OPINION
¶ 1 This еase concerns the “borrowed servant” doctrine. The issue for decision is whether a general employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of two “borrowed employees” working at the jobsite of a special employer.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 2 James Tarron was injured while working at a Phelps Dodge Corporation copper smelter. He fell into a gap сreated when two workers removed access ramps to a converter. Instead of covering the gap or installing a barrier, the workers strung yellow caution tape around the opening. Thinking that a handrail was in place, Tarron leaned on the caution tape, lost his balance, and fell approximately eighteen feet, seriously injuring his elbow and anklе.
¶ 3 The two workers who put up the caution tape were temporary employees loaned to Phelps Dodge under a labor agreement with Bowen Machine & Fabricating, Inc. The labor agreement consisted of a 1995 “Master Agreement” and a 2004 “Supplement.”
¶ 4 Tarron sued Bowen, alleging that Bowen was responsible under the doctrine of respondeat suрerior for the negligent work of the two borrowed employees. 1
¶ 5 Bowen moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not vicariously liable because the two employees were working under Phelps Dodge’s direction. Tarron cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted Tarron’s motion and denied Bowen’s motion, finding that, although Phelps Dodge “exercised actual control over the work at issue,” section 6 of the Master Agreement gave Bowen the legal right to control the employees.
¶ 6 The jury awarded Tarron damages of $1.5 million, apportioning fault as follows: Tarron, 2%; Phelps Dodge, 38%; and Bowen, 60%.
¶ 7 The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Bowen’s motion for summary judgment, but reversed the partial summary judgment in favor of Tarrоn, finding an issue of material fact as to “whether Bowen surrendered to Phelps Dodge the exclusive right to control [the two employees’] work activities related to installing a barrier.”
Tarron v. Bowen Mach. & Fabricating, Inc.,
¶ 8 We granted Tarron’s petition for review and Bowen’s cross-petition because interpretation of the borrowed servant doctrine is an issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5, Clause 3, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-120.24 (2003).
*150 II. DISCUSSION
A. The Borrowed Servant Doctrine 2
1. Background
¶ 9 The doctrine of respondeat superior generally holds an employer vicariously liable for the negligent work-related actions of its employees.
See Throop v. F.E. Young & Co.,
¶ 10 A borrowed servant relationship arises
when an employer sends one of its employees to do some work for a separate business. The employer usually is referred to as the “general employer” in the law of agency. The separate business often is called the “borrowing” or “spеcial” employer. The transfer frequently is pursuant to a contract between the general and borrowing employers which calls for compensating the general employer____The general employer has no intention of severing its employment relationship with its employee. Instead, the loaned employee is subject to the instructions of the borrowing employer.
J. Dennis Hynes, Chaos and the Law of Borrowed Servant: An Argument for Consistency, 14 J.L. & Com. 1, 4 (1994).
¶ 11 The doctrine has generated much confusion. Justice Cardozo reflected on the difficulty in determining when to attribute a borrowed employee’s acts to the general employer and when to the special: “The law that defines or seeks to define the distinction between general and special employers is beset with distinctions so delicate that chaos is the consequence. No lawyer can say with assurance in any given situation when one employment ends and the other begins.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L.Rev. 113, 121 (1921); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 cmt. d(2) (2006) (“When an actor negligently injures a third party while performing work for the firm that has contracted for the actor’s services, the question is whether that firm (often termed the ‘special employer’) or the initial employer (often termed the ‘general employer’), or both, should be subject to liability to the third party.”).
¶ 12 To determine whether a general employer remains vicariously liable for the negligent act of an employee it has contracted out to another, courts typicаlly examine whether the general employer either exercised actual control over the acts giving rise to the injury or retained a right to control those acts.
See, e.g., Williams v. Wise,
¶ 13 In determining liability, courts focus on “which employer had control of the details of the particular work being done at the time of the injury-causing incident.”
Ruelas v. Staff Builders Pers. Servs., Inc.,
¶ 14 The Master Agreement provides that the loaned employees are “not agents or employees” of Phelps Dodge and that Phelps Dodge “will have no direction or control as to the method of performance” of their work. Based on this language, the trial court found Bowen vicariously liable as a matter of law, reasoning that it had retained a contractual right to control the two borrowed workers.
*151
¶ 15 Summary judgment is appropriate “if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund,
¶ 16 Notwithstanding the sweeping language in
Lee Moor
and the Restatement sections, summary judgment on the question may sometimes be appropriate. If the evidence is such that “reasonable persons might well come to different conclusions as to who had the control or right of control at the time of the accident, the issue should be submitted to the jury.”
Williams,
2. Contract Reservation of Right to Control
¶ 17 The record contains ample evidence that Phelps Dodge actually controlled the work of the two employees. Notwithstanding this evidence, Tarron claims that the superior court correctly ruled, based on language in the Master Agreement, that Bowen had reserved a contractual right to control the employees.
¶ 18 Workers are often borrowed “pursuant to a contract between the general and borrowing employers which calls for compensating the general employer.” Hynes, supra ¶ 10, at 4. These contracts “routinely provide that the lent employee is not a special employer’s employee for any purpose.” Section 6 of the Master Agreement follows that model, providing that Phelps Dodge “will have no direction or control as to the method of performance of the Work” performed by employees borrowed from Bowen. The provisions of the Master Agreement, on their face, thus plainly gave Bowen the right to control the work of the two employees.
¶ 19 The question nonetheless remains whether, despite these contract terms, Bowen ceded that right to Phelps Dodge. Bowen maintains that notwithstanding the contract terms, the court should find as a matter of law that Phelps Dodge exercised complete control over the details of the job function at issue. Tarron counters that the contract provisions conclusively establish Bowen’s right to control as a matter of law.
¶ 20 The court of appeals correctly rejected both positions. Contrary to Tarron’s assertion, contract language does not always determine employment status.
See Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,
¶ 21 In
Santiago,
for example, the plaintiff was injured when hе was struck by a newspaper delivery ear.
¶22 We concluded that “[e]ontract language does not determine the relationship of the parties[;] rather the ‘objeсtive nature of the relationship [is] determined upon an analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case.’ ”
Id.
at 508,
¶ 23 Santiago demonstrates that contractual language is not talismanie. Contractual provisions may provide evidence of employment status, but they are not determinative. The trier of fact must examine the objective nature of the employment relationship when determining employment status, one indicator of which may be contract terms.
3. The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03
¶ 24 The court of appeals also relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 in determining that it should “not limit the facts to be considered to the contract between the two employers[,] but ... the jury should consider all relevant facts, especially facts that contradict the clear terms of a contract.”
Tarron,
¶25 Arizona courts have traditionally relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 for guidance in dеtermining an employer’s right to control employees.
See, e.g., Williams,
¶ 26 The Third Restatement retains the presumption, but permits the general employer to rebut it by presenting “factual indi-cia” showing that the special employer has assumed control. See § 7.03 cmt. d(2). It recognizes that a general employer in the business of providing temporary workers may surrender or cede to the special employer its right to control the work of borrowed employees. See id. (“When both a general and special employer have the right to control an employee’s conduct, the practical history of direction may establish that one employer in fact ceded its right of control to the other, whether through its failure to exercise the right or otherwise.”).
¶ 27 We find approрriate § 7.03’s practical allocation of liability to the employer that actually controls the work or has the right to control the accidenheausing conduct and is in the best “position to take measures to prevent the injury suffered by the third party.” It harmonizes with our borrowed servant jurisprudence by examining the right to control and emphasizing that such an analysis should usually be a question for the trier of fact. See id.
¶ 28 Although not providing an exhaustive list, § 7.03 identifies several factors to guide the righi^of-control determination, many of which have been employed by Arizona courts for years. It includes
*153 the extent of control that an employer may exercise over the details of an employee’s work and the timing of the work; the relationship between the employee’s work and the nature of the special employer’s business; the nature of the employee’s work, the skills required to perform it, and the degree of supervision customarily associated with the work; the duration of the employee’s work in the special employer’s firm; the identity of the employer who furnishes equipment or other instrumental-ities requisite to performing the work; and the method of payment for the work.
Id.
§ 7.03 cmt. d(2);
cf. Ruelas,
¶ 29 In some instances, a general employer and a spеcial employer may both be vicariously liable for an injury.
See, e.g., Inmon,
¶ 30 The possibility of dual liability for the acts of borrowed servants conflicts with the notion that a special employer must have the exclusive right to control a borrowed employee in order to be vicariously liable, and to the extent that our cases suggest that exclusive control is necessary, we disapprove such suggestions.
See Inmon,
¶ 31 We also distance ourselves from the “furthering the business” language in
Lee Moor,
4. Bowen’s Right to Control Borrowed Employees
¶ 32 Whether Bowen ceded its right to control the borrowed employees’ work must be cоnsidered in light of the facts relating to the injury-causing event. The trial court considered only one fact — the contractual provisions — which, although relevant to the determination of whether Bowen retained a right of control, are not conclusive on the issue. We agree with the court of appeals that there was sufficient evidence in the record to сreate a material issue of fact regarding whether, despite the contract, Bowen had ceded its right of control to Phelps Dodge. The grant of summary judgment therefore was not proper.
B. New Trial
¶ 33 Because we find that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Bowen retained a right to control the work of the borrowed employees, we affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s entry of partial summary judgment as to Bowen’s vicarious liability and remand for a new trial. For the same reason, we agree with the court of appeals that summary judgment was properly denied to Bowen. We take this opportunity to clarify the issues on remand.
¶ 34 The jury awarded Tarron $1.5 million in damages. Because the jury’s аward was unrelated to which employer was liable to pay damages, we see no reason to retry the jury’s award of damages.
¶ 35 The jury allocated thirty-eight percent of fault to Phelps Dodge and two percent to Tarron. Neither the petition nor the cross- *154 petition challenges those allocations. Tar-ron’s petition for review seeks to affirm thе trial court judgment holding Bowen liable for the remaining sixty percent as a matter of law; the cross-petition claims that Bowen is not liable at all under the facts of this case. There is therefore no reason to remand on any issue other than whether Bowen ceded its right to control the work performed by the two employees. The remand is therefore limited to that issue.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Tarron as to Bowen’s vicarious liability, affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand this cause to the trial court for a new trial.
Notes
. Tarron’s recovery from Phelps Dodge was limited to workers’ compensation benefits. See Ariz. Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 23-1022 (1995) (making recovery of workers’ compensation “the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment”).
. We use the term "borrowed servant” or "borrowed employee” doctrine to distinguish vicarious liability in the tort context from the "loaned” or "lent” employee doctrine applicable in the workers’ compensation context.
See Inmon v. Crane Rental Seivs., Inc.,