History
  • No items yet
midpage
T.D. v. Patton
868 F.3d 1209
10th Cir.
2017
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 рrovide.” Court, Parties extent the can so At comes before this the meaning suggested argument oral Mr. Becker language the Contract’s would have be language that the first time means raised and addressed by first trial party one has filed in a once suit court appropriate jurisdiction court, proper parties all do their would appealed. then Assuming that the rules keep being litigated from best issues it, evidence would interpretation allow an surely court. that would in different But of the might profit Contract parol from party seeking not A preclude from to liti- addressing evidence what parties in- gate though in party its chosen forum even by tended ambiguous their language re- B previously initiated suit forum garding in parties’ what court the disputes A party does not believe be should be-resolved. (Recall of-.competent, jurisdiction.” “court simply that, All this say is although I Tribe the state contends join two-judge panel opinion, our I do not jurisdiction court over this dispute.) lacks join Judge Hartz’s I be- concurrence event, In any language the puzzling does lieve that currently there is an insufficient distinguish tribal courts state record before us to address the issues argue appears courts. Mr. Becker Judge Hartz discusses in his concurrence. strips the because the waiver tribal court jurisdiction, it could be a exclusive provided jurisdiction court “exclusive” But also

the waiver. state courts do not If jurisdiction.

have the “shall exclusive original jurisdic

have ... and exclusive language juris

tion” excludes tribal-court exclude, diction, it would-likewise .state- T.D., Plaintiff-Appellee, jurisdiction, an result. absurd v. I hope this is the last time courts have Kelcey PATTON, Defendant-Appellant, construe waiver with- such clause ob- language. scure

EBEL, concurring. Judge, Circuit Department of Human Denver Services, In this appeal by two-judge Defendant. resolved panel, panel we have reached a unanimous No. 16-1092 disposition appeal. to the of the decision as Hartz, however, Judge Appeals, a con- has added United Court of States express currence his further views Tenth Circuit.

an dispositive issue that is rele- neither Filed panel vant our concurrence decision. His dicta, would if be its discussion were even panel’s opinion. panel

included Our expressly

decision does not address the

meaning language par- of the used and, generally

ties Contract their.

particular, language parties includ- provision addressing

ed in the Contract’s parties’ disputes what court should question Before that resolved. ever *3 (Gillian Dale, with Ringel D.

Andrew LLC., briefs), Evans, Hall & him Denver, Colorado, Appel- for appearing lant. Allen, abuse at the P.C., sexual Vellone, physical and severe Factor, &

Jordan of his father. hands Colorado, for appearing Appellee. Denver, summary moved EBEL, BRISCOE, Before that she is enti ground on the judgment MATHESON, Judges. Circuit immunity. The district qualified tled interlocutory This denied motion. MATHESON, Judge. Circuit Exercising jurisdiction appeal followed.2 Kelcey Patton under T.D. sued §- affirm. View we under 28 U.S.C. right violating § 1983 U.S.C. most light in the favorable ing the facts on a process. He relies substantive due that, T.D., we conclude theory,” provides which “danger-creation Patton violated T.D- n clearly established *4 for the can be liable officials that “state process substantive due constitutional those officials parties where third acts of a state official’screation right be free of harm.” that the danger caused created actor. private from a danger of (10th Doran, 242 F.3d v. Currier court that district agree We 2001) (quotations-omitted).1 Cir. T.D.’s substantive due Ms. Patton violated Patton, for the Den- worker social in placing T.D. right by knowingly Services Department of Human ver in- knowingly of position responsible (“DDHS”), one of was those vulnerability danger.3 creasing T.D.’s time, T.D., at the removing a minor juvenile ’to court She recommended home, into placing from his mother’s him placed and remain in that T.D. recommending T.D. custody, DDHS’s custody despite her temporary Duerson’s in temporary and remain be placed in safety concerns about T.D.’s admitted father, of Tiercel custody Duerson. home, knowledge of Mr. her Duerson’s from his fa- eventuаlly was removed T.D. a conviction history that included criminal received, reports ther’s home after DDHS against mi- attempted sexual assault ,T.D. half- sexual contact with his that care, notice of nor evidence in his brother, abusing potentially also Mr. son. DDHS T.D. Mr. Duerson was juvenile court during T.D.’s to inform place- later determined She failed knowledge of Mr. concerns Duerson, about T.D. suffered her ment with Mr. relátionship control over an special with and originally brought by 1. This action Gillen, mother, B.I.C. v. Regina as a individual.” Estate Garcia. T.D. added of 2013). (10th plaintiff has Cir. when he turned 18. Ms..Garcia F.34 plaintiff. is been as a T.D. since dismissed litigated both in-district parties theories The only Plaintiff-Appellee in this therefore the summary judgment granted court. The court case. theoiy, but denied special-relationship on the originally brought The action was summary judgment on the Department Denver both Ms. Patton and the appeals only theory. the unfavora- (“DDHS”). The district of Human Services her, appeal is ruling against so limited this ble summary judgment DDHS. granted court danger- § based on the 1983 claim to the order, appeal so Ms. Patton T.D. does theory. creation Defendant-Appellant only in case. this is the court’s not contest Patton does 3.Ms. liability 2. T.D. asserted two theories show a consti- that T.D. can determination against Ms. Pat- the Fourteenth Amendment (cid:127) - violation, her but instead focuses tutional theory, “danger-creation” ton: a discussed clearly arguments whether she violated above, theory. relationship” "special analyze the We law. nonetheless theory allows .established special-relationship state The explained for reasons violation liable "for officials to be held acts has assumed a below. private parties the state when history Duerson’s criminal and made dren their .mothers’ homes and placed homes, out of affirmative recommendations them their fear fathers’ where being fired. were social work- abused. juvenile ers both cases failed to alert the She to investigate also failed whether court of undermining relevant facts abusing T.D. despite Duerson was fitness as caretakers and recom- fathers’. potential awareness of evidence abuse. that the mended fathers assume This T.D.’s report evidence included despite being on notice that children — Mr. Duerson had hit wooden him with a the fathers’ homes places danger. were of. mop reports school handle and officials’ cases, And, both social workers significant that T.D. spending time investigate failed whether the fathers complaining body nurse’s office children, abusing despite being their aches and father. appearing fearful on notice of suggesting evidence abuse. information, In the face recom- Ms. Patton’s sufficiently resembles mended to the the conduct we held unconstitutional remain with his father. Ms. Patton acted such Currier that a reasonable official recklessly disregard and in conscious of a her position would have known that her known and risk that substantial T.D. would actions violated T.D.’s established immediate, serious, proximate suffer *5 right. not She was therefore entitled to conduct, harm in his Her father’s home. qualified immunity. whole, taken as a shocks the conscience and to due thus amounts a substantive I. BACKGROUND process violation the Fourteenth Background Amendment. A. Factual legal on the facts and determina- following presented Based The facts are decision, tion in light T.D., court’s a in this Currier rea- the most the favorable nonmoving official in Ms. would request sonable Patton’s shoes for party, on the sum violating have judgment understood was T.D.’s on mary the Cobos, rights. both and claim.4 Gutierrez v. 841 See F.3d Currier here, (10th 895, 2016).5 county social workers chil- Cir. removed 900 jurisdiction 4. T.D. asserts that we lack over 5. The facts come from the district court's appeal arguments Ms. present because Patton’s We also order. few facts —such as favor, require rely us on facts in hearing taken h'er reports dates and in statements of. disagree.- than in juvenile rather T.D.’s favor. We documents submitted to the court— order, explicitly presented not the court's in acknowledges that we must take but from considered documents court and light the facts in the most to T.D. favorable that are consistent with the court's factual She states does not review that she ask us to Jones, presentation. facts, See 515 Johnson v. U.S. presentation the district court’s of the 304, 319, 2151, 238 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d but on solely “focus[] instead whether (1995) (providing appellate may court that an by facts as determined the District dem Court review the determine what record to facts onstrate violation of established likely court when the rights.” district assumed district Aplt. T.D.’s constitutional Br. facts); court not state Zia Co. jurisdiction legal question We over did those Trust have that 1150, Causey Montoya, ex interlocutory appeal on rel. v. F.3d based on the facts (10th 2010) (stating 1152-53 by determined district in Cir. court and taken light nonmoving appellate for review of most favorable to the "universe facts” Glanz, party, summary judgment those here T.D. F.3d denial are facts Henderson v. 938, (10th 2015). court, may "explicitly Cir. 947-48 We found district com not, however, assumed”); guess likely do second the district bined those facts it Yorkville, Ohio, Village court’s determinations evidence sufficien see v. also DiLuzio 2015) (6th cy. (discussing Id. at 948. 796 F.3d Cir. Dependency for or from his Petition Removal Mother’s DDHS’s 1. T.D.’s Neglect Home Regina is Garda and 9, 2010, T.D. the son April On DDHS filed “Petition Duerson, separated. are Tiercel who Neglect” for T.D. and Dependency past, par- with the family has a troubled juvenile court on his sister based having for been referred ents DDHS un- DDHS’s concerns Garcia was lack neglect, supervision, intra-familial able care for her children. Ms. Patton intra-familial abuse. sexual Peti- was the case worker DDHS tion, appointed T.D. November turned was Lisa Gomez mother, living On Garciа. guardian ad litem. 2, 2009, DDHS notified November May On held school, not been that T.D. had which pre- a hearing on the Petition. Ms. Patton for program as a criminal served diversion signed by pared report hearing, for the mid-October. DDHS also charges, since supervisor, In the re- Senait Ketema. had learned his medications not been family’s Ms. Patton determined port, participated had refilled he signaling risk assessment score 11— T.D. therapy. After not re- mandated high the children level risk—and that school, a DDHS turn social worker visit- mentioned were unsafe.6 Ms. Patton home and ed Ms. Garcia’s discovered incar- Duerson been feces, ciga- animal disarray, with home years sexual attempted cerated two butts, piles dirty rette clothes assault on a that Ms. Garcia minor and gave floor. The social worker Gar- restraining him taken aout order accomplish, including list of cia a tasks keep away fami- from her Mr. Duerson sending pro- back his diversion *6 T.D. re- ly. Ms. Patton recommended that gram. custody purposes main in the DDHS for 2009, 15, in- On was December DDHS placement. formed T.D. been kicked out of his had juvenile At court ex- hearing, noncompliance for and program diversion 2010, 4, plored for The January options placement. T.D.’s truancy. On DDHS re- report parental court DDHS to ceived another T.D.’s violent obtain ordered escalating behavior was at school and at risk Mr. Duerson under the assessment instance, T.D. reportedly home. For applicable Manage- Colorado Sex Offender fork stabbed his with a sister and had (“SOMB”) ment Board standards deter- suicide. threatened commit re-committing mine his likelihood sex offenses, important to evaluate an factor 2010, early T.D. was April removed his whether T.D. placed placed should from his home mother’s and for father. Ms. ar- “Family responsible Patton was Crisis Center.” him; ty anger appropriate how it was to consider T.D.’s issues and control facts record, urination); (involuntary Duer- are not in the district enuresis Mr. stated court’s may minor but that bolster court's son’s for sexual of a determina- conviction abuse tion). offender; question The presented registration do and Ms. facts his as a sex restraining against court’s determinations of evidence sufficien- order Mr. Duer- Garcia’s Henderson, son; cy. at 948. 813 F.3d children were the fact that Ms. Garcia's programs; all Ms. individualized education home smelled of Garcia’s 6. DDHS reached these conclusions on: disheveled based urine; help family history in disci- T.D.’s of sexual mul- and Ms. Garcia’s need abuse and referrals; protection plining making her and them follow tiple child need for T.D.'s treatment; Ms. house rules. mental Garcia's inabili- health assessment, missing ranging Mr. Duerson’s risk while treatment appoint- but failed to do so.7 ments.” Dist. at 9 (quota- Ct. Order omitted). tions probation report The in Shiloh House Placement documenting the violation stated that 2010, May juvenile or-

On court he was amenable treatment place T.D. in dered DDHS to “Shiloh unwilling comply with his House,” facility a residential child care probation conditions. live, treatment, where T.D. could receive (cid:127) charged, Mr. Duerson was but not togo school. convicted, offenses, for other in- July juvenile court held On cluding assault, misdemeanor mis- permanency planning hearing —one minors, wrongs demeanor mis- every happen several would few violence, demeanor domestic placement months determine T.D.’s police resisting misdemeanor au- family At this hearing, status. thority. therapist reported that Mr. Duerson (cid:127) conviction, from Apart his 2005 there making “great progress” therapy in his “multiple been other incidents” therapist T.D. also relayed The involving P.G., abusing Mr. Duerson request that placed Duerson’s T.D. be including an incident when Mr. discharged his care after dragged into a Duerson bed- P.G. Shiloh House. grabbed her butt. room Duer- 4. Ms. Patton’s Review part investigation, As Patton History son’s Criminal parties also rеviewed what call the hearing, Report,” Before the next “Trails in the document crimi- reviewed Mr. Duerson’s system prepared in 2005 DDHS’s history, nal which revealed: social worker. DDHS detailed Mr, (cid:127) Duerson was convicted that Mr. 2005 conviction was prison years

and sentenced two attempt based on to sodomize P.G. attempted sexual mi- assault of will. nor, P.G., his step-child living investigation, on her Based Patton’s care at the of the time offense. about, “gut good” feel not] [did *7 registered Duerson was sex offend- placing Mr. questioned, T.D. with Duerson. er for conviction. that Id. at 10. (cid:127) 2005, a re- Mr. Duerson violated to straining by attempting con- order August 17, Hearing 5.The 2010 tact P.G. 17, 2010, August On before the next (cid:127) 2007, Mr. vio- November Duerson Patton, T.D., juvenile hearing, court Ms. probation. probation lated His was (an family Hutchinson ther- Briana outside “purposeful- revoked because he had (T.D.’s apist), Hommes clinician at Kyle ly complete to his sex offend- failed” House), to and Mr. met Shiloh Duerson obligations er “been treatment had custody. T.D.’s The attendees discuss deceptive disclosing his relation- ready to agreed T.D. was transition ship girlfriend,” his current with House to a lower care. Mr. no Shiloh level had his “purposefully violated girlfriend, reported successfully contact contract his had with Duerson he ment, Although favorably sup- parties dispute facts viewed to T.D. 7. the whether Ms. the arrange port she failed to do Patton failed to for his risk assess- so. 1216 put proba- on

completed offense-specific therapy minor and was later his in. offense, tion for not all did include longer probation. no that he was knowledge particular of her about meeting participants approved The or other Mr. Duer- conviction facts about Ms, ap- plan subject to Gomez’s tentative — history in Septem- son’s the final criminal T.D. proval from Shiloh transition —to 7, report, In the final ber report. Mr, home. partici- House The Duerson’s Duerson’s crimi- Pаtton did ^attach gradually the vis- pants agreed increase Report, nal Trails history which Duerson, its T.D. and between provided Duerson’s .2006 details supervision Mr. Duerson’s wife. inform the court conviction. Nor did she misrepresented her knowl- Ms. Patton probation that his revoked due his was history to edge of criminal Mr. Duerson’s his purposeful sex offender failure fulfill She meeting participants. also failed “multiple” treatment or the obligations meeting participants share with the involving other incidents abuse P.G. full of her concerns T.D.’s extent about In an report, initial draft father, placement including his expressed had concerns about taking of- his sex Mr. Duerson was father, placement including: his T.D.’s seriously.8 fense treatment (and specifi- Mr. Duerson’s criminal record cally attempted his assault sexual on P.G. 7, September Hearing 6. The 2005); proba- revocation his 7, 2010, juvenile September On fulfill his sex purposeful tion failure to obligations; offender permanency planning hear- treatment held another therapist’s taking “not concern that he was ing- Dist, seriously,” Ct. treatment Order at Hearing a. Report intentionally con- Ms. Patton omitted those report cerns her final September hearing, Before the supervisor, court. She so because her report juve- Ms. Patton submitted Ketema, told her that DDHS partici- nile It recounted how court. going to T.D. Mr. Duerson return pants August meeting go Ms. Patton “not should agreed ready to transition omitted). (quotations DDHS.” Ms. Pat- family of care and that lower level if ton fired feared she she includ- would therapist it inwas T.D.’s best believed , knowledge ed her or concerns in her final interest to Mr. home. to return report! also stated that Mr. Duerson equipped to believed he was better address Hearing b. The and that special needs Mr. Duerson Gomez attended the and Ms. offense-specific completed therapy hearing on other September No longer probation. no professiоnal from the *8 Although Patton had the Ms. informed meeting At hearing, was there. the both Mr, juvenile court that Duerson had been Ms. Patton Gomez and Ms. recommended custody.9 to Duerson’s a sexual offense transfer Mr. convicted disputed Because Mr. Duerson are Ameri- 8. It is to what extent Ms. Patton 9. T.D. and Indians, subject placement was knowledge can TiD.’s to misrepresented her or failed to i ("ICWA”), Indian Child Welfare Act meeting partici- concerns share her with requires prevent which ... "active efforts pants, we must view facts in T.D.'s but U.S.C, the,breakup family.” 25 of the Indian favor. 1912(d). argues § ÍCWA’s stan- No party outcome this case. dards affect the juvenile 13,2010 granted permission court 8. The The December Hearing begin transition. Ms. Patton prepared report for a De- 13, juvenile cember court hearing. It Patton hearing, Before the did not Ms. stated that Mr. Duerson successfully had the information discuss Trails Re- completed probation, was compliant with with port Ms. Gomez. Ms. Gómez testified plan, DDHS’s treatment inwas con- misconception she was under a about tact -with Ms. It Patton. also stated that nature of Mr. Duerson’s convic- T.D.’s behavior improving point and, tion, about had she known the details where he could attending transition from of the offense documented the Trails school at Shiloh House to attending a local she Report, “probably not have rec- would In school. report, Ms. Patton recom- placement ommended T.D.’s with [Mr. mended that T.D. remain in Mr. Duerson’s juvenile Duerson]” court. Id. at 11. temporary custody. (brackets omitted). quotations 2010,

In December Mr. Duerson and 7.T.D.’s Transition and Placement T.D. were discharged from their required

Mr. Duerson’s Home family therapy therapist séssions. The discharge stated report Meetings on September were held family had their goals reached treatment 8, 2010, complete plan October and that safety “no had re- concerns transition T.D. from Shiloh House to Mr. garding [Mr. Duerson’s] house.” Id. at 14. T.D., Garcia,. Duersоn’s home. Ms. (at Hutchinson, Duerson Ms. meeting), one 21, 9. The Hearing March Hommes, wife, Mr. Duerson’s Ms. Go- juvenile The perma- court held another mez, and a representative DDHS at- nency hearing on planning March tended. Ms. Patton attend either report hearing, for the meeting. said T.D.’s improved behavior had 21, 2010, October On Gomez filed a that, overall, school home T.D. Agreement juvenile Stipulated home; flourishing” “was Mr.- Duerson’s reporting successfully that T.D. had Id. concern T.D. She noted a minor - transitioned home on periods missed 30 class the second 15, Stipulated Agree- October term, school which Mr. Duerson blamed give ment asked the court to Mr. Duerson conflicting being and T.D. appointments; “temporary legal custody” T.D. so that encouraged sick. that she Ms. Patton said T.D. could enroll in and be school added to family try appoint- schedule public father’s assistance benefits. during ments Patton’s school. It at 13. also documented that Ms. Patton temporary custody recommended that agreed placement. Other than Ms. T.D. Duerson. remain with Mr. parents, Patton and T.D.’s none of the attendees at the 2010 meeting, Hearing 10. The June Hommes, as Ms. Hutchinson Mr. such for a report prepared June Agreement. Stipulated were listed hearing, permanency planning 3, 2010, On physical November court wrote that Mr. Duerson had used granted Specifically, “temporary legal physical punishment cus- on T.D. tody” T.D. to Duerson told her that his father had *9 Mr. “under an and Ms. Gomez supervision mop hit Id. him across the with a wooden (quo- order back [DDHS].” omitted). completing tations for not his chores. handle that, that she con- reported could told her officials had School months, spent a lot at only T.D. had Mr. attendance one last firm Duerson’s few complaining time nurse’s office hearing at the the last fatherhood class since aches, appeared to body sickness that she tried reported June. She had also father, not at timеs did afraid of his success, times, several without reported had go home. Ms. Garcia want assessment of Mr. parental written her, that, stays with during weekend T.D. however, stated, Duerson. that Mr. She to com- disrespectfully, refused had acted actively in participating Duerson fami- chores, badly, un- plete and had smelled therapy acting ly appropriately with he arrived at home. clean clothes when her young recommended that children. She that, report in her as Ms. Patton stated temporary custody T.D. remain information, she had referred result of this And, although she failed Mr. Duerson. had Fa- participate Mr. in DDHS’s Duerson every to visit Mr. Duerson’s home least Program. therhood Initiative policy required, the other month DDHS that, Patton report, Ms. stated had report mistakenly stated had “some concerns” although she home.10 monthly visits made skills,” Mr. she still “parenting in his fa- T.D. remain recommended that from Mr. Duerson’s T.D.’s Removal custody. ther’s 15. She testified Home made this recom- deposition her that she 19, 2011, September DDHS received On truly despite the fact that she mendation report contact T.D. of sexual between ‍‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍from father’s] to remove T.D. [his “wanted 21, September On and his half-brother. home afraid for T.D.’s because she was 2011, T.D. from Mr. removed Duer- DDHS safety.” express not con- Id. She him into tempo- son’s home took its court juvenile cerns to the because rary day. custody the next Ketema, supervisor, had told her In a for a prepared November home, T.D. in his father’s would remain stated hearing, Ms. Patton and Ms. Patton was afraid she would be Mr. minimal communication with Duerson fired if T.D. re- she did recommend hearing August, since and that last main with his father. youngest Mr. Duerson’s children had been juve- At 2011 hearing, the June home due to removed domestic partici- nile court ordered Duerson report- further drug violence use. She pate in Ini- the recommended Fatherhood only ed that Mr. Duerson had attended Program physical tiative and not use getting tempo- since one fatherhood class discipline on T.D. T.D., rary custody of had moved out state, complying August 25, Hearing and was 11.The plan. treatment In report for an 2011 hear- ing, Ms. Patton informed the Investigation Report of Abuse having reaching trouble she was reported that Mr. March T.D. him for unable to contact Duerson and was him while Duerson had abused he was period no of time. She had face-to-face custody. in- temporary DDHS father’s July, supervisor contact with as her vestigated that: and concluded instructed. disputed, policies but we are 10. Whether Patton failed DDHS’s are to observe every obliged light in the the facts most Duerson’s home at least other month to take and whether a to do violated favorable to T.D. failure so *10 (cid:127) ation theory, Duerson court concluded that Ms. sexually

repeatedly assaulted T.D. Patton’s conduct amounted a constitu- by forcibly orally sodomizing him that, tional violation and based on twice; clearly conduct violated established (cid:127) Mr. had hit T.D. Duerson with a granted law. The court also summary broomstick and threatened to knock judgment to DDHS.

him him unconscious and send to the T.D. appeal grant does not of sum-

hospital performing for not oral sex mary him; judgment on to Ms. Patton on spe- (cid:127) cial-relationship theory or grant per- Mr. Duerson had T.D. to forced

form oral him for sex on 10-15 min- summary judgment This appeal DDHS. punishment utes as for T.D.’s staying thus only concerns court’s deny- order bedtime; up past his ing qualified immunity to Ms. Patton on (cid:127) physically Mr. Duerson had forced danger-creation claim. three-year-old T.D. and his brother other;

to perform oral sex on each II. DISCUSSION (cid:127) Mr. Duerson had told T.D. not to tell We affirm the court’s district denial of anyone about the abuse. qualified facts, immunity because the tak- DDHS T.D. determined abuse had suf- en in light T.D., the. most favorable to fered while in Mr. Duerson’s home was show Ms. Patton violated T.D.’s clearly Id, “severe.” at 18. established due right substantive the Fourteenth Amendment. We Background

B. Procedural first applicable describe the standard Garcia, T.D., on behalf of legal review and standards. We then ana- sued Ms. Patton and DDHS state court lyze (1) Patton whether Ms. violated T.D.’s alleging they violated T.D.’s substantive process right substantive due under a dan- process right due under the Fourteenth ger-creation theory and- whether his Amendment. The defendants removed the right established. case to the United States District Court for the District Colorado. Plaintiffs’ sec- complaint, ond the operative amended one A. of Review Standard

here, § pro- raised a 1983 substantive due summary judgment “We review cess against claim and DDHS novo, applying legal de same standard danger-creation theory based on a and a Gutierrez, as the district court.” 841 F.3d special-relationship theory. A judg “court grant summary shall partial motion for summary filed a ment if the movant shows that is no there judgment on the special-relationship theo- genuine dispute any material fact ry. Ms. Patton filed cross-motion for judgment movant is as a entitled summary theories, judgment both as- 56(a). matter of R. Civ. law.” P. serting qualified Fed. immunity. defense standard, summary judgment applying DDHS also moved for ‘When we view the § on the claim. evidence draw inferences reasonable light therefrom in the most favorable summary judgment The court granted Gutierrez, the nonmoving party,” 841 F.3d in Ms. Patton’s on the special-rela- favor T.D., nonmoving party here tionship as the theory her on danger-creation theory. On theory. danger-cre-

1220 any Legal sufficiently reason definite

B. Standards official would have under able shoes 1, Qualified § Im- 1983 42 U.S.C. violating City it.’” that he & stood munity — Sheehan, Cty. Francisco v. San U.S. of 1983, person § a 42 U.S.C. Under 1765, 1774, —, 191 135 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 856 who “sub acting color of state law (2015) (brackets omitted) (quoting Plum any citizen subjected, to be jects, or causes — Rickard, —, 134 v. S.Ct. U.S. hoff deprivation ... the of the United States 2023, 188 (2014)). 2012, 1056 L.Ed.2d or immunities any rights, privileges, of not define “clearly Courts must es laws, Constitution and shall secured the high at a of generаlity.” tablished law levél injured.” to the “Individual party be liable al-Kidd, v. (quoting at 1776 may § Id. named in 1983 action defendants a Ashcroft 731, 2074, 742, 131 immunity, 563 U.S. S.Ct. qualified a of 179 raisé defense n (2011)). Instead, ... from 1149 “the public clearly officials L.Ed.2d which shields their conduct was damages ‘particularized’ actions unless law be established must clearly White, in light of established unreasonable the facts of the case.” S.Ct. at 137 Gutierrez, at 899. Creighton, law.” 841 F.3d (quoting 552 Anderson v. 483 635, 640, 3034, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed.2d as “Once an individual defendant (1987)). “Otherwise, ‘plaintiffs 523 would immunity, plaintiff car qualified serts the qualified able convert the rule of be (1) two-part burden to show: ries virtually unquali immunity into rule of actions federal the defendant’s violated liability simply by alleging violation of fied so, and, if statutory right, or ” (brackets extremely rights.’ abstract Id. (2) right clearly the established at omitted) Anderson, and,ellipses (quoting con the time unlawful defendant’s 639, 3034). 483 U.S. 107 S.Ct. omitted). (quotations duct.” Id. at 900 plaintiff If heavy “This is burden. Danger-Cre- 2. Fourteenth Amendment satisfy inquiry, part fails to either ation Claims immunity.” grant qualified the court must The Due Clause of Process Four- Carabajal City v. Cheyenne, 847 F.3d provides teenth Amendment “[n]o State 1203, 1208(10th 2017). Cir. life, deprive any person ... shall liber- A plaintiff clearly es may show ty, property, process or due without by pointing tablished law to either Su Const, T.D.’s claim law.” U.S. amend. XIV. decision, preme or Court or Tenth Circuit process on is due be- based substantive courts, weight Of authority other alleges,that state cause he de- official existing alleged time of violation. by creating him of a prived liberty interest Gutierrez, clearly 841 To F.3d at 900. increasing private vio- established, “existing precedent have must lence. 242 F.3d at placed ques the statutory or constitutional To Patton is evaluate whether Ms. enti beyond Pauly, tion v. debate.” White — qualified immunity T.D.’s sub tled —, U.S. 196 137 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1) claim, due we discuss: stantive Luna, (quoting 463 v. Mullenix — Supreme in DeShaney U.S. —, decision Court’s 305, 308, 136 193 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Winnebago Department (2015)). County v. So Although not be a 255 need there Services, directly S.Ct. point-,” (quoting “case Mul cial U.S. id. (1989), lenix, 308), L.Ed.2d which established S.Ct. officer ‘can “[a]n general not be said estab rule are not have violated a that state officials right private contours acts of right’s lished liable and set unless violence stage danger-creation exception Clause.” -at 197 n of the Process Due S.Ct. 998. The Court rule; (2) wrote: interpreting our to that decisions may While the State have been aware DeShaney allow a ex- *12 dangers the that Joshua faced in the affirmatively when state officials ception world, it played no part free in their create, danger of or private, the violence creation, nor it do anything ren- to plaintiffs to vulnerability increase a any more vulnerable to them. him der (3) our Currier v. danger; and decision in That once took temporary the State cus- Doran, (10th 2001), 242 F.3d 905 Cir. of tody analy- does not Joshua alter the which the basis the court’s district sis, it for when him returned to his parties agree order which the is the placed it no custody, him in father’s to critical case evaluate whether Ms. Pat- position worse than that he which clearly conduct violated T.D.’s estab- ton’s would have been had all; not acted at it right.11 lished does not perma- State become the guarantor

nent of an safety individual’s by having once him Un- offered shelter. a. DeShaney circumstances, der these State DeShaney, alleged the complaint no duty protect Joshua. Winnebago County social workers violated Id. at 201,109 added). (emphasis S.Ct. 998 “failing rights a child’s due Danger-creation exception b. to protect intervene child [the Joshua] Relying language empha against a risk of violence at his father’s in DeShaney, sized has above they hands which knew or should have that, as an exception to DeSha recognized 193,109 489 U.S. 998. known.” at S.Ct. rule, ney’s general a may state official rejected Supreme Court the social “a affirmatively liable state when actor could be liable. workers create, or acts a plaintiffs increasе[] to, vulnerability danger from vio private The Court lan- “[N]othing wrote: Currier, 923; 242 see also lence!” F.3d guage the Due Process Clause itself Harder, Uhlrig v. 64 F.3d n.7 572 & life, protect requires liber- State (10th 1995).12Although Supreme Cir. ty, property of its citizens yet Court danger- has confirmed that a not by private invasion actors. The Clause is DeShaney, exception exists creation phrased pow- as a limitation on the State’s in DeShaney its led “ha[ve] statements act, not guarantee er to as a certain every Appeals Circuit Court to rec ... safety security.” minimal levels DeShaney ognize an exception ” 195, 109 Accordingly, S.Ct. “[a]s 998. a Tyler, Jasinski v. dangers.’ ‘state-created general matter ... failure State’s (6th 2013) (collecting 538 Cir. F.3d an protect against private individual vio- Columbia, cases); accord Butera v. Dist. of 2001).13 simply 637, 648-49, (D.C. lence does not constitute violation F.3d Cir. Armijo Wagon sought 11. The court cited v. theory also invoke Schools, (10th court, Public Mound 159 F.3d district but the court it did determined 1998), clearly Cir. a basis for its established appeal T.D. does rul- apply not disagree We determination. district ing. Armijo, sufficiently court that which has dis- here, tinguishable pro- facts from Could those Cty., Arledge 13.See v. Franklin 509 F.3d vide do established We thus law. 2007) (6th (noting, 262-64 Cir. in a child- Armijo. facts-of detail the case, placement “recognized circuit noted, danger theor[y] due ... the state-created recognized we have another ex- As. process liability” City Co ception DeShaney’s general spe- Kallstrom v. rule —the (6th Gillen, lumbus, cial-relationship theory. F.3d 1066-67 Cir. F.3d at Background Factual To i. invoke actor theory, plaintiff must show state Shirley CYF worker social “affirmatively to create increas act[ed] children, the home of two Medina visited to, danger vulnerability plaintiffs A.J., es reportedly L.J. who ne- Currier, 242 F.3d private violence.” glected Id. at 909. After by their mother. McDonnell, state, 923; v. 299 finding see also mother had left the Ruiz (10th 2002). 1173, 1183 physical placed If a Medina plain Cir. F.3d petitioned of CYF. Id. CYF New preconditions, plaintiff those tiff meets grant- order Mexico’s court for an must next demonstrate: ing custody of legal the children CYF. *13 (1) entity charged state and Id. actors charged created individual told petition, In Ms. Medina danger plaintiffs or increased father, Christo- court that the children’s vulnerability to the in some pher Vargas, not the chil- supported way; dren, in “alarm- allowed to live them (2) plaintiff was a member a limited conditions,” ing and “have a would hard specifically group; and definable Id. taking time care the kids.” She (3) put plaintiff at defendants’ conduct the court nonetheless recommended serious, substantial risk immedi- custody of children to grant physical harm; ate, proximate and keeping legal custody Vargas, Mr. while (4) known; or CYF. Id. the risk was obvious hearing (5) petition, Before the on the CYF recklessly con- defendants acted social Tom Doran Mr. risk; worker learned disregard of that scious irrespon- Vargas history of financial had a total, conduct, such when viewed sibility, including only eight having made shocking. is conscience payments preceding in the child-support added). Currier, (spacing at 918 F.3d three But Doran noth- years. Id. Mr. said On element —whether ing final hearing knowledge. at the about that shocking the conduct conscience is. Id. —nei ordinary permitting nor negligence ther 10,1993, on Ms. May On based Medina’s as qualifies unreasonable risks conscience recommendation, physi- granted the court Ruiz, “Rather, shocking. 299 F.3d custody Vargas cal of the to Mr. degree must plaintiff demonstrate CYF. Id. kept legal outrageousness magnitude poten noticed a July Mr. Doran small truly harm is tial actual conscience Vargas’s bruise on Id. Mr. AJ.’s cheek. omitted). shocking.” (quotations I'd. it girlfriend explained was a result playground fall. Id. A.J. Doran

c. Currier v. explained also had another bruise a fall. Doran did Id. result Our decision which involved Id. investigate either bruise further. brought against claim Children, Mexico’s workers New social eventuаlly The mother returned (“CYF”), Department guardian Youth and Families state told the children’s ad girlfriend Vargas controls thé outcome of litem 242 F.3d that Mr. children, in- abusing physically this case. claim). 1998), holding support but the facts eluding by dunking in a them bathtub to children. Id. Ms. Medina took over the punish them. Id. Mr. Doran investigation learned about and discovered bruises on A.J., these accusations but but investigate. failed concluded that they were the result a fall. During Id. the investiga- tion, L.J. told Ms. Medina that she had 19, 1993, On October on Do- based Mr. spanked been with a belt. Id. Ms. Medina recommendation, ran’s Vargas and Mr. Doran instructed the children’s legal custody awarded of the children. Id. stop making mother allegations that Mr. 919 & n.6. This court determined Vargas abusing the children. Id. Doran was responsible [ju- “[Mr.] for the later, A few months Vargas poured venile grant court’s] decision to [Mr.] Var- boiling A.J., water causing severe gas legal custody, through either fail- bums. Id. At the emergency department, ure to investigate to the court doctors found A.J. “was every- bruised or through his affirmative recommenda- where he was not burned.” Id. A.J. eventu- tion.” Id. at 919. ally in the died intensive care unit. Id. L.J. time, Around that further indicia of was also found “covered with bruises” and light. instance, abuse came to For Octo- Vargas’s from Mr. removed home. Id. *14 20,1993, ber CYF workers noticed bruises Representatives for A.J. and L.J. L.J., “Da, on who said Da” had caused brought a substantive due claim Id. guardian them. at 910. theAt ad litem’s § under 42 U.S.C. based the dan- request, Mr. Doran interviewed Mr. Var- ger-creation theory Medina, against Ms. gas girlfriend bruises, and his about Doran, Gonzales, and one other couple which the said were caused fall- CYF worker. Id. at 908. The district court ing from a bunk bed On No- ladder. Id. denied their of qualified assertion immuni- 17,1993, vember CYF again officials found ty. Id. at 911. A.J., bruises on explained also as caused fall, by a bunk bed unexplained and bite Analysis ii. in Currier marks on L.J. Id. CYF then removed L.J. (1) On this court appeal, addressed: and A.J. from Mr. Vargas’s home and supported whether the facts a constitution- placed them with relatives. Id. al violation under the danger-creation the- Mr. Doran prepared an affidavit ory; and whether there November meeting with his su- established law. See id. 917-25.We focus pervisor, Gonzales, stating Melba that the Doran, claim against here children subject would be to further abuse Medina, Gonzales, whose actions if permitted to stay Vargas. with Mr. Id. were most relevant to T.D.’s claim.14 But Mr. Doran strongly “failed to advocate

against return of the children [Mr.] 1) Constitutional Violation Vargas.” Id. Ms. Gonzales concluded that Currier first addressed whether DeSha the children be returned to ‍‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍Mr. ney barred the claim and Vargas, happened which shortly thereaf- DeShaney answered no. It held did not bar ter, Id. relating the claim place to the children’s

After the children returned their fa- ment their father’s home because the home, ther’s requests CYF received to in- exposed children “would have been vestigate possible physical abuse dangers from their father but Ms, Although regard only Patton asserts that "the the other workers’ actions social potentially analysis relevant in Currier relates appeal. relevant to Doran,” to the actions Aplt. Br. at we (brackets and citations omit acts the state.” Id. at 918-19 Id. 919-20 affirmative added). ted). (emphasis The court The wrote: “When court considered Doran’s n affirmatively acts to investigate) remove a (i.e., state be inaction his failure custody of one from the parent his coupled

child cause it was “affirmative parent, then the child with another places the, removing constitutional DeShaney does foreclose the children placing their mother and Id. at 919. court further liability.” their father.” n.7.15 Id. at 920 the facts supported whether addressed Although sixth was “some- element danger- violation under the closer Currier held Mr. question,” what theory. creation conduct, total,” “viewed Doran’s when Doran, panel answered As to Mr. shocked the cоnscience: first elements of the dan- yes. On the five light information Doran of the initial ger-creation claim: financial Vargas’ irresponsi- had about the danger meets cre- Doran’s conduct bility, light the numerous liability .... theory of Doran “cre- ation abuse, allegations bruises Doran’s plain- increased the ated investigate the failure to bruises- and ' ' danger” vulnerability tiffs’ allegations subsequent-responsi- his to investigate through failure bility granting for the court order Var- allegations bruises and numerous gas legal custody be conscience could responsibility for the abuse course, shocking, on fur- depending, legal custody granting court order by discovery. ther provided context as members Vargas. A.J.] were [L.J. and n spécifícally “of limited and definable *15 Medina, . As. to Currier Ms. held group”: children the state removed has in,the involvement initial removal of the parent into natural taken from their and home children from mother’s their could failing custody. By investigate to state claim. support Id. at of allegations child and abuse instructing 921. But she could be liable recommending Vargas legal assume making allegations of the mother to stop put custody, conduct and Doran’s [A.J. Vargas serious, child abuse received cus- after immedi- obvious risk at L.J.] tody doing “affirmatively” in- harm, because so ate, proximate and a harm vulnerability to recklessly creased consciously and disre- the children’s Doran Id.16 garded. abuse. id. panel

15. The wrote: com- It is that the conduct true Plaintiffs Medina, Along 16. Ms. Doran had partially failure'by to act plain isof Doran making stop allega- instructed to . the mother Doran’s particular allegations of abuse. panel Id. at 910. The Currier tions abuse. allegations investigate to of- abuse failure' specifically social workers’ in- addressed the legal children were in custo- Medina, while state only struction as to Ms. held it however, distinguished, from dy should be danger- supported the to and relevant the state failed rescue a claim that against her her con- creation claim because legal given children once vulnerability children’s duct increased the Vargas. alle- investigate failure Vargas. pan- Doran’s Id. at 921. The abuse from Mr. gations in the should-be abuse viewed el’s whether to earlier discussion consider general post-placement context of state’s affirmative Mr. Doran’s conduct was fo- intervene,”-which removing the: "failure to conduct children cused on his instructing affirmatively placing does not describe their mother children at.9-19-20, children's mother. Id. their father. Gonzales, that, held As Ms. we reversed as to the claim Medi- supervisor, she con- violated na. children’s 242 F.3d at 925. by having rights knowledge stitutional Analysis C. depriving

Mr. Doran and Ms. Medina were rights failing to cor- those Ms. Patton’s conduct violated T.D.’s Id. at through rect their conduct training. clearly established substantive due 923. right under Currier free from state- Doran, Medina, danger. created Currier shows Mr. We affirm therefore and Ms. Gonzales could be held individual- district court’s denial Ms. Patton’s sum- ly responsible mary their unconstitutional ac- judgment motion asserting a defense they collectively tions when contributed qualified immunity to danger-cre- deprivation constitution- children’s ation claim. rights. al appeal, On court, as she district only addresses second 2) Clearly Established Law prong of qualified-immunity defense— finally Currier addressed whether whether she a clearly violated established actions defendants’ unconstitutional violat- right. We ad nevertheless Id. at 923. “clearly ed established” law. dress both prongs, as the district court Doran, As to held Currier the law did, questions because the of whether clearly “a established that reasonable state and, there was a constitutional if violation official have in 1993 would known and 1994 so, whether the violation of clearly reckless, shocking conscience law, are established See intertwined. Pear quo placed altered status son, (“It at U.S. 129 S.Ct. 808 serious, risk of child substantial immedi- may often be difficult to decide whether ate, proximate harm was unconstitu- right is clearly without established decid Id. regarding tional.” The law ing precisely existing what the constitu also clearly Gonzales’s failure train was (brackets right tional happens to be.” Id. Although established. the law omitted)). quotations was not established then that the First, conclude, we based timing of Ms. Medina’s conduct was rele- that Ms. Patton’s recommendations *16 violation, 925, id. at vant a constitutional place and in Mr. tem- keep T.D. our decision it so going Currier made porary her failure to with coupled is, forward. That Currier made clear its investigate Mr. Duerson was whether analysis of the claim against Medina abusing T.D., being despite on notice of placement affirmative after conduct abuse, evidence such supporting violated support danger-creation can child due, right T.D.’s substantive Callahan, claim. Pearson See v. 555 U.S. danger, free from state-created 223, 236, 808, 129 565 S.Ct. 172 L.Ed.2d Second, (discussing addressing a court’s conclude, how again we based prong clearly if no es- one—even there is Currier, pro- due T.D.’s substantive prong “promotes tablished law under at right cess established two— development prece- 2010 time Ms. Patton’s conduct cases). dent” for future below, 2011. As Currier suffi- explained therefore, ciently right put T.D.’s the un- defined The Currier court affirmed con- constitutional nature Ms. Patton’s qualified district court’s denial im- White, “beyond munity for See S.Ct. danger-creation claim debate.” duct Gonzales, 551; Sheehan, Mr. Doran 1774. and Ms. but S.Ct. 21, hearing and in the October nile court The Constitutional Violation 1. Stipulated Agreement. Ms. Patton’s whether first address We DeShaney’s satisfied conduct” “affirmative Currier supports also that Ms. Ruiz, 299 F.3d exception. danger-creation 3, after November affirmatively acted did, then Determining that it we at 1183. temporary 2010, took when Mr. Duerson danger- elements turn Currier, custody of we determined T.D. claim. creation Medina, after the children were that Ms. danger-cre- regard T.D.’s Although we custody, took “affir Vargas’s placed encompassing claim single ation claim as support sufficient mative conduct” conduct, we alleged Patton’s all of Ms. discouraging the by claim danger-creation “pre- to Ms. Patton’s refer sometimes' making allegations mother from children’s “post-placement conduct” and placement abuse, cutting potential off thereby before This concerns conduct conduct.” at 921-22. aid. F.3d private sources 2010, T.D. when after November ruling against Ms. Medina shows temporary legal and in the placed may be considered post-placement conduct so in custody of his father. We do physical provided it is danger-creation claim for a Currier, analysis our align part placed After T.D. was “affirmative.” “affir- there was at whether which looked 3, 2010, Ms. on November Mr. Duerson chil- after the conduct” before and mative merely d[o] “st[and] Patton did not 919-21. placed. F.3d at dren dic nothing suspicious circumstances when DeSha role for [her].” a more active tated a. Affirmative ney, 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. She This addresses whether section reports affirmatively. pre acted of “affir- necessary precondition meets hearings on De court pared for a conduct” mative 21, 2011, 13, 2010, March June cember Ruiz, 299 F.3d claim. 25, 2011, she recom that, Pat- Currier supports because in Mr. Duer- T.D. “remain” mended placement with recommended T.D.’s ton custody. made the temporary She son’s Duerson, in affirmative engaged August 25 recommendations June 13 and Currier, conduct. In pre-placement information having face of received in the affirmatively state “When the stated: Her abusing T.D. that Mr. Duerson was custody of to remove from the acts child to Mr. Duer- contributed recommendations child with parent places and then one retaining “temporary physical son’s DeShaney does not fore- рarent, another furthering T.D. and legal custody” over 242 F.3d at liability.” close constitutional posed to T.D. See Duerson met pre-custody conduct 919. Mr. Doran’s (“[A.J. L.J.] at 918 F.3d *17 he took “affirmative when standard exposed to the dan not have been would from removing in the children conduct for affirma father but the gers from their placing their mother and state; the same cannot acts tive Similarly their father.” at 920 & n.7. DeShaney.”). in for said Joshua here, removing participated Patton Ms. of T.D.’s Our review home, intentionally T.D. from his mother’s Ms. Patton’s claim thus includes fi- from her information relevant withheld placed after T.D. was court, both before and to and recom- report juvenile nal custody on No- temporary Duerson’s Mr. Duerson’s placement in Mr. T.D.’s mended 2010. vember September juve- at both the home (3) b. the danger- Elements his probation violation due creation claim his purposeful failure to fulfill his sex treatment obligations; offender The facts taken in T.D.’s favor show he (4) charged his other including offenses danger- satisfies the six of his elements wrongs misdemeanor to minors and creation claim. violence; misdemeanor domestic i. Element 1: Ms. Patton created danger

or increased (5) “multiple involving other incidents” posed T.D. physical Mr. Duerson’s and sexual abuse of P.G. private Patton created or violence increased T.D.’s vulnerability express Nor did Ms. Patton her own ad- danger posed to the Mr. by Duerson. See negative “gut” feeling about T.D.’s mitted Currier, 242 at 918. We F.3d devote most placement with his father.18 Viewing the our analysis this element. favor, facts in T.D.’s we conclude a reason- jury able could Ms. First, find Patton’s failure to Ms. Patton was one of those re- juvenile inform the knowledge court of her sponsible placement for T.D.’s initial concerns, coupled when with her affir- Mr. Duerson’s thus home and created or mative incomplete and therefore mislead- vulnerability increased T.D.’s to the dan- ing statements, juvenile influenced the posed by ger Mr. Duerson.17 her Sep- decision, court’s placement making juvenile report tember to the court responsible placement Patton for T.D.’s hearing, Ms. Patton intentional- place Duerson’s home—a report ly deleted from her danger. her concerns about Duerson and withheld certain Second, Ms. Patton created increased undermining facts Mr. Duerson’s fitness as danger posed T.D.’s vulnerability by caretaker, including: placed T.D. Duerson after was in his (1) temporary of Mr. Duerson’s 2005 details con- on November 2010. attempted

viction of sexual four post-placement hearing assault her re- minor, step-daughter ports, on a his T.D. P.G. she recommended that remain care, who temporary custody, was his documented in Mr. Duerson’s de- Report; spite having the Trails that he physical- evidence ly abusing T.D. (2) The record shows: restraining 2005 violation order attempting reported contact her that Mr. Duer- P.G.; mop son hit with a wooden him stating "responsi- significance." Aplt. When no Br. at "constitutional placement, argument ble” for we do not intend 44-45. But misses the Ms. Patton’s suggest solely responsible point intentionally that she excluded informa- Rather, placement we potentially use the term decision. tion her that was im- significant portant juvenile placement to describe her contribution court's deci- placement, thereby making responsible, present argue sion. Nor does she evidence or others, potentially along creating independently had the in- danger posed to T.D. reports. formation she excluded from In- deed, although juvenile court knew about appeal, emphasizes On the facts of Mr. conviction question probation, showing there was “no Juvenile Court is no evidence it had there *18 Report was attempted aware of to [Mr. Duerson’s] sexu- access the Trails internal —an assault,” already particular al DDHS and that Mr. Duerson had documеnt detailed facts that completed probation "multiple” his of his sex offender offense and documented treatment, so her other removal those facts bore incidents of P.G. ajjuse chores; it her coupled affirmative completing cause handle with n in to the exposing actions T.D. by School, posed father. (2). reported to her officials his. , spending significant . time T.D. was tempo- T.D. in Mr. Duerson’s When complaining of the nurse’s at office (1) rary custody, Patton Ms. received body aches, appeared sickness and allegation that Mr. Duerson had hit T.D.’s father, of his and at to be afraid (2) mop him the school with wooden to to go not want home times appeared officials’ that T.D. had reports his father. father, of body fearful complained disclose informa- Ms. did not Patton aches, and time in spent significant post-placement tion her third until Despite knowing office. nurse’s school she on never disclosed June allegations, Patton about these Ms. failed safety and true desire hér fear T.D.’s to to conduct at-home site visits Mr. Duer- to the home based T.D. remove month, every son’s home least other at as Patton rec- Ms. instead information. policy required.20 DDHS Nor did com- reports of her that T.D. in all ommended plete required face-to-face contact DDHS’s temporary Duerson’s remain Mr. custo- July T.D. as Ms".Ketema with dy. safety to decision withhold Her She also failed directed her do. follow concerns, coupled her recommenda- with after 30 class up peri- T.D. had missed T.D. his father’s home keep tions to accepting Mr. Duerson’s merely ex- ods— abuse, potential of evidence the face conflicting appoint- cuses T.D. responsible for the one those made See, Currier, e.g., ments was “sick.” keep juvenile court’s decision at Mr. Doran (concluding F.3d failed temporary Mr. custpdy. following up investigate by after Mr. Third, investigate Patton failed to Ms. childrеn’s Vargas reported the bruises Mr, abusing T.D.19 Duerson was whether falls). Ms. result Patton also earlier, the As Currier court consid noted 25, 2011 reported hearing at the investigate ered Doran’s failure . (1) having difficulty” contact- she “was Vargas chil abusing whether Mr. time,” ing “period for a Mr. Duerson coupled his failure was dren because to conduct a she had failed written removing “affirmative parental Mr. Duerson after assessment placing from their mother children hearing. Ct. the June Dist. Order their father.” at 920 n.7. at 16. supports may we consid Currier thus sum, amounted her actions fail- investigate er Patton’s failure evi evidence that abusing investigate dence Duerson was T.D. be ure Mr. Duer- dispute, allega- quired to so DDHS are in we 19. Ms. Patton asserts that "there is no do , investigate any,alle- failed to must view facts in favor. tion those gation any point,” Aplt. of abuse at Br. at 50. justified its decision not The district court See, alleged complaint e.g,, otherwise. alleged to consider failure to visit Ms. Patton’s .31, ¶¶ App„ (alleging 26-28 Vol. .1 every Mr. Duerson’s least once other home at failed to monitor Duerson’s home ground month on it did "not constitute uncover, every month to least extent affirmative Dist. Ct. Order at 39 action.” n.23. T.D.j; ¶¶ (alleging .the 31-34 abuse id. shows, analysis Ms. Patton’s fail- But our credible, investigate Patton failed re- Duerson’s home ure to Visit Mr. rele- may abuse). . ports of . accompanying long is vant so as there affir- Although See 242 F.3d at 920 & whether she ev- mative action. visited his home ery re- n and whether she was .7 other.month *19 abusing Currier, son T.D. See Because state removed T.D. (holding F.3d at 919-20 that Mr. Doran (Ms. parent Garcia) from his natural and danger by failing investigate to created the took him into state T.D. custody, falls abuse, potential including of no- evidence within the same specifically “limited and ticing learning and bruises the children group” as the definable children Curri general allegations about and specific omitted). er. (quotations Id. at 920 Currier abuse). ¡supports that group he in that rеmained n n n n even after Duerson Mr. tem awarded porary custody. Id. at 921-22. (1) By recommending that T.D. be placed recommending that and later T.D. put iii. Element 3: Patton’s temporary remain in Duerson’s Mr. custo- serious, T.D. at substantial risk of (2) dy, intentionally removing from her immediate, proximate and harm juvenile to knowledge report regarding and concerns put Mr. Duerson’s fit- Ms. Patton’s conduct helped T.D. caretaker, ness failing as a serious, and to a immediate, substantial risk of investigate abuse, of potential evidence proximate and harm. Id. 918. helped or create increase agree We district court’s deter- to vulnerability posed by T.D.’s the' mination jury quite easily that “a could Mr. Duerson both before after No- prior believe that [Mr. sexual Duerson’s] (providing vember 2010. See id. at 919 P.G., against offense his step-child, would responsible Mr. Doran creat- provided might have notice that he re- ing the danger granting Vargas Mr. offend another his child care.” legal custody “through either his failure to Dist. Ct. especially Order 36. This was investigate to the court [evi- given withholding so informa- Patton’s regarding history dence Vargas’s tion from juvenile court of Mr. Duer- responsibility] through financial his af- purposeful son’s to failure his sex fulfill recommendation”). firmative obligations leading offender treatment violation,21 specifically probation and “the ii. Element 2: Limited and group multiple of improper incidents contact be- definable tween [Mr. Duerson] P.G. Trails T.D. of a was a member limited and report.” latter Id. The his offense showed specifically group. id. at definable See was not an isolated increased incident and regarded group to be we reoffending. posed risk he Ms. Pah- “children the has state removed their ton putting thus T.D. at risk contributed natural taken into custo- parent and state serious, immediate, proximate harm dy,” id. at continued view by withholding information relevant group children as members after recommending placed T.D. bе with his fa- placement Vargas. their id. with Mr. See ther. Ms. Patton further contributed to the (holding at 921-22 acted un- Medina risk placement harm T.D. after the constitutionally by failing investigate poten- evidence theory for conduct after the children tial continuing placed had been of Mr. abuse and recommend Vargas). temporary in Mr. Duerson’s remain eventually Although complet- may Duerson have been relevant court’s maintaining ed his sex before offense treatment assessment commitment him, placement previous placed minor a safe environment for another unwillingness comply with such his care. treatment

1230 (2) concerns withholding notice of her despite being on that Mr. her Sep- her Duerson from abusing T.D. about Mr. was Duerson 2011, 7, 2010, and tember June Ms. 4 5: Patton iv. Elements and acted juve- 2011 to the reports disregard recklessly in conscious fired; being for of nile court fear or known risk of obvious an (3) to in- her awareness of and failure Ms. Patton acted The record shows that potential of vestigate evidence a recklessly disregard and in conscious of abuse, including report T.D.’s 4) (element obvious or risk that was known hit him with Mr. Duerson had Currier, 5). See (element 242 F.3d at 918. mop officials’re- wooden and school significant ports spent that he had report Sep- In her initial draft office time in the school nurse’s hearing, Ms. 2010 tember ap- aches complaining body placing her concerns about included father; fearful of his pearing knowledge on her Duerson based history particular, his of his criminal being responsibility for T.D. —in abusing child in his care. But she inten- remaining in Mr. Duer- placed and tionally concerns the final deleted those son’s home. being fired. fear her June significantly ex- Patton’s although hearing report, re- “ordinary negligence” “permit- or ceeded potential ported various incidents abuse ting risks” rose to “a unreasonable court, to the Ms. Patton nonethe- degree magnitude outrageousnеss and a intentionally withheld her concerns less potential truly that is or actual harm safety

that she feared for T.D.’s and her Ruiz, shocking.” 299 F.3d conscience professional judgment that T.D. should be Currier, also omitted); see (quotations from his father’s home. removed (determining that Mr. at 919-20 F.3d of her Ms. Patton’s intentional exclusion Ms. Patton’s parallel Doran’s conduct to knowledge hearing and concerns (discussed shocking) was conscience more showed she reports recklessly acted below).

known T.D, for the children’s ran acted mative conscious See risk recommendation, id. recklessly in disregard that Mr. safety through (holding of ‍‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍an conscious Duerson posed despite obvious disregard his affir- Do- creating or T.D.’s sum, substantive due increasing Patton’s conduct violated n [*] private n n violence vulnerability right by Duerson. knowledge allegations abuse and Vargas’s undermining Mr. fitness as facts Clearly Established Law caretaker). T.D. suffered Under

v. Element 6: Patton’s conduct right constitutional violation of a shocking conscience clearly previously As dis established. conduct, viewed “in total” Ms. Patton’s law, cussed, to show established favor, in T.D.’s conscience shock- placed the “existing precedent must have light ing in of: beyond statutory or question White, (1)her (quota withholding of certain informa- debate.” 137 S.Ct. omitted). Although tions tion about Mr. Duerson’s criminal need there id., officer history; point,” directly “[a]n “case clearly- cannot be to have that Mr. Vargas legal violated the court assume said right’s unless the con right established custody. F.3d at 919. Those facts sup- *21 sufficiently any that tours definite ported Currier’s that conclusions Mr. Do- in reasonable official his shoes would have (1) ran created or the increased children’s Shee he was violating understood that it.” (2) vulnerability placed to the danger, the han, (brackets quota 135 S.Ct. at 1774 and serious, at an obvious risk of im- omitted). tions mediate, harm, (3) proximate and and recklessly consciously disregаrded and Our decision in Currier those ex- meets Id. at 920. that risk. acting parallel on standards. Based facts of Currier and the law established in Doran, (1) Like Mr. Ms. failed to case, a reasonable official in Pat- abuse, investigate of including evidence a ton’s shoes would have understood that “very specific” report (e.g., of abuse T.D.’s violating T.D.’s was mop report) wooden and other indicia of right by creating increasing T.D.’s vul- (e.g., abuse T.D.’s complaints to school nerability danger by to the Mr. posed body nurses of aches of and fear Mr. Duer- Sheehan, Duerson. 135 S.Ct. at 1774. Ms. (2) son), juvenile and recommended to the Currier distinguish attempts Patton’s court that Mr. keep Duerson and receive unavailing. are temporary custody T.D. Accordingly, Currier, on facts of based reasonable a. Parallels Currier official in Ms. Patton’s shoes would have Cmrier factually this case are and and (1) understood that she or in- created legally point. county on Both involved so- vulnerability danger, creased to the (children removing cial workers child (2) placed T.D. at an risk of obvious seri- Currier) from recom- mother and then ous, immediate, harm, proximate and and mending placed child be the father’s (3) recklessly disregarded consciously home, by where the child was abused Id.22 risk. father. Both also members cases involved Second, Currier, specifically the same limited and defina- Mr. Doran withheld group ble has the state re- juvenile undermining from the court facts —“children parent moved from taken their natural Vargas Mr. caretaker— fitness as Currier, custody.” into state 242 F.3d at specifically, history paying of not child parallels These facts in additional support to this court’s contributed —and Currier define “beyond debate” T.D.’s sub- responsible determination he was process right stantive due to be free from placement Vargas. children’s White, danger. state-created 137 S.Ct. Id. at 919. Currier therefore put Ms. Pat- 551; Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. at 1774. she, too, ton on notice could be held placing First, responsible by (1) failed to Doran n withholdingfrom abuse, facts investigate in- potential evidence undermining Mr. fitness as a children, cluding general bruises abuse, allegations specific specifically, certain information “very and a caretaker — (2) regarding history. accusation” of his criminal abuse and recommended below, recognize timing 22. We Mr. Do- Currier addressed discussed physical ran’s conduct before le- after factor in not the critical Currier determine —but granted gal custody Vargas, Instead, to Mr. scope of relevant conduct. we — considering here we are Ms. Patton’s conduct whether there were "af- looked to and when legal physical before after custo- both danger. actions” taken to create firmative But, dy as was awarded to Mr. Duerson. Third, position con- ton’s have understood Currier found Doran’s would of: shocking light to be a constitutional violation. duct conscience (1) withholding information b, arguments Ms. Patton’s Vargas’s pay failure about Mr. attempts to Currier show support;

child not provide clearly established law. does in- his awareness and failure argues using Currier first She forecloses abuse, including potential vestigate to support her post-placement conduct. chil- numerous bruises remaining Her constitutional violation.23 explained dren bunk caused *22 arguments' attempt to Currier distinguish allegations bed Mr. Var- falls not us that children; persuade .24 Ms.. abusing Patton does gas was. qualified immunity for she is entitled to (3) responsibility juvenile for the clearly Mr, of law. lack established granting legal Vargas court’s custody. Post-custody i. conduct closely 920.. Patton’s Id. at conduct light argues Ms. Patton first held resembles Mr. of: Currier Doran’s that not rele- “post-custody conduct” was (1) withholding of her informa- certain to the analysis vant tion Mr. Duerson’s about criminal Doran, Mr. her own so history; post-placement 3, place- the November 2010 conduct after (2) her of to in- and failure awareness Aplt. Br. at ment'is also irrelevant. 48-49 .of vestigate potential evidence 919-20). (citing Currier, 242 This F.3d abuse, including argument misinterprets Currier. Mr. Duerson hit him with mop re- and school officials’ wooden that, Currier, recognized court this ports significant had spent that he during en- the time the defendant official time in the school office nurse’s gaged affirmatiyely con- in conduct body of ap- complaining aches and creation, all, to of tributed. father; of pearing fearful tending do so—in- defendant’s conduct responsibility being her for T.D.’s cluding investigate rele- failure —is placed remaining in Mr. Duer- vant. Relevance turns not on when son’s home. custody placement occurred but when above, danger-creat- As affirmative noted also withheld defendant’s ing analysis in Mr. conduct occurred. concerns Duerson from about Our 2010, 13, 2011, September 7, June Currier clear. We considered made this 25, reports Doran’s 2011 Mr. Mr. juvenilq recommendation that being Vargas legal custody of his court for have fear fired. Based should children, foregoing, though Pat- Mr. a reasonable official in Ms. be relevant even (1957), regard argument par 80 appro- L.Ed.2d rather than the more 23. We more priately Iqbal, directed whether there was a requirements ticularized v. Ashcroft violation, 662, 1937, but nonetheless we 556 U.S. 129 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 173 it pre- address here because Ms. Patton has (2009), Corp. 868 Bell Twom Atlantic v. argument. prong-two sented it as a 1955, bly, 550 U.S. 127 S.Ct. (2007). Aplt. But Br. at 37 n.6. L.Ed.2d points Patton also we re out argue explain Ms. Patton does how that not viewed motion dismiss the claim in Curri may provides affect whether Currier notice-pleading er under the standard Con law. established Gibson, ley 355 U.S. v. S.Ct. Vargas physical already custody assumed abuse that before occurred (though custody) not chil- legal granted to the concerned the father same Further, F.3d at 919. dren. Vargas’s children who Mr. placed we did consider Doran’s failure custody. Arg. Oral at 3:12-28. Ms. Patton investigate the children abuse after contends shе was “alerted to any never legal Vargas custody to be received by abuse [Mr. before Duerson] relevant, legal custody because custody was Aplt. transferred [him].” made, decision had been but because the (bold omitted); Br. at Arg. Oral 3:24- panel said Mr. Doran was not at argument 3:48. This fails for two reasons. engaging time in affirmative First, what matters most is not the iden- put danger, such as rec- victims, tity but the social ommending to that the workers in both cáses had evidence child Vargas. children remain Id. at abuse making fathers before their 909, 919. Finally, we considered Ms. recommendations, and thus had Medina’s instructing moth- children’s notice the fathers’ danger- homes would be er to remain silent about the father’s al- *23 Currier, places. ous In Mr. Doran leged had though abuse to relevant even notice, allegations Vargas so based that did after Mr. obtained le- Mr. short, gal custody. Vargas Id. conduct abused the children had after as- danger depends relevant creation on suming physical them, custody of that Mr. conduct, which can affirmative occur be- Vargas’s home continue to would be a fore legal and after a obtains parent cus- place of if danger father granted tody of a child. legal custody. Currier, See 242 F.3d at Currier, 919-20. He placement

Under T.D.’s in Mr. nevertheless recommended Mr. 3, 2010, Vargas Duerson’s legal custody home November be- awarded of the not conduct determine what was relevant children. at 919. Rather, to T.D.’s danger-creation claim. Here, Mr. Duerson’s abuse P.G.—his Currier inquiry shows the relevant is step-child gave his Ms. Patton care—

whether Ms. took Patton ac- affirmative notice that Mr. home Duerson’s would be a Patton, tions after similarly date. place for T.D. See Dist. Ct. Currier, to Ms. took Medina affirmative (explaining Order at 36' the record sup- 3, 2010, by actions after recom- November ported that Ms. Patton was on notice that mending four that T.D. times remain might Mr. Duerson “re-offend an- Mr. physical le- temporary care”). other By child intentionally gal custody. affirmative actions Those omitting juvenile from report her conduct, post-placejnent made her includ- court her concerns and details of Mr. ing investigate her failure to evidence of Duerson’s criminal history including her — potential abuse, T.D.’s analyze relevant knowledge “multiple that there were other danger-creation claim. abusing incidents” Mr. P.G.—- Duerson Attempts distinguish ii. Currier Ms. Patton’s own actions reflect she knew impor- information she excluded was attempts distinguish Ms. Patton’s * tant placement the court’s decision. Currier-on four all grounds fail. Doran, Compared to Ms. Patton Mr. had 1) children Same stronger even evidence Mr. Duerson was a child But she nonetheless abuser.- argues “dispositive Ms. Patton dis- placed child be tinction” recommended that a between case is Currier and this allegations that Currier home. past child convicted child abuser’s See, e.g., Aplt.

Second, (arguing Br. at 46 ther. as Mr. Doran recommended just Vargas’s in Currier to disclose Mr. Ms. Patton’s information failure had though him he even should live to other individuals “does establish them, Patton, after previously violation”). abused more constitutional Whether Duerson’s abuse learning about Mr. prong-one constitu- properly viewed T.D., stay that T.D. should recommended or a argument prong-two tional violation court followed father. clearly argument, it lacks established law recommendations, leaving those merit. to abuse enabling the father the home including “team” as She identifies multiple him on occasions. litem), (T.D.’s guardian ad Ms. Gomez pre-placement her con Combined with parents, and the attendees at the duct, makes post-placement T.D., meeting, including Currier than for a stronger even case (an family Briana Hutchinson outside ther- once violation. (T.D.’s apist), Kyle Hommes clinician Vargas Mr. Mr. Doran knew that But House), Shiloh receiving physi his children after abused DDHS who made the recom- сase worker (but them, legal) custody cal September mendation at the hear- single supporting Doran’s recommendation ing knowledge and who withheld chil Vargas’s legal custody those placement concerns about the viola dren to a contributed to the juvenile final submitted that, Currier thus tion. established Patton, only court. from Ms. apart And once Duerson knew participated “team” member who home, in his her recom abused T.D. *24 September hearing was Go- Ms. in Mr. that T.D. should remain mendations mez, failed with whom Ms. Patton to share led to a temporary Duerson’s also knowledge the full of Mr. extent her sum, pre- In constitutional violation.25 her or history her concerns about post-placement sup together conduct him, placement Currier violation. including T.D.’s ports a with de- clear tails of 2005 conviction Mr. Duerson’s doc- 2) process “Team” Report. umented in Trails Ms. Gomez arguments Ms. “probably” Patton raises two related testified that she would have in process placing about T.D. a “team” changed placement her recommendation Both fail. Mr. Duerson. Ms. these Patton shared details with they have her her because would corrected First, she could questions whether she misconception the nature about other “team” members also liable when (brackets at 11 his fa- conviction.26 Order supported placement Dist. Ct. lawyer do argument, ton notice that he could either or both Ms. Patton's at- At oral argue tempted that her notice of Mr. Duer- abusing give physically T.D. did not her son’s 26. Ms. other "team” members Patton asserts sexually Apart he would abuse T.D. notice knew, information she access to the being improperly the first raised for requested could that information. For have argument, time see EEOC v. at oral TriCore instance, argues is at like- “[i]t she least (10th Labs, ” 941 n.13 F.3d Reference ly’ up past Ms. Mr. Duerson’s Gomez looked 2017), argument Cir. lacks A home this merit. database, history Aplt. criminal in a Br. state place abuses a where the caretaker child is so, 47, but, it even if that would at danger takes. form that abuse —whatever compensate knowledge of the for her lack of event, physical- any Mr. Duerson had both Report document Trails different than Mr. —a ly putting sexually Pat- abused Ms. report. history P.G.— Duerson's criminal omitted). Ms. Patton also cannot shift outlined her place- concerns about T.D.’s blame to other “team” members when she (i.e., ment with Mr. Duerson being avoid failed disclose to them full extent fired) support that she knew knowledge about Mr. Duerson’s crimi- posed to T.D. Mr. Duerson’s home and history nal or her concerns about T.D.’s that she consciously disregarded that risk. placement in his home.27 Nor does Currier allow her to escape Second, argues is no indica- “there liability supervisor’s due miscon- tion part Do[r]an was of a team decision- Currier, duct. In we held that Mr. Doran’s making process” in Currier. Aplt. Br. Gonzales, supervisor, Ms. could also be 42-43. But Ms. Patton is incorrect liable for unconstitutional Currier any plac- lacked “team” knowingly failing to correct Mr. Doran’s Currier, ing children. four CYF and Ms. Medina’s unconstitutional behav- social together place workers worked ior. Id. at 922-23. The actions of Mr. Do- the children in Mr. Vargas’s custody. The ran’s supervisor did not absolve Mr. Doran guardian children’s ad litem and mother liability. This same is so with Ms. Patton also place- were involved the children’s and Ms. Ketema. ment. See 242 F.3d at despite 908-10. And of a group involvement 4) provide Failure to criminal record social held the workers could be held Currier argues sup- does not individually responsible danger-cre- for a port a danger-creation claim “premised on id. (Mr. Doran), ation claim. See to provide failure court with (Ms. (Ms. Medina), Gonzales). Ms. Pat- complete history criminal where the ton’s “team” process argument does not court is only aware conviction Currier dilute established law. history.” Aplt. argu- Br. 45. This 3) ment overlooks the relevant facts Curri- Supervisor’s direction er, responsible where Doran was held attempts distinguish Patton next placement for a in part decision because he Currier because Mr. Doran’s supervisor, failed disclose relevant information re- Gonzales, him direct to recom- garding Vargas’s caregiv- fitness as a *25 custody, mend whereas Ms. Patton’s su- er—his pay failure to child support. Simi- Ketema, pervisor, Ms. her to instructed do larly, here, stronger and even so. failed to disclose relevant information re- why We do not see this matters for a garding Mr. Duerson’s fitness —the details danger-creation claim based on Currier. regarding Mr. Duerson’s criminal convic- Currier that requisite establishes men- abusing care, tion for a in child his “multi- tal state for a claim is ple” abuse, other incidents of child

whether Ms. Patton in recklessly “acted supporting other facts only he was not disregard” conscious of a risk that was T.D., unfit for posed care but also or “obvious known.” 242 F.3d at 918. Ms. private to T.D. violence Patton’s reasons for deleting parts of her n n n n initial above, particular 27. As knowledge disputed noted her it is to what extent Ms. Patton mis- included details of Mr. Duerson’s criminal represented knowledge P.G., offense her concerns includ- history criminal shared concerns with probation ed the reasons for his 2007 revoca- attendees, meeting's we must view the (e.g., purposeful tion failure to fulfill his light in facts most favorable T.D. obligations). Although sex offender treatment 1236 Department Services, argue 489 U.S. attempts Patton fails in her Social n 998, (1989). clearly 189, not 109 L.Ed.2d 249

Currier provide does S.Ct. 103 estab- addition, in Currier to the Court more than establish In extent law. did lished DeShaney rights left the for open excep- “at door T.D.’s substantive due an White, danger, high generality.” 137 S.Ct. tion based state-created level omitted).28 It “case Tenth Circuit has for that (quotations is a test the devised broadly. acting exception applied has been too аn similar official] where precedent ... violat- should be reconsidered held have Our circumstances Id. The law case. appropriate an ed” the Constitution. and facts of Currier put person reasonable I on notice that her Patton’s circumstances DeShaney, Court Supreme held placement was regarding T.D.’s that social workers were not constitutional unconstitutional. Id. failing ly protect for Joshua De liable III. CONCLUSION father, Shaney Randy DeShaney. DeShaney, 191, U.S. affirm the court’s denial S.Ct. district We might first summary judgment. learned Joshua Authorities endangered DeShaney’s when second BRISCOE, concurring. Judge, Circuit to police DeShaney complained wife Joshua, prior causing I bound odr Id. at agree we are marks. had hit. Doran, ruling Winnebago County 242 F.3d 998. “The Currier v. S.Ct. 2001). (DSS) (10th However; I believe Curri- Department Cir. Social inter Services directly it [DeShaney], he wrongly er decided because but the ac viewed denied cusations, Supreme prece- pursue Court’s not them conflicts with the DSS did Winnebago County DeShaney year later, A v. Id. ad- Joshua was further.” dent Booker, for relied counsel Ms. Pat lished It 28. On law. v. Schwartz (10th 2012), App. under Fed. R. P. clearly ton submitted a letter F.3d 573 Cir. for 28(j), advising clerk this court's 1187-88, circuit established law. 2017 WL Dahn at 16-1059, Amedei, No. decision Dahn v. special- 3470142 at *6. held that the Schwartz (10th Aug. 2017 WL 3470142 Cir. F.3d relationship only applies doctrine to coun- 14, 2017), stating germane it is to Ms. ty employees placed who child foster argument "the District Court Patton’s county employees care but also to in another inquiry clearly established law addressed responsible investigating re- who high generality.” at too a level of child, ports noting place- the. abuse Dahn, a foster had relocated from child dependent the child made on the state ment Colorado, private adop- where Oklahoma county departments. at 581-85. and all its agency placed adoption with a tion him Dahn, holding reversed in We that Schwartz father him before аnd after foster who abused establish extension of "the *26 adoption approved. Oklahoma had the special-relationship lines doctrine across state custody adoption. of the the Id. at child until 1188, county well at as as lines.” 2017 Dahn 1180-81, 1187-88, *1, WL 3470142 at 2017 WL 3470142 at *7. county alleged The *6. lawsuit casework- gener- support does not Dahn Patton’s right the ers Colorado had violated child's ality argument spe- here. concerns the Dahn process to substantive due for their failure doctrine; cial-relationship this concerns case respond reports adequately ‍‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍of while abuse Moreover, doctrine. the living the child was father before the with the shows, analysis the court not our district did dismiss, adoption. The moved caseworkers clearly law that extend the established arguing they qualified immu- entitled factually case this and Currier are nity. motion, parallel, presents an even this case The con- district court the denied stronger danger- cluding foundation for a special the a than had rela- Currier caseworkers tionship the with estab- creation"claim. child

1237 to a hospital “multiple mitted local that Joshua ill was too to see her. Id. In abrasions,” 1984, examining bruises and the DeShaney March beat Joshua.so se- of physician suspected verely notified DSS child that Joshua permanent suffered Id, “immediately damage. Id. DSS brain abuse. obtained an “DeShaney was subse- from juvenile plac- quently order a court Wisconsin tried and convicted of child abuse.” Joshua in ing temporary custody of the Id.

hospital.” Id. § Joshua and brought his mother 1983 county

The convened a against County then “‘Child claims and' DSS em of consisting pediatri- Protection ployees alleging defendants “had Team’— cian, detective, psychologist, deprived police liberty of his Joshua without due caseworkers, county’s lawyer, process law, of several DSS of rights violation his hospital Amendment, various personnel by consid- under Fоurteenth fail —to ing protect er Joshua’s situation.” Id. The Team de- against intervéne to him of cided “there was insufficient risk his evidence violence at father’s hands of child abuse to they retain Joshua the which knew or should have known.” court,” custody 193,109 of the at 998. They but “recommend Id. S.Ct. claimed that measures, Joshua, “special relationship” in- protect several existed between cluding enrolling a preschool pro- him in Joshua and the State “because the State providing gram, knew that a special danger father with Joshua faced certain services, counseling hands, encouraging abuse at his specifically father’s girlfriend proclaimed, by deed, father’s out of by move word and its in DeShaney promised cooper- protect Id. tention to him home.” that dan 197, ger.” these Id. at 109 (quoting ate recommendations. Id. S.Ct. 998 DeShaney, 13-20, “Based Brief for recommendation Petitioners Team, 998, Child Protection 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 103 L.Ed.2d (No. 87-154), 880157). protection child case WL Specif -and dismissed here, ically, Joshua to returned his-fa- as is most relevant the DeSha ney plaintiffs briefing ther.” Id. asserted their county that the had violated Joshua’s due incident, a Following this DSS case- because, alia, rights it process inter DeShaney visited the home month- worker “handed him to his abusing back father ly. suspicious “[S]he a number observed abusing girlfriend.” and the father’s Brief head; injuries Joshua’s she also noticed added). (emphasis for Petitioners at 5 school, that he been enrolled girlfriend Supreme began, by discussing moved out.” Court 192-93, scope process She S.Ct. recorded substantive due observations, “along these with her con- claims. “The Due Process of the Clause tinuing suspicions provides that someone in the De- Fourteenth that ‘[n]o Amendment Shaney physically abusing any life, household ... deprive person State shall Id. at During liberty,, property, Joshua.” 109 S.Ct. 998. without due law,’” time, DeShaney, the case also received worker U.S. reports emergency morе two room S.Ct. 998. This “does not transform Clause been personnel every Joshua had treated for tort a state into committed actor 192-93, suspicious injuries. Id. at S.Ct. constitutional violation.” Id. at *27 Rather, reports 998. The second of “was to pre- these S.Ct. 998. it intended in 193, government 1983. 109 abusing power, November Id. at S.Ct. 998. vent ‘from [its] the monthly On caseworker’s two vis- or employing op- next it an instrument of ” home, 196, to DeShaney its the pression.’ (quot- she was told Id. at -S.Ct. 998 344, Cannon, 348, because change analysis not ua did the v. U.S. ing Davidson (1986)). 668, permanent It is “the State the 88 L.Ed.2d 677 does-not become 106 S.Ct. act,” power safety by to hav- guarantor of an “a limitation the State’s individual’s minimal levels guarantee of certain at ing not “a once him shelter.” Id. offered 195, 109 safety security.” Id. at 109 S.Ct. 998. words, purpose “[i]ts 998. other S.Ct. analysis, In its also the Court stated State, from the protect to the people conduct, returning including the State’s protected the State not to ensure that father, not dan- to his create a Joshua did 196, 109 at from each other.” Id. them vulnerability to or his ger Joshua increase gen- 998. Due Clauses “[T]he S.Ct. Process 998. It danger. to Id. at 109 S.Ct. erally right confer no affirmative to gov- wrote, may have been “[w]hile the State may be aid, even ernmental where such aid faced in dangers of the that Joshua aware life, liberty, proper- necessary to secure world, in played part free it no their itself government ty interests which creation, it to render anything nor do did Id. may deprive “[A] not the individual.” any to Id. him more them.” vulnerable to an protect failure individual State’s added). tem- (emphasis Again, the State’s not private simply does against violence of Joshua assumption custody porary of the Due Process constitute violation not re- analysis alter this because did 197,109 Id. at S.Ct. 998. Clause.” custody turning Joshua to father’s that “in certain recognized The Court “placed position him in no than that worse im- the Constitution limited circumstances been [the in which he wоuld have upon the duties poses State affirmative Thus, at acted all.” Id. State] respect partic- protection care and DeShaney opinion addressed Court’s 198, 109 ular individuals.” Id. at S.Ct. exception special relationship both added). (emphasis Specifically, “when exception the state created into its State takes a person an affirma- concluded that neither created will, Con- him there holds duty part tive imposes corresponding it a upon stitution “the protect state to Joshua. Id Because for his duty responsibility to assume some duty protect had no constitutional State 199- safety general well-being.” Id. at violence, against his its Joshua father’s case, 998. “[t]he S.Ct. such calamitous though failure do so— not from duty protect arises affirmative a vi- hindsight simply not constitute d[id] — knowledge of the individual’s the State’s of the Due Clause.” Id at olation Process of in- predicament expressions or from its 202,109 S.Ct. him, help but the limitation tent Despite clear DeSha statement imposed it has on his freedom act which ney, social workers we held Currier that 200, 109 on his own behalf.” Id. S.Ct. constitutionally harms inflict liable for are DeShaney alleged did if worker was upon the social ed at 199-200 & not meet this standard. “responsible for” court’s decision 200,109 998 n.9. The held that S.Ct. Court arrangement custody' authorize the relationship special there was no between the child was later harmed. which State, Joshua and State because attempted at 919-20. avoid We F.3d “by exercise of its the affirmative DeShaney by controlling precedent in power liberty so [Joshua’s] restrain[ed] drawing returning a child a distinction that it him to care for rendered] unable parent not increase the to the same 998. The himself.” Id. S.Ct. vulnerability danger from vio as- child’s further that the State’s Court stated parent, hands of that but sumption temporary custody Josh- lence over *28 returning abusing a parent physically child a different did. the children. Dоran Id. at Id. at was of least one of reports aware these investigate. but did not August Id. Also in plaintiffs in representa- alleged that Vargas’s Juarez fiancée of Anthony, the children Latasha and tives punished by children dunking the in them § brought against, among 1983 claims oth- a full Again, bathtub water. Id. Doran Doran, ers, Tom a social worker the allegation was aware of this but not did Children, Youth, Department and Families investigate. Id. On October the (CYF), alleg- of the State New Mexico came to CYF for children an office visit. Doran ing that had “violated their funda- Latasha had two visible bruises on her rights mental under Fourteenth her, gave back. asked who When them of Amendment Constitu- United States replied “Da Da.” Id. at 910. Id. at tion.” 908. The facts relevant DeShaney, in presented light issue 19, 1993, legal On October custody was plaintiffs, most favorable to the Currier Vargas. transferred Id. at 909. On April follows. are as 16, 1994, Vargas poured boiling water Anthony. Anthony Id. later from his died 30, 1993, April investigated On CYF a injuries. This court Id. affirmed the denial neglect regarding Latasha and qualified immunity to Doran were, time, Anthony, who at the danger theory. state-created Id. custody mother, of their Devonne Juarez. 909. A Id. at CYF worker found Latasha II Anthony, age both of four at under the time, matter, five-year-old the care of As I their a factual cannot square DeShaney. Id. cousin. Juarez left state. Id. I am not persuad- had Currier with purported ed our distinction between petitioned the Court for CYF Children’s state that assumes of a child formally transferring legal an order custo- parent then returns that child to the Latasha dy Anthony Id. A CYF. same and a parent state that assumes hearing regarding petition this held on custody of a child and then returns that 10,1993. May hearing, Id. As of Doran this parent. In child to a different both cases father, learned that children’s Var- had makes an affirmative the state recommen- irresponsi- gas, “history had of financial regarding placement dation bility” only eight sup- made child DeShaney, And, purportedly child. yеars. port previous in the three payments adequate affirmative conduct was Doran Court Id. attended the Children’s implicate process substantive due con- hearing, say anything but about DeShaney, cerns. U.S. Vargas’s pay support. failure to Id. child Therefore, assuming arguendo S.Ct. 998. legal granted The Children’s Court custo- danger theory the state-created CYF, dy physical of the but substantive due violations is a val- custody Vargas. liability in theory id some circum- 22,1993, July Vargas’s On Doran visited stances, alleged either the then home noticed a small bruise Antho- not meet the Tenth Currier does Circuit’s cheek, ny’s girlfriend which at- Vargas’s test, test sets the bar too low. to a fall on playground. tributed Id. On test, 3, 1993, un- Under our establish claim August Anthony another danger-creation theory, plaintiff der when for an bruise he arrived CYF (1) “that en- must show: the state actor visit. Id This office bruise also attrib- conduct”; (2) to a gaged fall. both in affirmative “that reported uted Id. Juarez violence”; Vargas private September there was *29 1240 custody Vargas.” Id.- granting legal or in danger the “created

state actor footnote, added). In a we (emphasis 919-20 vulnerability the plaintiffs dan creased (4) “plaintiff that was a ger way”; elaborated: in some specifically defin of a limited member the Plaintiffs It is conduct true that (5) actor’s “con that the state able group”; by a Do- partially of is failure complain risk of act,on put plaintiff duct substantial allegations particular ran to harm”; immediate, serious, proximate investigate failure-to alle- Doran’s abuse. known”; (6) or “the obvious that risk was gations of abuse while the children recklessly (7) in that actor “acted state custody be distin- legal in state should risk”; disregard conscious that however, claim guished, . a that from conduct, total, “such when viewed is that children to rescue the state failed .once of B.I.C. shocking.”1 Estate v. conscience Vargas. given Do- legal custody was Gillen, (10th 2014) 1099, 1105 Cir. 761 F.3d allegations of investigate ran’s failure Gillen, of B.I.C. 710 (quoting v. Estate general be viewed abuse should (10th 2013)), Although Cir. F.3d context of state’s affirmative conduct several Doran’s meets I doubt that conduct from their removing the -in children first, elements, I focus on the of these here placing children with mother and conduct. affirmative their father. element, this respect to we held With n.7. Id. responsible for Doran “was Currier that matter, I it general As a find hard grant Court’s decision to the Children’s can be “re- conclude a social worker custody, through Vargas legal either sponsible independent for” decision and, investigate to the failure ultimately change judge who orders through his affirmative recom- court or we,assume But, custody. such re- .even if (em- at 919 mendation.” F.3d exists, transform sponsibility we cannot added). basis The factual phasis into affirmative to act omissions failures that Doran failed to tell the conclusion was them “in merely by considering Vargas’s history of Court about Children’s of’ recom- general context irresponsibility, further financial failed to only affirmative act The mendation. Vargas and his investigate after bruises recom- could in Currier is the be found an explanation, offered failed fiancée which, itself, no my view is mendation allegation investigate that Var- Juarez’s recommen- from affirmative different punished gas’s fiancée had DeShaney be re- that Joshua dation dunking them a bathtub full water. - . custody. turned his father’s omission's, not Notably, are all these liability If attaches to such “Do- then stated that acts. We affirmative recommendation, any future harm or increased the ran ‘created place- a child in the recommended befalls danger’ vulnerability to plaintiff[s’] be the basis for a substantive ment could investigate through his the nu- failure process against- the social work- due claim allegations of abuse bruises and merous perma- This the state the court order er. rule makes responsibility and his (10th 2012) (recognizing the omis- have to these first two elemеnts referred We .Cir. six- "preconditions” preconditions must be met before sion of these two may allege plaintiff oversight a substantive due "generate[d] on the test had factor premised theory alike,” claim' of state-created because part counsel courts Gillen, F.3d danger. of B.I.C. v. Estate necessary preconditions are to invoke these Gray (10th 2014); Univ. v. Cir. danger theory). the state-created Hosp. Auth., n.8 672 F.3d Colo. of a guarantor' nent child’s safety.

Supreme has substan- Court told us that *30 process tive due does not reach so far. Stris, Geyser, Daniel Luke Peter K. DeShaney, 489 U.S. S.Ct. 998. Maher, LLP, Angeles, CA, Los Stris & Either is not recommendation Underwood, Jr., Earl Price Underwood & type conduct that can affirmative PC, AL, Riemer, Fairhope, Kenneth J. support a substantive violation due Riemer, J. Riemer Attorney Kenneth our test for a state-created Mobile, Law, AL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. liability, theory which case Currier facts; on wrongly decided our Tompkins, Brent Chase T. Espy, Jason test for danger theory the state-created LLP, Bingham, Larry Balch & Brittain Supreme conflicts with the Court’s deci- Childs, Prueter, Charles Waller W. Lans- DeShaney, by liability sion imposing Davis, LLP, Birmingham, den Dortch & acts that not violate the Due do Process AL, Edwards, Wayne Ryan Derek Todd Clause the Constitution. Dortch Hambidge,. Lansden Waller &

Davis, LLP, Nashville, TN, for Defen- dants-Appellees. Melendez,

Brian Dykema Gossett, JOHNSON, Hill, PLLC, Aleida Aleida in Minneapolis, MN, f.k.a. for Amicus Curi- dividually on behalf all ae similar

ly individuals, Plaintiff-Appellant, ‍‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‍situated WILSON, Before MARTIN and

v HIGGINBOTHAM,* Judges. Circuit . FUNDING, LLC, MIDLAND MARTIN, Judge: Circuit Defendant-Appellee. opinion, Our in this issued matter

Judy Brock, individually N. be May has been reversed now similarly situ half of a class others Supreme the United States Court. Our Plaintiffs-Appellants, ated, Cunningham, Donald VACATED, opinion is therefore v action is remanded to District Court . judgment reinstatement of the in favor LLC, Funding, Resurgent of Midland Cap- Resurgent Capital Services, Services, L.P., Funding, ital and 'LVNV L.P., Funding, LLC, LVNV LLC, ruling in accordance of the with the Defendants-Appellees. Supreme Court. : 15-11240, No. No. 15-14116 of Appeals, United States Court Circuit.

Eleventh

(June 27, 2017) * ting by designation. Higginbotham, Honorable E. United Patrick Circuit, Judge for Circuit the Fifth sit- States

Case Details

Case Name: T.D. v. Patton
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 28, 2017
Citation: 868 F.3d 1209
Docket Number: 16-1092
Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In