108 Ky. 278 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1900
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion- op the majority op the 'Court.
At the November election, 1899, appellailt W. S. Taylor and William Goebel were opposing candidates for Governor of Kentucky. Appellant John Marshall and appel-lee J. O. W. Beckham were opposing candidates for Lieutenant Governor. On the face of the returns, Taylor received a majority of 2,383 over Goebel, and Marshall a somewhat larger majority over Beckham. The State canvassing board, on the face of the returns, issued certificates of election to Taylor and Marshall. Goebel and Beckham then gave notice of contest, and the matter was brought before the General Assembly, which, under the Constitution, is the tribunal to determine contests for these officers; section 90 providing as follows: “Contested elections for Governor and! Lieutenant Governor -shall be determined by both Houses of the General Assembly according to such regulations as may be established by law.” The Statute passed pursuant to this provision of the Constitution regulating the determination of such contests is found in section 1596a, sub-sec., 8, Kentucky Statutes, and provides that on the third day after the organization of the General Assembly a board shall be chosen by lot, and have power to send for persons- and papers. Its decision shall be reported to the two Houses, and the General Assembly shall then determine the contests. The General Assembly convened on January 2,1900, and on the third day after its organization, as shown by the journals of the two Houses, a board of contest was appointed pursuant to the statute. The journals also show that on February
Appellants insist that all these proceedings were void, and did not affect in any way their rights to the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. A great many matters have been presented in the argument, but only such as seem decisive can be considered! without unduly extending this opinion. It is insisted: (1) That the proceedings of the Legislature on February 2d are void, because the Legislature had then been adjourned by the Governor until February 6th, and no legal session could be held in the meantime. (2) That, Goebel having died on February 3d, the contest for the office of Governor thereby abated, and the action of the Legislature on February 19th and 20th was, therefore, void, (3) It is averred that the Legislature took no action on Februáry 2d, and that the journals of these meetings were fraudulently made .by the clerk, and pursuant to a conspiracy between certain members of the assembly and the contestants. (4) It is averred that the General Assembly acted without evidence, and arbitrarily. These contentions will be considered in the order stated.
1. As to the Governor’s power to adjourn the Legislature. If the Governor had the power to adjourn the Legislature from January 31st to February 6th, of course no valid action could be taken by it in the interim. It is therefore necessary to determine whether he had such power. The only authority relied on to sustain his action is section 36 of the Constitution, which is as follows: “The
2. As to the de'ath of Goebel. The death of Goebel on February 3d did not affect the right of the appellee Beck-ham. If Goebel was elected Governor and Beckham Lieutenant Governor, in November, Beckham, upon Goebel’s death on February 3d, became entitled to the -office of Governor, and had the right to -continue the contest to secure what the Constitution guaranteed to him. So that, if the Legislature had not acted until February 19th, it had a rigiht then to act upon the contest, and its action would be none the less valid because not taken in- Goebel’s lifetime. But, as the legislative action of February 19th and 20th is assailed on substantially the same grounds as that on February 2d, this view of the case is not important, as
3. As to the validity of the entries in the journal, .and the effect to be given them. It is alleged that the journals are fraudulent, the work of a conspiracy between the clerks of the two Houses, certain of the members, and the contestants, and that the facts shown by the journals as to the presence of the members of the two Houses, and the action taken by them, are untrue. The question is, therefore, can the court hear evidence of this character assailing the integrity of the legislative journals? Section 40-of the Constitution provides: “Each house of the General Assembly shall keep and publish daily a journal of its .proceedings; and the yeas and nays of the members on any question shall, at the desire of any two of the members elected, be entered on the journal.” The journal of each House of the General Assembly, kept pursuant to this provision of the Coinstitution under the supervision of the House, is, .when approved by the House, not the act of the clerk, but the act of the House itself, and is entitled to the same respect ¿as any of its other official acts. So far as we have seen, the authorities are uniform that evidence caifi not-be received in court to impeach the verity of the record provided by the Constitution as evidence of tlje legislative proceedings. Thus, in Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 220, it is said: “And although it sometimes has been urged at the bar that the court ought to inquire into the motives of the Legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and annul their action if the allegations were established, the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon. The reasons are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the
The learned counsel for the appellants do not question the soundness of these decisions, but seek to distinguish them from the case before us on the ground that appellants have a pre-existing right, and that the rule referred to only applies to legislative acts operative for the future. But none of the cases rest on this ground: The ground
The Constitution of this State creates the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. It provides how they shall be filled by election. It also • provides how the result of that election shall be determined. In each of the four Constitutions of this State the General Assembly has been made the exclusive tribunal for determining this matter. This shows a clear and settled purpose to keep this political question out of the courts. We have no more right to supervise the decision of the General Assembly in determining the result of this election than we have to supervise the action of the Governor in calling a special session of the Legislature, or in pardoning a criminal, or the action of the Legislature in contracting debts, or determining upon the election of its members, or doing any other act authorized by the Constitution. There is no conflict between the action of the State canvassing board
4. As to the action of the Assembly -being void because without evidence and arbitrary. The report of the contest board to the General Assembly shows that it heard the evidence offered by the contestants and contestees, but the report does not, on its face, show that the evidence taken by the board was submitted by it to the General Assembly. The journals also fail to show this fact. It is insisted that therefore the General Assembly acted without evidence in determining the contest. But there is a clear distinction between the failure of the journal to show a fact where the journal is merely silent on the subject, and a fact expressly shown in the journal. Here the journals are only silent as to what evidence the General Assembly heard, and, as it was a question requiring evidence for its proper determination, it must be presumed that the Legislature did its- duty, and had before it such evidence as was satisfactory to it. Thus, in Cooley on Constitutional Limitation, it is said, in disposing of the question of the constitutional power of the Legislature; “In any case in which this question is answered in the affirmative the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the proper exercise of power. They must assume that the legislative discretion has been properly exercised. If evidence is required, it must be supposed that it was before the Legislature when the act was passed, and, if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of
It is also insisted that the notice of contest was insufficient, and that the evidence was equally insufficient; but these were matters to be determined by the Legislature, which the Constitution has made the sole tribunal to determine such a contest. Whether their decision in these
It is also argued that the contest board was not fairly drawn by lot; that certain of the board were liable to objection on the score of partiálity, and that, therefore, this board was not properly constituted. If any of these ob
It is also urged that under the specifications of tbe notice of contest, if all were true, tbe election was void, and the General Assembly should have so determined. But we have no means of knowing that-the General Assembly reached sucb a conclusion. The presumption is in favor of their judgment, and when they have found as a fact that tbe contestants received the highest number of legal votes cast at tbe election in controversy we are not at liberty to go behind their finding. In Com. v. Jones, 10 Bush, 725, tbe board found that Jones had accepted a challenge to fight a duel, and was,.therefore, disqualified to bold office. But as, under tbe Constitution, a conviction of tbe offense was necessary to disqualify Jones from bold-ing office, this court disregarded the finding of the board, for tbe reason that it related only to an immaterial matter. In this case, however, tbe Legislature finds tbe fact that determines tbe rights of tbe parties. There is nothing in their finding to show the election was void, and, as we can not go behind it (10 Bush, 747, 748), the cases of Leeman v. Hinton, 1 Duv., 38, and Hocker v. Pendleton, 100 Ky., 726, (39 S. W., 250), have also no application.
It is also insisted that the legislative proceedings are in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides: “No State shall
It is earnestly argued that the General Assembly was wrong in its decision of this case, and that it is a very serious matter thus to overthrow the will o-f the people. Whether the Assembly was right or not in its decision, it is not our province to determine. But a much more important question is involved in the case, which is the integrity of our form of government as founded by our forefathers. If the action of the Legislature may be disregarded by the courts, then it is no longer an equal and independent branch of the government within its Constitutional jurisdiction, but the courts become the final depository of the supreme power of the State. Judicial tyranny is no less tyranny because couched in the forms of la>w. There was great wisdom in dividing the powers of a republic between three equal and independent sets of officers. One operates as a check upon the other, and no greater blow to the perpetuity of our institutions could be given than to destroy this check.
For these reasons we are of the opinion that the courts of this State are without authority to enter into the in
Concurrence Opinion
The general demurrer to the answer and amended answer of contestees, which was sustained by the chancellor in this proceeding, admits that on the 9th day of December, 1899, W. S. Pryor, as chairman and W. T. Ellis, as I member of the State board of election commissioners, certified that .William S. Taylor and John Marshall had received the highest number of votes given for the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, respectively, and were duly and regularly elected to fill these offices for the term prescribed by the Constitution; that at the election, under the operation of the statute know as the ‘‘Goebel Election Law,” the entire election machinery of the State was in the hands of the friends and partisans of contestants; that all of the election officers, from the highest to the lowest, were selected by the State Board -of Election Commissioners, or by their appointees; that the members of the State Board of Election Commissioners were themselves fellow partisans of contestants; that by the action of the election officers on ■the day of the election contestees were illegally, and in many cases fraudulently, deprived of a large number of votes in the various voting precincts of the State; that, subsequent to the election contestants had entered into a conspiracy with divers members of the Legislature to nullify this election of the people by the institution of a fraudulent contest before them; that, pursuant to this conspiracy so entered into, the contest boards were selected by a fraudulent de
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting opinion:
Since Kentucky has had a government, the powers of the government have been divided into three distinct departments, and each of them is confined to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit, those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another. These departments are co-ordinate and co-equal. The magistracy of each department is confined to its own powers and duties. As a matter of course, and in the nature of things, these co-ordinate departments are in some respects interdependent. From the very nature of things it results that, while the legislative branch is supreme in saying what shall be law, and the executive in the execution of the law’s enacted by the Legislature, the power must rest somewhere of saying whether those departments have exceeded their powers, or have assumed powers which properly and constitutionally belong to another department. Were the sections of the Constitution (27 and 28) the only ones which limited the powers of the departments, such inquiry and determination would be limited to the decision of whether any of the three departments had transgressed upon the domain of one of the others. Rut the Constitution contains other limitations, and contains also-grants of power which are excep tions to the fundamental division of powers. One of these exceptions is the grant to the Legislature of power to determine contested elections for Governor and Lieuten
In this case a suit is brought to recover an office, and as the basis for such recovery a record is relied upon, - the record oí a so-called “trial and determination” by the Legislature sitting as a contest board. Upon this record it is claimed that the contestant appears entitled to the office of Governor. What does the record show? It shows that the contestee was duly certified to have received the highest number of votes as shown by the returns, and was thereupon duly inducted into office. After his qualification, his title to the office was perfect. I do not care whether, after the notice of contest was given, it be said he was Governor de jwre or Governor de facto. Until that notice was given, he was Governor by undisputed title. The record then shows that a notice of contest was given contesting the election, and claiming the office upon the ground that in the city of Louisville and some forty counties there was no legal election; that the election was void; that in the metropolitan city of the State, the equivalent in population and voters of thirty or forty counties of ordinary size, the election was void because of intimidation by the military, and interference by the judiciary, and no valid election was held there; that in some forty counties of the State the election was void because, in violation of the law, thin ballots were used. All other grounds alleged in the notice are merely cumulative to these, and the averment that the original contestant was
In my opinion, the record upon which the petition in this case is based shows on its face affirmatively that the board of contest had not jurisdiction of the matter which it undertook to try. It is not a mere defective notice. It excludes the possibility of jurisdiction. I think, therefore, that the demurrer to the answer should have been carried back to the petition, and sustained.
The brief time between the consultation and the delivery
This action was carried on writ of error by the appellants to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment of this court affirmed, as per extract here added.
Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, Nos. 1 and 2.
Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.
No. 603. Aruged April 30,— May 1, 1900, decided May 21, 1900.
Reported in 178 U. S. Reports on page 548 to 609.
MR. HELM BRUCE and MR. W. O. BRADLEY for Plaintiffs in error. MR. JAMES P. HELM and MR. KENNEDY HELM WERE ON THEIR BRIEF.
MR. LAWRENCE MAXWELL and MR. LEWIS MoQUOWN for Defendant in error. iMR W. S. PRYOR was on their brief.
Syllabus of the opinion of Chief Justice Puller found on page 548, vol. 178 U. S. Reports.
“By the Constitution and laws of Kentucky, the determination of contests of the election of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, is and for a hundred years, has been committed to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth.”
“The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, decided that the courts had no power to go behind the determination of the General Assembly in such a contest, duly recorded in the journals thereof; that the office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor was not property in itself; and moreover, that under the Constitution and laws of the State of Kentucky, such determination being an authorized mode of ascertaining the result of an election for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, the persons declared elected to those offices on the face of the returns by the board of canvas
Held 1. “That the judgment of the Court of Appeals, to the effect that it was not empowered to revise the determination by the General Assembly adverse to plaintiffs in error, in the matter of election to these offices, was not a decision against a title, right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States; and plaintiffs in error could not invoke jurisdiction because of deprivation, under the circumstances of property or vested rights, without due process of law.”
2. “That the guarantee of the Federal. Constitution to each of the ■States, of a republican form of government, was intrusted for its enforcement to the political department, and could not be availed of, in connection with the 14th amendment, to give this court jurisdiction to revise the judgment of the highest court of the State that it could not review the determination of a contested election of Governor and Lieutenant Governor by the tribunal to which that determination was exclusively committed by the State Constitution and laws, on the ground of deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.”
“It results from the conclusions announced that the writ of error must be dismissed and it is so ordered.”
“Mr. Justice McKenna filed a separate opinion but concurred in the result.”
“Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Brown concurred in a dissent for reasons stated in their dissent.”
“Mr. Justice Harlan dissented for reasons stated in his dissent.”
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in and adopt the foregoing as my view of the question .involved.