594 N.E.2d 1046 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, this case comes before this court on appeal from a judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. The lower court reversed the decision of the Perrysburg City Council ("council") which denied the application of appellees, Dorrence C. Talbut and Patricia L. Talbut, for a conditional use permit. Appellant, the city of Perrysburg, appeals that reversal. *477
The facts relevant to our decision are as follows.
Appellees filed an application for a conditional use permit, under Perrysburg Municipal Code Section 1264, in order to establish a child day care center in a district zoned C-4, Limited Commercial District. Council referred the matter to the Zoning, Planning and Annexation Committee ("Planning Committee"). The application was considered at the January 24, 1989 and February 15, 1989 meetings of the Planning Committee. Public notice was issued prior to the February 15 meeting, and interested parties were permitted to voice their concerns and opinions throughout the process. The Planning Committee, by unanimous vote, recommended to council that the application of appellees be denied. Public notice was issued by council on March 16, 1989. The public was invited to attend a public meeting on this zoning matter on March 21, 1989. At that meeting, the recommendation and report of the Planning Committee were reviewed and members of the public presented their opinions as to the effects of the proposed use. Appellees and their counsel were present at this meeting and voiced their views. Council then unanimously voted to deny the conditional use request.
Appellees timely appealed the denial to the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant moved to dismiss that appeal asserting that the lower court lacked the jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court denied this motion and held a hearing at which additional evidence, pursuant to R.C.
Appellant appeals that judgment and sets forth the following assignments of error:
"I. The court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
"II. The common pleas court erred by permitting a member of the city council to testify at the hearing on appellees' appeal."
Because we can dispose of this case on the merits, we will not address the validity of an ordinance which purports to reserve a great deal of power to a legislative body in dispensing conditional use permits. We merely note that constitutional questions could be raised relative to such an ordinance. 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 Ed.1986), Section 25.17.
In its first assignment of error, appellant contends that, pursuant to R.C.
Clearly, the actions of administrative officials and agencies are appealable to a common pleas court under the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2506 only when the function performed is quasi-judicial in nature. Union Title Co. v. State Bd. of Edn.
(1990),
In the case before us, Perrysburg Municipal Ordinance Section 1210.01(d) specifically requires that all zoning matters be referred to the Planning Committee. Council is then provided with the right to overrule or confirm the recommendations (regarding the zoning matters) of that committee. Other sections of the planning and zoning code provide council with the power to grant or deny a conditional use application and to determine whether the proposed use affects Perrysburg's comprehensive plan, and, in addition, provide standards to be used by council and/or the Planning Committee in reaching a decision. Perrysburg Municipal Code Sections 1264.01, 1264.03, 1264.05 and 1264.06. Thus, council, by ordinance, has set itself up as the final arbiter and exercises its discretion over all zoning questions, inclusive of conditional use permits. In addition, the requirements which are the earmarks of a quasi-judicial proceeding were actually followed and council, using standards delineated in the ordinances relevant to a consideration of the issuance of conditional use permits, exercised its discretion in interpreting those ordinances. Therefore, all elements necessary for reaching a finding that appellant did engage in a quasi-judicial or administrative proceeding were present. The trial court did not err in determining that it had the jurisdiction, under R.C. Chapter 2506, to entertain an appeal of the decision reached in that proceeding. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is found not well taken. *480
Appellant, in its second assignment of error, contends that the trial court erred in permitting a member of both council and the Planning Committee, Timothy J. McCarthy, to testify at the hearing on appellees' appeal.
R.C.
Our reading of R.C.
On consideration whereof, this court finds that substantial justice was done the party complaining. As to the merits of this case, we affirm and adopt the decision of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas and remand this case for execution of judgment. Court costs of this appeal are assessed against appellant.
Judgment affirmed.
HANDWORK, P.J., GLASSER and MELVIN L. RESNICK, JJ., concur.