3 Mass. App. Ct. 781 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1975
1. As we interpret the report of material facts filed by the probate judge who heard the amended equity petition, paragraph one of the decree, ordering reformation of the deed whereby the plaintiff Anna Sztuba sold her one-third interest in the farm to her son Casimir (since deceased and represented in this proceeding by the defendant as administratrix of his estate), was based entirely on the finding that the omission from the deed of the name of her other son, the plaintiff Joseph V. Sztuba, as co-grantee “was a mistake” on her part in that it “did not reflect Anna’s wishes” (emphasis supplied). The absence of any finding that Casimir shared his mother’s wishes or was otherwise chargeable with the mistake requires reversal of that paragraph of the decree (see Eno v. Prime Mfg. Co. 317 Mass. 646, 650 [1945]; Scirpo v. McMillan, 355 Mass. 657, 660 [1969]), unless the evidence, which is reported, shows that reformation of the deed was nevertheless justified (Cohen v. Santoianni, 330 Mass. 187, 190 [1953]). While Joseph gave some rather sketchy testimony about one or two conversations in which Casimir invited Joseph to join in the contemplated purchase, a careful examination of the record discloses that those conversations occurred several months before the sale was consummated. There was no evidence of any such intention on Casimir’s part at any later date and considerable evidence to the contrary. We conclude that there was no such full, clear and decisive proof of mutual mistake as would warrant reformation. See Kidder v. Greenman, 283 Mass. 601, 613-614 (1933), and cases cited. 2. We need not consider the propriety of paragraph 2 of the decree whereby the plaintiffs were denied an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of certain lots, as they took no appeal. 3. The remaining paragraph of the decree, whereby the plaintiffs were declared entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale of certain personal property of the farm in 1970 after Casimir’s
Decree reversed.
Judgment for the defendant.