*1 Schimmels, in plaintiffs qui Circuit In re 127 the tarn Ninth action but MODIFY (9th Cir.1997). Schimmels, F.3d judgment the to be prejudice without appeals summary that a the court held States of the United America. in against qui order
judgment relator AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. precluded government tarn action from against bringing its own FCA case gov
defendants. The court noted “tacitly participated
ernment had in the
adjudication adversary pro of the relators’
ceeding” by holding “its adversarial own in
proceeding abeyance year, over a
presumably awaiting the outcome Here, actions.” Id. at n. 15. relator’s TANKS, Erica Willis as Administrator only was tacit partic not there no such Willis, of the Estate Thomas as but ipation, complaint itself was so Representative Personal of Thomas deficient the court never reached the Willis, for the Benefit of All Heirs of Furthermore, merits of the claim. our Willis, daugh Thomas and as natural approach previous is consistent with our Willis, Plaintiff-Appel ter of Thomas that a assertion dismissal one rela lee, may necessarily tor preclude another from bringing relator suit the same government. behalf See United CORP.; LOCKHEED MARTIN rel., ex States Laird v. Lockheed Martin al., Defendants, et (5th Cir.2003). Eng’g, F.3d Finally, while acknowledge we that our Corp.; Lockheed Martin Lockheed Mar ruling would in fact give government Systems tin Support Aeronautical opportunity further allega- to look into the doing business as Lockheed Martin relator, tions that opportunity is Company-Marietta, Aeronautics De constrained the statute of limitation fendants-Appellants. provisions of the FCA. See U.S.C. 3731(b) (“A may civil action ... not be No. 05-60028. ... brought more than years after the United States Court of Appeals, date when facts right material Fifth Circuit. reasonably action known or should been known have official July charged United States responsibility with ”). to act the circumstances.... Accord-
ingly, we find that prej- dismissal
udice as to the United was unwar- States where, here,
ranted as the relator’s claims 12(b)(6)
were dismissed on a Rule motion on a
based lack of specificity the com- 9(b). required
plaint as Rule
Ill reasons,
For above stated we AF-
FIRM the district dismissing court’s order *3 (argued), Troy Blair
William Fredric Bondurant, Odom, Farrell Blair & Bran- *4 don, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee. T. (argued), Luther Munford L. Fred Jr., Merritt, Banks, LaToya Phelps Cheree Dunbar, Ayers, Joseph L. David Collins Wohner, Jr., Jicka, David Mark Charles Clark, Jackson, MS, Eager, for Watkins & Defendants-Appellants. Collins, Kaiser, Bredhoff &
Jeremiah A. II, DC, Maxey, L. Washington, Max- John Wann, MS, Jackson, Intern. ey Ass’n of Workers, Aerospace Machinists AFL- CIO, Amicus Curiae. DeMOSS, WIENER,
Before PRADO, Judges. Circuit WIENER, Judge: Circuit Defendants-Appellants Mar- Aeronauti- Corp. tin and Lockheed Martin (“Lockheed”) Systems Support cal Co. interlocutory appeal, by took this certified to 28 pursuant the district court U.S.C. 1292(b), seeking § reversal district summary judgment favor partial court’s Erica Tanks. The of Plaintiff-Appellant court under the discrete district held case, of this facts and circumstances of the Missis- remedy” provision “exclusive Act Compensation sippi Workers’ (“MWCA” Act”),1 generally or which “the 71-3-1, (2004). Mississip- Code are to the All references seq., 1. Miss.Code Ann. et Williams, recovering Douglas from Paul also an precludes assem- blyman plant in that and had been law tort em- employer from on state Willis, years. ployed Lockheed for 19 action, preclude Tanks cause of does black, Williams, who who was her state against Lockheed pursuing from white, regularly proximity in close worked workplace on tort of action cause based each Both perished other. at Lock- (“Wil- father, her Thomas Willis death of plant gunshot from heed’s wounds inflicted “decedent”). The district nev- lis” or court shooting of a the course certified, interlocutory ap- ertheless which or spree during Williams killed peal, whether the MWCA wounded several his co-workers before provides remedy the exclusive for Tanks’s turning guns one on himself. grant claims. of Lockheed’s state law Our decedent, a number of addition oth- appeal single issue certified thus black, employees- er Lockheed —some question. limits our review to that during some white—were shot Williams matter, disagree anAs initial we rampage: the course of his Some of the ques court’s view that the the district died their gunshot other victims from open is an tion it certified us one wounds; Like others survived. the dece- *5 circumstances, these and thus decline to Williams, dent and all the other victims further certify Supreme it to Court employees were Lockheed who were at the Deciding question as we Mississippi. they plant and at work at the time that Supreme Court of believe were shot. would, that, has and we conclude under the In her original diversity-jurisdiction tort applicable Mississippi current state complaint court, in filed district and again jurisprudence, Willis’s death —which was a Complaint, in her Third Amended Tanks act result of the willful of a co-worker allegations related numerous factual detail- job while both men were com —is widely- ing longstanding Williams’s and pensable under in turn the MWCA. This bigotry against known his African-Ameri- makes the MWCA complaints can “co-workers.” Her are en- remedy against Lock Tanks’s exclusive tirely devoid, however, allegations heed. therefore reverse the non-ex any racial demonstrated animus or overt clusivity ruling of the district court vis-a African-Americans, against acts either co- claims, vis state tort render a Tanks’s law co-workers, anywhere or workers non out- Lockheed, partial summary for judgment plant side Lockheed site. Stated dif- claims, Tanks’s law and dismissing state ferently, allegations Tanks’s of Williams’s proceedings remand this case for hatred, prejudice, bigotry towards and federal claims advanced her Third exclusively blacks address his co-workers Complaint. Amended workplace. example, his For she al- leged that racial Williams harbored hatred I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS. towards his African-American “co-work- tragedy a horrific ers”; This case‘arises from that he was to be known violent in July that occurred at “co-workers”; Lockheed’s towards that his plant County, Mississippi. in Lauderdale was aware of Williams’s animus towards timé, At the the decedent was an assem- his and Lockheed’s manage- “co-workers blyman Plant”; employed by who had been Lock- at ment that Williams “came to co-worker, years; heed than parked for more work and employee parking pi Code Annotated unless otherwise indicated. alternative, truck”; question that certification of the his with loaded firearms
lot interlocutory appeal. hatred to- The Lockheed of his district he informed “co-workers,” warning court denied reconsideration but certified wards to work with blacks being required interlocutory appeal. action for In alleviated, consequences “violent interlocutory ap- granting the motion occur”; made threaten- that he had could a mate- peal, the district court identified as “co- African-American remarks to ing legal question rial under 28 U.S.C. workers”; “co- that and a fellow white 1292(b) he compensability of Willis’s fa- intimidate their attempted had worker” tal characteriz- “co-workers”; African-American unsettled, of the law as ing the state racial taunts and abuse instigated centrality question to the noting the “co-work- African-American towards his authority certify claims and this court’s essence, ers”; all of on and on. Supreme such a Court implicate allegations Tanks’s Mississippi. and anti-black ani- overt racism
Williams’s exclusively in the context of are made mus II. ANALYSIS “co-workers,” and his black workplace allegations are obvious- and white. These A. of Review Standard tort support Tanks’s state ly intended de The district court certified its (and, eventually, federal discrimina- claims interlocutory and we appeal, cision for claims) Lockheed, grounded tion for leave to granted Lockheed’s motion alia, in, gross negligence, negligence, inter court’s denial of its appeal the district *6 in the face of wanton inaction willful and summary judgment pursuant to motion for of con- knowledge Williams’s longstanding 1292(b). § authority our under 28 U.S.C. co- safety to the of dition and the threat ordinarily a district Although we review job. workers novo,2 ruling de summary judgment court’s discovery, After limited Lockheed 1292(b) § jurisdiction under appellate our summary judgment on partial moved controlling only questions extends and several uncontested pleadings the law, thus, of law only the issue we review it, including compli- its facts submitted deter We therefore appeal.3 certified for duty to insure its ance with its MWCA the district court mine de novo whether bene- liability compensation for workers’ MWCA, using the the properly interpreted in- that Williams’s argued Lockheed fits. interpretation as would same method of MWCA, jury compensable is Court.4 Mississippi Supreme and, Lockheed is enti- consequently, that immunity from Tanks’s other state tled to Interpreting B. MWCA Act’s on the basis tort law claims denied Lockheed’s The district court The district remedy provision. exclusive concluding summary judgment, that motion agreed with Tanks court nevertheless law in- case though Mississippi even compensable under death was not Willis’s unclear, the dece- is terpreting the MWCA summary judgment. the Act and denied un- or, injuries compensable in dent’s moved for reconsideration Monsanto, Oversight Comp. Bd. 4. See La. Patients' Fund F.3d 2. MacDonald (5th 1994). Cir. 411 F.3d Fire & Marine Ins. v. St. Paul Cir.2005). (5th Equip. Corp., 392 F.3d Malbrough v. Crown (5th Cir.2004). Therefore, Act. der reasoned the Under 71-3-7 of the an em- court, remedy pro- ployer the MWCA’s exclusive pay is liable to compensation for the not bar Tanks from pursuing disability vision did or “death employee of an from law remedies. agree injury other state ... arising out of and in the course thorough employment, the district court’s discussion of of [his] without regard to the law,5 including case its fault injury....”10 deter- as to the cause of the decisions, (§ that an mination earlier line of In the definitional section of the Act 71- 3-3), (b) beginning Implement with Mutual & “injury” subsection defines Hardware Insurance Co. v. Pittman6 mean
1952, appears line, to conflict with a later ... accidental death arising out of and commencing with Miller v. McRae’s7 in in the course of employment without 1984. We shall not retrace the district regard to fault which results from analysis except court’s careful to reiterate untoward ... event if contributed to or briefly that undergird the rules our deci- aggravated or accelerated the em- sion. ployment significant man-
ner... .Untoward event includes 1. Elements of Proof: Compensability events causing unexpected results. An
for Co-Worker Assault under the
untoward event or events shall not be
MWCA
presumed to have
out
arisen
of and in
employment,
the course of
except in the
Under
MWCA and the Mis
case of an employee found
dead
sissippi
jurisprudence
that has evolved
course
employment.
decades,
over
past
six
The final narrowing of the focus of this
death)
(here,
definition is found in
ensuing
sentence
Act, compensation under the
is the
MWCA
3—3(b):
§in
“This definition ...
in-
law
71—
remedy
exclusive state
tort
available
cludes an injury
caused
act
or his
successors.8
willful
person
directed
an em-
Courts determine whether a plaintiff is
ployee because
while so
entitled to
under the MWCA
*7
employed
working
job....”
and
on the
or whether his other tort claims are barred
by the
exclusivity
MWCA’s
provision, by
Despite this explicit language defining
inquiring only
injury
“whether the
injury
is com
to include
by
willful acts
a third
pensable under the act.”9 The sole
party,
issue
the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
us, then,
before
is whether Willis’s injury,
cases,
Pittman line of
beginning shortly
i.e., his death from the intentional shooting
after
1942,
enactment of the MWCA in
at the hands of a co-worker
implicitly
while both
relied on a presumption that
work,
were at
compensable
under the willful
assaults
co-workers were acci-
Act.
Pittman,
dental.12 In
the court held such
5. See Tanks v.
Corp.,
Lockheed-Martin
Jitney
9.
Jungle
Newell v. S.
F.Supp.2d
(S.D.Miss.2004).
(Miss.2002).
956-64
§
10. Miss. Code
(emphasis
Ann.
71-3-7
add-
(1952).
6. 214 Miss.
8. Tanks, Miss.Code Ann. Hutto, Hurdle (“In v. Hollo- F.Supp.2d at 958 as way, (Miss.2003). Pittman, So.2d in obviously Watson and the court employ scope employment risks and of their are com- to be “incident attacks pensable under the MWCA: com many persons” and therefore ment committing assault, the In Pittman pensable under MWCA.13 in an the em- [I]f cases, Mississippi ployee/assailant acting court fo outside the later and scope of employment, course and his an arose “out of on whether assault cused viewed as of a analogous status is to that course of rather employment” in the and stranger relation- employment on the of the assaila focusing intent than ship, and his act the cover- falls within nt.14 Act, and
age
subject
to the exclu-
1984, however,
in
bar,
In
shift
only
“[a]
sivity
directed
inquiry, and in the court’s view
employee
employment
focus of the
“because of his
‘accidental,’
employed
on the
working
Mil
while so
and
began.”15
of what is
hand,
job.”...
if in
ler,
On
other
com-
Supreme
decided
Court
assault,
mitting an
employee/assail-
resulting from
damages
a claim for
in
acting
scope
ant was
the course and
acci
imprisonment arose not from an
false
employment
of his
and in furtherance
act, making
from a willful
it nec
dent but
business,
employer’s
injury
then the
in
such an
essary to determine whether
thereby is
un-
compensable
caused
within
encompassed
act was
tentional
Act, and
exclu-
consequently
der the
71-3-3(b)’s
in
definition of
sivity
not apply.18
bar does
viz.,
whether it
“an
caused
jury,
[1]
the willful
act
[2]
a third
person
There is no
that three of the
[3]
directed
against an
[4]
be
five Miller elements
satisfied
cause
of his
[5]
while so em
case: Williams’s
actions
(1)
intention-
(2)
(3)
at
al and
directed Willis while Willis
working
job ...”16 A
ployed and
employed
working
was “so
and
concluded,
in
person,”
“third
court
job.”19
for the first
remain-
As
of the two
acting
who
in the
cludes a co-worker
is not
elements,
court con-
ing Miller
the district
scope
of his
course
correctly—that
must be
employer’s
furtherance of the
business.17 cluded—
a third
he acted
considered
Here, in summarizing the Miller
scope
the course
of his em-
“outside
cases,
explained
line of
district court
But as
ployment.”20
for the second re-
element,
parties
intentional assaults
court
maining
when
Miller
the district
incorrectly
acting
course
under Miller—
or co-workers
outside the
concluded—
shooting
interlocutory appeal of the
been 'acci
17. Id. at 371. This
considered
to have
dental,'
ruling,
standpoint
grounded
from
at least
the victim’s
district court’s
which is
*8
Ass'n, Inc.,
.”)(citing Watson v.
Burial
original complaint only,
..
Nat’l
not im-
Tanks’s
does
749,
(1958);
107
Kerr-
234 Miss.
So.2d 739
statutory
plicate
the federal constitutional
Hutto,
(Miss.
Corp. v.
So.2d 1277
McGee
401
that Tanks raised in her Third Amend-
claims
1981)).
Complaint,
though,
purposes
even
of
ed
appeal,
accepts
as true all rele-
Pittman,
(quoting Ver
13.
16. Miller,
that, despite the fact that Williams acted furtherance of the master’s business ... scope outside the course and of his em- [or] tortious acts incidental to the author- of ployment, judgment dismissal could not ized conduct.”23 An employee’s unautho- granted may yet be to Lockheed on the basis of rized acts be within the course exclusivity bar. The court’s and scope employment they MWCA’s if are expressed inability its general reáson was to dis- “same nature as the conduct au- allegations cern or evidence suggesting thorized or incidental to that conduct.”24 that Williams’s actions “were An directed intentional violent assault on a co- against his victims ‘because their em- quite obviously worker is neither commit- ”21 contrast, ployment’ perceive we ted as a accomplishing pur- means of shall, therefore, plethora of both. poses employment We ad- of the nor of the same depth general dress more these final two ele- nature as authorized conduct.25 (1) ments, viz., seriously question whether Williams acted None can pur- scope employment the course and of his poses of the shooting Williams’s (2) injured spree whether Willis was person was the act of a third outside employment. of his scope employment. the course and of his Acting 2. Injury Outside Course and 3. Employment “Because of’ Scope Employment; “Third Par- Injuries or death caused
ty” Status the MWCA malicious and intentional of a acts agree with the district court they are inflicted that Williams’ actions were outside of the “because of’ the employee’s employment. scope employment course and of his It is the district court’s statement that must therefore be nothing characterized as the suggests injured that Willis was person.22 acts of a third The employment “because of’ his with which Supreme Court defines disagree. actions taken in we underlying Williams’s moti scope” “course and vation was rooted deep-seated in his racial with respect respondeat superior hatred, beyond tort but it is clear cavil that his liability as acts “committed in the course of act directed at his co-workers while willful accomplishing pur and as means to job all were on the was based on—“be poses and therefore in employment. cause of’—their Tanks, F.Supp.2d (emphasis 21. at 964 coverage court has denied under the MWCA added). injuries, for intentional the assailant co-work arguably acting ers are within the course and Miller, See, 22. scope employment. See So.2d at 371. e.g., Royal of their Wells, Oil Co. v. 500 So.2d 441-42 U.S.A.,Inc., (Miss.1986)(holding employee’s 23. that Adams Cinemark claims (Miss.2002). employer prosecu her for malicious tion, arising supervisor’s charge out aof money register, she had stolen from a Id. cash noting was not barred the MWCAand supervisor instigated charges who ("It false 25. See id. is obvious that Thomas’s tor- *9 person purposes her not a is assaulting tious act of Adams was not author- Miller, Act); (noting 444 So.2d at ized 371 or in furtherance of Cinemark's busi- ness."). injury that questioning arose out of Bay See and de also Hawkins v. Treasure Casino, 757, by employer’s tainment the head Hotel & 813 So.2d of defendant 759 (Miss.Ct.App.2001)(holding security department employ a intentional assault as result of the by suspicion co-worker to be outside the plaintiff-employee course and er’s that the was contrast, scope funds). employment). By stealing when the
465
of,’
a
relationship
like When even
tenuous
be-
“The words ‘because
employee’s job
cau
an
and an intentional
broadly-construed words of
tween
other
the
Act,
of,’
exists,
‘arising
injury
out
inflicted
a third
the
such as
sation with
however,
between
the court has held that
the
necessity
the
nexus
express
salesman,
A
employment.”26
applies.
traveling
This nex MWCA
as-
injury
the
and
by a
the
showing
of minimal causa
saulted
motorist whom
salesman
requires
us
route,
help
only
stopped
“a rational connection
while
his sales
[between]
tion:
necessary.27
injured
was held to have
injury”
and
been
because
employment
inju
employment.33
concluding
the connection between the
the
Whether
enough
employee
injured
of his em-
ry
employment
and the
is close
(1)
ployment,
claimant was assaulted
the court cited the facts that
that a
demonstrate
personal
is a factual
no
vendetta motivated the em-
“because of’
(2)
Still,
surrounding
ployee’s injury;
employee
facts
the
violated
question.28
employment-related injury
concerning
an
no instructions
the manner
the cause of
work;
(3)
as a which he carried out his
undisputed, we will treat
issue
stop
roadside
did not cause the
legal
employee
one.29
spacially
temporally
to deviate
or
from his
has
Mississippi Supreme Court
de-
The
(4)
route;
delivery
the salesman’s con-
required
that the
nexus between
termined
duct,
motorists,
helping
an
stranded
job
injury and his
is not
employee’s
acknowledged
being
incident of
when an intentional tort is the
established
road.34
personal
of a
vendetta
could
result
easily
interpreted
juris
as
have
anywhere
have been committed
We
prudence
employee
on whether an
is in
place
employment.30
as at the
Other-
reasoned,
wise,
jured
in a
employees
court has
“because of’ his
determined,
injuries
similarly
or
broad manner.
compensated
would be
personal
shortly
Mississippi Supreme
after
employee’s
death caused
Big
having nothing
to do with Court’s above-discussed decision
“2”
indiscretions
Rebuilders,
coverage
employer.31
These hazards cannot
may
by considering
be established
reasonably be viewed as risks associated MWCA
“(1)
following
injury
can
com-
factors:
oc
employment;
neither
their
employ
within the time frame of
legitimate
serve the
state inter-
curred
pensation
(2)
ment;
was within the
protecting employees
from work-
est
required by employment at
place injury.32
spatial area
Freeman,
while at
26.
379
shot
his mistress's husband
work
Big
Engine
"2”
v.
Rebuilders
888,
(Miss. 1980).
nothing
So.2d
890-91
had
to do with his
and such
employment);
Laundry
v.
Brookhaven Steam
Id. at 891.
27.
569,
Watts, 214 Miss.
the time of existed a and uncontrollable resentment activity between the causal connection that he was forced Lockheed work to with, around, causing injury and interests and under African American holding Thus, In that a employer.”35 conven allegations co-workers. Tanks’s rape by clerk’s a third ience store more than sufficient to establish the re- Act, we em minimal quired causal nexus between Wil- phasized requires that the third factor injuries Indeed, employment. lis’s and his showing only obligations that “the or con likely judicially she is from claim- estopped ditions of create ‘zone of ing otherwise on appeal. special danger’ injury out of which the contrast, complaints Tanks’s are de- arose,” not a causal relation between the any allegations void of that ever Williams injury employment.36
nature of the and the out anywhere acted of racial animus other respect With to the connection between Indeed, than at work. Tanks’s claim is employment, and his Willis’s replete repeated assertions that these district court stated that there “noth- co-workers, Willis, two Williams and ing suggest that at the time of the longtime employees Lockheed who worked shootings ... [the actions ... assailant’s plant proximity” floor “in close against were directed his victims ‘because other; each that Williams harbored racial ” employment,’ of their even though the hatred toward his African American “co- ” acknowledged court that the shootings did co-workers; qua workers that he was specific personal not arise out of a dis- known to be violent “toward his co-work- agreement between Williams and Willis.37 ”; ers that Williams came to work and disagree. allegations Tanks’s leave no parked in employee parking lot with that injury, doubt Willis’s like those vehicle; loaded firearms his that he co-workers, other resulted in principal part informed Lockheed of his hatred toward longstanding employment his co-workers, his black that unhappy he was alongside Williams. The- district court’s regarding employment by contrary conclusion to the notwithstanding, being because of forced to work with plethora we discern a of indicators that blacks, that, if the situation were not assailant, confirm that the actions alleviated, consequences violent could oc- Williams, “were directed his vic- cur; that threatening he made remarks ”38 tims employment.’ ‘because of their ”; black “co-workers that he emulated
Specifically,
job,
Willis was on the
at the KKK members
to intimidate “African
place
exact
”;
time
that his
American co-workers
in-
there;
required him to be
he was not
stigated racial
taunts
towards African
violating any
in performing
”;
instructions
his American
“co-workers
same with
job.39 All
allegations
relevant
”; and,
Tanks’s
“threats towards his co-workers
fi-
complaints demonstrate that
nally
importantly,
assail-
and most
during
ant’s actions resulted from his ever-in-
day
work shift on the
tragedy,
he
Inc.,
Tanks,
Munford,
35.
F.Supp.2d
Williams v.
683 F.2d
37.
at 964 & 964 n. 14.
(5th Cir.1982).
38.
Id.
(quoting
36. Id.
Laundry
Brookhaven Steam
Watts,
214 Miss.
Williams,
939; Big
Engine
683 F.2d at
"2”
(1951),
part
part
rev'd in
and aff’d in
Rebuilders,
pleadings are devoid of against acted out blacks Williams ever Williams, perpetrator, The em- community in the stores elsewhere ployee job on the he com- who was when —not play- or or bars or restaurants or schools acts, person, mitted as a third willful ing anywhere except or the work- fields scope were not taken the course and undeniably trig- rampage His place. and were directed being at gered by anger his uncontrollable Willis, victim and co-worker work, day day, year after after Williams, forced to employment. because Willis’s year, Thus, who were African with co-workers every coverage element of of will- eye And, turn a blind Americans. We would is act under the MWCA met. ful law, reality if to conclude that we were case when pursuant were directed at coverage Williams’s willful acts there is work- targets solely they employee’s exclu- most of these ers’ is they remedy against employer not at all because sive vis-a-vis were black and therefore state tort causes of action.41 We longtime co-workers who were black Jitney Jungle argues that we should affirm S. Tanks also employer ruling may (Miss.2002)(holding be not liable to the district court’s because she husband, de- able to demonstrate that Lockheed intended shot at work her happen, employer spite for Willis’s and that this actual notice employer estranged intent of the is sufficient to remove threats to harm the em- husband’s exclusivity impose from the bar of the ployee, case court refused to strict as the Mississippi Supreme injuries MWCA. The Court has liability inflicted on businesses employer, that an even with actual parties employees). never held third party’s notice of a third intent to harm an ad- employee, strictly 41. The federal discrimination claims first liable for the acts of that Complaint are employer’s premises vanced in the Third Amended out- interlocutory appeal. before us in this side the confines of the MWCA. See Newell v. *12 involving court’s denial of Lock- other law suits other victims of the district reverse summary judg- partial tragic this same and unusual case of work- heed’s motion ment, mo- judgment granting place violence would have the definitive render dismissing Tanks’s state law highest tion and thus answer from the court in the state claims, the case for further and remand controlling that enacted the statute. opinion. proceedings consistent with this - I concur in do the well-reasoned AND RENDERED IN REVERSED by Judge opinion written authored Wiener PART, IN PART. and REMANDED guess Supreme as our best of what the Mississippi Court of would conclude DeMOSS, Judge, specially Circuit I question actually simply before it. concurring: provided oppor- think we should have presents case a classic federalism This tunity get directly to from the the answer my issue. view there is no area of law truly authority. final “truly more local” nature and effect
than state workers’ law. Lopez, v.
See United States
514 U.S.
(1995). therefore, I disappointed, am persuade my colleagues
I was unable certify panel Supreme to the Court Mississippi question of the same narrow STRANGI, Deceased, Albert Rosalie interlocutory appeal. to us on presented Gulig, Independent Executrix, judge controlling read the The district Petitioner-Appellant, Mississippi Mississip- statute and relevant concluded, contrary pi to our cases holding, alleged injury
instant that the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL given not REVENUE, Respondent- Miller and Pittman lines competing Appellee. disagreement This on a Mississippi cases. No. 03-60992. law, Mississippi espe- of fluid foundation injured cially multiple in a case where Appeals, United States Court have, parties multiple filed claims both Fifth Circuit. courts, weighs heavily in state and federal July Supreme favor of certification Court Mississippi. may compel While we Mississippi accept Court of Supreme question, possibili- a certification of the
ty Mississippi that the Court would refuse
should not counsel our submission. question
Had and the Su- we certified
preme Mississippi declined to ac- Court no
cept, we would have alternative but to
offer our “Erie guess”; Supreme if the but accepted had and an-
Court certified, parties
swered the
in this several parties ease and the