Arnold Taylor, Cline Brown and Frank Ross were indicted (Count No. 1) for murder and (Count No. 2) for armed robbery, growing out of the hold-up of a liquor store in McCracken County, Kentucky, in the сourse of which an employe of the store was killed. Taylor and Brown were jointly tried on the charges (Ross not haying been apprehended) and, under instructiоns submitting the issue of their having aided and abetted Ross in the commission of the offenses, were found guilty on both charges. Judgment was entered fixing their punishments at two life sentences, one on each charge. Taylor and Brown have appealed, asserting various grounds of error.
The two appellants each signed a confession admitting having participated in the offenses, by planning them jointly with Ross and by acting as lookouts, and shooting and wounding a bystander, while Ross was engaged in holding uр the liquor store and killing the employe. The confessions were held by the trial court to be admissible, after a hearing in chambers of the circumstances under whiсh they were given, and they were used on the trial. The appellants’ first contention on the appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting the confessions in evidence.
The evidence taken at the in-chambers hearing indicated that the confessions were made as part of a “deal” in which certain felony charges pending against Taylor and Brown in Indiana were dismissed. The Commonwealth’s Attorney for McCracken County told the two men that the Indiana authorities would dismiss the Indiana charges if the two would make confessions satisfactory to him. They made and signed the confessions and the Indiana charges were dismissed.
The appellants maintain that the confessions, having been induced by a
promise,
cannot be considered to have been free and voluntary and therefore were inadmissible. They rely on such cases as Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States,
In Miranda v. Arizona,
“ * * * Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. * * *”
We think it is obvious that thе “compelling influences” referred to are ones exerted by the public authorities in such a way as would be calculated to affect the accused’s exercisе of a free and voluntary choice of whether or not to confess. Here the promise was solicited by the accused, freely and voluntarily, so they cannot bе heard to say that in accepting the promise they were the victims of compelling influences.
The appellants’ next contention is that they were entitled to directed verdicts beсause their confessions were not corroborated as required by RCr 9.60. They concede that there was ample corroboration of the fact thаt
an offense was committed,
but they maintain that there was no corroboration
of their criminal agency.
The
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contention is without merit, because under the plain terms of RCr 9.60 corroboration is required only of the fact “that such an offense was committed.” Corroboration of the accused’s criminal agency is not required. See Caldwell v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
As their third contention the appellants argue that the trial court errеd in submitting the case to the jury on the issue of their having aided and abetted Frank Ross in the commission of the charged offenses, because, they say, the evidence did not warrant such submission. Their proposition is that (1) a person cannot be convicted as an aider and abettor unless there is proof of the guilt of the principal, Bryant v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The foregoing ingenious argument has plаusibility but will not stand close analysis. The obvious reason for the rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice, in order to convict a defendant, is to protect an alleged participant in a crime from being convicted solely on his being “fingered” by another alleged participant, becаuse accusations by participants against each other tend to be unreliable. The rule is for the protection of the person so accusеd. But in the instant case the prisoners who are seeking the protection are the very ones who have pointed the accusing finger; they do not seek rеlief from someone else’s accusation against them, but from their own self-accusation. We think that in this situation RCr 9.62 is not applicable, and that under the rule requiring that proof of guilt of the principal be shown in order to sustain the conviction of aiders and abettors the testimony (or confessions) of the alleged aiders and abettors can supply the required proof of the guilt of the principal.
Appellant’s fourth contention is that the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth, after one of its witnesses had denied that the defendants had made certain incriminatory statements to her, to prove by other witnesses thаt she had told them of the statements. The witness in question was in court; she had testified and was available for cross-examination; the persons to whom she allegedly had repeated the defendants’ statements to her were in court and available for cross-examination; and had she testified to the defendants’ statements her testimony would not have been inadmissible as hearsay because it would have consisted of repeating admissions made by the defendants. Under these circumstances the evidence in question was admissible in accordance with the holding in Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The appellants assert as their fifth contention that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that neither defendant’s confession could be considered against the other. The simplest answer to this is that they did not raise this рoint in any way in the lower court, wherefore they are not entitled to raise it on appeal. See Hartsock v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
In a brief amicus curiae an attempt is made to raise a ground of error not asserted by the appellants. We will not rule on it. Cf. Young v. Young, Ky.,
The judgment is affirmed.