111 Va. 778 | Va. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought by the plaintiff in error to collect from the defendant insurance company a life insurance policy in which she was named as the beneficiary. Upon the trial there was a demurrer to the evidence and a judgment thereon in favor of the defendant company, to which judgment this writ of error was awarded.
The record shows that on the 29th day of June, 1907, W.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that the insured was attended by Dr. Miller in April or May, 1907. This appears in the claimant’s statement to the company for payment of the policy. It further appears that Dr. Call attended the insured in April, 1907, for a cold. It further appears that in June, 1907, before making application for the policy in question, the insured consulted Dr. Tompkins and told him that he was
The laAY applicable to these facts is stated by May on Insurance as follows: “Representations should not only be true, but they should be full. The insurer has a right to know the whole truth. And a lack of fulness, if designed, in a respect material to the risk, is tantamount to a false representation, and is attended by like consequences.. This lack of fulness is termed a concealment, which is the designed and intentional withholding of some fact material to the risk which the insured in honesty and good faith ought to communicate to the insurer. It is not mere unintentional silence or inadAwrtence. It is a positive intentional omission to state what the applicant knows, or must be presumed to know, ought to be stated. It is a suppression of the truth, whereby the insurer is induced to enter into a contract which he would not have, entered into had the truth been known to him. It is a deception whereby the insurer is led to infer that to be true, as to a.material matter, which is not true. Hence strictly speaking, under the general law of insurance, there can be no concealment of a fact which is not known to the applicant.” 1 May on Ins. (4th ed.), sec. 200.
In the case at bar the applicant knew before he was examined for this insurance July 1, 1907, that he had been attended by Dr. Miller in April, 1907. He knew that he had been attended by Dr. Call, for a cold, in April, 1907. He knew that he had consulted Dr. Tompkins in June, 1907, very shortly before his application was filed; that he had been examined by Dr. Tompkins, and that his sputum had been examined, disclosing the fact that he was afflicted with a dangerous malady. These important and necessarily controlling facts in determining his character as a risk were not only
The plaintiff in error contends that when the insured answered “Yes,” to the question, “Any disease of chest or lungs,” he thereby put the defendant on guard as to his lung trouble. The examining physician produces the. original application which shows that the answer to this question was first, “No,” and written over “Yes.” He testifies, in explanation of this change, that when the insured stated, subsequently, that in December, 1905, he had a mild attack of bronchitis, which is a chest or lung disease, he then changed the original answer, “No,” to “Yes,” in order to cover the mild attack of bronchitis. This was misleading rather than calculated to put the examining physician on inquiry. It indicated that the “bronchitis” was the only form of lung trouble the applicant had ever been troubled with. Assuming, however, that the categorical answer, “Yes,” was sufficient to put the physician on inquiry, that inquiry was subsequently prosecuted in the comprehensive question, “Give full particulars of every illness you have had since childhood, and name of every physician who has ever attended you or prescribed for you.” This question comprehended within its scope of inquiry the former question, and called for particulars touching the categorical answer thereto. As already seen, if it had been answered truthfully, the insurer would have been possessed of the very material facts which were fully known to and suppressed by the applicant. Facts which, if fully disclosed, must necessarily have resulted in a rejection of the applicant as an insurable risk. In answer to this question, the insured, in honesty and good faith, should
The circuit court property sustained the demurrer to the evidence, filed by the defendant company, and its judgment, must, therefore, be affirmed.
Affirmed.