Thе natural father ststepmother ice. appeal the Randolph County Chancery Court’s decision to grant the minors’ maternal grandmother visitation rights. On appeal, appellants Scott and Mary Ennis Tate contend that the action by appellee Jo Bennett seeking visitation rights under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215(a)(l) (Repl. 1998) was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216(b) (Repl. 1998). We agree and reverse and dismiss.
Scott and Cheryle Tate were a married couple with two children, Savanah and Jay Tate. On January 4, 1993, Cheryle Tate died in an automobile accident and was survived by her husband and two minor children. On May 14, 1994, Scott Tate married Mary Ennis Tate. Subsequеntly, Mary began proceedings to adopt Scott’s two children. She filed a petition for adoption-on November 22, 1994, and a hearing was held in the Randolph Cоunty Probate Court on January 18, 1995. On January 23, 1995, the probate court entered an interlocutory decree of adoption, ordering that Savanah and Jay be adopted by Mary. The final adoption decree was filed on July 3, 1995.
More than two years later, on September 30, 1997, Jo Bennett, the maternal grandmother of Savanah and Jay Tate, filed a complaint in Randolph County Chancery Court seeking custody of the children or, in the alternative, visitation rights. It is undisputed that Mrs. Bennett never received official legal notice of the earlier adoption proceedings. In the complaint, Mrs. Bennett alleged that the children had been рhysically and mentally abused by the Tates, which may have led to psychiatric treatment for Savanah. The complaint further stated that the children were living in an unstаble environment and that Savanah was in danger.'Following a hearing on March 15, 1999, the trial court entered an order, finding that Mrs. Bennett had received no legal notification of the earlier adoption proceedings as required under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-212(g), “and her visitation rights therefore shall not be terminated.” The trial court’s order also set out specific dates and times for the children to visit their grandmother, Mrs. Bennett.
The Tates argue that the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Bennett visitation rights. Speсifically, they argue that the provisions for grandparent visitation contained in Ark. Code Ann. 9-9-215(a)(1) (Repl. 1998) are not applicable in the present case for three reasons. With regard to grandparent visitation, section 9-9-215(a)(1) states in relevant part:
A final decree of adoption ... [has] the following effect as to matters within the jurisdiction or before a court of this state: ... [T]o terminate all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his natural relatives, inсluding his natural parents, so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes. ... However, in cases where a natural or adoptive parent dies before a petition for adoption has been filed by a stepparent of the minor to be adopted the Court mаy grant visitation rights to the parents of the deceased natural or adoptive parent of the child if such parents of the deceased natural or аdoptive parent had a close relationship with the child prior to the filing of a petition for step-parent adoption, and if such visitation rights are in thе best interest of the child.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-215(a)(l) (Repl. 1998).
For one of their three arguments, the Tates contend that Mrs. Bennett is not entitled to visitation under section 9-9-215(a)(1) because she was barrеd from filing her custody/visitation action by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 9-9-216(b), which states in relevant part:
Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one (1) year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner, upon any ground, including ... failure to give any required noticef.]
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216(b) (Repl. 1998). The Tates assert that Mrs. Bennett’s action for custody/visitatiоn, which was filed more than one year after issuance of the adoption decree, questions the adoption decree. Mrs. Bennett, on the other hand, asserts that section 9-9-216(b) is not applicable because “[n]either the adoption, nor the decree itself was questioned in this hearing.” We disagree. This court has consistently held that adoption statutes are to be stricdy construed and applied. See, e.g., Dougan v. Gray,
However, the trial court found that Mrs. Bennett did not receive legal notificаtion of the adoption proceedings as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-212(g) (Repl. 1993). Although section 9-9-216(b) expressly provides that the one-year statute of limitations applies to challenges based on a failure to give the required notice, we have held that it is a denial of due process to apply the one-yeаr statute of limitations to the natural father of the adopted child if the father was not given notice of the adoption proceedings. McKinney v. Ivey,
In light of our hоlding that this action is barred by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-216(b), we need not address the Tates’ other arguments for reversal.
Reversed and dismissed.
Notes
The record reflects that Mrs. Bennett had frequent contact with Savanah between April 1996 and July 1997 when Savanah was living in Alabama with her natural mother’s sister, Jennifer Taylor.
The supplemental record reflects that the Juvenile Division of Randolph County Chancery Court transferred legal custody of Savanah to Mrs. Bennett on June 28, 1999.
When Act 889 was approved on April 4, 1995, it did not contain an emergenсy clause or a specified effective date. Pursuant to Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, acts of the General Assembly that do not contain an emergency clause or a specified effective date become effective ninety days after adjournment of the legislative session at which they werе enacted. Priest v. Polk,
Mrs. Bennett might have beеn able to file for visitation rights under Act 889 of 1995 before the one-year statute of limitations expired. Nonetheless, the statutory notice provisions did not require that notice be given to Mrs. Bennett at any time other than at least twenty days prior to the January 18, 1995 hearing date. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-212(a) and (g)-