TAYLOR v. CHITWOOD et al.
S96A0627
Supreme Court of Georgia
June 17, 1996
266 Ga. 793 | 471 SE2d 511
FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.
1.
The record shows that after Taylor filed this petition, he was indicted and had bail set. We have previously held that there is no judicial oversight of the failure to hold a preliminary commitment hearing following indictment.2 Likewise, we conclude that the failure to hold a timely first appearance hearing provides no basis for release once the defendant has been indicted and had an opportunity to seek bail.
Taylor also contends that the failure to hold a first appearance hearing voids later proceedings, including indictment and trial. Taylor has an adequate remedy during trial and on direct appeal of any conviction to raise these issues. Therefore, the trial court properly denied his habeas corpus petition.3
2. Because Taylor has an extensive criminal history, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that bail of $50,000 was not excessive.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Carley, J., who concurs in the judgment only.
SEARS, Justice, concurring.
Not later than 48 hours after an arrest made without a warrant, or 72 hours following an arrest with a warrant, unless bond has been set and met, “the arresting officer or the law officer having custody of the accused shall present the accused in person before a magistrate or other judicial officer for first appearance.”4 At the first appearance, the judicial officer shall (1) inform the accused of the charges; (2) in
I concur with the majority that in this particular case, because Taylor was indicted and had bail set shortly after having been extradited to Georgia, there was no prosecutorial oversight in the failure to hold a first appearance hearing within 72 hours of his arrest. However, the language of Rule 26.1 is mandatory, and this Court‘s ruling today should not be misconstrued to mean that under different circumstances, a failure to hold a first appearance hearing will always be harmless error so long as an accused is later indicted. In order to avoid the needless frustration of criminal prosecution, in addition to the possibility of subjecting itself to unnecessary civil litigation, the State will do well to adhere to the mandatory language of Rule 26.1.
DECIDED JUNE 17, 1996.
Patrick John Taylor, pro se.
Jack O. Partain, District Attorney, for appellees.
