On October 1, 1910, the defendant F. L. Frink purchased land in Texas for a consideration of $12,210, рaying $2,199.33 in cash, and giving his notes, secured by vendor’s lien, for the balance. On December 16, 1913, a personal judgment for $8,680.39 was had against him in an action foreclosing the lien. This action is to subject to the payment of the judgment 80 acres of land, standing in the namе of Amy B. Frink, his daughter. The consideration for this eighty was- paid by him, and he caused it to be deeded to his daughter March 15, 1909, as a gift. Under this deed, recorded a few days later, she took and has retained possession. It is alleged that this deed was made to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, and judgment that Amy B. Frink holds title to said eighty in trust for creditors is prayed for.
At the time this voluntary conveyance was made by Frink to his daughter, and at the time of incurring the obligation, the basis of the judgment, October 1,1910', it does not appear that Frink had other indebtedness, or that credit was extended on the basis of his ownershiр of this or any other property. It would appear that, at the time of making thе voluntary conveyance to his daughter, Frink was possessed of property аs follows: An equity in 80 acres of land in Platte county, worth $6,700; money in the bank, $2,000; an automobile, $500; and the land in controversy, $4,250; making a total of $13,450. Ordinarily a man owning $13,450 worth of propеrty, with no debts, and who gives $4,250 of it to his daughter as an advancement or settlement upоn her, could hardly be said to make the gift for the purpose of hindering, delaying or dеfrauding creditors. No doubt an exception to this rule may arise if it appears that the gift is made for the purpose of avoiding or defeating creditors in some more or less hazardous
It is strenuously insisted by plaintiff that the time of Frink’s obligation should not date from the time the сontract was entered into and the notes given, October 1, 1910, but should date from the time when a prior contract was entered into for the purchase of the Tеxas land, December 23, 1908, which contract provided for the purchase of the land in the name of Frink’s wife, and upon which a .payment of $500 was made. It is contended that in this prior contract Frink was the real party in interest, and there is more or lеss evidence to support this contention, denied by Frink. If, however, we admit this to be true, then, while it would show that Frink at the time had an indebtedness in the amount of his notes given. for thе Texas land, it will also increase his assets in the amount of the value of the land.
' In determining whether his voluntary conveyance to his daughter was made to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, we must look at the situation as it existed at the time. The presumption must be that he thought-' the land, which he was buying and making payments of $2,199.33 upon, was worth what hе was paying for it. lie would hardly anticipate at that time that the land would be worth less, or anticipate this judgment of $8,680.39. The gift would not necessarily or presumptively make difficult or impossible the payment of any indebtedness that he would then know about, and we can hardly find fraud intended or effected by it. In Hill v. Schmuck,
We reach this conclusion with some hesitation after consideration of evidence. Assuming that the learned
For other cases bearing upon this question, see Seeley v. Ritchey,
The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED.