Talarico v. Dunlap

(No. 81459. Appellee, TALARICO, JR.,

ERNIE v. FRANK E. Appellants. DUNLAP, M.D., al., et Opinion September 1997. filed McMORROW,J., dissenting. (John Gloor,

Cassiday, Chicago Schade & N. Sei- bel, Keller, Richard C. Huettel Jennifer A. counsel), appellants. for Rathsack, Chicago,

Michael appellee. W. Morawicz, Morawicz, Ltd., Marion A. of Karr & Chicago, for amicus Trial Lawyers curiae Illinois As- sociation.

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN opinion delivered the of the court: presented

The issue appeal this is whether defensive collateral estoppel may by be utilized the de- fendant litigation this civil case to bar of an issue which was decided adversely plaintiff plaintiffs prior proceeding.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1986 Ernie Talarico was a second-year medical Chicago student at the College of Osteopathic Medicine. Talarico suffered from severe acne for many years. As a acne, result of his situations, Talarico avoided social depressed, became and was embarrassed extremely uncomfortable in clinical work situations where he and his fellow students had to "work on each other.” In June 1986, sought Talarico medical treatment for his acne condition from Dr. Frank at Dixie-Ashland Associates, Dermatology Dunlap prescribed Ltd. Accu- tane, effects, which had some side for the Ta- condition. 6, 1986, larico used the Accutane from June until September 1986. 21, 1986, pre- a August

On Talarico visited forest serve, male, grabbed 15-year-old pushed a him to the Later, ground, gun. and shocked him with a stun 27, August again preserve Talarico visited forest gun. man with a 25-year-old where he stunned stun ground; Talarico and the man fell Talarico him grabbed genitals the man’s and kissed several times occurrences, on the face. until these Talarico had no Up justice system. with involvement occurrences, ar- Subsequent to these Talarico was charged aggravated battery, aggravated rested and with restraint, aggravated crim- unlawful armed violence and proceeding, inal abuse. At the criminal Talarico sexual plea agreement whereby pleaded entered into a he battery. two of misdemeanor Talarico guilty to counts Further, stipulated concerning to the facts his crimes. having he admitted to committed the crimes "intention- knowingly, legal justification.” ally and without proper pursuant Supreme After admonishment (134 402), accepted Ill. 2d R. the court Court Rule 402 Talarico was plea. exchange plea, defendant’s In for his one-year probation, sentenced to misdemeanor ordered undergo counseling and assessed fees. psychiatric of the criminal following completion Some time from the proceedings, pardon Talarico received that Talarico was pardon provided Governor. The discharged of and from all further "acquitted rights all of citizen- imprisonment and restored to by the conviction.” might which have been forfeited ship four-count, first- Talarico filed subsequently in the circuit court of Cook complaint amended civil complaint counts of the were County. The first three Laboratories, manufacturer of lodged Roche against Accutane, lodged was remaining and the one count physician, against Dunlap, prescribing Dr. Associates, Ltd. Roche Lab- Dermatology Dixie-Ashland agreement with Ta- oratories entered into settlement settlement, larico. As a result of the the first three complaint prejudice. counts of the were dismissed with against remaining Dunlap The one count Dr. and (collectively, Dunlap) alleged Dixie-Ashland that Dr. effects Dunlap prescribed medication with known side Further, subjected unnecessary and Talarico to risk. complaint alleged properly that Dr. failed to complaint alleged monitor Talarico’s condition. The that, failings, a result injured as of these Talarico was in part injuries alleged those included crimi- "[t]hat activity charged.” nal for which was [Talarico] complaint additionally alleged

The the afore- injuries mentioned legal caused Talarico to "incur obligations services, for medical and related has caused him profits earnings to lose which he otherwise would have made and acquired; has caused him to lose educational advantage which he would otherwise have acquired; has caused him pain disability; to suffer all injuries of which and conditions are permanent.”

In complaint, answer to Talarico’s Dunlap moved (735 summary the court for judgment ILCS 5/2 —1005 (West 1994)) on the guilty basis that Talarico’s the criminal proceeding collaterally him estopped from claiming that Accutane proximately caused his criminal granted behavior. The court summary judgment in Dun- lap’s favor. Talarico stipulated ruling the court’s disposed of the entire case. appellate

The the order summary reversed (281 judgment 662), App. Ill. 3d granted and we Dun (155 315(a)). lap’s petition for leave to appeal Ill. 2d R. The Lawyers Illinois Trial granted Association was leave support file amicus curiae brief in of Talarico. 155 follow, Ill. 2d R. 345. For the reasons which we now af judgment firm the appellate of the court.

DISCUSSION appeal ruling This case comes to us on the from a is, Dunlap’s summary judgment. motion for Our review Delaney de nova. See v. McDonald’s therefore, Corp., 158 Outboard Marine v. 465, (1994), citing Corp. Ill. 2d 467 (1992). Co., Liberty Mutual Insurance 90, 154 Ill. 2d 102 Pardon The parties pardon concede that Governor’s legal defendant has no effect on the question presented They argument in this advanced no on the appeal. have Further, the appellate expressly issue. noted that regard pardon’s its decision was without effect. review, App. part See 281 Ill. 3d at 668. As of our never theless, briefly pardon’s we have considered the nature and effect. regard, following.

In that we note the Some courts pardon have held that a not only punish relieves ment for the offense but blots out the existence of the guilt of the offender. 67A C.J.S. Pardon and Parole 18§ (1978). court, however, a pardon This has held that merely custody releases an inmate from and supervi 201, People Kinney, ex rel. Abner v. Ill. sion. 30 2d 205 (1964). forgiveness a very pardon Since the essence of penalty, or remission assessed on the basis of the offender, implies guilt; conviction of the it does pardon obliterate the fact of the commission of the crime not and the conviction thereof. 67A C.J.S. Pardon and Pa (1978). words, role In "involves pardon 18 other § forgiveness forgetfulness.” but not 29 Ill. L. & Prac. v. 1, (1957); People Chiappa, Pardons § at 109 see also 53 (1977). Illinois, 639, though law App. Ill. 3d 640 The did slight, supports pardon a conclusion that Talarico’s conviction negate not the fact of his purposes estoppel. of collateral Estoppel

Collateral collaterally be Dunlap argues that Talarico should suit the issue estopped "relitigating” from this civil conduct, which was decided of his criminal of the cause prior proceeding. Applica estoppel equitable is an doctrine. Collateral party relitigating precludes a from tion of the doctrine prior proceeding. Herzog v. an issue decided in a (1995). Lexington Township, Offensive 167 Ill. 2d plaintiff occurs when seeks use of collateral litigating an to foreclose a defendant from issue de litigated unsuccessfully previously in an fendant has when, other action. Defensive use of the doctrine occurs prevent plaintiff case, as in this a defendant seeks to asserting plaintiff previously from a claim the has litigated Owens, and lost. In re 125 Ill. 2d requirements ap The minimum threshold for the plication estoppel, in Illinois of collateral as set forth Board, State Chamber Commercev. Pollution Control of (1) (1979), 1, in 78 Ill. 2d 7 are: the issue decided prior adjudication presented in is identical with the one (2) question, judgment in a final suit there was (3) prior adjudication, party in the merits against estoppel party whom is or in asserted was privity party adjudication. previ prior with a to the A requirement "identical-parties-mutuality” ous of has been eliminated. See Illinois State Chamber Com merce, 78 Ill. 2d at 7. estoppel apply,

For collateral the is- to decision on necessary judgment sue must have been for the litigation, person first and the to be bound must have litigated actually Vestal, the issue in the first suit. A. Is- Prosecutions, sue Preclusion and Criminal 65 Iowa L. (1980). 281, Rev. 288-89 Even where the threshold ele- ments of the doctrine are satisfied and an identical com- mon issue is found to exist between a former cur- applied lawsuit, rent collateral must not be to preclude parties presenting or defen- from their claims it is ses unless clear that no unfairness results 192

party being estopped. Kessinger Inc., v. Grefco, 173 Ill. Milligan 2d see also Van v. Board of 447, (1996); 467-68 Commissioners, Fire & Police 158 Ill. 2d (1994). 85, 96 deciding estop In whether the doctrine of collateral pel applicable particular situation, in a a court must litigation against right balance the need to limit adversary proceeding party may fully a fair which present Judgments § his case. 50 C.J.S. In (1997X 779 determining party op whether a has had a fair full and portunity litigate prior action, an issue in a those ele " comprise 'practical litiga ments which realities of ” Judgments tion’ must be examined. 47 Am. Jur. 2d In some circumstances the absence of an (1995). 651 § vigorously litigate proceeding incentive the former application estoppel. is relevant in the of collateral See Housing Authority County Young La Salle v. Men’s for Ass’n, Christian 101 Ill. 2d Restatement 246, (1984); 255 (Second) Judgments § see also 47 Am. 28(5)(c) (1982); Judgments § Jur. 2d There must have been (1995). opportunity litigate, the incentive and so that a fail litigate ure to the issue is in fact a concession on that is Vestal, sue. A. Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecu tions, 65 Iowa L. Rev. (1980). 288-89 litigate might absent, instance,

Incentive to be litigation where the amount at stake in the first significant, was in- litigation if or the future was not foresee- Judgments § Am. In the able. Jur. 2d proceedings, prior the seriousness of context allegations charge prior or the criminal at the hear- charged ing If is a factor to be considered. the offense is might nature, not be suf- of minor or trivial defendant ficiently challenge allegations made at motivated might and, case, trial in such a it be unfair to allow col- estoppel However, later. even sum- lateral be asserted mary they provide offenses, incentive when sufficient opportunity may defense, the basis of col- be

193 as, for proceeding subsequent in a civil estoppel lateral important another instance, they are of part when (1997). charge. Judgments C.J.S. § ap- propriety of question The here do not parties in a civil relitigation to bar estoppel collateral plying a criminal proceed- decided in previously of an issue case a criminal conviction generally accepted that ing. It is contesting in a from collaterally estops defendant established and the facts subsequent proceeding civil See 50 proceeding. decided in the criminal issues C.J.S. Judgments §

Further, the elements for parties concede satisfied. Concern estoppel apply collateral have been estoppel element of collateral ing identity-of-issues proceed in the criminal Talarico admitted specifically, knowing was both ing that his criminal conduct The issue to be decided civil case intentional. Accutane, instead, to cause Talari contributed whether ele agree conduct. the mens rea co’s criminal We and the battery ment Talarico’s conviction supporting are the malpractice cause element in the suit proximate Monroe, 2d 240 Thurmond v. 159 Ill. same issue. Cf. (1994) (collateral prior where traffic estoppel applied not only whether proceeding plaintiff determined proceeding later violated trafile statute civil collision). resulting determined who caused the interpretation differ is in their parties Where litigate” exception the "incentive to to the collateral parties rely Lilly doctrine. Both v. Eli Bulfin Co., (1993), App. supportive & 244 Ill. 3d 785 as their respective positions. are similar to the facts

The facts somewhat Bulfin There, charged at Bulfin was with one in the case bar. degree murder in the second and two counts count of plea,” attempted murder. Bulfin entered "Alford judgment without whereby entry he consented provide any trial, declined to the trial court with factual guilty plea, basis for the but maintained his innocence. App. Bulfin, 244 Ill. 3d at 786-87.See North Carolina v. Alford, 25, 400 U.S. 27 L. Ed. 2d 91 S. Ct. 160 plea negotiation, charges Pursuant to a Bulfin’s were given reduced and he was a sentence reflective of the reduction.

Subsequent to conviction, his criminal Bulfin filed a complaint against drug physi- civil manufacturers, two organization. cian and health maintenance In his com- plaint, charged drugs pre- Bulfin marketed and by scribed to him the named defendants induced his

criminal conduct. complaint

The civil was dismissed based on the doc- estoppel. appeal, appellate trine of collateral On our Arizona, court first noted that in where the criminal of- statutorily occurred, fenses precluded a criminal defendant is subsequently denying proceed- from in a civil ing allegations upon the essential of the criminal offense previously adjudged guilty. which he Further, was litigate” exception court noted the "incentive to to col- applicable. finding, lateral was not In so acceptance plea court reasoned that Bulfin’s of the was litigate: drug-induced riot out of a lack of motivation to conduct would have been a defense to the offenses charged. accepted plea Rather, Bulfin had substantially potential prison reduce his term. given plea

Talarico asserts that the terms of the agreement substantially him, offered which reduced the charged only offenses to a misdemeanor and carried probation, payment sentence of medical treatment and litigate. fees, Therefore, he had no incentive to consis- exception apply Bulfin, tent with application should to defeat estoppel. of collateral Dunlap misperceives contends that Talarico Bulfin. proper asserts that the focus in the incentive-to- the criminal with which is on the crimes litigate inquiry charges and not the originally charged is defendant Therefore, when negotiations. from which result may he be a crime for which charged with individual incentive prison, term to a substantial sentenced need to defend necessarily by established litigate is Dunlap argues that charge. Citing Bulfin, against that, suggest plaintiff when anomaly be an to would "[i]t a lack of incen defense, so out of his he did abandoned substantially to reduce to a desire opposed tive as App. Ill. 3d at 791. Bulfin, term.” 244 potential prison as it relates reasoning in reject the We Bulfin litigate. Col- incentive to guilty pleas and the negotiated rigid a doctrine which defies lateral is flexible of whether a question The application. or mechanical a fair to contest opportunity has had a full and party simple reduced to a cannot be prior determination (7th 1183, McCall, F.2d 1186 n.7 formula. Warren v. 709 1983). Cir. aby been admitted liti-

Ordinarily, when a fact has fact is that the gant, presume it is reasonable subject to re- that the fact should not be established and believe, however, the same litigation. that We do not negotiated guilty plea. a may every be said in case of Negotiated important an administrative pleas serve by justice system. pleas, Such function our litigation. accept A decision to design, dissuade factors, weighing myriad the result of often being a resulting sentence charge of the reduction factors. Because significant only factor but one of those necessarily it does not negotiated pleas in the case of only reflects defendant’s deny that the failure to follow sentence, estop- for collateral desire to receive reduced than the fact of consideration of more pel purposes LaFave, Criminal also 2 R required. "admission” is See (1984). 20.1, Procedure at 559-60 § "The litigate’ formula, 'incentive to as used in most of the cases and in Second, the Restatement allows a party litigate who did relitigate issue to if party can show that original litigation was a side show rather than a struggle to the finish.” (Emphasis orig- inal.) Hazard, G. Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Problems, Preclusion and Related (1981). Cornell L. Rev. Under that approach, the party may rebut the inference naturally drawn from the fact that actually litigated, issue was is to say, the inference that party had treated the issue with entire seriousness litigation. first See 66 584; (Second) Cornell L. Rev. at see also Restatement Judgments 28§

We believe that the Restatement offers the proper focus for the incentive-to-litigate inquiry. We therefore consider whether the inference which flows from Talari- co’s admission that his conduct was intentional knowing was "treated with entire may seriousness” or now be In doing, rebutted. so we are mindful give refusal Talarico’s judgment preclusive effect should not occur without a compelling showing of unfairness, nor should it be based on a conclusion that judgment the criminal was erroneous. Restatement (Second) Judgments of Comment j §

We provided have been with and have reviewed the record proceedings of in Talarico’s criminal case. As a review, result of that we only conclude that in the most technical sense was guilty plea Talarico’s an admission that his criminal conduct was knowing and intentional. The record makes apparent plea that the a compro- was mise: never is it conceded that Accutane was not the contributing factor to Talarico’s criminal In conduct. fact, it appears that both the trial court and the State’s Attorney were made aware of the use the Accutane and Talarico’s theory concerning its effects. mitigation,

Specifically, offered in defense counsel taking prior Accutane, he had no had to Talarico’s that background. problems com- He further no criminal aggres- had found to cause been mented Accutane response query court’s as In to the sive behavior. market, taken off the the medication had been whether pro- responded In in the affirmative. defense counsel nouncing mis- sentence, trial commented that disposition probation appropriate was an demeanor "very strange light circumstances involved” further noted that those circum- the case. The court *** to the At- had "documented State’s stances been Incidentally, torney Dunlap the state- office.” refuted concerning proceeding made at the criminal ment having Accutane been taken offthe market. incentive-to-litigate telling Also on the issue is originally generousness plea Talarico of the aggravated battery, offer. was charged aggravated with unlawful aggravated restraint, violence, armed A sexual abuse. conviction for these offenses carried Apparently pursuant substantial sentence. agreement, aggravated battery the two counts were charge battery,” only "simple amended to two counts charged nol- and the remainder of offenses were accepting agreement, prossed. court, The trial one-year imposed probation, a sentence of misdemeanor counseling psychiatric Significantly, at the and fees. proceedings, of the defense of- time counsel second-year fered that Talarico was medical student. Any delayed imprisonment term of have his stud- would ies. prior proceed-

We note further that to the criminal Attorney ings, Dunlap behalf of wrote to the State’s leniency Dunlap requested letter, In Talarico. "intelligent, Talarico, as rational whom he characterized very with of a stated mild demeanor.” certainty that extenuating there were circumstances pertaining charges against Talarico; to the stated that he never would characterize Talarico as ei- ther aggressive dangerous. or

Further, it appears that a subsequent civil suit against not, Dunlap was at time the of the criminal proceedings, In an by foreseeable. affidavit filed Talari- attorney, co’s criminal trial counsel at averred that time concerning he advised Talarico the plea, counsel only that party believed Roche was the li- potentially able for Talarico’s violent behavior. Counsel stated that he had neither an indication a suspicion any nor mal- of practice on the part Dunlap.

Finally, although we have concluded pardon negate does finding guilt, not of Talarico’s it none- merits theless favorable consideration as it relates guilt. the inference to be drawn from his admission facts, i.e., significant The above reduction sentence, charges student, Talarico’s status as unforseeability liability, of future civil consideration given by mitigation evidence, the trial court of the including Accutane, the use well Dunlap’s as as own statement to the Attorney regarding State’s Talarico’s demeanor, combine to rebut the inference that Talari- co’s admission on the issues of intent knowledge by was treated him with entire seriousness. believe We litigate the incentive the criminal offense was Therefore, present not fully here. collateral apply. should not concerning

Had the issue Accutane and its side ef- fects not been an proceeding, issue the criminal it However, perhaps would merit less consideration here. having the issue been first raised in the criminal proceeding, disregard it be patently would unfair to now having it as a factor contributed circumstances particulars acceptance. offer and Incidentally, trial in criminal counsel while Bulfin to that had reason believe that he Bulfin averred drug induced, we do had been criminal conduct Bulfin’s any the of that issue in indication not notice Bulfin plea negotia- part drug-induced the was a of conduct trial or made known to the court. tions incentive-to-litigate inquiry a As final note the generally, be unfair to create a situ- believe it would we who, criminal after in a defendant balanc- ation which accept plea ing trial, a to the and risks of chooses costs automatically right negotiation a to his to is said forfeit curtain of the civil A refusal to look behind the trial. negotiated plea require every guilty de- to criminal potential proceed crim- civil suit to with fendant with rigidly regardless Moreover, trial, risks. to inal of the estoppel permit application in of collateral doctrine the involving negotiated chilling pleas ef- will have a cases acceptance pleas. equity To fect on of such do the surrounding every requires simply that available fact permitting negotiated guilty plea prior to be examined preclusive apply. the effect of the doctrine to argues to further that it would be unfair permit reap to from Talarico the benefits which flowed negotiated guilty permitted plea and to then be to deny validity conclusively plea. of that If in fact it is Talari- determined that Accutane was the cause of conduct, in co’scriminal and we make no determination regard, perceive has that we do not that Talarico forgotten Not to be the facts Ta- benefitted. are although pardoned, larico, atten- suffers burdens having dant to record and has had to endure defending emotional, costs, both financial and of against charges. deny preclusive

Finally, Dunlap argues effect public policy in On in this Illinois. case would set bad contrary, we that the doctrine collateral believe spar- and, be, remains intact as it should is used ingly, case-by-case only equity on a basis, and when requires. Judgments § Jur. Am. 2d More- Dunlap, over, we who, notice no unfairness to hereto- subject litigation involving fore, has not been the is- sue effect Accutane on On Talarico. contrary, if in fact Accutane caused Talarico’s criminal any precluding relitigation conduct, unfairness would solely by have been borne Talarico.

CONCLUSION holding By bright our we do not line establish rule respect negotiations with the context collat- estoppel. Application eral of the doctrine must be case-by-case basis, determined on a after consideration simply that, of all of the available factors. We hold on particular case, the facts of this Talarico had no incen- litigate against charges tive to the criminal him. That being against case, bar the to Talarico’s suit civil Dun- lap deprive day would Talarico of his in court and unfairly advantage Dunlap. Therefore, for all of the foregoing judgment appel- reasons, affirm we the of the late court.

Appellate judgment affirmed. dissenting: McMORROW, JUSTICE guilty plea, unconditionally In his Talarico conceded requisite had he the mens rea to commit the violent charged. pied guilty essence, In offenses when to he the charges, reduced criminal Talarico admitted that he intentionally knowingly, legal justification, and without pushed ground 15-year-oldboy the and shocked him gun, again legal later, with a stun and a week without justification, 25-year-old gun, shocked a man with a stun grabbed genitals, his him several and kissed times charges, pied guilty the When to the he face. he reduced deliberately knowingly opportunity and forfeited the by actually caused was his conduct assert that violent negligence prescribing party’s an acne medica- third malpractice action, however, In instant medical tion. the repudiates of criminal intent and admission his Talarico arising damages compensatory own out seeks to use not be allowed Talarico should criminal conduct. ways. system judicial to have it both the majority my opinion, invites of the In the decision legal profes- community toward the of the the rancor system. justice facts of that under the I believe sion and subjecting justification legal Dr. no case, there is this expense the stress and Dixie-Ashland to subjecting any justification for trial,- there nor is by taxpayers expense of the incurred the use litigate state to an issue and resources of the courts today’s litigated. my previously view, In which had majority been precedent opinion that is sets an unfortunate policy, legal principles, contrary public to sound Through application of the doctrine fairness. flawed estoppel, majority permits Talarico to collateral contrary legal positions in two different maintain finality judg- thereby compromising lawsuits, of the economy, plea, judicial integrity guilty ment, the of the Accordingly, in this case. and fairness the defendants I dissent. acknowledges, majority parties concede,

As appellate panel held, the as circuit court and present collateral are in this case. elements of acknowledges majority opinion expressly The battery supporting Talarico’s convic "mens rea element malprac proximate the the cause element in tion and Why, are the 177 Ill. 2d at 193. tice suit same issue.” proceed then, his should Talarico be allowed to with proximate of his attack on claim that the cause violent Dunlap’s negligent prescription and Dr. the victims was monitoring of Accutane?

The majority’s answer to this question relies entirely upon strained application principle of the that collat eral not preclude relitigation does anof issue if party against the whom the doctrine is asserted lacked litigate sufficient incentive to the particular issue the According first lawsuit. majority, to the the incentive to litigate concept, as interpreted in the Restatement (Second) Judgments (1982), permits relitigation § " of an party original issue 'if the can show that the lit igation was a struggle side show rather than a ” 196, Hazard, Revisit quoting finish.’ 177 Ill. 2d at G. ing the Second Restatement Judgments: Issue Preclu Problems, sion and Related 66 Cornell L. Rev. (1981). I do believe not the admissions defendant represented by made while attorneys negoti his in his plea show”; ated should be viewed as a "side the stakes state, people defendant, for the of this as well as the are high in a too criminal to prosecution plea assume that negotiations anything are a "struggle less than Rather, finish.” negotiations joint such are a by effort court, prosecutor, attorney and defense thoughtfully knowingly guilt complex resolve fairly. sentence Talarico issues Since cannot show that show, original litigation awas side his cur relitigate attempt rent the issue of intent scope falls outside the of the litigate excep incentive to tion to collateral estoppel.

According however, to the majority, may Talarico proceed with his claim against "only Dr. because guilty plea most technical sense was Talarico’s knowing admission that his criminal conduct was majority intentional.” 177 Ill. 2d at 196. The reasons negotiated compromise was a in which Ta larico never conceded that Accutane was not contributing cause his criminal conduct. question precise

I sense in which Talarico’s un- in intentional engagement his admission of equivocal a mere can be deemed knowing criminal conduct goes an admission technicality. contrary, such On responsibil- criminal heart of the issue of Talarico’s characterization majority’s ity. respect With "compromise,” a such observa- guilty plea as Talarico’s com- because in this context singularly unhelpful tion is negotiations. That component is an essential promise as- of the risks of assessment made a calculated Talarico he not mean lacked defense does serting the Accutane the fact Significantly, litigate the issue. incentive his guilty in expressly Talarico did not concede that is not his violent behavior that Accutane did cause a is legally implicit such concession irrelevant because criminal conduct. in his admission intentional person’s Although may there be instances which preclude in a matter does not that guilty plea partly pursuing depends a civil claim which party from not guilty plea, this is such on facts admitted negotiated Talarico guilty plea, case. At the time of his aware that attorneys were well and his defense Indeed, with Accutane. he had been under treatment began that months before Talarico the record reveals Accutane, 100 to spent his own treatment with he had researching the effects of Accutane while 200 hours his topic on that at project research participating his guilty at the time of Accordingly, medical school. significant information from plea, possessed Talarico Accutane-impairment which to evaluate the merits of theory negligently If his proved defense. Talarico acts, thereby Accutane caused his criminal prescribed intent, he would have been negating his criminal However, outright Talarico instead acquittal. entitled to charges, and benefit guilty to reduced plead chose to treatment psychiatric included from a sentence decision, Talarico Having made that probation. permitted pursue should not be now a lawsuit that places thereby repudiate the blame on others and admittedly intentional criminal acts. virtually indistinguishable

The instant case from Lilly (1993), App. Co., v. Eli & Ill. 3d 785 Bulfin appellate rejected attempt by where the a similar plaintiff guilty pleading charges, who, after to criminal subsequently sought damages in a civil lawsuit based on allegation the that certain medications manufactured by defendant had induced intoxicated that state through acts, caused him to commit criminal no fault of plaintiff his own. The suit in Bulfin, civil like plaintiff bar, in the case at knew at the time of crim his might proceedings complete inal that he have a defense acquitted and be on based the use the medications. In light plea negotiation, of an however, offered he forfeited drug-induced impairment pleaded guilty issue, the and manslaughter aggravated to ing assault. After review

the elements of collateral and the incentive litigate exception, appellate to the in court held Bulfin plaintiff op the had been a full afforded and fair portunity litigate in the criminal case to the issue of involuntarily whether his actions resulted from an Accordingly, appellate induced state of intoxication. the properly court held that the civil suit was dismissed on estoppel. the The basis collateral court Bulfin litigate complete observed that the incentive to charges present every defense criminal in to is case in potentially prison person which a charges such faces a term for anomaly suggest "[i]t and that would be an plaintiff that, defense, when did abandoned his he so out opposed of a lack as to a of incentive desire to substan tially potential prison reduce his 244 Ill. Bulfin, term.” App. 3d at 791. distinguishing explain- Without the facts in or Bulfin

ing analysis appellate flawed, where the court’s was rejects the rea expressly instant case majority pleas negotiated guilty "as it relates soning in Bulfin at In so 177 Ill. 2d 195. do litigate.” and the incentive strong policy concerns ing, majority overlooks allowed to defendant arise which when crimes, and then knowing or plead guilty to intentional deny guilt purposes for subsequently to for litigation, compensation financial pursuing, civil Justice consequences of his own criminal conduct. cry estop of collateral equity application out of this case. pel to the facts recognized by of those concerns have been Some Taylor, in Cole example, For v. jurisdictions. other (Iowa 1981), rejected Iowa N.W.2d subsequent grounds defendant’s public policy convicted negligent psychiatrist’s that her claim in civil suit In a similar treatment caused her to commit the crime. courts should not vein, a New York court cautioned that voluntary pleas knowing be to look behind expected guilt from adverse civil conse- to relieve defendants may from the defendants’ admis- quences follow charges. guilt sions of to serious criminal Merchants 495, Arzillo, Co. 98 A.D.2d 472 Mutual Insurance v. held, long guilty The "As the court as N.Y.S.2d stands, be heard plea guilty the defendant and cannot Insurance, say to otherwise.” Merchants Mutual 506, at In Adkinson v. Rossi A.D.2d at 472 N.Y.S.2d 105. (Alaska 1983), Co., a defen- 659 P.2d 1239-40 Arms manslaughter was then had of dant who been convicted wrongful family the for death. As by sued victim’s the suit, sought implead gun to civil he to defense the gun ground on the the was defective manufacturer discharged it ac- and had killed the victim when Court, in rejecting the cidentally. Supreme The Alaska manufacturer, gun to attempt implead defendant’s has observed, "[Allowing defendant who been an convicted of intentional killing, impose to li- ability on others consequences for the of his own anti- social conduct runs counter to underlying basic values system.” Adkinson, 659 P.2d at justice our criminal 1240.

The public policy same concerns enunciated in the above present cases are at Allowing case bar. Ta- larico to in pursue Accutane issue his medical mal- practice action in the case at bar creates an pre- unwise impose cedent to on the courts of this state. Talarico waived Accutane defense his by plea guilt to conduct, intentional he should be bound such by admission as a matter good law and sound policy.

By declining impose estoppel collateral under the case, circumstances majority of this allows defen- dant finality plea to circumvent of his guilty and to gain parties seek financial from third for own crimi- Finality judgments negotiated nal acts. in crimi- nal cases serves an in important purpose our criminal justice system. Once an by accused who is represented plead counsel guilty charges decides to to criminal accept conduct, the consequences of his own he should not be able to system use civil court make mockery proceedings by repudiating out the criminal his guilty plea pecuniary gain. compensation for The that Talarico in seeks his civil suit is not limited to expenses physical suffering medical ef- or from the side compensated fects of Accutane. He seeks to lost be income and profit advantage, and lost educational pre- sumably arising from Talarico’s criminal conviction and resulting impact it have on his may placed medical reasons, career. For these I find no principled basis apply which to exception collateral this case.

The appellate approval cited with Bulfin following: estoppel is a defen- where "The clearest case such charge and pleads guilty to a substantial criminal dant concerning the litigation same transac- seeks in civil then criminal act. that he did not commit the tion to assert a criminal Particularly galling is the situation where plaintiff in guilty his own seeks as convicted claim redress based on subsequent civil action to or, as effrontery some repudiation of the confession. The it, might say chutzpah, much to take. There too G. Haz- certainly be an in such case.” should ard, Judgements: Revisiting the Restatement Is- Second Problems, 66 L. Cornell Rev. sue Preclusion Related 564, 578 I to the basic agree foregoing with the adhere system our articu- underlying justice values I hold Talarico lated in the Adkinson case. would affirm estoppel, on collateral admissions based grant summary judgment trial to the defen- court’s I Accordingly, dants. dissent.

(No.81943. al., al., et et Appellants, Appellees. M.E.H. v. L.H.

Opinion September 1997. filed

Case Details

Case Name: Talarico v. Dunlap

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 11, 1997

Citation: 685 N.E.2d 325

Docket Number: 81459

Court Abbreviation: Ill.