Dеfendant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence to the extent it was less safe for him to drive (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1)) and following too closely (OCGA § 40-6-49). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support both convictions, the trial court’s admission of similar offense evidence, and the trial court’s admission оf evidence relating to his refusal to take a breath test. Although the properly admitted evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, the trial cоurt failed to make the necessary findings, on the record, before admitting the evidence of similar offenses. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new triаl.
Officer Anthony Menichini stopped defendant for following too closely. Officer Menichini testified that defendant was driving at approximately 45 mph, and was within ten feet of the vehicle in front of him. And Officer Lou Gregoire, a second patrolman who saw defendant’s car from the opposite direction, said defendant was driving so closely behind the vehicle in front of him that Gregoire could not even see the headlights on defendant’s car.
When Officer Menichini stopped defendant, he noticed that defendant smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot eyes. He therefore asked defendant to perform several field sobriеty tests. Defendant took the tests, and performed poorly. Officer Gregoire, who viewed defendant taking the tests from a distance, said defendant was very unsteаdy on his feet. Based on his observations and his experience, Officer Menichini considered defendant to be a less safe driver and arrested him for driving under the influence.
After he was read his implied consent rights, defendant agreed to take a breath test. When he got to the station, however, he put his mouth on the mouthpiеce but would not blow. The operator of the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test machine therefore was unable to get a sufficient air sample to get a reading.
1. Viewed in a light to support the verdict, this evidence is sufficient to enable rational jurors to find defendant guilty of driving
*102
under the influence and following too closely beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of similar offenses without meeting the requirements of
Williams v. State,
The State suggests that defendant, as the appellant, has the burden of ensuring we have a transcript of the USCR 31.3 (B) heаring, and that since there is no transcript of the hearing in the record, we must assume that the trial court made the required determination. As a general rule, the cоmplaining party on appeal does have the burden of ensuring we have everything in the record we need to evaluate an alleged error; othеrwise, we will presume the trial court acted properly. See
Vaughan v. Buice,
Because the admission of evidence of similar offenses is the
exception
rather than the rule, the State has the burden of ensuring
*103
that the requirements of
Williams
are met before such evidence may be admitted — and this includes ensuring that the trial court’s determination that the State has made the necessary showings is on the record. Cf.
Riddle v. State,
3. Defendant contends that testimony about his refusal to blow into the Intoxilyzer should not have been admitted because (1) the operator of the breath test machine failed to request two air samples, and (2) the State failed to show that the machine the operator used was in good working order on the date of his arrest (January 22, 1995).
(a) Under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1) (B), the State must request two sequential breath samples for testing, or the results are not admissible. Defendant argues here that because the tester did not ask for a second sample, testimony regarding defendant’s refusal to provide an adequate first sample should not have been allowed. Defendant failed to raise this argument in the trial court, however. At first blush, it seems doubtful thаt the two-sample requirement would apply when a defendant refuses to provide an adequate first sample. In any case, we decline defendant’s rеquest to address the issue without the benefit of full argument and a decision below.
(b) Under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1) (A), the State must show that the machine “was operated with all its electronic and operating components prescribed by its manufacturer properly attached and in good working order.” The easiest way to do this for breath-tеsting machines, without calling the inspector to testify, is set forth in OCGA § 40-6-392 (f): each time the machine is inspected, the inspector prepares a certificatе of inspection, signed under oath, which states that he has inspected the machine in question and has found that all the electronic and operating cоmponents prescribed by the manufacturer are properly attached and in good working order.
In this case, the State introduced a certificate of inspection stating that the machine used on defendant on January 22, 1995, had *104 passed inspection on January 4, 1995. But the inspector did not sign the certificate under oath until June 12, 1995; and defendant argues that because of this delay, the certificate — the only evidence that the machine was in proper working order оn January 22,1995 — was inadmissible. While it is certainly best for the inspector to complete and sign the certificate immediately after the inspection, the statute does not require such immediacy. We therefore conclude that the delay in signing the certificate under oath went to its weight rather than its admissibility.
Judgment reversed.