not be chargeable with all of the acts of negligence complained of, the allegation relative to failure to warn is sufficient to keep him in the case as against general demurrer. Therefore, the defendant King’s general demurrer was improperly sustained.
Judgment reversed.