Taylor v. CowanTaylor v. Cowan
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- Before:
- Hopkins
delivered the opinion of the court:
On December 18, 2000, Robert Taylor (the petitioner) filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his release from the Illinois Department of Corrections. In his petition, the petitioner alleged that his sentence of natural-life imprisonment was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), that he had served his prison term under the sentencing statute in place at the time of his conviction, and that he was entitled to his immediate release from incarceration. The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petitioner’s appeal followed. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
FACTS
Following a bench trial, the petitioner was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9—1(d)) and of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 18—2). The trial court sentenced the petitioner to death for the murder conviction and to a 60-year, extended-term sentence for the armed robbery conviction. On appeal, the supreme court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the petitioner’s armed robbery conviction and reversed his conviction. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 508 (1984). The supreme court also vacated the petitioner’s death sentence and remanded his case to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing for his murder conviction, with directions to impose a sentence other than death. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d at 525.
On remand, the trial court determined that, even though the petitioner was not charged with the offense, the evidence at the trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 19—1(a)). Because factors in aggravation were present, i.e., the murder had been committed during the course of a
The petitioner filed his writ of habeas corpus after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, which held that a sentence is unconstitutional if a fact used to increase the maximum penalty for a crime is not submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. In his petition, the petitioner asserted that because the trial court based its sentence of natural-life imprisonment on the statutory aggravating factor that the murder committed had been accompanied by brutal and heinous conduct indicative of wanton cruelty, a sentencing enhancement not pled in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt, his sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi and the extended-term sentencing statute under which he had been sentenced was void. Further, the petitioner claimed that under the sentencing statute in place at the time of his conviction, he could only be sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005—8—1(a)(1)) for the murder. The petitioner asserted that when day-for-day good time is applied, he has served more than 20 years of the maximum sentence that he could have been given and is entitled to his immediate release. The State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2—615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (
ANALYSIS
The petitioner argues that under the Habeas Corpus Act (the Act) (
In a motion to dismiss under
The petitioner has not alleged that he is entitled to a release because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, but he contends that his sentence is unconstitutional and void ab initio because of the holding in Apprendi. The petitioner asserts that after day-for-day good time is considered, he has served his maximum sentence under the sentencing statute in effect at the time of his conviction and is entitled to a discharge under
Here, the petitioner is not entitled to a discharge under the Act. The petitioner is currently serving time for a life sentence, so his time of legal detainment has not expired. His argument that his prison term has expired rests on the crucial issue of whether his sentence is unconstitutional under Apprendi.
Even if, as the petitioner argues, the life sentence imposed on him is unconstitutional under Apprendi, the petitioner still does not meet the requirement that he is entitled to a discharge because his prison term has expired. The petitioner’s sentence would be 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment under the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing. Regardless of whether the petitioner has earned day-for-day good-time credit under section 3—6—3(a)(2) of the Unified Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1003—6—3(a)(2) (now see
Further, even if Apprendi were applicable to the petitioner’s case, he would not prevail; therefore, we do not determine whether Apprendi is a subsequent event entitling him to an early discharge from his lawfully imposed sentence under
Here, the petitioner’s sentence was imposed under section 5 —8—1(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005—8—1(a)(1) of the Unified Code (now see
Second, the petitioner claims that his sentence was unconstitutional under Apprendi because the aggravating factor that the murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous indicative of wanton cruelty was not charged in the indictment, submitted to the trier of fact, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Regardless of this claim, the fact remains that the petitioner’s life sentence was also imposed because it occurred during the commission of a burglary, an aggravating factor, standing alone, that allows the imposition of a fife sentence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 1005—8—1(a)(1), 9—1(b)(6)(c). In the petitioner’s appeal of his resentencing, the petitioner’s life sentence was affirmed, based upon a finding that the murder had been committed in the course of a burglary. Taylor, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 943. The appellate court found that the fact that the petitioner had committed the offense of burglary during the murder was supported by the evidence of record beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 943. Because evidence of the aggravating factor that the petitioner had committed the murder in the course of committing a burglary was presented to the trier of fact (the trial judge) and proven at the petitioner’s trial beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner’s sentence of natural life does not violate Apprendi.
Further, although the petitioner contends that he was not charged with burglary, the error is harmless, because the appellate court found that the evidence of record supported the finding that the petitioner committed the offense of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 943. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002), that the failure to include an element of an offense in an indictment that would enhance the sentence imposed is harmless error where the evidence of the element is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. The Supreme Court further held that the sentence imposed in Cotton need not be vacated when the requirements of Apprendi were not met if the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 868, 122 S. Ct. at 1785.
The petitioner cannot present any evidence that he is entitled to a discharge because he has served his sentence (
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Randolph County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
MAAG and KUEHN, JJ., concur.