Tommaso Guerrini, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Drew Brinkman, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Robert I. Lester, Assistant U.S., USLA — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
557
Before: PREGERSON, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Tommaso Guerrini, a native and citizen of Italy, appeals the district court‘s order denying and dismissing his
Guerrini was released from detention on January 5, 2007. “For a habeas petition to continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner‘s release ... there must be some remaining collateral consequence that may be redressed by success on the petition.” Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Guerrini has not shown he suffered any legally cognizable collateral consequences from his detention. See id. See also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Moreover, we recently clarified in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2011), that post-hoc memorandum dispositions are inadequate and that audio recordings would satisfy due process. Thus, Guerrini cannot show that he has a reasonable expectation that he would be denied a recorded bond hearing in the future. See also Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). Finally, Guerrini never represented, and does not currently represent, a certified class of similarly-situated aliens. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 753-55, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976).
Guerrini‘s current detention is the result of his intervening unlawful reentry attempt in 2009 and his current status as an “arriving alien” ineligible for bond under
DISMISSED.
Grace TAN GO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 06-71575
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted Feb. 9, 2011. Filed May 5, 2011.
558
Patrick Joseph Sandoval, Esquire, Gallagher Sandoval, Robert G. Berke, Esquire, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioners. Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Don George Scroggin, Esquire, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Before: WALLACE and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, Senior District Judge.*
MEMORANDUM**
Grace Tan Go petitions for review from a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Substantial evidence supports the Board‘s denial of Tan Go‘s claims for asylum and withholding of removal. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the Board‘s denial of an applicant‘s asylum and withholding claims for substantial evidence). Although Tan Go contends that she will be subjected to an illegitimate kidnapping prosecution upon removal to the Philippines, the record does not compel us to conclude that her prosecution is a pretext for government persecution. See Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that an alien‘s fear of being held accountable for criminal conduct “does not necessarily entitle” her to “protection [in] the United States“). According to the record, James King, who operated a drug-trafficking scheme with Tan Go‘s husband, was stabbed and placed in the trunk of the Gos’ car in June 2002. After King alleged that the Gos had kidnapped him, Tan Go and her husband were formally charged by the Philippine government with committing this offense. This evidence is sufficient to support the Board‘s conclusion that the kidnapping charges against Tan Go were filed as part of an “actual, legitimate, criminal prosecution.” See id. at 1109.
Similarly, Tan Go‘s dispute with the King family does not compel the conclusion that “anti-government sympathies” have been attributed to Tan Go. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1988). Unlike the “government by thievery” controlled by the Ton Ton Macoutes in Desir, Tan Go has not demonstrated that the Philippine government and the King family should be treated as one. See id. at 724, 729. Although the Kings have accused several members of Tan Go‘s family of committing criminal offenses, and although the King family has allegedly threatened them with violence, Tan Go‘s family has successfully fought these charges, avoided trial, and remained unharmed. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that the King family has sufficient power and influence over the local government to fulfill its threats of violence against Tan Go. See id. at 729.
Finally, we reject Tan Go‘s CAT and due process claims for the reasons set forth in our decision addressing her husband‘s nearly identical claims for relief.
PETITION DENIED.
Tomas Miguel CRUZ-BRAVO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 07-75101
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Submitted April 20, 2011.* Filed May 5, 2011.
559
David N. Shomloo, Esq., Portland, OR, for Petitioner. Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, District Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Portland, OR, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent. Before: RYMER, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Tomas Miguel Cruz-Bravo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA“) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge‘s (“IJ“) removal order. We have jurisdiction under
Cruz-Bravo does not challenge the agency‘s determinations that he is removable under
Because Cruz-Bravo is removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we lack jurisdiction to review his remaining contentions except to the extent they may be construed as “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See
Construed as due process challenges, Cruz-Bravo‘s remaining contentions are unavailing. While the BIA is “not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner,” Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005), we are unpersuaded in this
