Rоbert Jackson was employed by Dusco, Inc., as a security guard *219 at a shopping mall. Jackson was on a routine patrol in an exterior service bay area ensuring that the back doors to the stores were locked after the mall had closed. Suddenly, he slipped and fell in a large pool of grease which had been thrown out the back door of a McDonald’s restaurant instead of being carried across the service area and put in the proper grеase disposal receptacle. Jackson sued T & M Investments, Inc., which owned and operated the restaurant.
A jury returned a verdict of $338,830 in favor of Jackson individually, and $18,250 in favor of Jackson as the executor of the estate of Mаrie Jackson. T & M brings this appeal asserting nine enumerations of error.
1. T & M asserts in its first enumeration of error that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict because Jackson was a licensee and there was no evidence that T & M had been wilfully or wantonly negligent.
T & M did not own or occupy the service bay area. T & M had a non-exclusive license to use the service bay area to receive supplies, access trash dumpsters, and deposit grease in designated receptacles. Consequently, general landowner liability theories do not apply. As was the case in
International Paper Realty Co. v. Bethune,
Even if one were to construe the faсts of this case to fit the model of landowner liability, T & M would have had an obligation to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe. “An owner/occupier has the duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary care tо keep premises safe. OCGA § 51-3-1. As to a licensee, however, there is liability only for wilful or wanton injury. OCGA § 51-3-2. The accepted test to determine whether one is an invitee or a licensee is whether the party coming onto the business premises hаd present business relations with the owner or occupier which would render his presence of mutual benefit to both, or whether his presence was for his own convenience, or was
*220
for business with one other than the owner or occupier.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises,
2. In its second enumeration of error, T & M alleges that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the duty owed a licensee, or to define licensee, was prejudicial error. For the reasons articulated in Division 1 of this opinion, this argument is without merit.
3. Enumeration 3 alleges that the trial court erred in failing to enforce a motion in limine regarding evidence of a subsequent collateral incident. A review of the record indicates that only one witness testified that there could have been a second incident involving grease in the service area. This testimony was offered in direct response to a question concerning other incidents posed by T & M’s counsel on cross-examination. “Where counsel elicits testimony unfavorable to his client, he will not be heard to object to it.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Tiftarea Shopper v. Maddox,
4. T & M asserts that the special damages awardеd for lost wages was improper as it was not supported by sufficient evidence to allow the jury to calculate the lost wages with specificity. A review of the record indicates that Jackson testified that he had been earning a sаlary of $1,260 per month as a security guard. His testimony included his continuous work history, the date upon which he last worked, at age 59, and recounted his unsuccessful efforts to find work. We find that this evidence would permit the jury to calculate the amount of thе loss with a reasonable degree of certainty. See
Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Tigner,
5. T & M also asserts that the special damages awаrded for future medical expenses was improper as it was not supported by sufficient evidence to allow the jury to calculate the expenses with specificity. Jackson’s treating physician testified that he continued to treаt Jackson for his injuries and that he recommended that a myelogram and other tests be performed. He stated that Jackson would require continuing physical therapy. He testified that the current cost of an M.R.I. is $650 to $700. This testimony was sufficient to prеsent the issue of future medical expenses to the jury. Since the special damages verdict was not broken down by the jury, we cannot say which portion was attributed to lost wages and which portion to future medical expenses. “The jury is the finаl arbiter of the facts and the verdict must be construed by the trial and appellate courts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Rosequist v. Pratt,
6. T & M, in its sixth enumeration of error, alleges that the award for loss of consortium was improper. At trial, no evidence was presented to establish the date of the death of Jackson’s wife, who died during the pendency of the litigation. T & M argues that without that date there was insufficient evidence upon which the jury cоuld base its award. “Damages for loss of consortium,. . . are . . . not capable of exact pecuniary measure and must be left to the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors taking into consideration the nature of services, society, companionship and all the circumstances of the case. (Cit.) [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.)
Gurly v. Hinson,
7. T & M cites as error the trial court’s refusal to admit medical records from a visit made by Jackson to Dr. Nichols 12 years prior to the incident which forms the basis of this case. T & M argues that OCGA § 24-3-4 permits the admission of statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. Such records are, however, “still subject to the general rule that ‘(i)f a hospital record contains diagnostic opinions and conclusions, it cannot, upon proper objection, be admitted into evidencе unless and until the proper foundation is laid, i.e., the person who entered such diagnostic opinions and conclusions
*222
upon the record must qualify as an expert and relate the facts upon which the entry was based.’ [Cits.]”
Stoneridge Properties v. Kuper,
8. The eighth enumeration of error alleges that the trial court made numerous errors with regard to the jury charges. In instructing the jury on the burden of proof in a civil case, the trial court charged as follows: “By a preponderance of the evidence is meant that superior weight of the evidence upon which the issues involved. . . . And in this instance, it’s to the Plaintiff’s side of the case rather than the Defendant’s side of the case.” While the final portion of this charge is not part of the pattern instruction, we find that a juror of average intelligence would understand that the judge was attempting to clarify which party had the burden of proоf and not infer from this phrase that he believed that the plaintiff actually had a preponderance of the evidence. “Instructions which, when the jury is given credit for ordinary intelligence, are not confusing and prejudicial are not reversible error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Unique Designs v. Pittard Machinery Co.,
9. T & M’s final enumeration of error, that the verdict was contrary to the law аnd evidence is deemed abandoned pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2). In its brief, T & M has simply rephrased its enumeration of error without providing guidance as to the basis for this claim and has cited no authority. “The mere repetition and rephrasing of an enumeration of error without more is not the argument anticipated by [Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2)]. ‘The principal purpose of argument is to provide guidance to this court on the basis for a claim of error and for citations of authority which tend to support appellant’s allegation of error. (Cits.) A mere recital, or repetition, of the enumerated error is not argument. (Cits.)’ [Cits.]”
Chesser v. Wallace,
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part.