165 Mass. 547 | Mass. | 1896
This is a bill in equity to set aside a deed to the defendant in trust, executed by the plaintiff in 1898. The plaintiff was then nearly twenty-two years of age, and she was about to be married. Her property consisted of about $115,000, $75,000 of which she conveyed to the defendant in trust to pay the net income of the same to her during her life, and upon her death without a will, leaving child or children, to pay the principal to them ; and in case she left no child surviving, then the
The case was heard by a single justice of this court, upon the pleadings and evidence. The question of undue influence was disposed of at the hearing, and is no longer insisted upon. It has been found as a fact, that at the time plaintiff executed the deed she was “ a very intelligent and capable woman, but without other experience in business matters and in the management of her property than what she had learned from occasional reports of her guardian, and otherwise by chance.” She was advised by Mr. Putnam “ to put the property in trust, and she assented to it, and left it to him to have the deed prepared for her to sign. Putnam, in so advising, acted wholly and only with a view to the plaintiff’s good,” and his advice was wise and proper. Putnam, not being a lawyer, relied on a lawyer who was the confidential adviser of several members of the family, including Putnam as guardian, and who also acted in good faith and to his best ability. The plaintiff now has a daughter living.
The single justice also found as follows: “I do not find precisely what the plaintiff understood as to the effect of the deed, deeming it immaterial in view of the facts reported, but I find that the plaintiff, acting freely, intelligently, and wisely, was willing to execute whatever her stepfather should recommend, and to adopt his judgment as her own. I find, further, that he explained, and reasonably supposed, from what took place between her, the lawyer, and himself, that she understood that the instrument irrevocably put the property out of her hands, and limited her to the receipt of income from a trustee. Putnam understood the operation of the deed as far as it went. His attention was not called by the lawyer to the absence of a restraint on anticipation, and of a power of revocation, nor did he notice such absence. The lawyer simply did not think of them, as they are not very usual in our every-day
The single justice was of opinion that, under the law of this State, the foregoing facts did not constitute a ground for setting aside a voluntary settlement, and ordered the bill to be dismissed ; and at the plaintiff’s request reported the case to the full court; such decree to be made as equity might require.
We are of opinion that the ruling was correct, and in accordance with our decisions. We do not assent to the argument for the plaintiff that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff understood the deed. While the point has not been directly adjudicated in this Commonwealth, our cases proceed upon the theory that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove the allegations of the bill. Thus, in Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494, 496, it is said by Chief Justice Chapman : “ After careful consideration of the pleadings, and all the evidence reported by the master, and the character of the deed of trust, the court are of opinion that the allegations are not proved.” So in Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300, 302, it is said by Mr. Justice Gray, speaking of a settlement in trust: “ There is no evidence of its having been executed under any mistake.”
The general rule in this Commonwealth is, that a voluntary settlement, when completely executed with no power of revocation reserved, cannot be revoked or set aside except upon proof of mental incapacity, mistake, fraud, or undue influence. Hildreth v. Eliot, 8 Pick. 293. Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494. Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300. Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262. Keyes v. Carleton, 141 Mass. 45. Thurston, petitioner, 154 Mass. 596, 597.
In Keyes v. Carleton the plaintiff alleged that she’ did not
In the case at bar it is expressly found that the plaintiff acted freely, intelligently, and wisely, and that the deed was explained to her. Whether she understood precisely what was the legal effect of the deed is unimportant, if she understood its contents. Ho settlement of a married woman could stand, however beneficial to the settlor it might be, if she could have it set aside on her testimony that she did not understand its legal effect. If it is shown that the instrument was explained to her, and that she understood its contents, which is fairly to be inferred from the report in this case, there is no mistake in a legal sense because its legal effect was not fully understood by her.
It is contended for the plaintiff that there was a mistake in not inserting a power of revocation; but at the time the deed was executed she was about to marry and leave her mother and stepfather. His conduct is found to have been “ only with a
It is further contended that the deed did not give the plaintiff sufficient protection, because it contained no restraint against anticipation of the income; but it is well settled in this Commonwealth that “ a person cannot settle his property in trust to pay the income to himself for life, with a provision that it shall not be alienated by anticipation, so as to prevent his creditors from reaching the income.” Pacific National Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175. Jackson v. Von Zedlitz, 136 Mass. 342.
We are aware that the courts in England, in recent times, have decided some of the questions above considered in a different manner from this court. In England, it appears from the decisions that a power of revocation is generally inserted in trust deeds, and its absence is the principal ground for setting aside such a deed ; but in this Commonwealth such a power is rarely to be found, and, as shown above, its presence would generally defeat the object for which the deed is made.
On the whole ease as it is presented to us, we are of opinion that the order of the single justice dismissing the bill should be
Affirmed,