72 Miss. 731 | Miss. | 1895
delivered the opinion of the court.
The trial of the appellant in the court below was begun on January 22 and concluded on the twenty-fifth of the same month. On the trial W. L. Cromwell, sheriff of the county in which the trial was had, appeared as a witness for the prosecution, and testified to material facts. George Cromwell, a son of the sheriff and his deputy, was also introduced as a witness by the state, and testified to the same facts. J. A. Stacey, another regular deputy sheriff, was likewise a witness on behalf of the state, and testifie,d to other material facts.
On the night before the jury returned their verdict, and after their retirement from the bar for deliberation, the two
The eighth and tenth grounds of the motion for a new trial rest upon the presence with the jury in their retirement to consider of their verdict of public officers who were material witnesses for the prosecution, and the action of the court in overruling this motion squarely presents for decision the effect of such gross irregularity upon the finding of the jury.
The prime object sought to be attained by the withdrawal of the jury from the bar of the court, by their exclusion from all others and by the exclusion of all others from them, is that in absolute privacy they may deliberate undisturbed by any outward influence. In their deliberations they must examine, discuss, weigh and pass upon the evidence. They may have occasion to criticise and discredit. parts of it, and, properly to discharge their delicate and often difficult duties in these particulars, they should be in condition to speak and^ act with perfect freedom. Alone and in seclusion, they enjoy this perfect freedom, for their deliberations are confidential. They need neither hesitate nor fear to frankly and freely speak out as to any witness, or the evidence of any witness.
This view has been vigorously maintained in State v. Snyder, 20 Kan., 306; in People v. Knapp, 42 Mich., 267; in Gainey v. The People, 97 Ill., 270; and in Richard v. State, 74 Ind., 275, nor has its soundness been impugned by any court of last resort, so far as our research has extended.
This ground for reversal is not technical. It is vital, and of universal interest. It affects not only the prisoner, but the whole body of the people, for it touches the confidence of the public in the purity and impartiality of the trial by jury.
Reversed and remanded.