Tasanilla Hopson v. Delores Palmer Hopson

839 certainty legislative corporation ner personam over a about this in in an in mind; language modifying action,3 for the we think our Code should expression ordinarily judicially go used such as is is far in construed to respect greater legisla- clarity of an individual. It refers the absence of by defendant be found tive intention “who” cannot 13- than is evidenced § by and “who” shown to be 104. affidavit We think it notice authorizes publication only or from type nonresident absent have been of cases in against for at six months. It which least such notice is available by publica will also be seen that notice nonresident defendant.4 personal tion is made substitute for The motion is service when defendant cannot Denied. found “and” is shown affidavit language “a nonresident”. This is hard ly application for to a domestic suitable corporation. provision additional Some might 13-104 such as have been §

thought corpora desirable to insure that 13-108

tions were included § as In other same extent individuals. HOPSON, Appellant, Tasanilla might words, Congress intended have purpose v. 13-104 other than to serve a § corporations HOPSON, Appellee. the extension over Delores Palmer through personam jurisdiction notice 11558. No. emphasized publication. This is when Appeals, United States Court literally it is read 13-104 noted that § of Columbia Circuit. as the United States contends would Argued 24, Feb. 1954. personam permit on the 20, 1955. notice even for basis Decided Jan. eign corporation which had no status District of whatever Columbia. by publication Notice gen personal It

substitute service.

erally unavailable as a basis for fix

ing personal liability. It is a means reaching property relationships are within the though parties not. all are usual these limitations While efficacy as of such service are not corporations important the case of individuals, evidenced decisions process with due it is consistent jurisdiction in this man- law to obtain 3, example, Pennoyer Neff, See, 95 We decided this without ref- 565; 735-736, 714, provisions 24 L.Ed. Clear U.S. erence L. Pub. No. Roberts, 389, Cong., Sess., 177, ap- Co. v. 51 Ela. water Mercantile 2d 68 83d Stat. 436, 117; L.R.A.,N.S., proved 176, days 4 State June 40 So. effective 180 Woods-Young Tedder, statute, see, particular- Co. rel. This thereafter. gections 643, denied, 1083, ly, 12, So. certiorari Fla. shows the care 946; Congress recently 52 S.Ct. L.Ed. U.S. with which has treated Chicago, Co., subject B. & R.Q. 225 Ill. Nelson service domestic L.R.A.,N.S., corporation. N.E. also, Restatement, Sec, Conflict of Laws § (1934).

Stephens, Judge, dissented Chief

part, Miller, Circuit and Wilbur K.

Judge, dissented Stewart, F. Stewart

See

2d wife, Hopson Tasanilla deserted

Delores, shortly after their follow- child born the 1948.1 Their ing year. di- to Because she refused him, pro- vorce he instituted divorce ceedings against 1950, in Florida shortly discharge after his from the military living service and while she was Maryland Washington, in a suburb of personally D. C. Delores was neither process, appear served with nor did she participate proceed- or ings. in the otherwise pendency, She was of their aware however, and stated in a letter Tasa- “ * * * attorneys nilla’s terpose I in- objection no a divorce—but gives my since this is based on lies and daughter protection expect don’t me sign anything.” 13, 1950, On June by publication, service he obtained provided a decree of final divorce which payments for $10.00 a week for the nothing of the child but for his DiLeo, Joseph Washington, D. Mr. days later, wife. Twelve he entered C., appellant. D. marriage Kentucky, into another from Geyer Tausig, Washington, Mr. John which a child has since been born. C., appellee. D. brought Delores suit for In Banc. support and for herself STEPHENS, Judge, Before Chief July 14, pre and child on 1950. At a EDGERTON, CLARK,* WILBUR stage liminary proceeding, in -the Tasa MILLER, PRETTYMAN, K. BAZE sought nilla dismissal of a motion for LON, FAHY, WASHINGTON and pendente ground lite on DANAHER, Judges. Circuit parties lacked resi sufficient BAZELON, Judge, Circuit with whom in or connection dence PRETTYMAN, EDGERTON, FAHY, pertinent Columbia. circum DANAHER, margin WASHINGTON and Cir- set bel stances are out Judges, against him; cuit concur. court at ow.2 The ruled * there, peri- during Judge, Clark, before the deci died income taxes Circuit 1952, od, and until March car was case. his sion registered Michigan. He left Florida marriage place on the Island took Their 13, briefly stopping on June and after stationed as where he was of Guam Indiana, Columbia, District went she as of the armed forces and member There, 1950, 23, married. on June civilian worker. applica- under oath license military tion, “present gave Tasanilla entered When first he residence” as- 1942, Murray, Kentucky, in Ken- servieo in he was domiciled and his “new address” tucky. Street, Washington, In Juno while still as 139 Joliet D. C- service, July Thereafter, approximately he to the District Colum- moved approximately complaint six months. As of bia one week before the instant day January filed, metropolitan he was released he returned duty, Washington, signed year’s from active he claimed as home both area of Kentucky Michigan apartment Mary- where his mother lease on an located in period January lived. For the from 10 to at land of Columbia line. August 1950, applying he June claims to have been for active- paid duty Force, gave domiciled Florida. He filed and with the Air he his mail- (1) ;age Application proceeding of the doc- later s another ruling is en- non conveniens branch of trine of the court held this tan forum the Distrct tamount to dis trusted to the discretion of of motion denial equitable ground miss on to be exercised non con forum binding considerations, determination veniens and its and of the law effect as appeal except not be disturbed the case. for a discretion.5 clear abuse of this trial, Upon existence viewed Although in of this the circumstances es- and wife status as of the husband case, think the we claim mainte- to sential refusing juris- in been warranted District of Columbia law.3 nance ur.der non under the doctrine of diction conveniens, forum According course, view, to this De- say that its fail- we cannot claim for would be lores’ an discretion. ure to do so is abuse of if barred the Constitution’s full faith Moreover, traditional there are certain recognition required and clause credit which, equitable in our considerations parte in ex of the divorce obtained view, impel in favor not a balance proceedings.4 found, Florida The court disturbing This suit was its action. however that had Tasanilla no bona in There is no show- commenced 1950. permanent fide to intent establish a any prejudice appellant suffered domicile, Florida and that the Florida appellee’s reason the trial in jurisdiction court was therefore without record far as the forum.6 So choice of to the decree of enter divorce. Accord- concerned, least, appellant has no at ingly, it held the decree entitled to permanent is reasonable and it residence granted sup- full faith and credit and past itinerant his- assume from his to port ami maintenance relief to Delores matter, practical tory that, as it would and the child. extremely appellee difficult for the upon him in some oth- obtain service brought appeal urging, to this Tasar.illa ju- forum.7 To refuse to exercise er substance, District Court “put date and her at this late failing risdiction (1) apply to the doctrine erred litigation merry-go-round juris- to non conveniens refuse of forum certainty jurisdictions, with no refusing (2) other diction, to full accord any or could would exercise of them the Florida decree. and credit to faith pendente her lite to would be allowed permanent as 4920 Deal address ing and alimony permanent di- in case of Washington 20, 201, Apt. Drive, S.E., appel- maintenance of herself 4, for the 1950, vorce of November As D. 0. any, children, if committed to minor employed salesman as a was lant court, payment her care time trial At Columbia. District may be enforced in same thereof legal 4920 Deal gave residence he regard pay- as directed in manner Maryland. Hill, His car Drive, Oxon D.O.Oode, permanent alimony.” ment of Virginia. registered in then was (1951). 16-415 § complaint was filed time theAt Maryland, suit, lived Delores parte proceeding, mean, By ex we 4. an line. just of Columbia District across course, there one which later, moved into she week one About process personal service of nor neither voluntary minor child. She participation by appearance or and work live continued spouse sued. job January when until Simons, 1951, U.S.App.D.C. v. Simons 5. Tucson, Arizona. transferred 364; 180, F.2d Ford Motor Co. apparently Cir., 1950, Ryan, relied on our 182 F.2d 3. The provides statute Corp. Gilbert, 1947, Oil See Gulf fail or re- husband shall “Whenever 67 S.Ct. L.Ed. U.S. minor chil- his wife maintain fuse Ryan, supra, 1055; Motor Ford Co. v. do, dren, although any, so able if page 330. F.2d at pendente wife, application supra. may 7. See permanently, note decree that he lite her, periodically, pay such sums as (cid:127)shal the di would, make jurisdiction is to we result this situation in her behalf” give the Ne unjust.8 think, unduly vorce divisible—to effect harsh and marital affects vada decree insofar as it rehearing granted (2) in banc We on the status and to make it ineffective purpose consid- in this case for alimony.”12 issue of expressed The Court also ering flowing questions Su- from the hold that the view preme v. Es- in Estin decisions Court’s wiped York Nevada the New out concerning May Anderson,10 tin,9 and holding that award would amount ato recognition to be accorded the foreign respondent Nevada could from “restrain Con- under the divorce decrees asserting judg her claim under that credit clause. stitution’s full faith and attempt ment. That is an to exercise necessarily required This consideration personam jurisdiction per over upon the decision review of the recent son not before the court. That subject by division of this court 13 Thus, done.” be acquired since Nevada never Meredith v. Meredith.11 to enter a decree Estin, obtained an ex husband affecting personal right, the Court after parte in Nevada a divorce approved New York’s enforcement of its appeared he wherein New York generally, prior judgment notwithstanding the Ne wife a awarded his decree vada divorce decree. alimony (the equivalent permanent for May in- which Later, Anderson permanent under in the of D.C.Code). Upon proceeding corpus obtaining Neva habeas the volved a right to decree, stopped paying immediate determine he under the to da Ohio children, Supreme thereupon custody of York award. She sued New supplemental judgment of divisi- doctrine this for a New extended holding payments. bility that Ohio past divorce York for due The Su full faith preme to accord the New York bound Court held that was not * * “property Wisconsin interest an award was a to credit awarding custody intangible, the ex-husband. to an over which Court, through recognize,” “that said the cannot be exerted control over “[W]e custody thing. right chil- physical of her to a intangible Jurisdiction over a mother’s an right personal to only entitled at can indeed arise from dren a right power protection persons as her control or relationships over as much whose least alimony.”14 Frankfurter Mr. Justice are the source of * * * concurring opinion, rights obligations. out, pointed in a The Melvin, 1942, U.S.App.D.C. 8. Melvin v. 13. Ibid. 39, 42, concurring opin 129 F.2d page page 534, at 73 S.Ct. at 14. 345 U.S. Rutledge. ion of Associate Justice page page 533, S., of 345 U. at At 843. S.Ct., Burton Mr. Justice 843 of 73 1948, 541, 1213, 68 S.Ct. 9. 334 U.S. * * “* us we have before wrote: 1561. L.Ed. question whether a court elemental state, a mother is neither where 840, 10. U.S. S.Ct. domiciled, present, may nor resident 1221. L.Ed. right care, off her immediate cut 1953, 204 F.2d 64. 11. management companion custody, 548-549, ship pages S.Ct. of her minor children without hav at 12. 334 U.S. personam.” ing jurisdiction page Court here over at page 536, S., Pennoyer page at 345 U. at applied of and cited And doctrine S.Ct., Neff, Mr. Justice Frank 24 L.Ed. 844 of 73 95 U.S. are, course, observed: “There debtor ac furter adjudications of domicile state the quires pertain per power other than those determine no children, as for instance unless lat decrees of creditor sonal ap alimony, may personally definitive served or even has ter decreeing State, binding proceeding. let alone pears “We know of power Full Faith and Credit which would take under Clause.” source category,” of that case out Court. said patently that he understood the Court’s decision so involved.” adhere We only required holding. to be that Ohio was this by the full faith and credit clause to also, present case we In the accept custody decision Wisconsin clause faith and credit full think the fit, could, but that it if it saw treat the operate mainte bar to does not binding Wisconsin decree as without recognized Meredith that nance. We violating that clause. divisibility on the doctrine rested ju personam lack of in court’s applied doctrine of We spouse non-appearing risdiction over the divisibility in Meredith of divorce main and not the reduction There, sued husband Meredith.15 prior to the tenance in the District divorce limited for said, the Estin de “While divorce. We Alimony August 1948. Columbia merely enforcement cision involved with the hus pendente lite was awarded prior of a maintenance order entered complaint An amended consent. band’s reasoning foreign divorce, by the hus filed absolute orig equally applicable seem April dis This was later band grant inal after the di under Fed.Rules on motion missed consistently CivJProc, vorce. Either be done U.S.C.A., 41(a) (2), rule .28 faith the full and credit clause.” having moved to Texas. Si husband the multaneously, reasoning find We no basis however, per drawing distinction, so far full file counterclaim the wife to mitted separate concerned, faith credit are between maintenance, did which she grant original of maintenance after August 27,1951, 1,1950. September On prior divorce a suit filed to the final divorce husoand obtained grant divorce, Meredith, inas provision for in Texas without decree alimony divorce, in a filed suit after as Although or maintenance. present Moreover, case. seems it to us appear requested in the her to husband unduly that it would exalt form over personal proceedings, was not she Texas ly any rigid substance to draw distinction process nor did with she volun served since the claim sued in Meredith tarily appear participate therein. judgment and the one reduced to in Es- Upon wife’s trial counterclaim tin flow from the same substantive 1951, the District Court held in October as the one neither sued nor parte ex Texas divorce entitled to reduced to in the case. and, accordingly, faith and credit full grant We therefore hold that a of main moot. the counterclaim as dismissed parte tenance in a suit filed after an ex held, appeal alia, inter that we theOn foreign divorce is also consistent with full faith and credit did not clause the full faith and credit clause. recognition require of the Texas divorce cutting any Meredith, however, extent off orig- In we ruled nonappearing may tbe wife inal awards maintenance after an maintenance under the had to divorce barred question recogni law; public policy of the District of Columbia. nonrecognition policy, principles tion or “even as to the on We held this “based “squarely recognition comity,” required is left issue of maintenance” up of such sach individual and that [forum] divorces failure of “the wife conformity alimony pub jurisdiction grant- there solved seek * * * light policy many ing lic will bar her conflicting availing interests' considerations from thereafter herself of Sec- Faye page See 16. at 65. 204 F.2d 66. 204 F.2d 88; Sup.Ct.1954, Faye, 139 N.Y.S.2d Armstrong, Armstrong 162 Ohio 123 N.E.2d St. grounds stat- The husband relied C,;maintenance divorce. tion D. [the 16-415 alimony statute, claiming Maryland ute], just an old on as to obtain failure ju- defined secured here court’s historical at the time a divorce extinguishing prior power risdiction so to exclude the has the effect of C; grounds alimony award recon- D. On unless maintenance order.” limited sideration that we went divorce existed. The court we now conclude re- jected rule, reading fixing argument, too this far in blanket this since the stat- may particular declaration, ute as an circumstances cases, affirmative exist not as negative gen- later, as we shall describe where limitation. Under its equity power, eral allowance of maintenance after such di- held serve, alimony though it could vorce vene, award rather than contra- even grounds public policy. alleged. local divorce were not great important “But rigid fixing rule, we took suggested, why at once position of the D. C. 16-415 § should not the exist to policy expressed public Code local great remedy wrongs, social and to against award of maintenance once justice parties do who are other a divorce has become effective. adequate wise without means of re That section states: “Whenever lief? Courts are instituted to re * * * shall husband fail to main- wrongs dress and to furnish relief * * * ap- tain his wife plication for the violation of the laws of so of the wife” order him to ciety, wrong and no calls im more pay as maintenance such sums would peratively for than redress that of a be allowed “in case of divorce.” We helpless wife, husband thought position supported by our pledged whom he pro has himself to Rapeer Colpoys,18 decision in wherein tect and defend.” expressed we the view that once the recognized general Rapeer equity parties divorced, longer they are are no powers survived 16-415: “We bear § “husband” and “wife” within the mean- Lesh, App.D.C. 475, in mind Lesh v. 21 of the maintenance statute. But we to the effect that Section 75 is not convinced, a hold, are now and so that the upon power general limitation the Su of equity powers, court has which preme supplanted Court the District of Columbia statute, are not legislative recognition but a mere enough which a appropriate are broad power which, apart statute, from support grant exists circumstances to a having general equitable in a tribunal parte maintenance after an ex divorce. powers. say do And we not that Sec merely specific operates statute is a tion 75 as [now 16-415] a authorization to enter a power maintenance limitation of the Su preme decree and is not a on limitation the District of Columbia general equitable powers court’s to en to issue a maintenance order ter such a decree. In Tolman support v. Tolm divorced father for the of his 21 an19 concerned the trial children.” Both before and after the jurisdiction alimony passage 16-415, court’s to award on suits for § mainte petition allege which did not nance in sufficient the District “have been re page App.D.C. 475, 17. 204 at F.2d 67. where the court found a general equitable power to award ali App.D.C. 216, 18. 85 F.2d 715. mony pendente lite maintenance actions case, however, may distinguished Tliat although Code, provided which for ground ap on the there the wife actions, specifical it in divorce did not peared proceedings. in the divorce ly provide for it in maintenance actions. 1893, App.D.C. 19. 299. App.D.C. page 219, 21. at 85 F.2d at App.D.C. page Id. page at 308. To the effect, Lesh, 1903, same see Lesh v. * * * domiciled where were garded equitable rather son both pointed out We Columbia. legal.” than voluntary appearance the father’s considerations, give Equitable there court “did the Nevada weighed fore, inevitably are factors his obli- determine court sought gation support aid is when its- neither the because personal wife’s the enforcement of a domi- father nor the son had Nevada antedating rights, divorce. recognized,

marital matter of cile.” We public policy, as a rights may extin That such guished law of the father was Columbia the Estin, provide adequate from Estin v. decree is clear bound to May supra, obligation supra, Anderson, his son and held that already Rice, spite we noted. In Rice v. de- “still exists in the Nevada dissenting, is, explicit succinct Mr. Justice Jackson ly cree.” We made it that “It therefore, duty results attributable summarized the court in the compel to recent decisions when he wrote: District of Columbia to the fa- provide adequate support ther to under “ * * * However, in addition general equity powers.” rights grouped under the beclouding mystery There is consortium, are termi- term teaching of the by divorce, nated there are sub- application of mentioned or our cases rights sidiary property of a nature repeated 1877 the Since instances. alimony, support, such as distribu- Supreme Court laid down rule personalty, tive interests in dower Pennoyer v. Neff: has as stated presented and inheritance. These “ * * * difficulties case of divorce on entire where But process constructive service to determine object action dependent obligations nonresident in which personal ther 3 is, was no real chance defend. defendants, where improvised So the Court personam, the con- merely con- suit cept divorce, of ‘divisible’ Estin v. form in this service structive Estin, 334 U.S. 68 S.Ct. ineffectual a non-resident purpose. 1561], 1218 good L.Ed. [92 a divorce tribu- from Process to end a but inval- run into State cannot of one nals dependent property id rigtts.” parties to affect State, and summon another 23 territory its to leave domiciled there proceedings respond to opinion in Rice Rice The Court in its v. process or them. Publication personal clear service was made where the the State within notice upon respondent, nor did in made she create cannot sits tribunal any way participate pro- in the Nevada obligation upon greater the non- gs. ceeds appear. Process sent resident State, process Schneider, Earlier, of the in Schneider him out published equally it, question un- of the are us the within before we had upon availing proceedings to establish divorce in a Nevada effect of liability.” personal obligation father of a 44, 146, Franklin, 1948, 1940, App.D.C. 145, 112 F.2d U.S. 22. Franklin 12, 385, 386, App.D.C. In F.2d 13. 45. Bates, 14, U.S.App.D.C. 1944, Ba tes 15, 679, 751, 674, 23. 336 U.S. S.Ct. point 141 F.2d L.Ed. 957. although District Code out ed of maintenance authorize awards does 383, 384-385, U.S.App.D.C. 1944, 78 24. money lite, pendente such awards and suit 544, emphasis sup 141 F.2d discretion, the District Court’s within are plied. powers. general equity its To under Howard, 714, 727, 24 L.Ed. 95 U.S. effect see Howard v. same then, validity certain, upon frontal foreign of the attack It rights parte though divorce, ac personal wife ex of a the cir are there surrounding procure through quired cumstances foreign may always parte decree. We ment etc be viewed as material survive an public equitable hold There are two be consistent considerations. important why policy of of Columbia to reasons courts should the District among First, seek Nev to avoid an them. attack. include maintenance ertheless, be pro such cause her to enforce deference due to the suit ceedings state;27 equitable second, open of a usual de sister to the power might the result of the Exercise of the court’s attack well be fenses. stigmatize grant parte unnecessarily to marriage subsequent to foreign maintenance after ex might, many in situa children bom thereof. defenses; tions, question Since the encounter such ex of maintenance does depend ample, collusion, upon in has been each where there case the in validity foreign divorce, own miscon concealment of the wife’s sound gen judicial or, during coverture, practice ordinarily laches duct will avoid a might erally, inequitable frontal attack conduct such as such decree. in a case blackmail. be involved Accordingly, preferable procedure circumstances, aid other of the court the circumstances of the surviving the assertion of a wife’s calls for its remand to the District Court might well serve local to maintenance principles redecision under the set Equitable public policy. considerations opinion. forth in this If the facts of question govern, and solution of will permit separate the case mainte- a discretion will lie the exercise of nance action to be entertained and de- guided by par the circumstances reaching cided without the court’s equity as courts of ticular case such validity parte of the ex traditionally been called have foreign decree, the District Court should family field relations. exercise follow that If course. fact and law uncompromising Clearly, an rule which invalid, decree is allowed or denied maintenance either Court is decide, free only so if claims after an divorce it must. regard par without facts Reversed and remanded reconsid- case, inequities ticular result prin- eration and redecision under the hardships inconsistent with sound ciples opinion. set forth in this policy.26 public STEPHENS, Judge., (concur- Chief modify the rule We therefore ring dissenting part, result recognizing in Meredith announced part). guided by equitable that, sort below, set I described, the reasons forth con- For we Dis considerations by consistently courts, the result reached this court cur in Columbia trict of acceptance may of policy, affirmance the of allow maintenance with local jurisdiction the District Court. Oth- divorce under after an erwise, general equity power. I dissent from the decision of It follows their may necessity no the court. that there divisibility U.S.App. 1945, Gullet, in connection with the of Gullet v. 80

26. Cf. 73, 17, to maintenance was neither considered and Gul 349 F.2d Gullet v. D.C. discussed. U.S.App.D.C. 12, nor let, 1949, 83 174 F.2d 531, of which eases the in the second Municipal Army Court, Rescue v. in trial found the divorce court 549, 569, 334 U.S. 67 S.Ct. 91 L. Hobbs, 1952, Hobbs v. And see valid. (1947), 1666 the Ed. Court said U.S.App.D.C. 68, 412; F.2d policy and it has followed a of “strict Huggs, 1952, Huggs U.S.App.D.C. necessity” disposing v. of constitutional 237, 195 F.2d where the doctrine issues. charged Dewane, also desertion. appeal This involves a Hopson’s ap- deser- Mr. denied the the answer action ir. the District Court charge, appel- con- pellee, that he had Hopson, tion admitted Mrs. support lant, husband, support no toward the tributed monies monies her Hopson Hopson, of that he elf, Mrs. but asserted and for Dewane hers support contributed to the of Dewane. parties. minor The suit child of the justified nonsupport custody The answer his of Dewane involved the Hopson, Mrs. and thus contested Hopson, the Dis- which was awarded appeal, maintenance action so far as she is con- Hopson. trict however, to Mrs. by pleading cerned, decree of divorce presents concern- custody provision judg- his own favor obtained in Florida prior filing Hopson’s to the com- subject appeal. of Mrs. ment is the plaint; the answer asserted that after brought Hopson’s Mrs. was action longer the Florida was no his decree she (1951), provid- under 16-415 D.C.Code § wife and that he was therefore not obli- ing: gated “equit- to No her. (as able defenses” to as are referred Whenet er husband shall fail or refuse any, children, maintain his wife and minor if explained) present hereinafter in the although court, applica- do, able so on opinion pleaded of this court were pendente permanent- wife, tion of the lite and dispute answer. ly, may pay her, periodi- It is without that serv- he shall cally, such sums as be allowed to her as process upon Hopson ice of Mrs. alimony pendente permanent lite or in case proceeding constructive, Florida was divorce for the minor of herself and the was she at no time a resident of or children, any, if care committed to her court, payment and the thereof in Florida. in re- enforced same manner as directed gard payment alimony. permanent Court found trial After a complaint, filing Mrs. Hopson At her the time of went the time Mr. that at Hopson Dis was not domiciled he com- the time Florida in 1950 and at Hopson there, trict Mr. proceeding of Columbia and menced the divorce however, Hopson, not. April, Mrs. secured in- he had no the 26th of personal process establishing permanent hus service dom- tention District, shortly band ir. after 13th that on June in the state and icile filing complaint of her com year, she he date on which same living decree, menced and continued to there he Florida divorce obtained the year. Hop- do so for more than a Mr. departed and did not there- from Florida jurisdiction son contested the there- return. The District after court, apparent District Court but that the Florida concluded that fore ly upon Melvin, faith of Melvin grant did App.D.C. 56, (D.C. 129 F.2d U.S same and that decree of Cir., 1942), overruled contention.1 of Columbia in the District invalid Hopson charged continues complaint Mrs. Hopson’s failure Hopson, he sup wife Mr. lawful Hopson contribute Mr. obligation legal maintain and has a port of the minor child ei filer public interests, are in the District Melvin, er in its 1. In Melvin any way Curley, Curley affected.” quoting opinion, from that, court added: But after App.D.C. 120 F.2d “ District un . Court’s [T]he . . (D.C.Cir.1941), said: “ * * jurisdiction * main ... public policy doubted of the [T]he of require nonresidents suits between tenance its Columbia does of Distiict should ex jurisdiction elsewhere not be domiciled of a matri- take to courls jus circumstances persons unless unusual dispute ercised tify who between two monial U.S.App. [76 here. ...” trial nor in the District domiciled are neither [Emphasis 40] at thereof; especially F.2d at D.C. where residents even supplied] showing no that the welfare there property, children, oth- of of rec- evidence There is substantial child. minor their support well as finding support that court requiring ord to of judgment the court entered The Hopson acquired no dom- support Mr. that and Hopson maintain to Mr. Florida; and Fed.R.Civ.P. icile month- the Hopson Dewane and Mrs. ly payment provides “[fjindings fact shall of that The court named sums. of erroneous, clearly set unless remar- not be aside Hopson had Mr. found that regard given op- due be the entry de- and shall Florida the after of ried the portunity judge of of court to ; record the trial the is evidence cree and there marriage, credibility The of the the witnesses.” that born of that a child was finding although to conclusions reached no court made the Hop- that of divorce Mr. the Florida decree of The relevance effect. invalid, Hopson was and that Mrs. there- after the Florida son’s appear of will fore continues to be the lawful wife of child the birth legal Hopson, opinion Mr. the he has obli- discussion of below the gation support to maintain and her as this court. child, well as the minor are therefore appealed Hopson court to this Mr. present record, unassailable. the un- On judgment from the District Court. the 16-415(1951), quoted der D.C.Code § appeal a di- was first heard before The above, Hopson Mrs. was entitled to the judges, de- vision three but before judgment entered in favor the sponte cision court sua was rendered the District Court. in banc. ordered that case reheard the rehearing Hopson On the made but Mr. decide the does not so this court But One, two the contentions: the does is to reverse What it case. erroneously accepted judgment to the remand the action; other, of the maintenance the under “for redecision District Court principles erroneously refused to court’s) (this forth” its set accord full faith and credit the Flori- opinion. further court decides The according decree, since, Hop- da son, to Mr. permit “If facts of the case that: finding required the evidence separate maintenance action to his favor as to the Florida domicile. without decided entertained and Hopson not, appeal, Mr. did on the oth- reaching of the court’s validity judg- erwise contest the maintenance foreign decree, of the ment. follow that should District Court acceptance This rules that court in law the for If in fact and course. jurisdiction by the District Court invalid, eign District Court decree is agree, was not erroneous. that I With decide, only if it must.” so to is free ruling because of this court in or deter court does not consider margin Melvin v. Melvin set forth of the mine at this time correctness above. finding Court’s that there ruling upon This makes court Hopson in Mr. no Florida domicile subject child, of the minor Florida decree its conclusion Hopson, Hop- Dewane Mr. invalid. The as therefore court was signs son. doing for not so a de as reasons case, part in this this court court extend On record sire on more, appeal proceedings could, decide the “deference due without affirming Dis- and a desire avoid of a sister state” unnecessary stigmatization Hopson’s “a favor. subse trict Court language policy In a above it has followed a “strict neces- footnote disposing quoted opinion, sity” in refers is- constitutional opinion Army Municipal Court, of this sues. While to Rescue specify what S.Ct. constitutional is- 331 U.S. does might (1947), case, be involved the instant L.Ed. 1666 the state- sue Supreme presumably had in mind the ment of Court that constitu- therein it 850

quent marriage Estin, premise the children and born Estin v. in Gul- Gullet, U.S.App.D.C. 73, thereof.” let v. 149 (D.C.Cir.1945) (as premise F.2d 17 court, opinion of As I read the phrased by opinion is this court in its supports order in the follow ihe remand “ case), a the Meredith . . . ing departure point of manr.er: As a necessarily divorce a all vinculo dissolves and revises its deci court reviews matrimony, of the incidents of includ- Meredith, 204 F.2d sion in Meredith v. receive, of the wife to and explicit (D.C.Cir.1953). An state duty for, provide of the husband to necessary un ment of that to an case is support, maintenance and and that these derstanding In that of the revision: rights and duties therefore could not case, Mr. had filed a ac Meredith divorce marriage survive a dissolution of the tion in and Mrs. Mere the District Court relationship.” 204 F.2d at 65. This granted dith had been leave file further, however, said that wheth- separate counterclaim for maintenance. er or not a local maintenance action suit, Mr. Meredith later dismissed his might prevail foreign in the face of a Texas, moved tc and obtained there a decree of depend upon divorce would domicile, on valid Texas but divorce public policy locality, and that only as to Mrs. constructive service 16-415(1951) D.C.Code § in effect de- Meredith, having appear entered no she policy clared a local requires which On the trial ance the Texas action. alimony wife forum, foreign to seek counterclaim, of Mrs. Meredith’s otherwise be barred from pending, the District remained availing provision. herself of the Code Court dismissed it as moot in view account, On that ruled, this court Mrs. being decree, the TexE.s prevail Meredith could not in her main- foreign opinion decree had de that the tenance action. Mrs. Meredith filed a stroyed and marital status Mr. petition rehearing in banc Meredith and therefore Mrs. Mrs. petition pending court. That was at the maintenance, based Meredith’s claim to sponte time the court sua ordered a re- upon re existence hearing in banc in the case, instant re- longer lationship, enforceable pending during mained rehearing, in view of the full faith credit clause pending and is still upon. and unacted appeal On the Constitution.3 The appear relevance of this will below. Appeals Court of Meredith this taking court, In the instant case this affirmed the District Court’s dismissal decision, above, claim, doing Meredith as up said of the maintenance so point departure, respect as a following grounds: rules in on the accepts decision Estin, thus: The court view Estin v. 334 U.S. of and ruling (1948), affirms S.Ct. L.Ed. 1561 Meredith grant below, specifically rejected case that a of maintenance after a discussec. parte valid view that full the District Court’s policy required local faith and credit clause denial not a full problem.4 claim. faith and credit The court The court having rejected, acceptance undermined bases this and affirmation repudiated upon Estin, upon May Estin v. tionally required respect By amount of the term “valid e® di- domiciliary finding be accorded to the dissenting vorce decree” as used in this foreign court, in view of opinion Williams v. meant decree based Carolina, U.S. North plaintiff spouse domicile of the valid (1945). S.Ct. L.Ed. domiciliary ap- without foundation or pearance spouse theory so far defendant 3. That this was the of the dismis- concerned, sal of Mrs. Meredith’s constructive counterclaim service apparent spouse, is made as to such the court's order of dismissal of Novem- ber

851 Anderson, 528(1953), guided by v. de 345 U.S. cretion the circumstances particular cided after the Meredith decision. The the case such as courts up- equity traditionally concludes that reach Estin called unadjudicated family on to exercise in the rela- v. Estin includes a wife’s field of claim; sup and the court tions.” maintenance ports theory survival of such a foregoing basis It foreign divorce de claim over valid a above, court, reverses stated as that personal cree, saying “. . . and re- judgment instant case in the antedating rights a divorce marital tells redecision” and “for mands the case extinguished by may a not be . . . facts of if the Court the District foreign In divorce decree”. action permit the case making ex statement the court without and decided entertained be May pressly Anderson. refers also to v. validity reaching question decision court “modifies” the But decree, foreign by rejecting so- Meredith in the case if in But follow that course. should recognized therein, called “blanket” rule foreign decree in- law fact and Columbia the the District of valid, is free so to the District Court policy local has been declared D.C. decide, only if must. The court 16-415(1951), pol and that that Code § say consequences shall what does granting prevents mainte icy foreign a that the attend determination foreign divorce de valid nance after a invalid. decree is ali has to seek wife failed if the cree following disagree I reasons For the According mony forum. in the disposition with the case made are, independent court, there by the court: statute, “general equity powers” in I grant District Court my cited authorities view notwithstanding the limita a wife supporting do its decision as thought to be declared heretofore tions Estin, Mr. Estin v. In Estin not do so. according powers, Those the Code. obtained —Nevada—divorce logical court, extension of are a and without service constructive age “migra powers new equity in a proceed- any appearance Nevada in the cites, sup tory as The court divorces.” ing wife, decree the Nevada general equity porting the existence of alimony. But provision for made no causes, powers matrimonial Tolman Mrs. Estin prior decree Nevada (1893); App.D.C. Tolman, 1 299 Lesh York, par- where New secured (1903); Lesh, App.D.C. 21 475 Ra resided, proceeding hau ties Colpoys, App.D.C. 216, peer gen- had entered husband (D.C.Cir.1936); F.2d 715 Schneider, Schneider v. separation appearance, decree eral U.S.App.D.C. 383, 141 F. Upon alimony. awarding permanent (D.C.Cir.1944). 2d 542 But the court decree, obtaining Mr. Estin the Nevada recognizes that since maintenance payments. making alimony stopped equitable “the action there Supreme then sued Estin which, equitable defenses” if usual tablished, es York the arrears of New prevent 476; judgment. a wife’s secur 63 N.Y.S.2d secured a Id., ing examples, App.Div. a maintenance decree. As N.Y.S.2d 421. Appeals “collusion, of New York af- court refers to conceal The Court firmed, 73 N.E.2d own 296 N.Y. ment of the wife’s dur misconduct coverture, Supreme ing or, generally, Court of the in did the United laches might on certiorari. U.S. in States equitable conduct 1213, L.Ed. 1561. The S.Ct. of blackmail.” Accord volved “Equitable the Nevada ruled considera Court impair govern, Mrs. Estin’s un- and solution of the could not will tions prior New York dis- be- will lie exercise of a der the 852 judgment that property cause to make was a in- it ineffective on the of ali- issue mony. It accommodates the of both interests by pro- terest created New York Nevada and New York in this broken

ceeding parties ir pres- both were by restricting each State to the matters of her ent, dominant 548-549, juris- and the Nevada court had no concern. [334 U.S. at 68 1218] S.Ct. at intangible diction over this in the ab- power sence of control or over Mrs. As I this decision read Su Estin herself. The Court said: preme authority, Court is no and no lan guage properly decision can property judgment in York New of is a The respondent, York in created New terest authority, application treated as for an pres parties proceeding in were which both a ent. “divisibility” of the so-called of divorce petitioner imposed obligations It property rights granted respondent. The to a claim for wife’s maintenance which ju intangible, was an which it created interest ripened adjudication had not into an oyer through which cannot be exerted risdiction prior entry favor for thing. physical over over a Jurisdiction control intangib.e only eign decree from indeed control an can arise divorce in favor oyer relationships persons power whose No such husband. claim for mainte obligations. rights soiree of are the nance involved in was Estin case Curry 357, McCanless, [59 v. 307 366 Cf. U.S. 900, 1339]. L.Ed. S.Ct. 83 have, the decision can therefore in re give over a is sufficient debtor Jurisdiction spect claim, prec of such no force aas over the of his domicile some control the State Supreme levy example, edent. Whether can, he owes. It debt which a tax on (Blackstone its transfer v. will go will in the future so far to rule 277, Miller, [23 188 U.S. 189 S.Ct. 47 L.Ed. unadjudicated that an claim Aldrich, 439]; State Tax Comm’n 316 U.S. v. 1358]), 1008, foreign 174, survives valid [62 L.Ed. 176-177 S.Ct. decree of di 86 through garnishment appropriate it or attach open question. vorce is an In Williams Sturm, (Chicago, v. & R. Co. ment R.I. P. Carolina, 287, v. North 317 U.S. 63 S. 1144]; 797, [19 see 710 L.Ed. 174 U.S. S.Ct. 43 Balk, 625, 49 207, S.Ct. [25 v. 198 U.S. 215 (1942), Harris Ct. 87 L.Ed. 279 the Court 1023]), it for collect it and administer L.Ed. ruled that the marital status is so far Williard, 294 benefit creditors. Clark v. destroyed by decree, 865]; 356, Fischer 79 [55 U.S. 211 v. American United L.Ed. S.Ct. Co., 314 [Life] Ins. U.S. as to the wife but on valid domicile 380, 549, 444]. But [62 86 L.Ed. we 553 S.Ct. husband, may the husband re power no which the State of are aware of marry per impunity so far of the debtor has to determine laws domicile intangible rights un of the creditor in the sonal against bigamy are The de concerned. personally served or the creditor has been less recognizes cision thus effect that after proceeding. appears in the The existence of repeatedly any Pennoyer Neff, oower has denied. such a of the wife to ; 565] 95 714 L.Ed. [24 U.S. conjugal conjugal fidelity association and 586, Sansom, 110 S.Ct. [3 U.S. Hart v. longer true, no exist. It is as stated Dunlevy, 101] New York Life Ins. Co. v. L.Ed. 613, 1140], [36 60 L.Ed. S.Ct. U.S. above, original decision in power source of which would know no We Meredith v. Meredith this court ruled category. case out of that take the wipe premise that the of Gullet v. Gullet that decree that is said out The Nevada alimony respondent’s claim for under the New a valid divorce dissolves all of nothing judgment than an at less York matrimony, including incidents respondent tempt Nevada to restrain from asserting judgment. claim under of the wife to receive and the attempt personam to exercise an That is duty provide of the husband to mainte person jurisdiction before the over court. support, repudiated by nance and was not be Since done. Nevada no That adjudicate respondent’s rights power in Estin v. Estin. judgment, give New York need New York But since Meredith v. Meredith is now phase of and credit to that Nevada’s full faith having judgment. A a court re-examined modified this court to render it not entitled to the notwithstanding proper, it seems and credit which the Constitution full faith and statute sitting that case is not before the court States demand. United Hansberry Lee, U.S. 40-41 S. [61 case, in banc in the instant me 22]; 85 L.Ed. North Caro Williams v. Ct. my say view, was, that, lina, [65 U.S. S.Ct. 89 L. governed is, 1577], no more Estin Estin and cases cited. Ed. result in this situation make than is the instant case—because neither give divisible—to -effect divorce decree Nevada v. Meredith Meredith nor in the in- as it insefar affects marital status and ruled, upon v. Tol- Tolman the faith wife’s stant ease pow- man, general equity entry of that under the adjudicated prior to the claim Supreme ers of the Court the foreign decree. the grant alimony pendente and lite it could May Anderson v. in The decision action, counsel in fees a maintenance support the de- to my no lends view in power and do so not de- that its to was ruling in the The court. of this cision May pendent upon any special statute. The right a mother is that the case attempt case involved to enforce a management custody, and care, the to companionship foreign wife’s claim after a maintenance children minor of her divorce decree. foreign by and cus- divorce cut off not having Rapeer Colpoys tody decree, not In v. the court ruled the mother foreign merely (1929) of the the time forum at 18-102 D.C.Code § in the having describing (which, entered proceeding not manner there and after right Supreme appearance such But which therein. Court an equity, pro- of the natural out enforce a a mother arises decree of relationship child, parent only which is vides: “But di- where custody by payment money destroyed divorce or de- rects no defend- not by imprisoned only except ant death. shall be those cree provided especially for”) cases is a limi- Lesh, Tolman, Ra Lesh v. Tolman v. upon power Supreme tation of the Colpoys, Schneider peer respect Court in of the manner of en- by upon Schneider, the court relied forcing orders, its and that that statute establishing general case as the instant permits by imprisonment enforcement powers District Court equity contempt only directing for of “decrees causes, to to me seem matrimonial payment money” only in cases involved Tolman Tolman v. irrelevant: especially provided for. And the court by non-resi a claim for against ruled an order a divorced suing husband, who re her dent wife father for the maintenance of his chil- divorce, No either sided in the District. dren is not such a “case” since it is not foreign, or had occurred domestic within the terms of D.C.Code 14-75 § sought by party. either The none was only question (1929) (which parallels D.C.Code 16- § was whether or in the case (1951) except that the latter refers Supreme of the not the then-called Court “pendente alimony lite” as well as exercising “equity Columbia, District of permanent alimony), which refers jurisdiction”, authority powers and had only to a husband. The case involved no grant alimony grounded upon causes question of the survival over a judicial other those than decree of divorce a wife’s mainte- separation or a mensa et thoro nance claim for Only herself. sup- could decreed Ecclesiastical port of minor children was England involved. Court of of the at the time Dec above, As said divorce does destroy not Independence. laration of The court relationship parent and child Supreme ruled that the of the Court Dis duty its support. attendant powers. trict did have such The case question involved no toas the survival Schneider, In Schneider v. of a maintenance claim over a ruled that collusive Nevada divorce decree of divorce. obtained husband, Schneider Lesh, appearance suit for mainte- who also entered an Lesh Supreme instituted the Nevada court but nance had no domi- payment District, Nevada, impair right order cile did not of the alimony temporary parties, and counsel of a minor child fees who was raised The as not was entered. before Nevada court named Mr. Schneider. The to whether court held that tempo- duty power make an allowance of it was Court, “general Appeals alimony. rary equity powers” The Court of exercising distinguished sup- compel provide father to grounds port. Thompson “ no claim case involved for- her conduct herself. . . . the wife maintenance of Mrs. Schneider sought alimony only She the feited her under matrimonial child. laws of the State of the domicile obtained where husband II divorce, hence could retain view, my only, do the cases Not subsequent- for maintenance supporting its de cited the ly jurisdiction.”5 obtained in another so, de I think the not do also cision part But matrimonial misconduct on the contrary to the rul is cision of court the ground of the wife as a was of divorce Thomp Thompson v. in of this court only a fact which went of to merits affirmed, son, (1910), App.D.C. 14 Virginia decision, juris- not to the 129, 57 L.Ed. 347 33 S.Ct. U.S. Virginia authority dictional of the court contrary premise (1913); to the destroy the marital status. And the U.S.App.D.C. 68, Hobbs, 91 Hobbs v. aspect matrimonial domicile deci- Huggs (D.C.Cir.1952), F.2d 412 v. Supreme Thomp- sion of the Court in the Huggs, U.S.App.D.C. F.2d son case would seem now be irrele- Gullet, (D C.Cir.1952), and v. Gullet (after vant since Thompson the Court U.S.App.D.C. 12, (D.C. 174 F.2d 531 Thompson) overruled, v. in Williams v. Cir.1943); contrary theory to the Carolina, North Haddock, Haddock v. North Williams v. Carolina. 201 U.S. 26 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed. 867 Thompson, Thompson Mr. (1906), doing and in so ruled that matri- Virgin- in Thompson, was who domiciled foreign monial domicile in the state marriage, before and after ia both necessary destruction of the et thoro in a mensa a divorce secured marital status the courts of that ground Virginia upon matrimoni- state, only personal a valid domi- Thompson. In the Mrs. misconduct al part cile on the plaintiff of the process on Virginia service action foreign requisite. state is only. Thompson was constructive Mrs. Virginia decree, respect Hobbs, Mrs. With to Hobbs v. to the Prior Huggs Huggs claim Thompson maintenance filed a and Gullet v. Gullet: actually Mr. eases Columbia Those did not in the District of Thompson, involve a Virginia question de- and after the survival of a maintenance process upon claim, adjudicated unadjudi- service of whether she secured cree foreign pressed cated, the claim valid in the District over de- him appeal foreign cree; On in her favor. in each of them the decree reversed, Thompson But this was found be invalid. Mr. the de- recognized ruling was domicile in those matrimonial cision each of cases that the Virginia authority Virginia, decree of the District to- Court in credit, pass upon validity to full faith of the was entitled having foreign been in status of a decree of divorce that tte matrimonial local Virginia decree, claim; destroyed by contest maintenance and. Thompson’s Appeals, could to maintenance in this the Gullet case Court ruling longer previously This was that case had be enforced. noted that been Supreme on certi- Court man- remanded Court affirmed pass upon requiring ques- stands ease therefore it to The ner orari. unadjudicated validity foreign proposition that an of a tion of the divorce- pleaded validity claim does survive a which had been but the foreign In Estin v. not been ruled divorce. Estin of which had valid at Appeals marriage opinion this recited The Virginia. however, courts, agreed Both a fact that the recited place part of Co- domicile es took matrimonial was in opinion Virginia. lumbia. Hopson's Either premise of de- be favor. those Mr. trial. The first foreign judgment, appear, be the would de- it would decree valid cisions is that a unadjudi- proceeding stroys end below—if of an foundation (in validity of a It cated claim. divorce) is irrelevant case the Florida were these cases noted that all three of disposition mainte- to the of wife’s decided after Estin Estin.6 appear nance claim. This result in the in- this Court The decision of intended contrary, my view, stant case opinion view of the statements theory of Williams stated above that viving suit her sur- a wife to enforce duty Carolina, v. North that the open maintenance claim is to “the right of the husband and the correlative equitable defenses,” usual “equitable and that fidelity conjugal wife to association govern,” considerations will do not di- survive a question” and that “solution of will vorce. guided discretion, lie the exercise aof Ill particular the circumstances of the case, of the court equity opinion decision such as courts of have tra- ditionally Court appear been called leave the to exercise family for- An invalid field of the direction. relations. insufficient no bar eign parte of course divorce ex closing paragraph of its But unadjudicated main- ato wife’s whatever says: opinion “If in fact and court the will succeed That claim tenance claim. foreign invalid, the the decree law merit, without ref- own or fail decide, free but District Court is so foreign divorce. invalid erence to the only if it must.” rules that not opinion court this In its foreign appears divorce even valid Court Thus the unadjudicated equi- main- the will bar wife’s of if on consideration told that necessarily Hopson’s It follows favor tenance claim. in Mrs. finds them ties it invalidity validity or of for- must be en- judgment that the for a tered; eign wholly against her, consideration divorce is a them but it if finds disposition question inquire a wife’s may irrelevant the the into it still Consistency validity claim for maintenance. Florida divorce. The the the court, theory require would manding un- seem to this re- the this and conflict between redecision, derlying the instant case for the decision—that the court’s foreign invalidity validity to limit the District to a deter- di- of the or question mination the whether or not irrelevant to the vorce is a consideration any equitable disposition claim of “the usual defenses” of wife’s maintenance way Hopson’s pre- —appears stand in the of Mrs. to leave the District Court claim; vailing on her maintenance if direction as to its without sufficient judg- duty. Bearing inquiry no such defense is established then in mind that into Hopson’s validity Mrs. ment should be entered in favor; of the Florida divorce the only if, if such defense is on consideration of estab- be made against they, equitable lished should alone or defenses some Peff, Dis outside the see Peff v. N.J. A.2d be noted It should opinion by Supreme (1919), are di the authorities of Columbia trict Jersey written for the Aek- and after decision New court before both vided erson, or not and concurred all of the whether J. v. Estin Estin maintenance, including unadjudicated members other claim an Vanderbilt, (who alimony, a valid for Chief Justice one survives or participate); DeYoung eign com did not De- There is a of divorce. subject Young, in 28 prehensive 27 Cal.2d P.2d 457 note on opinion by seq. (1946), Court of et A.L.R.2d authority California written court is substantial There unadjudicated Spence, J. effect example, For survive. does claim them, principles appropriate shall been determined of law Hopson, Mrs. event what—in the of a decision case before court already known, through court its thus are to exercise decides whether reported cases, duty defined examine into the freedom to statutes or it is the question validity of application court to decide the case If, if it finds the principles. divorce—is court to do of those how- valid; ever, if is it do it novel, what the case is if there are no opinion principles deci- statutory finds it invalid? The known of local or give appropriate these sion of no answer to court law for the solution of the. questions. bar, in the case at will then have recourse to well reasoned court’s Speculating to what by reputable decisions courts other may mean: It opinion and decision jurisdictions in similar cases and will ap pear Florida divorce if the usually follow them. If does Hopson to be valid determined necessary propositions not find the prevail tc be allowed is not jurisdictions, law in other if it does any equi- if maintenance claim—because approve them, but cannot ifor it finds determined shall table defense against divided, authorities will considered without her when by choosing attempt then . . invalidity validity or reference among competing compet- decisions and divorce, then Florida fortiori ing analogies, to decide the case at bar validity prevail if the she should not general prin- in accordance with some question determined ad- shall be ciple analogies that harmonizes with the versely would seem to to her. But it justice.” the of law and with It is thus from if the Florida di- follow this that properly grows.7 that the law But the she determined to be invalid vorce is deciding court in the instant fol- position. Does then be a better will lows none of the methods above de- then allowed this mean that will be she scribed. It could have decided the case prevail claim de- on her maintenance proposition thj applying appropriate the spite equitable fact the de- recognized gen- locally of law both and against her should determined fenses be erally if there is substantial evi- without reference to when considered findings dence to the of a trial validity question of Florida the appeals uphold court the court of it, must so, appear If it divorce decree? would appropriate proposi- and the further if cn the of this that Hopson pleads remand case Mr. recognized locally tion of law both and establishes and generally foreign of a decree di- guilty collusion, has been con- wife of without entered establishment during vorce of cealment of cover- misconduct plaintiff domicile is invalid for judgment ture, a laches blackmail of lack the render- might .court for maintenance nevertheless be by applying statute, it and local a entered her favor. Such result the (1951), 16-415 D.C.Code which au- hardly § intended. if court ca:i have But compel thorizes the Court to intended, will of what avail is maintain his wife and husband to minor the District be the reconsideration resulted, child. That has validity Court oi the of explained dissenting above in this Florida divorce? affirming opinion, in a decision IV judgment Court in of Mrs. Hopson’s But favor. the court does not of the court pinion decision oThe case. ju- What the court accepted so decide does my view, from depart, prop- court elementary announces is this: is It methods. dicial given law for solution of osition of a dif- jurisdiction in if paraphrase ‘which, Study statement is Wambaugh, §§ of Cases 73- See language quoted appears. foregoing § 1894), which (2d ed. case, an it entered a wit, case in which them judgment him—since ferent Hopson’s unadjudicated favor. It claim is con- Mrs. maintenance may foreign decree; be in this con- commented further a valid fronted proposition claim text that it is ironical that the decision that such a law is court, apparently to en- intended such a The court also survives decree. large procedure in future maintenance cases to be followed announces a involving foreign decrees, involving valid future cases maintenance disadvantage operates the wife divorce decrees. The court then now applies newly before the court—whose announced rule of procedure present maintenance on record and law to the solution of case, under the local statute the instant present which involves on the clear. To benefit future record an invalid plaintiffs penalizes divorce, judgment suit reverses the wife now disposition before the court. remands the case procedure. under this new rule and new Hopson: Since As to Dewane only This method of is not decision a judgment reversed and is to be departure judicial accepted from meth- case remanded ods, unwarranted, and is on that account redecision, reconsideration and is, but also it reasons above equitable may view defenses stated, unnecessary. entry Hopson, raised Mr. distinguished judgment The unwarranted character the de- final —as parture pendente effect lite relief order—as accented from parties proper to the case. As to Mrs. for the benefit of Dewane securing Hopson: postponed. And Instead of affirm- will at least be as to not, equitable ance now of the Dis- whether or if an defense Court, Hopson compelled trict by action—in which Mrs. undergo Hopson plaintiff the court to retrial and is the established —is against her, any judgment may consequent of the redecision be en- delay expense. Moreover, present and in in the favor of tered action Hopson permitted opinion present Mr. retrial is be and Dewane deci- against equitable raise defenses Mrs. sion the court are silent. Must the Hopson, and, tolo; equi- if he establishes such dismissed in an be is action defense, against is to defeat maintenance defense Mrs. table established claim, Hopson way, unless the District Court exer- to stand in the so far present concerned, cises its discretion to re-examine action the as validity Hopson’s duty of the of the of Mr. Florida enforcement doing arising divorce and in so Dewane out of determines it the re- invalid, may lationship parent in which she event be and child? Is dealt favorably (although just with more avoid a how of the court to decision effort might is, explained, “stig- by as above not made clear in opinion unnecessarily court). subsequent and decision of the matize mar- Also, noted, riage it is to be this and the born authoriza- children thereof”— Hopson equitable e., protect tion Mr. to raise the effort of the court to i. defenses the retrial of child born of the case is the of Mr. notwithstanding Hopson subsequent the fact that when to the Florida di- originally adjudication instant case was from an before the vorce the Dis- might Hopson pleaded District Court Mr. Court which reflect trict defeat, Hopson’s legitimacy present such defenses Mrs. its —to claim; action, support? and notwithstand- Dewane to ing if, pleading justice, charity, the fact without like Should com- defenses, he raised them at home? Should not this the mence court recognize obligation prior evidence, protect course of the introduction of Hopson the District Court must have determined interest Dewane who is grants said, questions, But if the court Mrs. Mere- it? These before rehearing petition present opin- banc dith's are left unanswered then Mr. Meredith will have cause to ion and decision. aggrieved. feel rehear- While in such ing he, Meredith, as well as will V opportunity have an heard this court decision opinion and The opportunity will futile so injustice to either preventable occasion far as Mr. Meredith is concerned since explained isAs Meredith. Mr. Mrs. or above, he will find himself confronted original deci- its binding precedent of the decision ruled Meredith Meredith sion instant case with its modification of' the unadjudi- Estin an of Estin in view previous ruling in Meredith v. Mere- val- claim survives cated dith. instant The will decision divorce, id announced the modification unfavorable wife, D.C. also that ruled but having to Mr. Meredith without his local (1951) declared a 16-415 Code § opportunity had an to be heard in re- recovery main- policy which forbade spect rehearing of it. On the notwithstanding a wife tenance obliged Meredith case this court will be ap- survival, not entered if she apply ruling and will foreign proceeding. As pearance in the therefore remand the case a retrial although affirmed, this court a result in the District Court under the modifi- difieren; grounds, result reached ruling cation of the Meredith and un- Court, its decision was procedure der the new outlined in the As favor. Meredith’s Mr. therefore opinion. court’s Thus Mr. Meredith disposi- above, explained required undergo will expense court affirms case the of the instant tion of a Court, retrial in the District ruling in Mere- first reiterates the this in the face aof state law which rejects Meredith, the second dith v. possible make it for Mrs. Meredith a wife’s local main- announces that prevail against him. (which has survived a claim tenance injustice to Mrs. Meredith if her may prevail divorce) valid petition rehearing granted, is not notwithstand- District of Columbia granted, to Mr. Meredith if (1951) provided D.C.Code 16-415 § prevented. jus- could have been I think satisfy the District Court can wife required tice that at the time of the equities This in her favor. are sponte rehearing sua order for in banc ruling Meredith in modification case, thereafter, in the instant or Mrs. ipso course, Meredith, does not petition rehearing Meredith’s for in unfavorably Mr. to Meredith alter facto banc in the Meredith case should also Mere- in But Mrs. that case. decision granted have been and the two cases rehearing banc, petition in for dith’s together. and consolidated heard In pending this must before still parties event each to upon. her If the denies ruled be oppor- two tunity cases have had an petition Meredith will have cause Mrs. heard in court in this re- feeling aggrieved since modifi- for spect previous of the modification of its ruling original Meredith cation ruling in the Meredith case. her; peti- if and is favorable summary my rehearing In and conclusion: banc in had been for tion granted, spon- of the court decision at time sua view the rehearing unwarranted the fol- banc the instant case te ordered supported thereafter, case, lowing It is not and if reasons: or instant contrary cited; it is had been cases consolidated for the authorities existing two jurisdiction disposition, argument in this authorities Mrs. Mere- theory of presumably the decision would have had the and to dith case; this in the more favorable Court Williams it decision. benefit “ * * * was, insufficiently Court District Our view directs the is, duty un- respect and future Court’s in this the District of its cases; of law to doubted of mainte- in its announcement applied procedure nance suits nonresidents to be followed between involving valid domiciled elsewhere should maintenance suits divorce, ap- exercised unless unusual circum- procedure justify plication of law and stances here.” trial only present involves case which There are no unusual circumstances departure decree, it is a invalid justify the ex- accepted judicial appellate meth- from ods, jurisdiction by ercise of District consequent with hard- unwarranted I would Court. directions reverse ship Hopson possibly to Mrs. dismiss, clearly I think the court unjust Hopson; to Dewane it exercising ju- abused its discretion in petition rehearing if Meredith risdiction. granted and Mr. Meredith if But, assuming is. properly jurisdiction— accepted Court should, pres- I think the court under my court now view holds— clearly applicable, law ent affirm the is that the should be affirmed judgment of the District Court Mrs. reasons set forth dissent- Hopson’s favor. ing opinion Judge STEPHENS, of Chief in which I concur. MILLER, Judge

WILBUR K. Circuit

(dissenting). par-

When this suit filed neither was

ty domiciled, employed was resident District of Columbia. The wife Hill, Maryland,

and child lived in Oxon also,

and the husband lived there about away. party a block Neither property in the District. Process QUEEN, Appellant, Charles M. served the husband while he was through passing the District of Colum- JONES, Appellee. Marvin H. Yet bia. exercised No. 11963. jurisdiction. United Appeals, States Curley, 1941, Curley said We District of Columbia Circuit. F.2d App.D.C. 732: Argued Jan. “ * * * public policy [T]he Decided Jan. does Columbia Rehearing Petition juris- require to take Denied courts Feb. dispute matrimonial of a diction persons who two are nei- between District nor domiciled ther thereof; especially residents even showing that the there is

where children, prop- welfare Laughlin and James J. Albert Messrs. interests, erty, public or other Washington, Ahern, Jr., C.,D. J. any way af- District are appellant. fected.” Melvin, 1942, O’Brien, U.S.App. Washington, Melvin v. John J. Mr. D. 39, 40, Somlcin, C., 129 F.2d with whom Mr. Fred Wash- D.C. foregoing excerpt C., brief, ap- ington, was on the quoted from D. Curley opinion pellee. added: and then

Case Details

Case Name: Tasanilla Hopson v. Delores Palmer Hopson

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Jan 20, 1955

Citation: 221 F.2d 839

Docket Number: 11558_1

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.