OPINION
Appellants Robert B. Taylor and R.B.T. Investments, Inc. f/k/a Gulf Oxygen Company, Inc. (collectively, “Taylor”) appeal from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, “Allstate”) on the grounds that Taylor’s sole cause of action against Allstate is a Stowers 1 claim, and no Stowers claim can be made under *95 the facts of this case. In two issues, Taylor asserts that the trial court erred by granting Allstate’s “no cause of action” motion for summary judgment and by denying Taylor’s motion for leave to replead his claims against Allstate.
We conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment with respect to Taylor’s claims against Allstate for negligence, vicarious liability, and tor-tious interference with Taylor’s fiduciary and contractual relationship with his attorney but that the trial court erred in determining that no cause of action exists with respect to Taylor’s breach of contract and statutory claims. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Taylor’s motion for leave to replead because Taylor had already been provided an opportunity to replead, and Taylor had in fact amended his pleadings at the time summary judgment was granted. We, therefore, affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Background
According to his pleadings, Taylor was involved in an automobile accident in 2005 in which the passenger of the other vehicle was catastrophically injured. The family of the injured passenger brought suit against Taylor. Allstate retained John Causey, an independent contractor, as counsel for Taylor in the automobile accident suit. Taylor claims he had defenses to that suit, including his contention that he was entirely in his lane of traffic when the collision occurred, he was still or moving slowly at the time, and the passenger’s failure to wear a seatbelt caused the injuries. At mediation, Taylor settled the automobile accident suit for an amount that exceeded his insurance coverage. Allstate tendered policy limits. Taylor filed this action against his former legal counsel and various insurance providers, ultimately including Allstate, to recover costs paid by Taylor to settle litigation against him arising out of the automobile accident.
Taylor’s initial claim against Allstate was for negligence with respect to Allstate’s handling Taylor’s defense in the automobile accident case. Allstate filed special exceptions and moved for traditional summary judgment on the grounds that a Stowers claim is the only common law claim cognizable under Texas law for an insurer’s alleged mishandling of a third party claim against the insured, and the facts pled by Taylor would not support a Stowers claim. Taylor filed a second amended petition to add claims against Allstate for breach of contract, tortious interference with Taylor’s contractual and fiduciary relationship with Causey, vicarious liability for Causey’s conduct in representing Taylor, and violations of provisions of the Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”). In response to Taylor’s new claims, Allstate filed a supplement to its motion for summary judgment. Citing additional authority, the supplement referenced Taylor’s new claims and re-urged its argument that a Stowers claim was Taylor’s exclusive cause of action against Allstate.
Taylor filed a response to Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, in which he disputed that a Stowers claim was his exclusive remedy under Texas law, distinguishing some of the cases relied on by Allstate and pointing out that the Texas Supreme Court had remanded certain insured-insurer claims in one of the cases relied on by Allstate. Taylor then filed a supplement to his second amended petition to add claims against Alstate for additional violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code and asserting that Allstate breached the standard of care implicit in its contractual duty to defend.
*96 The trial court rendered summary judgment in Allstate’s favor. Taylor filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment and for leave to replead, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, the trial court entered an order severing Taylor’s claims against Allstate into a separate cause. After severance, Taylor filed a motion for new trial, which was not granted, and this appeal ensued. 2
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding,
A defendant-movant may establish its right to summary judgment by demonstrating that the law does not recognize the cause of action pled.
E.g., Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,
Taylor’s Tort Claims Against Allstate
Taylor alleges common law causes of action against Allstate for negligence and tortious interference with his contractual and fiduciary relationship with Causey, Taylor’s legal counsel in the automobile accident suit; Taylor also alleges that Allstate is vicariously liable for conduct by Causey in the defense of that suit. Allstate argues, on appeal as it did below, that the only common law cause of action recognized under Texas law in the context of an insurer’s handling of a third party claim against an insured is a
Stowers
claim, and no
Stowers
claim exists here.
3
*97
See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co.,
A. Vicarious Liability
With respect to Taylor’s vicarious liability claim, Allstate argues that Taylor’s claims fail as a matter of law under the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Traver,
Because the attorney misconduct alleged by Taylor falls within this category of representative conduct over which the attorney must exercise absolute control, Taylor may not hold Allstate vicariously liable for Causey’s alleged actions. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment with respect to Taylor’s vicarious liability claim.
B. Negligence
Taylor’s negligence claim alleges that Allstate “failed to exercise ordinary care in discharging [its] duties and obligations to [Taylor] by conducting an inadequate investigation and providing an inadequate defense in the [automobile accident suit].” Allstate argues that Texas law does not recognize a negligence claim by an insured against his insurer based on alleged mishandling of the defense of a third party claim. We agree.
This court has previously declined to recognize a negligence claim against an insurer where the insurer does not refuse to defend or settle but, rather, the insured is dissatisfied with the quality of the defense provided.
See Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Ins. Co.,
In
Head,
the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a duty of good faith and
*98
fair dealing between an insurer and its insured, stating: “Texas law recognizes only one tort duty in this context, that being the duty stated in
[Stowers
].”
Head,
Four years after
Duddlesten,
the Texas Supreme Court reinforced the position it took in
Head
in a context where the claims arose out of the insurer’s conduct in handling and settling a third party claim rather than a refusal to defend.
See Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
In
Ford,
an insured sued his insurer for negligently handling his claim after a letter from the insurer stating that the insured was partially negligent in causing the fire was obtained by the fire extinguisher certification company that the insured was suing.
Ford,
Other courts of appeals have taken similar tacks since
Duddlesten.
Our sister court, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, recently handled an appeal involving facts similar to
Duddlesten. See Methodist Hosp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
The Dallas Court of Appeals has reached a consistent result under facts similar to those presented here.
Cain v. Safeco Lloyds Ins. Co.,
Taylor relies largely on
Traver
to argue that his claim for negligent defense is actionable, pointing out that: (1) the Court in
Traver
distinguished itself from
Head
on the basis that the claim asserted in
Traver
arose not out of a refusal to defend but allegations of inadequate defense, and (2) the
Traver
court remanded “any remaining claims that [the insured] pled or might plead against [his insurer].” We are unpersuaded by these arguments. While Taylor’s allegations of negligent defense can be factually distinguished from the allegations of improper refusal to defend in
Head,
this same distinction cannot be made "with respect to
Mich-Continent, Duddlesten, Methodist,
or
Cain,
each of which involved allegations of negligence in the handling of a third party claim.
Mid-Continent, 23
In accordance with Texas Supreme Court authority, as interpreted by this Court and other Texas courts of appeals addressing the issue, we hold that Texas law does not recognize a negligence cause of action under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on Taylor’s negligence claims against Allstate.
C. Tortious Interference
Taylor asserts that Allstate committed tortious interference with a contractual and fiduciary relationship by:
tacitly, expressly and through the implied promise of future business, required Mr. Causey — and Mr. Causey assented — to put Allstate’s interests ahead of Mr. Taylor’s interests by consciously limiting Mr. Taylor’s defense solely to engineering a settlement — a settlement in which Mr. Causey, although clearly not ready for trial and the case clearly was not ready for trial, coerced Mr. Taylor into accepting by telling him that the case would go to trial in a week and that there was a medical lien in excess of $8,000 which the jury would weigh heavily in [the automobile accident victim’s family’s] favor and against Mr. Taylor. None of these statement (sic) were true.
Allstate’s argument for summary judgment broadly states that, under existing precedent, Stowers provides the sole tort duty in third party insurance cases. The motion does not distinguish between Taylor’s negligence claim and Taylor’s tortious interference claim. In his response, Taylor globally contends insurance companies should be subject to the same laws as others, but he does not point us to any specific argument or authority permitting an insured’s claim against his insurer for tortious interference with the attorney-client relationship between the insured and legal counsel retained by the insurer.
*100 1. Tortious Interference with a Fiduciary Relationship
We have previously declined to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship.
Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C.,
2. Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship
In
Head,
the Court did not recognize a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing for an insurer in handling third party claims because the insured is fully protected against the insurer’s refusal to defend or mishandling of a third party claim through his contractual and
Stowers
rights.
Head,
The control-based analysis in
Traver
may be read to counsel against a claim for tortious interference in this context. The Court in
Traver
reasoned that the elevated duties owed by an attorney to a client require the attorney to exercise the kind of unfettered control over his representation of the client that forestalls meaningful outside influence over the representation.
Traver,
We also note that Texas case law has given the insurer room to protect its legitimate interests in the defense of a third party claim by placing a burden of absolute loyalty to the insured on the attorney, who “must at all times protect the interests of the insured if those interests would be compromised by the insurer’s instructions.”
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., Inc.,
We conclude that, under current Texas Supreme Court authority, Texas law does not recognize a cause of action by an insured against his insurer for tortious interference with the insured’s relationship with his attorney arising out of the insured’s handling of the defense of a third party claim under the circumstances alleged by Taylor in this action.
D. Taylor’s Contract Claims Against Allstate
Taylor contends that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on his breach of contract claims on the basis of Allstate’s “no cause of action” summary judgment. Taylor points out that the Texas Supreme Court expressly contemplates the existence of some contractual right in the following statement: “The court overlooked the fact that an insured is fully protected against his insurer’s refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-party claim by his contractual and
Stowers
rights.”
Head,
Allstate re-urges its argument that the
Stowers
doctrine represents the insured’s exclusive basis for recovery against its insurer with respect to the insurer’s handling of third party claims. In the context of Taylor’s contract claims, Allstate relies largely on three courts of appeals’ opinions:
Cain, Duddlesten
and Methodist.
See Duddlesten,
The no-cause-of-action analysis in
Cain, Duddlesten
and
Methodist
dealt with the insured’s tort claims.
See Duddlesten,
*102
The nature and extent of the duties owed under a contract are determined by the contract’s terms.
See Duddlesten,
Here, Allstate provided no analysis of the terms of Taylor’s insurance contract with Allstate and did not file the contract with its motion for summary judgment. Without such analysis, we conclude that Allstate has not met its burden of proving that it was entitled to summary judgment on Taylor’s breach of contract claims as a matter of law.
Cf.
Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (to prevail on a motion for traditional summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law);
KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp.,
E. Taylor’s Statutory Claims Against Allstate
Taylor’s statutory claims against Allstate include numerous alleged violations of DTPA and Insurance Code. Taylor essentially argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims because the
Stowers
doctrine does not supplant an insured’s statutory rights of action. Allstate makes no argument specific to Taylor’s statutory claims. To the extent Allstate’s broad assertions about the exclusivity of the
Stowers
claim can be read as an argument that the
Stow-ers
doctrine necessarily supplants all statutory causes of action an insured might otherwise have against its insurer in the context of defending third party claims, we disagree. None of the authority presented by Allstate supports the position that Texas law prohibits an insured from bringing otherwise valid statutory claims against an insurer.
E.g., Duddlesten,
Because Allstate asserts only a general “no cause of action” basis for summary judgment on Taylor’s statutory claims and does not attack any of the elements of the statutory claims Taylor asserts, we conclude that Allstate has not met its burden of proving that it was entitled to summary judgment on Taylor’s statutory causes of action as a matter of law.
Cf.
Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c);
KPMG Peat Marwick,
F. Taylor’s Warranty Claims Against Allstate
*103
Although Taylor’s pleadings refer to breach of warranty claims against Allstate, Taylor’s appellate briefing does not address those claims. Nor did Taylor provide the trial court with a basis for denying summary judgment on these claims. For this reason, we hold that any error in granting summary judgment on these claims is waived.
Wheeler v. Methodist Hosp.,
We therefore sustain in part and overrule in part, Taylor’s first issue.
Opportunity to Amend Pleadings
In his second issue, Taylor contends he should be given an opportunity to replead his claims. Taylor asserts: “When a ‘no cause of action’ summary judgment is granted, the Trial Court abuses its discretion by not allowing the non-movant the opportunity to replead,” citing
Perry v. S.N.,
The record shows that on the same day Allstate filed its motion for summary judgment, Allstate specially excepted to Taylor’s allegations against Allstate on the grounds asserted in its motion for summary judgment. We agree with Allstate that, like the plaintiff in
Perry,
Taylor was put on notice of Allstate’s summary judgment grounds and given an opportunity to replead before the trial court signed the summary judgment order.
See Perry,
Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment on Taylor’s breach of contract and statutory causes of action and remand those claims for further proceedings; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
Notes
. G.A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co.,
.
Although no party challenges our jurisdiction, we conclude in our sua sponte review that the language of the trial court's orders unambiguously expresses the trial court’s intention that the summary judgment order become final and appealable upon issuance of the severance order.
See In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,
No. 01-09-00851-CV,
"This judgment is [a] final judgment. All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.”); In re Daredia,317 S.W.3d 247 , 249 (Tex.2010) (indicating that a statement that the judgment in question is "appealable” is a clearer indication of finality than a statement that the judgment is "final.”).
. Taylor does not allege that Allstate ever refused him defense in the automobile accident suit. To the contrary, the parties appear *97 to agree that Allstate performed its duty to defend — whether negligently or not — and tendered the full limits of its policy after receiving notice of the claim.
. This court has also declined to recognize a cause of action against an attorney for aiding and abetting a client's breach of fiduciary duty to a third party by conduct within the scope of the attorney’s representation of the client.
Span Enters. v. Wood,