In conjunction with a project involving modification of Moreland Avenue at its intersection with 1-20, the Department of Transporta *708 tion (DOT) condemned 0.076 acres of land owned by the appellant and others, and deposited $28,680 in the court registry as the just and adequate compensation for that taking. Taylor was dissatisfied with that valuation, and requested a jury trial. Trial in the matter occurred on December 16, 1991, and resulted in a jury verdict for Taylor in the amount of $122,452. In this appeal from the judgment entered on that verdict, Taylor contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence generally pertaining to the impairment of his right of access to the remaining property.
Situated on Taylor’s property is a fast food restaurant which depends upon convenient access to the property from the public road. The portion of Taylor’s property taken by the DOT is a tapering strip of land alongside the public road and directly in front of the restaurant. The DOT project plans called for replacement of a stop sign with a yield sign at the end of the exit ramp off 1-20, so that vehicles exiting from 1-20 could merge into the current through lane without stopping when the traffic flow permitted it. The land taken by the DOT was to be used to widen that through lane and taper off to facilitate such merging of traffic. It was undisputed that the driveways to Taylor’s property were unchanged, other than being set back a few feet. However, Taylor claimed that because of the merging process of vehicles exiting 1-20 onto Moreland Avenue, access to his property will be substantially interfered with, and at times completely blocked by vehicles backed up in the “merge” lane.
At the trial, following selection of the jury, the DOT made a verbal motion in limine to exclude evidence upon which Taylor relied to prove damages to his remaining property resulting from the interference with his right of access to his property caused by the condemnation and road project. The trial court’s grant of the motion excluded, inter alia, all evidence of circuity of travel, traffic patterns, change in traffic volume or flow, changes in lane configuration, location of the exit rámp and references to replacement of a stop sign with a yield sign at the exit ramp, and damages resulting from the above. Inasmuch as Taylor’s claim was that the road project would diminish the value of his remaining property because of a substantial interference with his right of access to the property, the trial court’s ruling in large part “gutted” his case. Taylor sought a certificate of immediate review, but the trial court declined to grant it, because the jury had already been selected. Proffers of the excluded testimony were made during the trial.
1. The basis for the DOT’s motion in limine was that Taylor’s access to the property had not been restricted in any compensable manner, because the driveways to the property remained open and unobstructed. The right of access to a public road is a property right arising from the ownership of land adjacent to the road, and the
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owner cannot be deprived of this right without payment of just and adequate compensation.
MARTA v. Datry,
The use of a public road is subject to the reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.
MARTA v. Datry,
supra. A property owner or business has no right to traffic flow past the property in question, and a change in traffic pattern is not compensable. Dep
t. of Transp. v. Coley,
However, where the damage resulting from such inconvenience is based upon the impairment of the right of access to the property, that damage is special and may be compensable. Evidence of matters otherwise noncompensable, such as inconvenience and circuity of travel, is admissible to show the impairment of the right of access.
Dept. of Transp. v. Whitehead,
In summary, matters such as any change in traffic flow or pattern, the location of the exit ramp and the replacement of a stop sign with a yield sign, the configuration of the lanes on Moreland Avenue, and the expected traffic activity resulting from the use of the strip of property taken provide no basis, in their own right, for compensating Taylor. However, those circumstances are appropriate and admissible for the limited purpose of showing the degree of impairment to the right of access to the property in question. For that reason, the trial court erred in granting the DOT’s motion in limine.
2. Properties on another street were used as comparables to show the value of the subject property before the taking. However, Taylor was not allowed to adduce testimony that because of a lack of traffic volume, the other properties were not suitable for traffic-oriented businesses and thus were not comparable to the property in question. In
Dept. of Transp. v. Petkas,
3. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that it could not consider any diminution in the value of the remaining property that may result from the DOT’s expanded use of its right-of-way existing before the taking.
Simon v. Dept. of Transp.,