35 So. 2d 628 | Miss. | 1948
Lead Opinion
In the administration of the estate of Mrs. Ora Shirley, intestate, in the Chancery Court of Pike County, appellant probated his claim in the amount of $1,522.77. It sought payment for board, lodging, clothing, medical attention and nursing; taxes on her property furnished the decedent, his sister, for the years 1939-1944 inclusive; and funeral expenses paid by claimant for the decedent's interment. A contest thereof was filed by James L. Avera, the only heir-at-law of the decedent, being her son by a former marriage. The final decree allowed the claims for taxes and funeral expenses, but disallowed all *616 other items: board, lodging, clothing, medical attention and nursing. Claimant appealed. There was no cross-appeal.
The sole question before us is, was the chancellor correct in such disallowance, as stated, supra. However, the only objection made by the contestant in the chancery court, which we consider worthy of special discussion, is that the Statute of Limitations in this case barred all portions of appellant's claim for services and necessaries given Mrs. Shirley more than three years prior to her death.
At her death on February 1, 1946, Mrs. Shirley was about sixty-one years of age. Pursuant to a writ de inquirendo lunatico in Pike County, she had been admitted to the State Hospital at Whitfield on or about December 18, 1938. While there, she besought her brother, the appellant here, to remove her to his home, avowing that she was not crazy. Although the authorities of the hospital declared that she was suffering from dementia praecox, paranoid type, they paroled her to appellant, on condition that he would be responsible for her care and actions. On that date, May 1, 1939, he signed the following commitment:
"Parol, Discharge or Release of Patient C.R. Talbert am today removing Mrs. Ora Shirley from the Mississippi State Hospital against the advice of the Staff Doctor in charge with the understanding that the patient is still mentally ill. I agree to assume all responsibility for her care and actions while outside of the Institution and while in my custody, to relieve the Hospital of all responsibility in connection with this patient. I also agree, should it become necessary at any time within a period less than a year, to return this patient to the Hospital to do so without any expense whatever to said Mississippi State Hospital. This the 1st day of May 1939."
After arrival at the home of her brother, she was never of any help around the place, required and received *617
constant attention; and the necessities of life; and shown great consideration; and appellant paid the taxes on her property. She paid nothing for these necessities, or for her taxes. When she departed this life, appellant furnished the funds for her funeral. So, no part of her small estate was utilized for the purpose of her support during her life, although the brother expected reimbursement at her death. Appellant made no demands of her personally, since she was non compos mentis; and he kept her property intact against the contingency that she might need it for some major emergency affecting her mental or physical health. But it is clear from the evidence that he expected to be compensated out of her estate. It is interesting to note that, had she remained in the hospital, she could have been compelled to pay for her support there since she had a sufficient estate. Section 6905, Code 1942; Hyde v. Miller,
It appears from the testimony that the contestant, her son by a former marriage, as stated, contributed nothing to the support of Mrs. Shirley. He defrayed none of the expenses or costs of the matters for which appellant sought compensation in his probated claim.
This case in its material aspects is almost a counterpart of McCully et al. v. McCully,
We declared that wants of an insane person, which are personal to body and mind are "necessaries" within the rule requiring an insane person or his or her estate to pay for necessaries furnished such person in good faith. In the case at bar, there can be no question, in our opinion, that the disallowed liabilities in appellant's probated claim are clearly within this rule.
Here, appellant received his sister into his home, and in good faith furnished her with the listed necessities of life, expecting repayment from her property. This obligation was to continue indefinitely, and did continue until her death, and there was no fixed time for payment thereof. Therefore, the rule announced by us in the McCully case, as to the Statute of Limitations, applies with equal force to the case at bar. That is, the statute did not start to run against Mrs. Shirley's liability to her brother until the date of her death. The question of limitations as to part of the claim of appellant is earnestly argued before us in the instant case.
The cited case also correctly held that taxes on the property of the insane decedent paid by her nieces were recoverable by way of reimbursement, and amounts for her board, nursing, clothing, care, and attention were compensable from their aunt's estate. The two cases are practically parallel, and the rules of the McCully case controlled the issues under consideration by us here. However, in the case we are considering the chancellor incorrectly disallowed the claims for services and necessaries.
But, argues the appellee, in Boggan v. Scruggs,
However, when the Boggan case was decided, the McCully case was not recalled to our attention, and on our further research it is developed that the Whitehead case cited in the Boggan case deals with an entirely different kind of claim, as stated, ante. This has resulted in the necessity to partially overrule the Bogan case standing alone rather than to overrule the McCully case, and several other cases of similar import followed through the years. For instance, in Lee v. Lee's estate et al.,
In the case of Gaulden v. Ramsey,
The contract in the instant case was an implied one under the rule in 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, Sec. 114, 115, p. 274, where it is said: "Generally, when necessaries are furnished to a person who by reason of mental incapacity cannot himself make a contract, the law implies or imposes an obligation or agreement on his part to pay for them; his liability for necessaries is deemed rather a benefit than a disadvantage to him." See also 28 Am. *621
Jur. 699, 700, Section 62, Insane and Other Incompetent Persons; Gross v. Jones,
This brings us down to the case of Stephens v. Duckworth,
The chancellor, upon hearing the report of the master, and exceptions thereto, reversed each of his findings, both upon points of law and upon the facts. Among other reasons for so doing, the chancellor held that the recovery sought was a claim against the estate which had not been probated. We reversed the chancellor and rendered a decree here for the claimant-daughter. Upon the reasoning in our opinion there, we declared that "her claim propounded by her petition before the time for probation of claims, was not such as could be probated as required by Section 1671, Code of 1930, as amended by Chapter 304, Laws 1934 [now Section 568, Code 1942]. . . . It was a liability in the strictest sense of the word, and not a claim within the meaning of our statutes upon probated claims." Several Mississippi cases were *622 cited in support of this announcement, which an examination of the report will disclose. This will dispose of that part of our holding in the Boggan case to the effect that "facts which prevent the statute of limitation from running against a probated claim should appear in some form on the probate thereof and cannot be made to appear for the first time by evidence offered when the claim is under consideration in the administration of the decedent's estate," since it was "not a claim within the meaning of our statutes upon probated claims." That being so, and no probate being required, and a hearing on petition being permissible, no justifiable reason could exist for the rule announced in the Boggan case on the point of limitation. The record of the court in the Duckworth case would be bound to show that the decedent was indeed deceased; and when that melancholy event occurred, then the Statute of Limitations commenced to run.
With reference to the Statute of Limitations in the Stephens v. Duckworth case, supra, we also said: "It is not even contended here in appellee's brief that this was not a continuing claim for services, and therefore not barred by the statute of limitations." The case cited as its authority for this holding on the Statute of Limitations, Ellis v. Berry,
Even if it could be said that Boggan v. Scruggs, by implication, overruled McCully v. McCully, there would still remain all of the other contrary decisions, which would also have to be considered as overruled by implication, in order to clear the way for the Boggan case. However, the Boggan case would have been correct if the claim presented had been the general type of claim on open account, and some other types of demands agaist a decedent's estate, on which limitations commenced during his lifetime. It was wrong in seeking to justify itself by a general rule not applicable to the *623 special field of furnishing services and necessaries to a decedent, as to which we have always ascribed a specific rule, concerning the commencement of the Statute of limitations. As stated, supra, where the petition was filed, the record was bound to have shown that the person obligated was deceased, and this would obviate the necessity of averring the death in the petition. So, would it, too, for the same reason, prevent a requirement of such averment in a probate claim or affidavit of the kind involved here. Furthermore, the statute itself prescribes what such an affidavit must contain, and the form and contents of the claim, and it does not direct either to the state when the debtor died. The record of the administration cause authorizing the notice to creditors is bound to have established that fact. The limitations here, according to the cases cited herein, and dealing with similar claims, began when the death occurred, already established by the record giving jurisdiction of the case to the chancery court. Hence no reasonable purpose would be served to require the affidavit uselessly to state that deceased departed this life on a certain date. Death could be the only fact here starting the Statute of Limitations to run against the probated claim, and to require its date to be given in the affidavit would be supererogation, and expand the statute, which we have no authority to do.
A case involving services to decedent was Foster v. Shaffer,
The fact that in the case at bar the claim was, by the scrivener, divided into monthly and yearly periods, could not effect an acceleration of the commencement of the running of the Statute of Limitations, which, under the circumstances here could only start to operate at the date of the death of the decedent. Otherwise, the law would present the strange anomaly of appellant being compelled every three years to sue his insane sister, the services and necessaries still continuing to be furnished her in his home. Such a course would be adhorrent, and would probably end all such assistance from one relative to another in like condition, as the sister here. The policy of the law, well-established in this State, that on these continuous contracts, express or implied, limitations do not start until the death of the debtor is both expedient and enlightened.
We are therefore constrained to overrule the case of Boggan v. Scruggs, on which appellees rely, and which stands alone in this precise field of our jurisprudence, insofar as it deals with the Statute of Limitations, rather than to repudiate the contrary well-established doctrine declared in McCully v. McCully, and the many other decisions in harmony therewith; and because of the holding by this Court in Stephens v. Duckworth, discussed at length above.
The decree of the chancellor disallowing appellant's claim for board, lodging, clothing, medical attention *625 and nursing, is therefore reversed, and a decree will be entered here allowing same. Since the estate is still in process of administration, and our adjudication may cause its insolvency, or require further administrative orders and decrees not inconsistent with this opinion, we remand the case to the chancery court, except for our decree here, for such further administrative procedure as may be necessary and proper.
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
Nor do I think we should change the rule announced in Boggan v. Scruggs,
I do not dissent to the holding that the statute of limitations has not run against this claim because, and *626 only because, prior decisions of this Court appear to support that holding and I am bound by such decisions. As an initial proposition, I would not assent that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in such a case until the death of the intestate. Ordinarily, in the absence of express contract to the contrary, payment for services and goods furnished is due when rendered and furnished. The rule announced is too dangerous. Under it one may furnish services and goods for thirty to forty years, without a penny being paid in the meantime and without the beneficiary knowing he or she is supposed to pay therefor, and after the death of such beneficiary collect from the estate what is supposed to be the fair and reasonable value of such services and goods, regardless of the cost fluctuations and price changes during that time of such services and necessaries. Better it would be to require such claimant to have himself appointed guardian and let the chancery court allow to him, from time to time, a fair amount for such services and goods. The Chancellor could and would properly evaluate such amount at the time and under then existing conditions, having in mind the value of the estate of such dependent.
Dissenting Opinion
Boggan v. Scruggs,
This claim is not one for unliquidated damages nor based on a contingent liability, but one which arose ex contractu during the life of the appellant's intestate, though it did not become due, that is payment therefor could not have been coerced, prior to the death of the deceased, nevertheless it is a claim within Section 568, *627
Code 1942, as this Court expressly held in Old Men's Home, Inc., v. Lee's Estate,
Among the purposes of the statute requiring claims against the estate of decedent to be probated, "is that the administrator and all other parties concerned may ascertain what debts are claimed to be due by the estate, and act intelligently in determining whether the same are just and should be paid, or whether the same should be contested. The statute also clearly contemplates that, in presenting claims against the estate of a decedent, the evidence or statement of same probated must on its face show a prima facie right in the claimant to recover from the estate the amount claimed, and that it must disclose the nature and amount of the claim with sufficient precision to bar, when paid, an action therefor." Lehman v. Powe,
In McCully v. McCully,
The claim here under consideration was probated in this form: *628
"Statement of account
Three years and ten months board, lodging, clothing, medical attention and nursing at $30.00 per month ................................... $1380.00
Tax payments for account on lands in Pike County Miss.:
1939 taxes, Release No. 4404 ........ $15.43 1940-41 taxes, Release No. 4405 ..... 58.95 1942 taxes, Release No. 5052 ........ 33.59 1943 taxes, Release No. 5053 ........ 28.01 1944 taxes, Receipt No. 7810 ........ 18.70 ______ Total taxes paid .............................. 154.68"
Followed by the statement of credits to be applied thereto. It does not disclose when the rendition of the services began or when it ended, or why the statute of limitations should not apply thereto. The overruling of Boggan v. Scruggs, supra, would not necessarily result in disclosing error in the decree appealed from. In that case the probated claim showed on its face that a portion of it was barred by the statute of limitations. The probated claim here wholly fails to contain any information on that point, for, as just stated, it discloses neither the beginning nor the ending of the services rendered the decedent. The necessity for a probated claim to disclose whether it is barred by limitation will appear when we remember that an administrator is without authority to waive this bar, or to pay a claim so barred. 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, Sec. 382; 7 Miss. Digest, Executors and Administrators, Key No. 213, and authorities there cited. See also authorities thereon hereinbefore cited and in the controlling opinion.
The probate of a claim of this character need not and should not be limited to a mere statement of the items thereof, but should be "a statement of the claim in writing" of such character as would enable "the administrator and all other parties concerned" to "act intelligently in determining whether the same [is] just *629
and should be paid." Lehman v. Powe, supra; Henderson v. Ilsey, 11 Smedes M. 9,
The decree of the Court below should be affirmed.