104 Fla. 481 | Fla. | 1932
Lead Opinion
In September, 1927, Appellant filed its bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, praying for the reformation and correction of a deed of conveyance executed on the part of appellee to appellant June 21, 1907. A demurrer to the bill of complaint was sustained and appeal was taken from that order.
It is contended by appellee that the deed and conveyance were gratuitous, that the city was without authority to make it in the first place, and that a court of equity will not reform a gratuitous conveyance.
The record discloses that appellant in June, 1907, acquired title to certain lands in Hillsborough County known locally as "Hooker's Point", that said lands were in the form of a peninsula and were bounded on the east, west and south by the waters of Tampa Bay, and that the lands under the waters of Tampa Bay within the limits of the City of Tampa and adjacent to "Hooker's Point" being the lands involved in this controversy, were by Chapter 4882, Acts of 1899, Laws of Florida, granted to the City *483 of Tampa, that a question arose between appellant and the City of Tampa as to which one of them owned the submerged lands in Tampa Bay adjacent to "Hooker's Point,", but that said difference was composed by the City of Tampa agreeing to and passing its ordinance Number 440 conveying to appellant all interest the city had in and to these certain described submerged lands in Tampa Bay, adjacent to and extending from Hooker's Point, east and south, to the city limits, and west to the property of the Tampa Terminal Company on the condition that said property be used within ten years from date of the ordinance for railroad, shipping, warehouse, terminal, commerce, or other purposes permitted by the riparian act of the State of Florida. The record further discloses that on June 21, 1907, deed was executed by the City of Tampa to appellant in compliance with the terms of said ordinance but that the description in said deed is vague and indefinite and that while appellant had at all times rested in the assurance that it held title to all the submerged lands owned by the city of Tampa which the said deed and ordinance purported to convey, it (appellant) was advised by the city in August, 1926, that it (the city) claimed title to a portion of said submerged lands and that the said deed and ordinance did not in fact convey all the submerged lands belonging to and lying within the city to the south, east and west of "Hooker's Point".
It is admitted and is shown that at the time the deed was executed, the city intended to convey and appellant thought it was taking title to all the submerged lands claimed by the city to the east, west, and south of Hooker's Point. The city now contends that it did not convey to appellant all the submerged lands the deed and ordinance were intended to convey and that it was without authority to convey those lands it did convey.
In support of its contention as to lack of authority to *484
make the conveyance, the city invokes Section Ten of Article
In State ex rel. Buford vs. City of Tampa,
The contention that the conveyance complained of was a mere gratuity is also without support. Gratuity implies *485 absence of consideration. Consideration is the inducement to a contract. In other words, it is the cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which induces one to enter into a contract. It may be valuable, as when founded on money or its equivalent, it may be good as when founded on morals or affection, it may be express as when specifically stated, or implied as when inferred by law from the conduct of the parties, it may be continuing as when consisting of acts performed over a period of time. Other classifications might be enumerated. A contract may be supported by any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant derives a benefit, or it may be supported by any labor, detriment or inconvenience, however small, sustained by the plaintiff, if such act as performed or inconvenience suffered is by the consent express or implied of defendant.
The record on this point discloses that the lands agreed to be sold amounted to approximately six hundred acres, that they were all low salt-water flats or marshes over which the tide ebbed and flowed and were for all practical purposes worthless. It is shown that appellant has in compliance with its contract filled in said lands and that they are now occupied and being used for terminal, shipping, warehouse and other commercial purposes, adding many thousands of dollars to the city's taxable values besides reclaiming and making valuable areas which were formerly worthless. It has also improved the city's shipping, port, and commercial facilities and all was done within the terms of the agreement. It would be difficult to describe a contract better supported from the standpoint of consideration. Haesloop vs. City Council of Charleston,
We think, therefore, that the deed brought in question should be reformed in accordance with the prayer of the *486
bill. Jackson vs. Magbee,
The decree of the Chancellor is accordingly reversed.
Reversed.
WHITFIELD, P.J., AND DAVIS, J., concur.
ELLIS AND BROWN, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
BUFORD, C.J., dissents.
Addendum
On petition for rehearing our attention is directed to the fact that this appeal is from an order on a demurrer to the bill of complaint and that if said judgment is not sustained the defendant has its right to answer the bill and make an issue on the facts. It is suggested that notwithstanding this fact the main opinion of the Court uses language indicating that the cause was finally disposed of precluding the defendant from making any defense available to it.
We do not think the order of the Court susceptible of that interpretation nor was any language used in the opinion so intended. The order of reversal does not preclude the defendant from answering the bill and tendering such defense as it may have.
Other questions raised in the petition for rehearing were considered in connection with the main opinion.
Rehearing denied.
WHITFIELD, P.J., AND DAVIS, J., concur.
BUFORD, C.J., AND ELLIS AND BROWN, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment. *487
