James V. Tusino, the Superintendent of the Department of Public Works (DPW) for the Town of Seekonk, Massachusetts (“Town”), appeals from a district court judgment directing him to pay plaintiff-appellee H. Charles Tapaban compensatory and punitive damages for violating Ta-palian’s equal protection rights in connection with a road reconstruction project. As we discern no error, we affirm the district court judgment.
I
BACKGROUND
Our review of the record discloses that the jury rationally could have found the following facts: In 1989, the Town rejected Tapalian’s application for a permit to construct a subdivision — to be known as “Pembroke Estates” — because Davis Street, the lone access road to the subdivision, was too narrow. Tapaban brought suit against the Town in state court, and in 1994 the parties entered into an Agreement for Judgment (“Agreement”) whereby Tapaban agreed as a precondition to *4 the construction of Pembroke Estates that he would improve a portion of Davis Street at his own expense, by “scarifying” the existing road surfaсe then resurfacing it with a double layer of oil-sealed “stone chip” to a paved width of twenty-two feet. The Agreement further prescribed that Tapalian’s specifications must be approved by the Town’s DPW director.
In 1995, Tusino was appointed the new DPW superintendent for the Town. In 1997, Tusino, who was unaware of the 1994 Agreement, caused Davis Street to be widened and resurfaced with “stone chip” at the Town’s expense. Early in 1998, after Tusino had learned of the Agreement, Ta-palian and Tusino met for the first time, at Davis Street, to discuss other Davis Street improvements (if any) which Tapalian would be required to make before Tapalian could commence construction of Pembroke Estates. Tusino infоrmed Tapalian that, as a condition of his approval of the specifications, Tapalian was to set him up with “two women” who worked at a nightclub located in a building owned by Tapalian. Tapalian advised Tusino that he was not about to act as his “pimp.”
At their next meeting, Tusino sought to impose upon Tapalian other more onerоus conditions not explicitly contemplated under the 1994 Agreement. Although Tusino had not consulted with any engineering expert, he informed Tapalian that he interpreted the term “scarification” — contained in the Agreement — to require that Tapali-an undertake a costly pulverization of the existing stone-chip surface which the Town had just installed within the previous year. Whereas in road-construction parlance scarification simply requires that grooves be etched into the old road surface to ensure adequate adhesion of the newly applied surfacing materials.
In addition, Tusino insisted that Tapali-an straighten the curves in Davis Street, pave the entire street (as distinguished from the portion specified in the Agreement), and construct three-foot-deep, gravel-filled trenches on both sides of the resurfaced roadway, almost three times the depth prescribed by the “industry standard.” Further, Tusino informed Tapalian that he wanted asphalt as the top coat, whereas the Agreement called for a less expensive stonе-chip surface. Finally, Tu-sino insisted that Tapalian conduct unprecedented sieve tests on several gravel samples and that Tapalian use more expensive gravel. Tusino’s assistant confided to Ta-palian’s contractor that Tusino was intent upon “deliberately busting [Tapalian’s] balls.”
In November 1998, Tapalian commenced a statе court action for contempt against Tusino and the Town, which had superintended the Agreement, arguing that the imposition of the new conditions flagrantly violated the terms of the Agreement. The Town in turn commenced a lawsuit to enjoin Tapalian from cutting trees on the subdivision land until after he completed the specified updates to Davis Street.
On December 11, 1998, Tusino wrote to Tapalian, stating that he had issued an order on December 1 that all road construction projects in the Town were to cease for the winter. Yet, notwithstanding the purported promulgation of this unprecedented moratorium, on December 17 Tu-sino issued a permit to another contractor, Kevin Murphy, to begin work on a nearby road construction project at the “Middle-march” subdivision. Moreover, none of the additional conditions imposed upon Ta-palian were imposed upon Murphy.
In the spring of 2000, Tapalian decided to proceed. He hired a contractor to dismantle the surface of Davis Street and install a new surface, as Tusino hаd insisted. Tusino then superimposed a host of additional, costly conditions. For instance, *5 he demanded that the road be sprayed with calcium chloride, a procedure Tapali-an’s contractor deemed not only unprecedented but unnecessary. Finally, in the course of these discussions, Tusino informed Tapalian’s contractor that he also expected to be provided with “a forty-foot boat and two girls.”
Meanwhile, in November 2000, Tapalian and the Town settled the pending contempt action brought by Tapalian, as well as the Town’s claim for injunctive relief, and the parties agreed to the appointment of an independent engineer to determine whether the final rоadwork met the terms of their 1994 Agreement. Thus, Tusino was relieved of any oversight authority relating to the Davis Street project.
Soon after an independent engineer certified in 2000 that Tapalian was in compliance, Tapalian commenced the instant action in federal district court against the Town and Tusino, alleging that Tusino’s actions violated the Equal Protection Clause,
see
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and demanding both compensatory and punitive damages. In due course, Tusino counterclaimed for defamation and infliction of emotional distress. After determining that the November 2000 settlement was res judicata, the district court dismissed the Tapalian claims against the Town. However, the district court denied the motion for summаry judgment filed by Tusi-no, in his individual capacity, noting that Tusino had adduced no evidence that he was in privity with the Town in relation to the November 2000 settlement.
Tapalian v. Town of Seekonk,
II
DISCUSSION
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
First, Tusino contends that he is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because Tapalian failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish all elements of his equal protection claim. Denials of motions for judgment as a matter оf law are reviewed
de novo;
and after viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom (as well as credibility determinations) in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will reverse the district court “ ‘only if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have reаched a verdict against that party.’”
Santos v. Sunrise Med., Inc.,
The Equal Protection Clause contemplates that similarly situated persons are to receive substantially similar treatment from their government.
See Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. and Mortgage Fin. Corp.,
The Tapalian claim rests upon the latter prong,
viz.,
an allegation of malice or
*6
bad faith. Normally, such a plaintiff must establish more than that the government official’s actions were simply arbitrary or erroneоus; instead, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s actions constituted a “gross abuse of power.”
Baker v. Coxe,
1. The “Similarly Situated” Standard
The determination as to whether individuals are “similarly situated” for equal protection purposes is an amorphous one.
See Barrington Cove,
Tusino contends on appeal (i) that Tapa-lian has adduced no evidence that the Davis Street project was similarly situated in all relevant respects to the Murphy road project in the nearby Middlemarch subdivision, (ii) that Tapalian’s own investigator testified that there was “no comparison” between the two projеcts, and, thus, (iii) that Tapalian failed to establish that Tusi-no’s imposition of different specifications for the two projects violated Tapalian’s equal protection rights. These contentions fail.
The evidence adduced at trial did not preclude a rational jury from finding that Davis Street is similar to other road construction projects in Seekonk.
See Santos,
The distinctions suggested by Tusino— between Davis Street and Middlemarch— rest principally upon his premise that the former project required heightened construction specifications because the public would utilize Davis Street more extensively than the Middlemarch Road. His public-welfare justification is belied, however, by the evidence that the Town itself had uрgraded and widened Davis Street as recently as 1997, yet had not considered it necessary, in the interests of public safety, that it upgrade Davis Street to the more stringent specifications Tusino sought to *7 impose upon Tapaban only a few months later, during early 1998. To cite but one instance, the Town admittedly did not dig roadside trenches to a depth of three feet. Thus, in light of the unobjected-to jury instruction, the jury remained free to infer that conditions at Davis Street were not such a special case, but instead were substantially similar to other road construction sites in Seekonk.
2. The “Selective Treatment” Standard
Tusino contends that his motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because Tapaban adduced no evidence which would compel a jury to conclude that Tusino lacked a rational basis for according different treatment to the Davis Street project. Tusino asserts (i) that the Agreement explicitly provided that “[a]ll specifications for the paving of the Improved Davis Street ... shall be as approved by the Director of the Seekonk [DPW],” and (ii) that the heightened specifications he imposed upon Tapaban were based upon his good-faith interpretation of certain ambiguous terms in the Agreement. Each of these contentions is seriously flawed.
First, from the outset Tusino has misperceived the applicable standard of review. It is not necessary that the Tapaban еvidence
compel
a jury finding of selective treatment, but simply that it
permit
such a rational inference.
See Santos,
Second, as previously stated,
see supra
Section II.A.1, the “public-safety” rationale Tusino offers for imposing stringent conditions upon Tapaban is undermined by the more lax specifications of the Town’s earlier upgrade. Whatever ambiguities it may contain, the Agreement reasonably cannot be construed as according Tusino carte blanche to impose any spеcifications he deemed appropriate, including those which served no legitimate governmental purpose.
See Esmail,
Finally, yet most importantly, the trial record is laden with the language of personal malice and “bad faith” retaliation, aimed at punishing Tapaban immediately following his rejection of Tusino’s request that Tapaban supply him with “two wоmen.” Although Tusino denies having made any such request, those credibility determinations were for the factfinder.
See Santos,
*8 B. Punitive Damages
Next, Tusino urges us to reduce or vacate the $150,000 punitive damages award. Challenges to punitive damages awards are reviewed
de novo,
and are to be affirmed unless “ ‘we find it “certain” that the amount in question exceeds that necessary to punish and deter the alleged miscоnduct.’ ”
Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez,
In this regard, Tusino first contends that a juror’s post-verdict comments, which appeared in a local newspaper, suggest that the jury improperly awarded high punitive damages in order to deter the Town, rather than Tusino. We do not consider post-discharge comments made by jurors to the press, since but for an “extraneous influence” exception not applicable here, a party is prohibited from impugning a jury verdict by probing the mental processes of the jurors.
See United States v. Connolly,
Second, Tusino complains that Tapaban failed to adduce evidence of Tusino’s financial circumstances, whereby the jury might have been enabled to determine that he could not afford a high punitive damages award. The present argument ignores the principle that it is the defendant’s burden — not the plaintiffs — to adduce evidence of the defendant’s lack of financial resources,
see Brown v. Freedman Baking Co.,
Finally, Tusino contends that the evidence adduced at trial does not support the great disparity between the $58,843 compensatory damages award and the $150,000 punitive damages award. In assessing the reasonableness of a punitive damages award, we consider (i) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (ii) the ratio between the punitive damages and the actual and potential damages; and (in) the comparison between the punitive damages figure and other civil and criminal penalties imposed for comparable conduct.
See Davis v. Rennie,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Tusino asserts on appeal that the Tapaban equal protection claim is barred by the res judicata effect of the November 2000 settlement of the lawsuits between the Town and Tapaban, since Tusino substantially controlled that litigation.
See In re Iannochino,