121 P. 584 | Utah | 1911
Lead Opinion
The respondent instituted this proceeding to obtain permission to enlarge certain irrigating canals or ditches belonging to appellants. The proceeding is grounded on Comp. Laws 1907, section 1288x22, which reads as follows: “When any person, corporation, or association desires to convey water for irrigation or for any other beneficial purpose, and there is a canal or ditch already constructed that can be enlarged to convey the required quantity of water, then such person, corporation, or association, or the owner or owners of the land through which a new canal or ditch would have to be constructed to convey the quantity of water necessary, shall have the right to enlarge said canal or ditch already constructed, by compensating the owner of the canal or ditch
Respondent in his complaint, among other things, in substance, alleged that he had the right to the use of ten second feet of the waters of Provo River in Utah County; that appellants were the appropriators of, entitled to the use of, and did use a large quantity of, the water flowing in said river; that they were diverting said water from said river, and were conveying it through two certain canals or ditches of which appellants were the owners, and which canals constitute one continuous waterway or system several miles in length; “that there is about 1000 acres of arid land owned by divers persons near the north end of the said canal of the North Union Irrigation Company, as described, and it is so located with respect thereto that it is capable of being irrigated by waters drawn through the said canals; that said land is now barren and unproductive, and without artificial irrigation must remain so, and the only available source of water supply for the same is from Provo River, and the water now taken from the said river is insufficient to supply waters for the said land, and, in addition thereto, there is a large area of land in the same location, for the irrigation of which the water supply is wholly insufficient, and water for irrigation in the said locality has a ready rental value for irrigation and other purposes, and by increasing the said water supply in the said locality much arid land will be redeemed, and the use of such water be made of great value to its owner for rental and other purposes; that it is the plaintiff’s intention to, and he will, if he is permitted, enlarge the said canals as hereinafter prayed for, supply water for rental, to be used in the redemption of the said arid lands, and increase the supply for lands where the water right is at
It is not deemed necessary to set forth the averments of appellants’ answer, except to state that appellants denied that respondent was the owner of ten second feet of water, or any other quantity in excess of three second feet, and averred that the nature of the soil in which said canals are constructed is such as to cause great injury to said canals if respondent be permitted to reopen the bottom or sides thereof.
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and among other facts found by the court are the following: That respondent owns certain water rights in Provo River, the exact quantity of which is not found except that it exceeds a flow of two second feet; “that at certain seasons of the year there is a large flow of water in said river in excess of the waters appropriated by any person or persons whomsoever which is subject to an appropriation, and which plaintiff (respondent) intends to appropriate and divert from the said river at the point aforesaid, together with the water already
The court, in the decree based upon its findings, among other things, required that the canals be enlarged under the supervision of a competent civil engineer who may be selected by appellants and whose services shall be paid for by respondent; that, wherever the “water surface” of said canals is broken and the character of the soil is such as may cause loss of water by seepage or percolation, such places, if any, must be sealed by puddling or other means so as to avoid loss as aforesaid; that respondent must bear the loss of water while in transit through said canals. It is also provided that the
The decree also provides as follows: “It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff, before entering upon work of enlargement, execute and file in this cause in the above-named court a good and sufficient bond in the penal sum of $15,000, to be approved by the clerk of said court, in favor of the defendants jointly and severally, conditioned for the execution of said work of enlargement in such manner as to add ten second feet carrying capacity to each of the said canals without injury to the said canals, and to maintain the same with their present margin of safety and in as an impervious state to water as they are at the present time, and conditioned for the payment of all damages that may arise to the defendants or either of them through failure- to execute said enlargement in manner aforesaid, and conditioned for the payment to the defendants and each of them of all damages which may be done to them or any person for which they may be responsible, arising out of the enlargement of said canal by plaintiff, and further conditioned that the plaintiff will pay all costs and expenses of controlling, regulating and dividing his water as aforesaid by the defendants and his pro rata costs and expenses of maintaining the said canals as hereinbefore decreed and determined. The said bond shall be perpetual and' a condition precedent to the right of the plaintiff to enlarge said canals, and precedent to the right of the plaintiff and his successors in title to flow water therein. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the damages to the defendants and each of them, except such as may arise through defective or insufficient enlargement of the said canals, are
While counsel for appellant have assigned quite a number of errors by which they assail the findings of fact and some of the conclusions of law, yet in their brief they have practically confined their arguments to three only of the assignments.
The first assignment relates to the findings; and it is contended that the court erred in finding that the respondent “is the owner of certain water and water rights in and to the waters of Provo Biver, together with the right to divert the same from said river at the point where the canal of the Provo Bench Canal Company intersects said river,” because there is no evidence to sustain such finding. The argument of counsel in this respect is that the
But it is contended that respondent has not shown that he has an actual and subsisting right to the use of ten second feet of water, and hence the court erred in giving the respondent the right to enlarge appellants’ canals for the purpose of conveying water through them which he does not own. As already pointed out, respondent has some water which he can divert into appellants’ canals, and it is undisputed that in certain seasons of each year there
Appellants, however, contend that said application should be ignored by us because it was made for the benefit of, and allowed by, respondent, who in his official capacity as state engineer is alone authorized to pass upon and allow such applications. The statute of this state, so- far as we are aware, does not exclude any person from making an application for any of the unappropriated waters
Upon principle the conclusions reached in the foregoing cases seem to us to be clearly sound. The applicant who seeks to enlarge a ditch, before be may proceed to do so, must pay the owner thereof all the damages be may sustain by reason of the enlargement. In the case at bar respondent
Appellants also insist that the court erred in finding that “both of the said canals are such as to admit of enlargement and increased carrying capacity without detriment or injury thereto.” Although this finding is vigorously assailed, yet we think it is sustained by the clear, if not the-overwhelming, weight of the evidence. It is beyond dispute that appellants have constructed, and for many years have successfully maintained, the canals sought to be
Counsel for appellants most vigorously insist that the court committed flagrant error in fixing the amount of damages, and they in the strongest possible terms claim that sacred rights of their clients have been disregarded,
It is also contended that the burden of establishing the amount of damages was upon respondent, and that in any event the court erred in permitting him to enter upon appellants’ property before he had established what was just com
“The burden of showing necessity and public use is upon petitioner. The burden of showing the damages which the owner will suffer rests on him.”
In 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.), sec. 645, the rulis stated to be in accordance with the text quoted from Cyc., and the author of Lewis’ Eminent Domain, in part at least, collates the cases both for and against the rule as there stated. In addition to the numerous cases cited by Mr. Lewis, see, also, Monterey County v. Cushing, 83 Cal. 507, 23 Pac. 700, Los Angeles County v. Reyes, (Cal.), 32 Pac. 233, and cases there cited.
The question, therefore, is, D'id the court err in fixing the amount of damages? It must be remembered that it is conceded that the appellants did not own the fee of the lands traversed by the canals in question, but all they owned was an easement or right of way and right to maintain the canals upon the lands in question. All that respondent sought to, and all that he could, condemn, as against appellants, was a similar right or easement. Respondent’s easement was, however, to be imposed upon, or added to, appellants’ existing easement. No doubt appellants’ easement in legal contemplation constituted property, and an interference with or an impairment of it was, in legal effect, an interference with property or with a property right belonging to them, and for such interference or impairment they are entitled to what our Constitution terms “just compensation.” If appellants’ easement, therefore, is regarded as property, it nevertheless is property which was and could be used only for
Counsel, however, urge that to permit respondent to use their canals as contemplated will be of great advantage, andi may result in considerable profit to him. This may be so, and yet the question remains, In what way does what he is permitted to do damage appellants? They are limited in their recovery by the amount of damages suffered by them. They cannot recover for any benefit respondent
“The contention, of the railroad company is that the verdict and judgment for one dollar as the amount to he paid to it was, in effect, an appropriation of its property rights without any compensation whatever; that the judgment should he read as if in form as well as in fact it made no provision whatever for compensation for the property so appropriated. . . . The owner of private property taken under the right of eminent domain obtains just compensation if he is awarded such sum as, under all the circumstances, is a fair and full equivalent for the thing taken from him by the public. If the opening of the street across the railway tracks did not unduly interfere with the company’s use of the right of way for legitimate railroad purposes, then its compensation would be nominal.”
So here, if appellants’ use of their canals is “not unduly interfered with” by the enlargement and use that respondent is permitted to make of them under the conditions that are imposed upon him, then, in view that he neither takes any property nor interferes with any substantial property rights of appellants, their damages must be merely nominal. In what way does respondent interfere with appellants’ use of the canals? Is it reasonable to assume that ten second feet of water added to a flow of 125 second feet, or an increase of about eight per cent., will “unduly interfere”- with appellants’ use of the. canals ? While it is true that the quantity of water which respondent is permitted to add to the present flow in the canals might, under certain circumstances, cause injury, yet in this case the evidence clearly shows that such a result is not at all likely or probable. Moreover, the decree guards and protects appellants against any future damage or liability that may be occasioned by
“According to the best authorities, however, it is believed to be remuneration for the net injury which is suffered from the exercise of this sovereign right. The word ‘compensation’ imports that a wrong or injury has been inflicted, and must be redressed in money. Money must be paid to the extent of the injury. This may be less or more than the value of the property taken; but, when compensation has been made to the extent of the injury, the language and just purpose of the Constitution are satified.” (Italics ours.)
“The commissioners, therefore, could only award to the owners (of the prior easement) the value of the public easement taken, deducting therefrom the value of the private easement, which already encumbered the property. Matter of City of Brooklyn, 73 N. Y. 184. It is quite evident that the public right taken, deducting therefrom the value of the private easement, leaves only a nominal injury because the added burden is itself but technical and nominal. The real burden is in no manner increased by absorbing the private in the public right, or substituting the latter in the room and stead of the former, since as burdens on the land they are substantially identical.”
See, also, Joyce on Damages, section 76. If therefore, we attempt to express appellants’ damages in the terms employed by the New York Court of Appeals, it is still apparent that the value of their easement — that is, the value of the canals and the right to maintain and devote them to the purposes for which they are intended — is just as great after the enlargement as it was before. Nor is it apparent, nor probable, that the convenient use of the canals will be impaired to any appreciable extent.
But it is contended that appellants are affected in the control of the canals and in making repairs if any are necessary. Such a claim is always possible where one easement is added to another, and where a use becomes a doubled, instead of a single, one. This, however, is not a matter for which substantial damages can be allowed,
It is further contended by appellants’ counsel in their brief that by the decree appellants “are to be deprived of their right to enlarge (the canals), their right to appropriate additional water, their right to supply others for a profit to the extent at least that plaintiff occupies
The contention that some of the conclusions of law are erroneous, even if conceded to be true, is not of controlling importance in view of the findings. In our opinion the findings are supported by the evidence and the judgment is in accordance with the material findings of fact.
“Where some of the ‘conclusions of law’ in a decision are not properly drawn from the facts found, this is no ground for reversing the judgment if the ultimate conclusion upon which the judgment rests is not erroneous in view of the facts found. In such a case the minor conclusions are at most hut errors — erroneous deductions which do not injure the party complaining of them.”
See, also, Miller v. Hicken, 92 Cal. 229, 28 Pac. 339; Spencer v. Duncan, 107 Cal. 423, 40 Pac. 549.
Iu concluding this opinion, we desire to make it clear that by what we have said we do not mean that in making appli
We are clearly of the opinion that appellants’ use of their canals will be the same after the enlargement thereof as before, and that they have not shown wherein they will suffer inconvenience, injury, or damage to any extent, and hence the judgment ought to be, and it accordingly is, affirmed, with costs to respondent.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. My principal reasons therefor are stated in my dissenting opinion in the case of Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Company, infra, also just decided.