T.K.B., a child, petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the validity of her secure detention, pending the outcome of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. We granted the petition in an unpublished order and directеd that respondent release the child. By this opinion, we now state the reasons for granting relief.
Petitioner entered a guilty plea to resisting an officer without violence, a misdemeanor. The child was placed on home detention сare, but failed to appear at the adjudication hearing and a custody order issued. The child was later detainеd and placed in secure detention to await the adjudication hearing.
An order detaining a child in the custody of the stаte pending a juvenile delinquency hearing must comply with the statutes au
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thorizing juvenile detention.
See R.W. v. Soud,
Juvenile detention determinations involve a two-step process. If a juvenile qualifies for detention under the “admission criteria” of the RAI and subsections 985.255(l)(a) through (j), the inquiry proceeds to the tallying of points for various factors to yield a “risk assessment,” and the RAI scorе must establish a need for detention.
R.A.P. v.
Parkins,
Although the pre-disposition report recommended probation, the state objected contending that petitioner was at high risk to reoffend because she had a history of running away from home. The circuit court continued petitioner’s detention for almost a month while awaiting a new predisposition repоrt. Petitioner’s parents refused to pick her up from detention and the circuit court found that there were no other viable options for her placement.
Section 985.255(1) provides that a child placed on home detention may cоntinue to be detained if the child is alleged to be an escapee from a nonresidential commitment program, a probation program or conditional release supervision. At that point the child is eligible for secure detentiоn. Nothing in the statute provides for secure detention for absconding from any situation other than those three programs.
Section 985.03 does not define the term “abscond.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), defines “abscond” as to “depart secretly оr suddenly, especially to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of process,” or “to leave a place, usually hurriedly, with another’s money or property.” DJJ has adopted rule 63D-10.004(5), Florida Administrative Code, which states that absconding
occurs when a supervised youth goes in a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the court in order to avoid the legal process, or when the youth hides, conceals, or absents himself or herself with the intent to avoid the legal prоcess. Mere absence or not appearing for appointments is not absconding, but may constitute a techniсal violation of supervision.
The rule further provides that within one working day after determining that the youth has absconded, the Juvenile Probation Officer shall file with the court an Affidavit for An Order to Take Into Custody and an Affidavit/Petition for Violation of Probation. No such affidavits were filed in this case.
Rule 63D-10.004(5) includes a statement that a “youth reported by parent(s)/guardian(s) to have run away is considered an absconder.” However, this definition of “absconding” to mean “run away” does not appear in the statute. As this court has repeatedly held, the power
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to place juveniles charged with a delinquent act in detention is entirely statutory in nature. S.W.
v. Woolsey,
In addition to the improper scоre of ten points for absconding, DJJ erroneously scored one point for the pending misdemeanor, which was not a sеparate offense. Nor were the three points for “aggravation” supported by the record. Subtracting those fourteen points improperly included in the RAI, petitioner correctly scored eight points, which did not qualify her for secure detention.
The circuit court is strictly prohibited from ordering detention because of a lack of a better alternative. § 985.24(2)(d). Detention because of concern for the child’s well-being is not authorized.
J.J. v. State,
Finally, we note that this is the eighteenth juvenile habeas petition this court has considered from Duval County in the last thirteen months. Ten of the petitions have been granted, three petitions have been denied on the merits and the remaining cases were dismissed as moot. This is an inefficiеnt use of limited judicial resources, especially where the rule of law is clear: if the statute fails to authorize secure detention, a juvenile cannot be so held.
Z.B. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice,
Juvenile detention is a mаtter that is controlled by legislation. It is not for us, as judges, to question the wisdom of the legislation. Rather, our task is simply to carry it out. Section 985.255 establishes the criteria for detaining a child, pending the outcome of a juvenile delinquency case. A decision to detain a child must be made according to the statutory criteria.
K.E.,
PETITION GRANTED.