51 Ind. 375 | Ind. | 1875
Rehearing
On petition eor a rehearing.
A petition for a rehearing has been filed in this case, in which the position is reasserted, and ably argued, that the judgment of the court quashing the affidavit of Stout and another so completely terminated the attachment proceedings that the judgment in favor of Taylor, so far as it relates to the attached property, was invalid.
Counsel for the appellant has been again hear<$* in an elaborate brief, in answer to the petition, insisting,
The quashing of the attachment as to the claim of Stout and another had no effect upon the lien of Taylor upon the attached property or his right to resort to the undertaking if the property was not delivered according to its terms. It was not necessary that Taylor should sue out a writ of attachment upon his affidavit, in order to acquire a right to resort to the property attached.
Sections 190, 191 and 192 of the act read as follows:
“If judgment in the action be rendered for the plaintiff, or one or more of several plaintiffs, and sufficient proof be made of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, moneys and effects in the possession of the garnishee, the court shall also, give judgment in favor of the plaintiff or creditors against the garnishee, or the property of the defendant, or both, as the case may require, which may be enforced by execution.”'
“ After judgment for the plaintiff, or one or more of several plaintiffs, property attached and remaining unsold may be sold, on execution, as in other cases.”
Lead Opinion
The sufficiency of the complaint in this case, to which a demurrer was sustained, is the only question for decision. The facts averred in the complaint are the following :
On the 13th day of .January, 1866, Stout and another sued Hezekiah, in the Marion Common Pleas, and at the same time sued out an attachment in their action. On the 22d day of January, in the same year, the sheriff' seized the personal property of the defendant therein. On the 25th day of the same month, Hezekiah, with Elliott as his surety, executed an undertaking, payable to Stout and another, with condition as follows:
“Now the conditions of the above obligation are such, that if said property is' properly kept and taken care of, and shall be delivered to the sheriff on demand, or so much thereof as shall be required to be sold on execution to satisfy any judgment which may be recovered against said Hezekiah in said action, or if he shall pay the said appraised value of said property as aforesaid, not exceeding, however, the' amount of the judgment in said cause or causes that may be adjudged! against him, then the foregoing obligation to be of no effect, else to be and remain in full force.”
Thereupon the property was surrendered by the sheriff to Hezekiah. On the 14th day of February, 1866, Hezekiah moved the court to quash the attachment on the ground of
The statute provides as follows:
“ The defendant, or other person having possession of property attached, may have the same, or' any part thereof, delivered to him, by executing, and delivering to the sheriff a written undertaking, with surety to be approved by the sheriff, payable to the plaintiff, to the effect that such property shall be properly kept and taken care of, and shall be delivered to the sheriff on demand, or so much thereof ás may be required to be sold on execution to satisfy any judgment which may be recovered against him in the action, or that he will pay the appraised value of the propei’ty, not exceeding the amount of the judgment and costs.” 2 G. & H. 143, sec. 168.
Sec. 186, on p. 147, reads as follows:
“Any creditor of the defendant, upon filing his affidavit and written undertaking, as hereinbefore required of the attaching creditor, may, at any time before the final adjustment of the suit, become a party to the action, file his complaint, and prove his claim or demand against the defendant, and may have any person summoned as garnishee or held to bail, who has not before been summoned or held to bail, and propound interrogatories to the garnishee and enforce answers thereto, in like manner as the creditor who is plaintiff.” -
Sec. 187, p. 148, reads as follows:
“A dismissal of his action or proceedings in attachment by ' the first attaching creditor shall not operate as a dismissal of the action or proceedings of any subsequent attaching creditor.”
' In this case, Stout and another sued out an attachment, in connection with their action against Hezekiah, on a defective affidavit, as we infer, and the property, real and personal, of Hezekiah was seized by virtue of it.
The undertaking!', whioh is the foundation of this action.
2. That if this were not so on any other ground, it is not now in the power of the appellees to controvert such right, for the reason that the judgment of the court in favor of Taylor and the order for the sale of the property are conclusive as to such right.
Counsel for appellee refer us to Drake Attach., secs. 83, 84, 85 and 89; Hall v. Brazelton, 46 Ala. 359; Lillard v. Carter, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 604; Gere v. Gundlach, 57 Barb. 13; Hardin v. Lee, 51 Mo. 241; Evesson v. Selby, 32 Md. 340; Stone v. Magruder, 10 Gill & J. 383; Bruce v. Cook, 6 Gill & J. 345; Egan v. Lumsden, 2 Disney, 168.
Counsel for appellant, in support of his positions, cites the following cases: Richardson v. Hickman, 22 Ind. 244; Ryan v. Burkam, 42 Ind. 507; Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321; The O. & M. R. W. Co. v. Alvey, 43 Ind. 182; Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio, 435; The State v. Manly, 15 Ind. 8; Perkins v. Bragg, 29 Ind. 507; Bittick v. Wilkins, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 307; Conklin v. Butcher, 5 How. Pr. 386; Talcott v. Rosenberg, 8 Abb. Pr. N. s. 287; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wal. 308; Beech v. Abbott, 6 Vt. 586; Williams v. Stewart, 3 Wis. 773; In re Clark, 3 Denio, 167; Gregg v. Thompson, 17 Iowa, 107, and Bray v. McClurg, 55 Mo. 158.
After a careful reconsideration of the question decided, we think we should adhere to the conclusion announced in the original opinion.
The petition is overuled.
The complaint shows that Taylor, by coming in under the .attachment of Stout and another, and becoming a party to the action, had acquired a right to look to the attached property for the payment of his debt, no matter what became of the attachment of Stout and another.
The complaint, affidavit and undertaking of Taylor appear to have been legal, and the insufficiency of the affidavit in the original case could have no effect upon them, or upon the rights of Taylor under them.
The sections last quoted accord with the construction placed upon the former sections quoted, and confirm us in the correctness of the construction given. See, also, Rugg v. Johnson, 13 Ind. 431; Ryan v. Burkam, 42 Ind. 507; and Moore v. Jackson, 35 Ind., 360.
We think the facts stated in the complaint show a cause ■of action in favor of the appellant, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. It may be conceded that, were it not for the sections of our statute which we have quoted, the rule would probably be otherwise. Drake Attach., sec. 411 et seq.
The judgment below is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.