27 N.M. 250 | N.M. | 1921
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Jewel Tadloek, appellee, by her next friend, brought this action in the district court for Guadalupe county, against school district No. 29 of Guadalupe county and Placido Baca y Baca, county school superintendent, to recover $130, alleged to be due as salary as a school-teacher, plus $1,000, exemplary damages. The cause was referred to a referee, and submitted to the court for final judgment. From a judgment for $130 and costs in favor of appellee, the appellants have prosecuted this appeal.
■ On August 10, 1918, the school district and the appellee entered into a written contract, by the terms of which the appellee was employed to teach school in said district for a term of seven months, beginning September 2, 1918, at the rate of $65 per month. The contract was approved by the county board of education of Guadalupe county, and the appellee performed service under the contract until January 24, 1919, when, according to the allegations of the complaint, she was dismissed without cause by the board of directors of the school district.
While the evidence is conflicting as to whether the school district or the appellee breached the contract of employment, and while, this court is as advantageously circumstanced to determine the truth of that matter by weighing the evidence as was the trial court — the trial court not having seen the witnesses, but having rendered judgment upon the transcript of evidence taken before the referee — yet it will be unnecessary to consider the weight of the evidence.
The complaint omits the Guadalupe county board of education as a party defendant, and it is contended by the appellants, among other things, that the trial court erred in refusing to hold that such board was a necessary party.
Section 5 of the act provided:
“The said board shall have full power and control over all rural schools and districts and the funds thereof, including high schools in rural districts and the funds thereof, except as such power is now conferred upon the state board of education and the state superintendent of public instruction. Said boards shall, also, have power to contract for and purchase all sites, buildings, equipment or other property for schools. All rural school moneys in the respective county treasuries and all such money credited * * * to such schools shall be expended and disbursed upon warrant of the county board of education only, signed by the president thereof and countersigned by the secretary thereof, and no contract or expenditure of said funds or any part thereof hereafter made, except in the manner herein specified, shall be valid. * * * Teachers shall be employed by the board of school directors with the. approval of the county board of education.”
Section 6 vests the title of all rural school property in the county board of education. Section 8 provides:
“County boards of education * * * shall have power and be required to provide, by building, purchasing, or leasing, suitable schoolhouses; to keep same in repair, to provide for fuel and light, for the payment of teachers’ wages as well as other employees, * * *; to provide for the payment of interest on school bonds and the redemption thereof, and to defray all other expenses connected with the proper conduct of the public schools in their respective districts.”
Section 9 authorizes county boards to constitute the local boards of school directors their agents in executing the ministerial powers conferred upon the county boards, such agency to be in writing and revocable at the pleasure of the county boards.
Section 11 vests in the county school superintendent jurisdiction over rural schools; requires him to make visits to such schools and supervise the methods of instruction employed and consult with the school directors “concerning the improvement of their schools.”
Section 14 makes the local boards of school directors bodies corporate, with power to sue and be sue'd and contract and be contracted with. Section 16 places the “care and keeping” of the rural schoolhouses and property therein in the' hands of the school directors, subject to the limitation heretofore expressed.
Section 4956, Code 1915, enacted in 1891, and not specifically repealed by the act of 1917, provides:
“Every person employed to teach a school shall keep a proper record, and at the end of each term, make a report to the county superintendent, showing the whole number of pupils that have attended * * * and for failure to maké such report, he may be fined. * * * No person shall be paid any money for teaching any school outside of incorporated cities, towns and villages, until an order is-presented, signed by two of the school directors or the proper district and indorsed by the county superintendent.”
.The last clause of this section is relied upon by the appellee as authority for the proposition that it was unnecessary to make the county board of education a party defendant; the contract of employment having been made by the school directors, and the payment of the salary sued for being permitted by the last clause of the last-mentioned section.
Section 5 of the act of 1917 which requires that rural school money shall be paid “only” upon the warrants of the county board of education, signed by the president and countersigned by the secretary, is wholly inconsistent with the plan theretofore existing by which school moneys in rui^al districts was expended by the school directors. Under section 5 teachers’ salaries can be paid only upon the warrants of the county board of education, and consequently the last clause of section 4956, Code 1915, was repealed. That the Legislature determined to carry forward the new system of school expenditures in all its parts is indicated also by the fact that it repealed specifically section 4851, Code 1915, which provided for matters concerning the vouchers and warrants for the payment of rural school moneys by local school directors. The judgment in the case at bar would cause the payment of the appellee’s salary as school-teacher to be made contrary to the act of 1917, and in a manner wholly antagonistic to that specified in that law. As rural school money, and particularly teachers’ salaries, can be disbursed under the law only by the county board of education, and as this action was an attempt to compel payment of a teacher’s salary, though the action was grounded on a contract, the board of education of the county was an indispensable party defendant, for the district court would obtain no jurisdiction to compel the payment of the salary from the school funds in the hands of such board, except where such board was made a party defendant. From the statement of general principles hereinafter mentioned, it will also be seen that the county board was an indispensable party defendant for other reasons.
Because the complaint fails to state a cause of action and for the error of the court in refusing to require the county board of education to be made a party defendant, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion; and, it is so ordered.