8 Johns. 173 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1811
delivered the opinion of the court. The judgment in Maryland, upon which this suit was brought, was rendered against the defendant, as an endorsor of a foreign bill of exchange, and he now contends that he was not chargeable, by reason of the want of due notice of the non-acceptance, and of the non-payment of the bill. Whether notice of the non-acceptance of the bill, without accompanying that notice with the protest for non-acceptance, was competent, under the law of merchants, to charge the party, is a point which we need not now dis.cuss, as the suit in Maryland was upon the protest for, non-payment, as well as for the non-acceptance; and the non-payment, if supported by the requisite notice and proof, was sufficient to sustain the action. It has been urged to the court that there was not due diligence in giving notice of non-payment, and that the question of diligence is open here for investigation, notwithstanding the trial and judgment in the other state. But we are by no means satisfied that such.an inquiry ought now to
In the case of Hitchcock & Fitch v. Aickin, (l Caines, 460.) this court Went no further than to decide the general principle, that a judgment of another state was not conclusive, but was to be placed upon the footing of a foreign judgment under the English law. '1 he question then is, how far, and to what extent, do the English courts permit foreign
In the present case, the defendant has certainly not succeeded in impeaching the judgment. He has, at most, only excited doubts, under the obscure, and, perhaps, very imperfect testimony before us, as to the fact of due diligence in giving notice of the protest for non-payment. And where the party has once litigated his case, before a competent jurisdiction, and when no fraud or unfairness is pretended, every doubt and eyery presumption arising on a matter in pais ought to be turned against him. We may, with propriety, adopt the observation of Lord Kenyon, in the case of Galbraith v. Neville, as stated in a note to 5 East, 475. that “ without entering into the question how far a foreign judgment was impeachable, it was, at all events, clear, that it was prima facie evidence of the debt, and that no evidence had
Motion denied.