393 S.E.2d 494 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1990
A jury found appellant guilty of trafficking in cocaine (OCGA § 16- 13-31 (a)) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (5)). Appellant enumerates several alleged errors in his effort to have the convictions reversed.
The record shows that an informant, who was working as the arresting officer’s agent, called the officer and stated that he had a person who wanted to sell three ounces of cocaine for $3,300. The officer and the informant then went to a prearranged location and waited for the seller to arrive. Appellant arrived at the location and stated that when he received the money, he would wave his hand in the air and a second person would bring the cocaine. The officer gave appellant $2,300 for two ounces of cocaine and, when the second person brought the cocaine, appellant and the second person were arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. During a search of appellant, the officer found a handgun in appellant’s pants.
1. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in allowing a State witness to testify whose name did not appear on the list of witnesses provided to appellant. “Although the witness’ name did not appear on the list previously furnished to appellant, the trial court did allow appellant to conduct an interview before the witness was permitted to testify. Accordingly, there was no violation of OCGA § 17- 7-110.” Boscaino v. State, 186 Ga. App. 133 (3) (366 SE2d 789) (1988).
3. Appellant alleges error in the trial court’s recharge to the jury on entrapment. The jury requested, and received, a recharge on the law of entrapment. Appellant objected to the following portion of the recharge: “Entrapment exists where the idea and intention of thé commission of the crime originated with a government officer or employee or with an agent of either and he by undue persuasion, incitement or deceitful means induced the accused to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the conduct of such officer.” Appellant objected because in the original charge, the words “or agent” followed the word “officer” in the last line of the charge. The trial judge overruled the objection, but during a subsequent recharge on entrapment, requested by the jury, the trial court included those words in the charge. Appellant objected to the second recharge, contending that the words “or agent” should have been included in yet another portion of the charge, even though not included in the original charge. Having reviewed the charge and the two recharges, we conclude that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the law of entrapment, and we find no harm from the failure to include the words “or agent” in one portion of the charge, particularly when the exact same charge was given twice without any objection by appellant. See Wallace v. State, 162 Ga. App. 367 (3) (291 SE2d 437) (1982).
4. The evidence considered in its entirety was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty on both counts of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Corbitt v. State, 169 Ga. App. 739 (7) (315 SE2d 25) (1984).
5. Appellant raises as error on appeal that he was denied the ineffective assistance of counsel. The record reflects that appellant retained an attorney to represent him during the trial; that appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal; that an attorney was thereafter ap
Judgment affirmed and case remanded with direction.