T.J. v. Superior Court CA1/3
A174042
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2025|
Check TreatmentFiled 11/17/25 T.J. v. Superior Court CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
T. J.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A174042
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
(Contra Costa County
Respondent;
Super. Ct. Nos. J2400437,
J2400438, J2400439, J2400440)
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES
BUREAU,
Real Party in Interest.
T.J. (Mother) petitions this court for an extraordinary writ after the
juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her four minor children.1
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) She contends the trial court erred in setting
the hearing because she had made progress with her court-ordered
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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reunification plan and because there was a substantial probability the
children could be returned to her care. We deny the petition on the merits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
Contra Costa County Children & Family Services (the Bureau) filed
four petitions pursuant to section 300 on August 6, 2024—one for each of the
four children, 14-year-old T.1, 12-year-old T.2, eight-year-old T.3., and two-
year-old M.S. As later amended and sustained, the complaints alleged
Mother had not provided adequate protection from domestic violence between
herself and M.S.’s father (Father);2 that an earlier dependency case had
recently been closed with a safety plan to protect Mother and the children,
but Mother did not follow through with the safety plan; and that Mother and
Father had violated an active restraining order protecting Mother (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1)); as to T.1, T.2, and T.3, that Mother had placed the children at
risk of physical harm by engaging in acts of domestic violence with Father in
the presence of the children (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)); as to T.2, that Mother asked
her to intervene in a violent argument by barricading her bedroom door then
jumping out of the window, and that T.2 felt unsafe at home because of
domestic violence between Mother and Father (§ 300, subd. (c)); and as to
M.S., that Father had placed her at substantial risk of harm and neglect by
engaging in acts of domestic violence in her presence. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
The children were placed in the home of a maternal aunt (Aunt), where
they remained throughout these proceedings.
2 Although T.1, T.2, and T.3 have a different father than M.S., for the
sake of simplicity we refer to M.S.’s father as “Father.” The father of the
three older children is deceased.
2
The detention/jurisdiction report explained that the Bureau received
information on July 29, 2024 that Mother and Father had been involved in an
argument, during which they hit each other. Mother ran into T.2’s bedroom
and asked her to barricade the door, Father “ ‘busted through’ the door” as
T.2 tried to do so, and Mother jumped out of the second story window,
breaking both her ankles and fracturing her spine. It appears that T.2, T.3,
and M.S. were in the home at the time. Mother was taken to a hospital, and
she would need surgery followed by placement in a rehabilitation facility.
The older children, T.1, T.2, and T.3, reported other incidents in which
they saw Father being physically abusive to Mother, including a recent
incident when Father “ ‘sock[ed]’ ” Mother in the face. On another occasion,
T.2 saw Father push Mother down and hit her, causing her to bleed from the
face, and break items in the home; another time, T.2 came home and found
the front door broken. These incidents occurred mainly at night.
Mother denied any recent domestic violence with Father. Mother
denied that Father lived in the family’s home, but Father said he stayed
there more than half the time.
Mother had a history of child welfare referrals dating to 2008. As to
the referrals that had been substantiated, in July 2022, she was “foaming at
the mouth” and appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamines
and amphetamines while holding then two-month-old M.S. An investigation
indicated that Mother and Father had been engaging in domestic violence
and Father had sent threatening text messages. After this incident, the
children were detained and the family received reunification and
maintenance services, including domestic violence services and development
of a domestic violence relapse plan. That dependency was vacated on April
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17, 2024, less than four months before the incident giving rise to the current
dependency.
A report before the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing detailed an
additional incident of prior domestic violence, shortly after M.S. was born, in
which Mother and Father engaged in a physical altercation in the stairwell of
an apartment building while Mother was holding her four-week-old infant.
She fell to the bottom of the stairs with the baby still in her arms. During
the incident, Father struck Mother multiple times and strangled her. Mother
obtained a restraining order against Father, which was still in effect when
Mother and Father engaged in the fight that ended with her jumping out a
window. Nevertheless, during the time the protective order was in place,
Father often spent the night at the family’s home.
Father had a history of arrests from June 2008 to May 2022, including
arrests for assault with a firearm, violation of parole, criminal threats,
inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, child abuse with possible
great bodily injury, cruelty to a child, and battery.
On November 13, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition as
amended, adjudged the children dependents, and ordered reunification
services.
Six-Month Review Report
The six-month review hearing was initially scheduled for April 30,
2025. The Bureau’s report indicated that Mother had taken a five-week
domestic violence prevention class, and the class facilitator reported that
Mother participated in it actively. She was also participating in a domestic
violence survivors’ support group, and the facilitator reported that she was
very engaged in the discussions. Mother said she had been attending
therapy, but the social worker could not confirm this information. She had
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attended only three of nine sessions of one parenting class, but she was
participating in another parenting class.
Mother had attended only 12 of 21 possible visits with the children
during the period from November 15, 2024 to April 16, 2025, many of the
missed visits being due to Mother not confirming she would attend or
cancelling shortly before the visit. The three older children had expressed
indifference about the missed visits. During visits, M.S. often played on her
own while Mother tried to interact with the older children.
T.1 and T.2 had seen pictures of Mother and Father together and text
messages from Father on Mother’s phone. They expressed their fears about
returning to Mother’s care. T.2 had spoken about Mother being verbally and
physically abusive toward the children, about not having food in the home,
and about being tardy or absent from school while she was in Mother’s care.
T.1 said she did not think she could have stability and consistency in her life
if she returned to Mother’s care, and she was angry at Mother and distrustful
about Mother’s relationship with Father.
Two of Mother’s family members told the social worker they saw Father
at Mother’s home on the afternoon of January 30, 2025, despite the existence
of a restraining order.
The Bureau recommended terminating family reunification services
and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26. On the scheduled date of
the review hearing, Mother and Father requested a contested hearing, which
ultimately took place on August 7, 2025.3
Additional Reports Before Six-Month Hearing
A report dated June 9, 2025, explained that since the last hearing,
Mother had attended only three of seven possible visits with the children,
3 Father is not a party to this writ proceeding.
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and she ended one visit an hour early. During that visit, Mother asked T.1
repeatedly whether T.1 needed a new swimsuit for class, and Mother became
defensive and “mutter[ed] under her breath about the attitude.” T.1 was
upset after the visit and told the social worker she would like to attend fewer
visits because Mother had “mood swings” and T.1 “never [knew] if she’ll be
upset or not.” Both T.1 and T.2 expressed their view that Mother’s behavior
was “ ‘very odd, very confusing . . . why it turned so argumentative.’ ” The
caregiver reported that Mother called the children only infrequently.
The Bureau had learned that some of the information Mother provided
about her therapy was not true. Mother had said she began seeing her
therapist in September 2024, and in April 2025 she told the social worker she
had switched to a new therapist because of a problem with her insurance.
But the social worker later learned that Mother’s intake interview for the
initial therapist did not take place until December 2024 and that her services
were discontinued in April 2025 because of poor attendance—that is, she had
attended only 11 out of 18 sessions.
An August 4, 2025 memorandum to the juvenile court explained that
Mother had again switched to a new therapist, and she reported being happy
with him. Her attendance at visits had recently improved, but she still had
attended only 60 percent of the visits available to her. One missed visit was
attributable to her decision to go to Las Vegas to celebrate her birthday and
that of an adult daughter who lived there. Mother sent pictures of the Las
Vegas trip to T.1, which caused T.1 to feel left out. T.1 and T.2 were
“unwavering” in their wish to remain in Aunt’s care, and T.3 had also spoken
about wanting to remain in the foster home, despite his love for mother.
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Contested Six-Month Review Hearing
At the contested hearing, Mother introduced evidence that she had
completed a 12-hour parenting course in April and May 2025 and two
domestic violence programs between May and July 2025, one five hours and
one four hours. However, the social worker assigned to the case testified that
he had told Mother that the domestic violence programs did not satisfy the
need for a 26-week comprehensive domestic violence victim program that
included safety planning and prevention. Such a program was necessary
because of the severity of the family’s domestic violence and the fact that the
previous dependency had ended only four months before the current
dependency case began. Mother had been attending weekly sessions with a
domestic violence counselor since June, and they had been working on a
safety plan.
Mother had engaged in some individual therapy and had expressed a
desire for family therapy. A family therapist had been assigned. Mother had
had one individual session with him, but family therapy had not yet begun.
Mother had recently told the social worker she would be moving to a
different city and would no longer be living in the home to which Father had
access.
In December, Mother had still been in a wheelchair and having
problems with her mobility because of the fall from the window. She had to
take a bus to some of the visits, which she told the social worker made it
difficult for her to get around.
The juvenile court terminated reunification services for both parents
and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, finding that neither parent had
participated regularly and made substantive progress in their case plan. As
to Mother, the court explained its reasoning as follows: The present
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dependency began only shorty after an earlier proceeding, which also
involved acts of violence by Father against Mother, had ended. Mother had
made some efforts during the dependency—particularly taking into account
her injuries—but her participation had been less than adequate. She had
had multiple individual therapists, her therapy had been terminated for poor
attendance, and despite the additional three months that had elapsed while
the six-month review hearing was continued, she had not made significant
progress. And the family had not yet begun family therapy, something the
court concluded the three older children “desperately need[ed]” to address
their feelings toward Mother and their sense that she did not love them. The
court held out the prospect, however, that there might be progress in family
therapy before the section 366.26 hearing and that Mother could bring a
petition to change the order. (§ 388.)
DISCUSSION
In general, when a child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile
court must order reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); Tonya M. v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.).) The governing
statutes set forth time limits for those services. As pertinent here, when a
sibling group is removed from parental custody, and one member of the group
is under the age of three, reunification services may be limited to six months
after the dispositional hearing, and “shall be provided for . . . no longer than
12 months from the date the child entered foster care.” (§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(B) & (C).)4 At the six-month hearing, the court may set a section
366.26 hearing within 120 days if it “finds by clear and convincing evidence
4 The date a child entered foster care is deemed to be “the earlier of the
date of the jurisdictional hearing . . . or the date that is 60 days after the date
on which the child was initially removed from the physical custody of their
parent or guardian.” (§ 361.49, subd. (a).)
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that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress
in a court-ordered treatment plan.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) If, however, the
court finds there is a substantial probability the children may be returned to
their parent within six months, or if reasonable services have not been
provided, services may be offered until the 12-month hearing. (§§ 361.5,
subd. (a)(1)(C), 366.21, subd. (e)(3).)
Mother contends the juvenile court’s findings that she had not
participated regularly and made substantive progress in her case plan and
that there was no substantial probability the children could be returned to
her by the 12-month hearing are not supported by the evidence.
We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence,
considering the evidence in favor on the prevailing party and resolving
doubts in favor of the trial court’s order. (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150; In re Yvonne W. (2008)165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401
.) Where a finding must be based on clear and convincing evidence, the question is whether “the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)9 Cal.5th 989
, 994–996.) Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case.” (Yvonne W., at p. 1401.) In our review for substantial evidence, “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010)191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689
(Kevin R.).)
Mother argues these standards are not met because she had made all
the progress with her case plan that she could, in light of the injuries she had
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suffered. For instance, she points out, she attended six sessions of a domestic
violence support group and was engaged in the discussions. She attended
two domestic violence programs, one five hours and the other four hours. She
attended two six-session parenting classes, and she said she had learned
about how children respond to their parents’ actions, using incentives for
good behavior, and the importance of structure and routine in children’s lives.
After participating in a domestic violence counseling session, she told a social
worker she wanted to continue to focus on recognizing and regulating her
emotions and that she appreciated the discussion with her counselor about
boundaries and protecting herself. In December 2024, she told the social
worker she was trying to be more firm with boundaries, and she said she
could live without Father.
We bear in mind, though, that it is not our role to reweigh the evidence,
but rather to determine if there are sufficient facts to support the juvenile
court’s findings, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s
order. (Kevin R., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 688–689.) In our view, the
evidence is sufficient for the juvenile court to have found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother had not participated regularly and made
substantive progress in her plan. Mother’s case plan required her to
complete a 26-week domestic violence class, which she did not do, instead
completing two classes that totaled nine hours between them. Mother’s
failure to make more progress in the tasks related to domestic violence is
particularly significant because domestic violence lay at the heart of this
case. Mother and Father had a history of domestic violence that led to a
previous dependency, one which ended less than four months before the
incident giving rise to the current case. And in the current case, one of the
children reported recently seeing Father “ ‘socking’ ” Mother in the face, and
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the violence culminated a few days later when Mother ran into T.2’s bedroom
and asked her to barricade the door, then jumped out of the window to escape
Father, who was “ ‘bust[ing] through’ the door.”
Even during this dependency, there was cause for concern that Mother
remained in contact with Father, in violation of her case plan’s requirement
that she comply with the restraining order: The children reported seeing
pictures and text messages on her phone that suggested they were in contact,
and family members told the social worker they had seen Father at Mother’s
home in January 2025. The record fully supports a conclusion that Mother
had not participated regularly and made substantive progress in the domestic
violence portion of her case plan.
Mother’s case plan also required to her enter and complete individual
counseling. Here, too, Mother had made some efforts, but they fell short in
ways that allowed the court to conclude she had not participated regularly
and made substantive progress in this regard, either. Mother had completed
some counseling, but the record indicates she started therapy three months
after she told the social worker she had done so, that her first therapist
terminated the therapy because of attendance violations, and that Mother
misrepresented to the social worker the reason those sessions ended. Mother
reported churning through four different therapists between March and
August 2025. And in one program, where Mother stayed for 11 sessions, her
engagement was reportedly “limited” and there was “minimal follow-through
with assigned work.” Perhaps as a result, in the same conversation in which
Mother informed the social worker she was working on “emotional
intelligence,” she also “erupted into an aggressive tirade toward [the] Social
Worker, not once stopping to ‘take a breath, take a pause,’ nor ‘not react to a
negative thought’ as she stated she was learning to do.”
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Mother was also inconsistent in her visits with the children, attending
only approximately 60 percent of the available visits. She failed to confirm
many of the visits ahead of time, failed to show up for some, and failed to stay
the entire length of time for others. She even chose to go to Las Vegas to
celebrate a birthday on the day of a scheduled visit, causing her to miss it.
And when Mother’s visits did occur, the social worker opined that the quality
of the visits left considerable room for improvement.
Taking all these facts into account, the juvenile court could properly
find by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had not participated
regularly and made substantive progress in her case plan.
The evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was
no substantial probability the children could be returned to Mother’s care by
the time of the 12-month hearing. In considering the likelihood of
reunification at a six-month hearing, the court considers not the likelihood
during the six months after the hearing, but “the likelihood of reunification in
such time as remains until a potential 12-month review hearing, even if less
than six months.” (Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 840.) That date was a
mere two months off (see §§ 361.49, subd. (a), 366.21, subd. (f)(1)), and the
trial court could reasonably find there was no substantial probability that
Mother would sufficiently have addressed the problems that led to the
children’s removal during that brief period of time.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize and do not discount the
efforts that Mother did make. We also recognize that she faced physical
limitations during her recovery from the injuries she sustained from jumping
out of the window to escape Father. But in light of the record as a whole,
including Mother’s history of domestic violence with Father, her failure to
meet the requirements of her case plan, and the indications that she
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maintained contact with Father, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s
findings that she had not made substantive progress and there was no
substantial probability the children could be returned to her care by the time
of the 12-month hearing.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary relief is denied on the merits. Our
decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.490(b)(2)(A) & 8.452(i).) Mother’s request for a stay of the December 1,
2025 hearing is denied.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
T.J. v. Superior Court (A174042)
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