138 Ga. App. 832 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1976
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether, under the evidence submitted, the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that the decedent committed suicide.
The appellee, Aetna Life Insurance Company, issued a group life insurance policy through the decedent’s employer insuring decedent’s life for $30,000 in whole life benefits and $15,000 in accidental benefits. Decedent died from a gunshot wound in the abdomen on April 21, 1974. A dispute arose between the decedent’s brother, the named beneficiary of the policy, and the decedent’s estranged widow and child, the latter asserting an implied trust on the whole life benefits of the policy. The dispute was eventually resolved in favor of the brother. See Taylor v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 630 (221 SE2d 45).
In the present action, decedent’s brother seeks to recover the $15,000 accidental benefits under the policy. Aetna refused payment on the ground that decedent died from "intentional self-destruction or intentional self-inflicted injury” exclusions provided in the policy. Aetna moved for summary judgment on this ground, and it was granted.
Decedent’s wife, from whom decedent had been separated for six months, stated that when decedent brought the boy home an argument developed. During the course of the argument, decedent pulled her hair. Because the argument took place in the presence of the child, the latter became upset and the wife demanded the decedent leave. Decedent returned to his apartment. His girl friend was there, watching television and she observed him come into the apartment. He said nothing to her but went straight to the bedroom. After about an hour she heard the phone ring. Decedent answered it. Two or three minutes later she heard a loud bang. When she went into the bedroom she saw decedent lying on the bed. The phone was off the hook.
The caller had been decedent’s wife, who had called to tell decedent that their argument had upset the child and he should not do it in the future. "Q. What did he [decedent] say? A. Well, he paused for a moment and then he said, 'Well, you don’t have to worry about it because I am not going to be in your life any more anyway.’ Q. Then what happened? A. Then there was a pause and I called out his name and he didn’t answer and then the next thing
There was no evidence of a note or any other writing left by decedent. Decedent’s brother and girl friend both described him as appearing normal and coherent during that day. His depression from having to take the child back was not unusual. Decedent had been seeing a psychiatrist since July of 1970 for treatment of what the psychiatrist called a schizoid personality, a personality disorder, but that decedent was not overtly psychotic or incompetent. Decedent’s wife stated that decedent once told her that the reason he was seeing a psychiatrist was so that he "wouldn’t kill himself and me both.”
There was no evidence of alcoholic consumption by decedent. There was evidence that decedent liked guns and often "fiddled with them.” His brother had seen him "nervously handling” the pistol in question a few days previously. The autopsy showed "faint blackish deposits at the abdominal skin lining” at the bullet entry point. The death certificate showed the cause of death as "gunshot wound — abdomen,” and that the injury occurred as a result of a "self-inflicted gunshot wound.” Decedent was 28 years old. Held:
In the two most recent cases on this subject the Supreme Court reversed this court’s conclusion that suicide was shown as a matter of law by the facts in both cases. In Belch v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 823 (136 SE2d 351), the decedent insured was alone in a car when two gun shots were heard. He was found slumped over in the car, a bullet shot in the chest with the pistol in the seat beside him. There was also a note in the front seat which said "All my life I have tried to pay my debts. God bless you all. George. P. S. No setting up at J. C.’s.” The Supreme Court held that the directing of a judgment n.o.v. for the insurance company was error.
In Power v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 305
In view of the above authorities, we are constrained to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. As was stated in Lincoln &c. Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 137 Ga. App. 699, "we are not prepared to demonstrate that the result here should be any different from that reached by the Supreme Court in Power, supra.”
Judgment reversed.