98 Minn. 36 | Minn. | 1906
The defendant is a fraternal beneficial society organized under the laws of this state, and on September 28, 1893, it duly issued to Wilbur N. Taylor its beneficiary certificate, whereby it agreed to pay to the beneficiary therein named, the plaintiff, who was the wife of Mr. Taylor, the sum of $2,000 at his death. He died November 20, 1903. Due proof was made of his death, but the defendant refused to pay
1. The defendant contends that the plaintiff might have reyiewed the order here complained of on the defendant’s appeal from the order granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial; hence the question is now res adjudicata within the rule laid down in Tilleny v. Wolverton, 54 Minn. 75, 55 N. W. 822, to the effect that on an appeal from a judgment all questions which might have been raised on a former appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial are res adjudicata.
An order granting or refusing a motion to change the venue of an action is not appealable. Carpenter v. Comfort, 22 Minn. 539; Allis v. White, 59 Minn. 97, 60 N. W. 809. Logically the only way to review such an order is by appeal from the judgment, because a motion to change the venue of an action is no part of the trial. The office of a- motion for a new trial is to review errors occurring on the trial. See City of Winona v. Minn. Ry. Const. Co., 27 Minn. 415, 6 N. W. 795, 8 N. W. 148; Hinds v. Backus, 45 Minn. 170, 47 N. W. 655; Schoch v. Winona & St. P. Ry. Co., 55 Minn. 479, 57 N. W. 208. It was, however, held in the case of Wilson v. Richards, 28 Minn.
It appears from the record of the former appeal in this case that the sole and controlling question urged by the parties and determined by this court was whether the defendant had waived the right to insist on the defense that the deceased misrepresented his age. This was the basis of the district court’s order granting the new trial, as shown by its memorandum. Kipp v. Clinger, 97 Minn. 135, 106 N. W. 108. We are then of the opinion that the order denying the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to the county of Hennepin may be reviewed upon this appeal from the judgment.
2. There is no substantial dispute as to the facts established on the hearing of the motion to remand the cause. The only question is as to the legal inference to be drawn from the facts. It is clear that the defendant at the commencement of the action had its general office and headquarters at St. Paul, but this will not sustain the order refusing- to remand the case, if the defendant then had an agent in the county of Hennepin, within the meaning of G. S. 1894, § 5185, which provides that “a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any county where it has an office, agent, or place of business.” This statute is in the alternative, and a corporation must be deemed to reside in any or all counties in which it has an office or a place of business or an agent authorized to represent it in its business transactions in the county. Schoch v. Winona & St. P. Ry. Co., supra.
Now it appears, from the provisions of the constitution of the defendant set forth in the record and other undisputed evidence, that the defendant during all the time here in question had in the county of Hennepin several subordinate lodges and deputy master workmen whom it controlled and through whom it transacted its business in that county and collected its mortuary assessments for its beneficiary fund. The provisions of the defendant’s constitution are quite voluminous, and it is unnecessary to quote them in detail. We hold, upon a consideration of such provisions and the undisputed evidence, that such subordinate lodges and deputy grand masters were the representatives of
The defendant, however, urges that it was not reversible error, in view of the fact that the court on the first appeal held that the defendant had not waived its right to insist upon the forfeiture of the certificate by reason of misrepresentation as to the age of the deceased, and therefore the result must be the same, wherever the cause may be tried. On the argument we were impressed somewhat with this view of the case, but upon further reflection we are of the opinion that the right denied the plaintiff was a valuable one, which is carefully safeguarded by the statute, and that we cannot say that the error was harmless.
The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with direction to the trial court to grant the plaintiff’s motion to remand the cause to the district court of the county of Hennepin for trial. So ordered.