20 Tex. 782 | Tex. | 1858
The right of the appellant, to his homestead exemption, was pleaded to the suit brought to foreclose the mortgage; and the judgment therein, condemning the land to be sold, was a direct adjudication adversely to the right of the defendant, upon the issue made by the plea. The merits of the judgment cannot be brought in question in a collateral action. Until reversed or annulled by some direct proceeding for that purpose, it is, and must be held, wherever brought collaterally in question, conclusive of the matters therein adjudicated. There is no better settled principle, than that the judgment or decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, or necessarily involving the decision of the question, is conclusive
If the appellant had made the proof in the former case, which he has made in this, the Court must have adjudged the question in his favor, or its judgment must have been reversed, upon appeal, by this Court. If he neglected or failed to make the proof, the Court could not do otherwise than render the judgment which was rendered in the case. But whether he made the proof or not, or whether the Court decided erroneously or not in that case, cannot be inquired of in this. The judgment in that case is conclusive of the question. If it were otherwise, there would never be an end of litigation; and questions solemnly adjudicated by a competent tribunal, would still remain, as before, open to re-examination.
The precise question now before the Court, was determined by this Court in the case of Lee v. Kingsbury, which, if there ever could have been a doubt as to the application of the general principle to such a case, must be held decisive of the question. (18 Tex. R. 68.)
But it is insisted that there are other parties, the children of the defendant, who have intervened in this suit, and who are not
It is further insisted that the former judgment is void, because the Act creating the artificial person, plaintiff in that suit, was unconstitutional, and there really was no such person as the Texas Monument and Military Institute. The title of the Act by which the plaintiffs in the former suit were created a corporation, is the following: “An Act to consolidate the Texas Monumental Committee and the Texas Military Institute with Rutersville College.” And it is objected that the Act embraces more than one object; and is consequently repugnant to the 24th Section of the General Provisions of the State Constitution. This objection we do not think tenable. The object expressed in the title of the Act is to consolidate the two bodies into one; and the natural inference would be, that the one corporation was to be clothed with the rights, privileges and powers which formerly appertained to the two, now consolidated in one. The terms employed in the title of the Act are sufficiently significant of the subject of its provisions; and that was what the clause in the Constitution intended. It could not have meant that the word “ object” should be understood in the sense of “ provision for that would render the title of the Act as long as the Act itself. Various and numerous provisions may be necessary to accomplish the one general object, which an Act of the Legislature proposes. Nor could it have been intended that no Act of legislation should be constitutional which had reference to the accomplishment of more than one ultimate end. For an Act having one main or principal object in view, may incidentally effect or be promotive of others; and it would be impossible so to legislate as to prevent this consequence. The intention doubtless was, to prevent embracing in an Act, having one ostensible object, provisions having no relevancy to that object, but really designed to effectuate other and wholly different objects, and thus
Judgment affirmed.