47 Conn. 498 | Conn. | 1880
This case comes here upon a motion in error to obtain the reversal of a decree of the Superior Court founded, mainly, upon the following facts:—One William M. Kellogg, being the owner of certain real and personal property in the town of Rocky Hill, and being indebted in a considerable sum to several parties, two of whom had sued him for the recovery of their claims, applied to the defendant Atwood, another creditor, for assistance, requesting him to pay his debts, take a deed of his real estate as security, and give him five years in which to redeem the property. Atwood gave no
The decree of the Superior Court upon these facts ordered the respondent Atwood, within a reasonable time, to convey to the petitioner as. trustee aforesaid, the parcel of land in the Rocky Hill meadows, free of all incumbrances created by him or by any one under him, and deliver to him possession of the same, and declared so much of the deed from Kellogg to Atwood as conveyed to the latter the meadow land to be null and void, and the title to that land, subject to the mortgage upon it of $600, to be vested in the petitioner as trustee for the benefit of Kellogg’s creditors. It also ordered the respondent Atwood, within a reasonable time, to pay to the petitioner as trustee the sum of $825, the sum received by him from the respondent Warriner for the homestead, with interest thereon from March 8th, 1879. And it perpetually enjoined the respondent Atwood from proceeding in or any further prosecuting an action of ejectment pending in the Superior Court in which he was plaintiff and Kellogg defendant, to recover possession of said meadow land.
The grounds upon which the reversal of this decree is sought by the plaintiff in error, are—
1. That it does not appear from the record or from the finding of the court below that the petitioner has ever accepted the office of trustee of the assigned estate of Kellogg, or has ever qualified as such, or that he was acting in that capacity when this suit was brought.
2. That the record does not show that the petitioner is at present entitled to any relief in equity, but shows that he has adequate remedy at law.
3. That the court below erred in declaring to be void so much of the deed from Kellogg to Atwood as conveyed to the latter the meadow land, and in not decreeing that said deed, as to that land, should be and remain an equitable mortgage in Atwood’s hands.
4. That the court erred in decreeing that the sum of eight hundred and twenty-five dollars be paid by Atwood to the petitioner, without making any deduction or allowance for the
6. That the court should have allowed to Atwood $191.91, the amount of the claim secured by attachment upon the property conveyed to him by Kellogg, and paid by Atwood to free the property from the attachment'.
6. That the relief granted was improper, as not placing or attempting to place Atwood in statu quo, but leaving him in a worse position than before the conveyance, and Kellogg’s estate in a better position than he was at that time.
7. That the court erred in not decreeing a specific performance of the contract between the parties in accordance with the terms of the proposition made by Kellogg to Atwood, and impliedly accepted by the acceptance of the deed of the premises.
Other errors are assigned, but a decision of the questions which they raise, being unnecessary to a proper disposition of the case, a statement of them is omitted.
The first question may be disposed of in a few words. The record shows that the petitioner was duly appointed trustee of the estate assigned by Kellogg for the benefit of his creditors ; and the bringing of the present suit and the prosecution of it to a final decree by him, furnish conclusive evidence of his acceptance of the trust and that he was acting in the capacity of trustee of' the assigned estate at the time the suit was brought. They also furnish primd facie evidence that he was duly qualified to act in that capacity; and that was sufficient, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to satisfy the requirements of the law. Pond v. Hine, 21 Conn., 519; O’Neill v. Henderson, 15 Ark., 235; Penny v. Davis, 3 B. Monr., 314 ; Perry on Trusts, § 261.
The next question is whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable relief. The plaintiff in error contends that he has adequate remedy at law. •
It is a general rule, subject to but few exceptions, that courts of equity exercise jurisdiction in cases of fraud, sometimes concurrent with, and sometimes exclusive of other courts. 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 184. But there are many cases
The facts appearing upon the record before us disclose a case of gross abuse of confidence, imposition and fraud. Kellogg was ignorant and illiterate. He was in debt to the amount of about $1,365. He had real estate of the value of $1,225 over and above the mortgages upon it, and less than
In the case of Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms., 203, a conveyance made by a weak man easy to be imposed upon was set aside, though there was no proof of any particular efforts made to prevail upon him to execute it. But the deed was prepared by the grantee, and there was no proof that the grantor gave any instructions, or that it was read to him; the Master of the Rolls observing that fraud was apparent, and judging upon the face of the deed is judging upon evidence which cannot err.
In Harding v. Handy, 2 Mason, 125, a conveyance executed by a father-in-law to his son-in-law for a nominal consideration and upon a verbal arrangement that it should be considered a trust for the maintenance of the grantor, and after his death
The Supreme Court of Yermont in the case of Mann v. Betterly, 21 Verm., 326, after stating it to be a well settled principle that mere inadequacy of consideration furnishes no sufficient ground for the interference of equity to set aside a deed, say: “but it is equally well settled that inadequacy coupled with such a degree of weakness and imbecility of intellect as would justify the inference that such weakness had been taken advantage of, would afford sufficient ground for such interference.” The same court in the case'of Conant v. Jackson, 16 Verm., 335, use this language:—“The court will not measure the degree of understanding and say that a weak man may not contract or give away his property; yet they will scrutinize the gift made by a man of feeble understanding, or one whose powers of memory and whose mind
In the recent case of Allore v. Jewed, 94 U. States R., 506, which was a suit brought by the heir at law of one Marie Genevieve Thibault, late of Detroit, Michigan, deceased, to cancel a deed of land alleged to have been obtained from her by the defendant a few weeks before her death, when from her condition she was incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the transaction, Mr. Justice Field in delivering the opinion of the court said:—“ It is not necessary in order to secure the aid of equity to prove that the deceased was at the time insane, or in such a state of mental imbecility as to render her incapable of executing a valid deed. It is sufficient to show that from her sickness and infirmities she was at the time in a condition of great mental weakness, and that there was gross inadequacy of consideration. From these circumstances imposition or undue influence will be inferred.”
Judge Story, in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, says: “The doctrine, therefore, may be laid down as generally true, that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understandings, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that ho has been imposed upon, circumvented or overcome by cunning or artifice or undue influence.” 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 238; citing Gartside v. Isherwood, 1 Bro. Ch. App., 560, 561; Rippy v. Grant, 4 Ired. Eq., 443; Tracey v. Sacket, 1 Ohio St., 58; Whiteburn v. Hines, 1 Mumf., 557; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Dev. & Batt. Eq., 241; Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb., 376; Hunt v. Moore, 2 Barr, 105.
The question then arises whether the petitioner, as trustee of the estate assigned by Kellogg for the benefit of his credit
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth errors assigned are so intimately connected that they may be considered together.
In several English cases, where the defendant appears to have been a participator in the fraud, but the proof was not entirely clear, the court has set aside the conveyance, decreeing it however to stand as a security for the money actually paid. Herne v. Meeres, 1 Vern., 465, (S. C., 2 Bro., 177,) was a case of this sort. The Lord Chancellor observed that at law, where a conveyance is found to be fraudulent, the creditor comes in and avoids it all without payment of any consideration money; but in equity, where the court can decree back the principal and interest, there is no hurt done; and a lesser matter in such case will serve to set a conveyance aside. He accordingly decreed that the purchaser reconvey upon payment of the consideration with interest. Addison v. Dawson, 2 Vern., 678, and Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms., 203, were cases in which upon setting aside the conveyances
In respect to the seventh error assigned, it is sufficient to say that the respondent Atwood denied at the hearing before the committee that he had agreed with Kellogg to take a conveyance of his real estate, pay his debts, and take a mortgage for his security, giving five years for redemption. But if that were not sufficient, it rested in the sound and reasonable discretion of the court to decree or refuse to decree a specific performance of the contract, if indeed there was a contract between the parties. 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 742. And the discretion of the court was properly exercised.
I am therefore of opinion that the decree of the Superior Court should be so modified as to require the respondent Atwood to pay to the petitioner, as trustee aforesaid, within a reasonable time, only the sum of $633.09 with the interest thereon from and after the 8th day of March, 1879, instead of $825 with the interest thereon from that date; and that the decree in all other respects should be affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; except Carpenter, J , who having tried the case in the court below, did not sit.
Judge Hovey of the Superior Court sat in the place of Judge Carpenter, who having tried the case below, was disqualified.