This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when she alighted from defendant’s automobile. Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff entered on a jury’s verdict. The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiff was a guest within OBS 30.110, or a paying, passenger. ① There was no evidence of gross negligence.
The facts are as follows. Defendant, age 22, was unmarried and lived in Corvallis where she was employed. Her mother, the plaintiff, lived in Albany. On the evening before the accident defendant called plaintiff and asked her to come to Corvallis and help defendant look for an apartment. The .plaintiff agreed *363 and on the following day she drove her car to Corvallis where she joined her daughter. They then proceeded in defendant’s car, the defendant driving. After spending a short time shopping they began their search for a suitable apartment. The day wore on and plaintiff announced that she would have to go back to Albany to prepare dinner for her husband. It was decided that defendant would drive plaintiff home and that after preparing the meal they would return and resume their search for an apartment. At defendant’s request, plaintiff purchased gasoline for defendant’s car. Upon their return to Corvallis they looked for apartments for awhile, shopped for groceries, and finally returned to their starting point. Defendant parked at the curb leaving the motor running and she and plaintiff conversed for ten or fifteen minutes. As plaintiff started to alight from the car defendant’s foot slipped off the clutch, the car lurched forward and plaintiff was thrown to the pavement causing the injuries for which she brought this action.
Plaintiff contends that she was a paying passenger and not a “guest without payment” within OES 30.110. The contention rests upon the theory that defendant received a benefit in the form of her mother’s advice and assistance in attempting to find suitable living quarters. Plaintiff states the rule to be that “One who accepts a ride for the sole purpose of performing a service for the driver of a vehicle is not a guest but a passenger.” ② The rule is stated too broadly. There *364 must not only be a benefit but tbe benefit must be more than “vague or trivial” ③ and it must be one that has some significance beyond the usual social amenities which are expected in the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Certainly the requirement of a benefit to the defendant would not have been fulfilled if plaintiff had ridden with her daughter for the purpose of providing her with companionship, or to console her in time of trouble, or to help her select a new dress, or any one of many different activities normally engaged in by mother and daughter as an ordinary part of family intercourse. The benefit in the present case is of the same nature.
Nor did the purchase of gasoline by plaintiff for defendant at the latter’s request constitute “payment” within the meaning of the statute. This is not like
Johnson v. Kolovos,
*365
The situation in the case at bar is the converse of that in the recent case of
Spring v. Liles,
Plaintiff further contends that if she was a guest there was a jury question as to whether that status terminated after defendant’s car had stopped and the transportation of plaintiff had terminated. We are of the opinion that plaintiff’s status as a guest continued while she was in the act of alighting from the car. The jury could not reasonably find otherwise.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant.
Notes
The cause of- action ..arose prior to the amendment of the guest statute in. 1961; ORS 30.115.
In support of the statement plaintiff cites Sheehan v. Apling,
Johnson v. Kolovos,
See cases cited in Spring v. Liles,
In similar fact situations it has been held that a family member was a passenger. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal2d 244,