18 Wis. 163 | Wis. | 1864
By the Court,
The statute exempting personal property from sale on execution, after specifying certain articles of household furniture, adds the following: “ and all other household furniture not herein enumerated, not exceeding two hundred dollars in value.” The question presented in this
The counsel relied on a class of cases where general expressions in wills have been very liberally construed according to the supposed intentions of the donors. But even in those cases there was nothing going so far as to include a piano as furniture. But even if it might be possible in construing a will, where the circumstances indicate an intention in the testator to bestow everything in his-house, to give this general word that effect, we should still think that the general object and spirit of the provision of our constitution and statutes on the subj ect, would forbid it here. For though the influence of music and “ the concord of sweet sounds ” may, as counsel claimed, be of a refining and elevating character, and though it may add much to the pleasure of a home, still the object of the exemption laws was not to surround the debtor with all possible pleasures and enjoyments at the expense of his creditors, but simply to postpone the claims of justice to those of mercy, by leaving him what the constitution describes as the “ necessary comforts of a home.”
The class of articles mentioned in the statute in immediate connection with this general clause, which are plainly necessary for a family, show that by this clause the legislature intended to indicate other articles of a like nature. And the limitation of the value to two hundred dollars, which is less than the usual cost of a piano, shows that they could not have had reference to that instrument. The obvious design of this pro
It appeared in the case that the plaintiff was a pianist, and that he had taught music for pay within three months prior to the time of the seizure. We do not consider this sufficient to show that teaching music was at that time his business. On the contrary, the special and peculiar manner in which this fact is stated, would indicate that it was not. If that fact had appeared, it might have presented the further question, whether the instrument could have been claimed as exempt under the subsequent clause of the statute, which exempts the tools and implements, or stock in trade, of any mechanic, miner or other person, used and kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, and the library and implements of any professional man, not exceeding two hundred dollars in value. But as it is, the case does not present that question.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.