23 Wash. 446 | Wash. | 1900
This appeal involves the construction of a will, and is from the order of the court refusing to allow the admission of testimony offered to assist the court in construing the will, and from the order dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction.
The decedent, Ignatius Colvin, conveyed, by his last will and testament, to the appellant, Sarah Taylor, a life interest in a certain tract of land. Colvin, it is alleged, was an ignorant man, unable to read and write. The scrivener (J. K. Mitchell) who drew the will, was ready to testify that Colvin employed him to draw the will, and that he directed Mitchell to convey to the appellant what was known as the “Taylor Ranch.” One-half of this ranch, which is known as the “Mize Donation Claim,” is in township 16 and the other half in township 15. According to the testimony offered, Mitchell prepared the description from an old plat of Colvin’s, which showed simply township 16; and in accordance with that plat the will was drawn, conveying to the appellant a life interest in that portion of the claim north of the township line, or that portion which is in township 16. It is claimed that the description intended to be in the will contained the part south of the township line, or that part which is in township 15, and that the will was executed on the ..supposition that that portion of the ranch which is included in township 15 was included. The respondents objected to this testimony on the ground that it was the introduction of parol testimony to vary or dispute the terms of a written instrument, and the objection to its admission was sustained by the court, which is alleged as error here.
It is also insisted by the appellant that if, as a matter of fact, the testator dies possessed of lands which have not been conveyed by the will, such fact raises a latent ambiguity, which warrants the introduction of extrinsic testimony to explain. If this were true, it would terminate this case in favor of the appellant; for it is conceded that Colvin was the owner of that portion of the Taylor ranch
“It seems to us that this evidence, taken in connection with the whole tenor of the will, amounts to demonstration as to which lot was in the testator’s mind. It raises a latent ambiguity. The question is one of identification between two lots, to determine which was in the testator’s mind, whether lot 3, square 406, which he owned, and which had improvements erected ‘thereon, and thus corresponded with the implications of the will, and with part of the description of the lot, and rendered the devise effective; or lot 6, square 403, which he did not own, which had no improvements thereon, and which rendered the devise ineffective.”
Altogether a different proposition from the one at bar. There is no> question here but that the land which was conveyed by the will was the land of the testator. It was conveyed by metes and bounds, the description being perfect. And the devise is effective under the will as it appears of record. It is not a question of effectiveness which is raised by the appellant, but the claim is
We think that the will is not subject to construction, that the court properly sustained objections to the introduction of the extraneous testimony, and that the case was properly dismissed.
The judgment is affirmed.
Reavis, Fullerton and Anders, JJ., concur.