Lead Opinion
This appeal arises from an inmate’s allegations that he was not provided access to proper medical care while he was incarcerated at the county jail. Appellee Jacob Armstrong initially filed a complaint asserting state and federal law claims against Quinton Rush, individually and in his official capacity as Tattnall County Sheriff; Jason Howell, individually and in his official capacity as Tattnall County
We start with the factual basis for Armstrong’s complaint, accepting his well-pleaded material allegations as true.
Approximately a month later, Armstrong passed out at the jail and was transported to the hospital. The doctors at the hospital determined that Armstrong had suffered a stroke and attributed the cause to abscesses on and/or in his brain. Armstrong alleges that if defendants had allowed him to оbtain the MRIs that were ordered by his treating physician, these abscesses would have been detected earlier. Accordingly, Armstrong seeks damages for the severe injuries he suffered due to defendants’ negligent and intentional failure to provide him access to proper medical care.
1. Against this backdrop, we now turn to the question of whether Armstrong’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity. “[0]ur review of this question of law is de novo.” Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.,
Pursuant to a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution,
. . . sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.4
Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e). Accordingly, under Georgia law as it presently stands “sovereign immunity has constitutional status, and that immunity may be waived only by an act of thе General Assembly or by the Constitution itself.” Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch,
In contrast, subsection (d) of the 1991 amendment to Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX establishes a different type of immunity, known as official or qualified immunity when an officer or an employee of the state is suеd in his individual capacity.
Under the doctrine of official, or qualified, immunity, a [state officer or employee] may be personally liable for negligent actions taken in the performance of ministerial functions, but [is] immune from personal liability for discretionary acts taken within the scope of their official authority and performed without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.
Accordingly, as can be readily seen, the doctrines of sovereign immunity and official immunity are examined under entirely different analytical frameworks, and the question of whether the state employee, agent or officer is performing a discretionary as opposed to a ministerial act simply has no place in considering whether a county or a county emрloyee or officer sued in his official capacity is entitled to immunity on state law damages claims under Paragraph IX (e). Hewell v. Walton County,
Unfortunately, in Cantrell,
Turning back to the facts of this case, Armstrong sued the county and county employees and officials, in both their official and individual capacities. However, the individual defendants did not move to dismiss the claims made against them in their individual capacities, and thus the only issue before the trial court was whether Armstrong had carried his burden of showing
Armstrong asserts that OCGA § 42-5-2, which provides among other things that the governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical custody of an inmate has the responsibility of providing the inmate with any needed medical care and hosрital attention and specifically places the burden of paying for such medical care on the governmental unit housing the inmate, waives the County’s sovereign immunity. However, as we have explained on several occasions, “[w]hile OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) imposes upon the county the duty and cost of medical cаre for inmates in its custody, [this Court has clearly determined] it does not waive sovereign immunity of the county or its agents or employees.” Graham v. Cobb County,
2. Because of our holding in Division 1, we nеed not reach the issue of whether Armstrong’s claims against Tattnall County were also subject to dismissal based on the running of the statute of limitation or other reasons.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Tattnall County also asserted two othеr reasons for dismissal: (1) that Armstrong was in fact provided proper access to medical care as required by Georgia law, and (2) that his claims against the County were barred by the applicable statute of limitation. However, as more fully set out below, we find it unnecessary to reach these issues.
We herеinafter refer to Tattnall County and the individually named defendants collectively as the “defendants.”
In reviewing a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss a complaint, “we view all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded material allegations as true, and view all denials by the defendant as false, noting that we are under no оbligation to adopt a party’s legal conclusions based on these facts.” Love v. Morehouse College, Inc.,
This was not always the case. For greater detail concerning the history of sovereign immunity law in Georgia, see Center for a Sustainable Coast,
Although the 1991 constitutional amendment expressly authorized the enactment of a State Tort Claims Act whereby “[t]he General Assembly may waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit” and the “Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 [et seq.,] was subsequently enacted to waive the sovereign immunity of the state for the torts of its officers and employees, [the legislature] expressly exclude[d] counties from the ambit of this waiver.” Gilbert,
That subparagraph provides in full as follows:
Except as specifically providеd by the General Assembly in a State Tort Claims Act, all officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to perform, their ministerial functions and may be liable fоr injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Except as provided in this subparagraph, officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies shall not be subject to suit or liability, and no judgment shаll be entered against them, for the performance or nonperformance of their official functions. The provisions of this subparagraph shall not be waived.
However, Cantrell went on to affirm the grant of summary judgment to the county defendants based on other grounds.
Although Howard, quotes Cantrell, we find it unnecessary to overrule Howard since that case is wholly without precedential value and hence already not binding authority. See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a).
Armstrong clearly had the burden to establish waiver. As we have previously explained, “[sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense that must be established by the party seeking its protection. Instead, immunity from suit is a privilege and the waiver must be established hy the рarty seeking to benefit from the waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Happoldt,
As our appellate courts have explained, this does not mean that plaintiffs alleging that a government agency denied or provided inadequate medical treatment to an inmate are necessarily without recourse bеcause such claims may in some circumstances state a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983. See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in the result and all that is said in the majority opinion. I write separately to note that the nomenclature we use in this area of law is extremely confusing and that, perhaps, we should consider renaming these terms in future cases. Currently, if John Doe is sued in his official capacity, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies. If John Doe is sued in his individual capacity for actions taken within the scope of his official duties, the doctrine of official (or qualified) immunity applies. In other words, the doctrine of official immunity does not apply to defendants sued in their official capacity.
We could make the concepts easier to distinguish if we replace “official immunity” with “qualified immunity” when analyzing whether a person is immune from suit. Then, if John Doe were sued in his official capacity, we would continue to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but if John Doe were sued in his individual capacity for
I recognize that our appellate courts have analyzed immunity issues in terms of “sovereign” versus “official” for many years. We often begin the immunity analysis of an official sued in his individual capacity by describing it as “official or qualified,” but we generally drop the “qualified” adjective and complete the analysis using only the adjective “official.” As the majority notes, confusion remains. Overruling Middlebrooks and Cantrell should clarify the immunity issues rеlated to inmate claims that are raised in this case. But the continued confusion in this area must be attributed at least in part to the nondescriptive way we label the two forms of immunity, and we could further clarify the analysis by describing the immunity of an official sued in his individual capacity as “qualified.”
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Phipps, Judge Miller and Judge McFadden join in this special concurrence.