MOHIT TANDON v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE
No. 1-24-0980
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
March 20, 2025
2025 IL App (1st) 240980-U
FOURTH DIVISION
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 23CH4620
Honorable Sophia H. Hall, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Ocasio concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The order of the Circuit Court of Cook County dismissing the plaintiff‘s amended complaint for declaratory judgment is affirmed. The amended complaint seeking a determination that the plaintiff is not required to register as a sex offender under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act did not present an actual controversy when there was no dispute between the parties regarding whether the plaintiff was required to register.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, Mohit Tandon, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Cook County dismissing his amended complaint for declaratory judgment against the defendant, the Illinois State Police (“ISP“). The amended complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff was
¶ 3 On August 14, 2023, the plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint for declaratory judgment, alleging that he is a resident of Texas but intended to move to Illinois “pending favorable resolution of this action.” The amended complaint stated that, on December 2, 2019, the plaintiff pled guilty to two criminal charges in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, including one count of Conspiracy to Commit Transportation to Engage in Prostitution in violation of
¶ 4 The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiff believed that his guilty plea would not require him to register as a sex offender in Illinois but stated that ISP had not made a formal determination whether offenses under
¶ 5 On September 29, 2023, ISP filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (
¶ 6 On April 4, 2024, the circuit court issued an order granting ISP‘s motion to dismiss. The court found that ISP‘s failure to rule on the specific issue raised by the plaintiff did not create a controversy for purposes of a declaratory judgment action. The court also found that the plaintiff “failed to allege facts to show the immediate relationship with Illinois“, because he did not state he was moving to Illinois, but rather merely expressed a desire to move to Illinois depending on the outcome of this action. This appeal followed.
¶ 7 The plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the amended complaint because he faces a threat of criminal prosecution if he moves to Illinois without registering, and because a pre-enforcement complaint meets the actual controversy requirement for a declaratory judgment action. In the alternative, he argues that, even in the absence of an actual controversy, he has adequately alleged that there are “cognizable interests” at stake making a declaratory judgment action appropriate under this court‘s decision in Rohm & Hass Co. v. Cont‘l Assurance Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 378 (1978).
¶ 9 A declaratory judgment action has three essential requirements: “(1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest, (2) a defendant with an opposing interest, and (3) an actual controversy between the parties involving those interests.” Cahokia Unit School Dist. No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 36;
¶ 10 The plaintiff argues that an actual controversy exists because, without a formal determination by ISP of whether he is required to register under ISORA, he faces a threat of criminal prosecution if he moves to Illinois and does not register. ISP argues that there is no actual controversy as the amended complaint states that ISP told the plaintiff‘s pretrial officer that the plaintiff was not required to register under ISORA, and the plaintiff‘s claim of possible future prosecution is speculative. We agree with ISP.
¶ 12 The amended complaint asserts that the plaintiff‘s federal convictions do not require registration under ISORA because they are not enumerated offenses under ISORA, and are not substantially similar to any enumerated offense. Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, ISP agrees with the plaintiff and informed his pretrial officer that the plaintiff was not required to register. Despite this apparent agreement between the parties, the plaintiff argues that an actual controversy exists as there has been no formal determination by ISP as to whether he needs to register, and he risks criminal prosecution if he moves to Illinois without registering.
¶ 13 Based on the allegations in the amended complaint, the plaintiff has not been threatened with any criminal prosecution, nor has he been told by ISP that he must register or face prosecution. He merely alleges that it is possible that he might be prosecuted if he moves to Illinois without registering and a law enforcement officer might determine that he should have registered. This remote possibility of prosecution, which is contingent on the plaintiff moving to Illinois without registering and being arrested and prosecuted, does not create an actual controversy between the
¶ 14 In arguing that an actual controversy exists in this case, the plaintiff cites to four declaratory judgement actions challenging sex offender registration determinations from other jurisdictions. Iseman v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 600 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 2023), involved an incarcerated plaintiff who was told by Missouri Department of Corrections officials that he would be required to register as a sex offender upon his release from prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff‘s complaint for declaratory judgment, finding that “the Department‘s advice to Iseman was sufficient to create a concrete, present dispute” regarding whether he was required to register. Id. at 691.
¶ 15 In Keeney v. Fitch, 458 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), the plaintiff was registered as a sex offender and filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that he should no longer be required to register, as he was convicted under a statute that criminalized homosexual acts that was repealed after the United States Supreme Court‘s decision Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Missouri Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether there was an actual controversy and evaluated the merits of the plaintiff‘s claim. Id. at 845-47.
¶ 16 The third case cited by the plaintiff is Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013). In that case, the plaintiff plead guilty to a single count of child sexual abuse, and successfully challenged a sentencing requirement that he would be required to register as a child sex offender. Id. at 124, 126. While the plaintiff was incarcerated, the Maryland
¶ 17 The final case cited by the plaintiff is State v. Doe, 425 P.3d 115 (Alaska 2018), in which two separate plaintiffs petitioned the Alaska Department of Public Safety for a determination of whether they would be required to register as sex offenders based on out-of-state offenses, and both were told that they would have to register. Id. at 118-19. The plaintiffs filed separate declaratory judgment actions challenging that determination. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court held that neither plaintiffs’ conviction required registration without considering whether there was an actual controversy or determining whether a declaratory judgment action was appropriate. Id. at 120-123.
¶ 18 All four cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable from the instant case, because all involve instances where the plaintiff was either already registered as a sex offender or was informed by the relevant state agency that he would be required to register. Only two of the cases, Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs. and Iseman v. Missouri Department of Corrections, considered the question of whether an actual controversy existed, and both found that a controversy existed because the relevant state agency had determined that the plaintiff was required to register. Here, the amended complaint alleges that ISP told the plaintiff‘s pretrial officer
¶ 19 The plaintiff argues that a declaratory judgment action is appropriate because he cannot comply with the sentencing order in his federal criminal case without a formal determination of whether he is required to register. In the sentencing order attached to the amended complaint, the plaintiff was required to register under SORNA with the appropriate state agency, and the federal district judge found in a subsequent order that whether the plaintiff is required to register may depend on “a particular state‘s implementation of SORNA and the laws of that state“. The purported lack of formal guidance from ISP does not prevent the plaintiff from complying with the federal court‘s order requiring him to register depending upon the relevant state agency‘s implementation of SORNA. The plaintiff is not entitled to an advisory opinion determining whether he is required to register if he moves to Illinois when there is no indication that he will be required to do so.
¶ 20 The plaintiff alternatively argues that declaratory judgment is appropriate even in the absence of an actual controversy when “cognizable interests” are implicated by the complaint, citing to Rohm & Haas Co. v. Cont‘l Assurance Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 378 (1978). ISP argues that Rohm & Haas Co. does not create an exception to the requirement that there must be an actual controversy in a declaratory judgment action. We agree with ISP.
¶ 22 As the plaintiff‘s amended complaint does not allege an actual controversy exists between the plaintiff and ISP as required for a declaratory judgment action, the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action and was properly dismissed. Therefore, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff‘s amended complaint.
¶ 23 Affirmed.