Lead Opinion
The only question to be determined in each of these cases is whether there is any right of appeal to the Common Pleas Court with respect to an occupational disease claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes.
The only right of appeal to a court with respect to a claim for workmen’s compensation is such as may be provided for by statute. Industrial Commission v. Monroe (1924),
The only statute providing for an appeal tо the Common Pleas Court with respect to a claim for workmen’s compensation is Section 4123.519, Revised Code, which reads, so far as pertinent:
“The claimant or the employer may appeal a decision of the Industrial Commission in any injury case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the injury was inflicted or in which the contract of employment was made if the injury oсcurred outside the state.”
As pointed out in Johnson v. Industrial Commission (1955),
Thus, when the General Assembly provided in Section 4123.519 for an appeal “in any injury case,” it certainly did not expressly provide for an appeal in an occupational disease case.
In 1955, when Section 4123.519 was first enaсted (126 Ohio Laws, 1015, 1022), the General Assembly also enacted Sections 4123.512 to 4123.518, inclusive, which, with Section 4123.519, substantially revised the administrative procedures to be followed with respect to workmen’s compensation claims and provided for administrative appeals and court appeals with respect
Furthermore, when it enacted Sections 4123.512 to 4123.519, inclusive, in 1955, the General Assembly also enacted Section 4121.131, Revised Code, prоviding in part:
“The Industrial Commission * * * shall # * * render final determinations of disputed claims as provided in Sections 4123.516, 4123.517 and 4123.518 * * * except as provided in Section 4123.519 * * * ”
Thus, final determinations were to be made by the Industrial Commission of all disputed claims whether for “injury or occupational disease” except where there was an appeal in an “injury case.”
As we read these 1955 amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes, they express a legislative intention to provide for administrative review оf all disputed claims whether for “injury or occupational disease” but for a court appeal only in an “injury case” and not in an occupational disease case. In effect, the General Assembly expressed the intention that there should be no appeal in an occupational disease ease just as clearly as if it had expressly so stated,
1. When the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes were amended in 1921 (109 Ohio Laws, 181) to provide for compensation for occupational diseases, this was done by enacting Sections 1465-68 (a) and (b), General Code. Section (a) of that statute (which, аs later amended, became Section 4123.68, Revised Code) provided for compensation payments to employees who contracted certain scheduled occupational diseases and to dependants of employees whose deaths were caused by such diseases.
Section (b) (which as later amended became Section 4123.69, Revised Code) extended to those employees and dependents all the rights, benefits and immunities provided for injured employees by the other sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes excepting Section 1465-90, General Code (which as later amended became Section 4123.51, Revised Code), which permitted a court appeal in certain “injury” cases.
2. If this exception as to Section 1465-90, General Code (later Section 4123.51, Revised Code), had not been made, Section 1465-68&, Gеneral Code (now Section 4123.69, Revised Code), would have conferred the same right of appeal with respect to an occupational disease claim as conferred by Section 1465-90, General Code (later Section 4123.51, Revised Code), with respect to an injury claim. Industrial Commission v. Monroe, supra (
3. When Section 4123.51, Revised Code, was repealed in 1955, its provisions for court appeals in injury cases were replaced by the provisions of Section 4123.519 for court appeals in injury cases; and, by reason of the provisions of Section 1.23(A), Revised Code (“where reference is made to any section * * * of the Revised Code, such reference shall extend to and include any amendment of or supplement to the section * * * so referred to or any section or sections hereinafter enacted in lieu thereof”), the words of Section 4123.69, Revised Code, which reаd, “except Section 4123.51,” should in effect read, “except Section 4123,519,”
5. Section 4123.95, Revised Code, provides:
“Sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed in favor of employees and the dependents of the deceаsed employees.”
In our opinion, the only legislative purpose in amending Section 4123.69 in 1959 so as to eliminate reference to Section 4123.51 was to clear up the statute by removing an unnecessary reference to a statute which had been repealed four years before. The excepting reference of Section 4123.69 to Section 4123.51 had become unnecessary, as hereinbefore indicated, not only because of the repeal of Section 4123.51 in 1955 but also because of the clear expression by the General Assembly, in the 1955 enactment of Sections 4123.512 to 4123.519, inclusive, Revised Code, and Section 4121.131, Revised Code, of an intent to provide for an appeal in injury cases but not in occupational disease cases.
This opinion is fortified by the fact that, at the same time, the General Assembly removed several other obviously unnecessary exceptions with respect to other statutes (Sections 4123.06, 4123.18, 4123.86, 4123.87 and 4123.88, Revised Code) which had been added to the provisions of Section 1465-68&, General Code, when it had been recodified as Section 4123.69, Revised Code.
Furthermore, the 1959 act, which eliminated the Section 4123.51 exception in Section 4123.69, amended Section 4123.519 which is claimed to have somehow conferred a right of appeal in an occuрational disease case. However, although the General Assembly in that act specifically referred to occupational diseases or occupational disease claimants in 13 other sections
Admittedly, there had never been, prior to November 1959, any statutory provision for an appeal with respect to an occupational disease claim. Therefore, if the General Assembly had intended in 1959 to provide for such an appeal, it is inconceivable that it would not have clearly expressed its purpose to do so.
It would have been very easy for the General Assembly to provide for such an appeal, if it intended to do so, by either eliminating the word “injury” before the word “case” in Section 4123.519 or by adding the words “or occupational disease” after the word “injury,” as it had frequently done both in the 1955 act, which contained Sections 4123.512 to 4123.519, inclusive, and Section 4121.131, Revised Code, and in other рarts of the 1959 act, which eliminated the exception with regard to the repealed Section 4123.51.
A direction to liberally construe a statute in favor of certain parties will not authorize a court to read into the statute something which cannot reasonably be implied from the language of the statute.
Our conclusion is that there is no right of appeal to the Common Pleas Court with respect to an occupational disease claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes.
This conclusion is fortified by a consideration of the history of the 1959 legislation which is claimed to have provided a right of appeal with respect to occupational disease claims. This legislation was enacted as a part of Substitute House Bill 470. That bill, as recommended by the House Committee on Industry and Labor, specifically allowed an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in the county “where the injury or occupational disease was sustained or contracted.” Substitute House Bill 470, p. 26 (1959). However, the provisions of the bill relative
It follows that, in case No. 37366, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the Common Pleas Court affirmed, and that, in case No. 37491, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.
Judgment reversed in case No. 37366.
Judgment affirmed in case No. 37491.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. It is with real regret that my first opinion as a member of this court must be a dissent.
I agree with my colleagues that, “The only question to be determined in each of these cases is whether there is any right of appeal to the Common Pleas Court with respect to an occupational disease claim under the workmen’s compensation statutes.” My answer is “Yes.”
Further in the majority opinion it is stated:
“The only statute providing for an appeal to the Common Pleas Court with respect to a claim for workmen’s compensation is Section 4123.519, Revised Code, which reads, so far as pertinent:
“ ‘The claimant or employer may appeal a decision of the*220 Industrial Commission in any injury case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the injury was inflicted or in which the contract of employment was made if the injury occurred outside the state.’ ”
The majority opinion limits the right of appeal to thе Court of Common Pleas to “any injury case,” completely ignoring the plain provisions of Section 4123.69, Revised Code (effective November 2, 1959), which specifically provide that occupational disease claims be accorded precisely the same ‘ ‘ rights, benefits, and immunities ’ ’ as are provided in any ‘ ‘ injury case. ’ ’
Whether an employee’s disability arises as a result of a traumatic injury or the contraction of an oсcupational disease, the General Assembly recognized that the ultimate result is the same; the employee is deprived of his ability to earn a living and provide for his family because of a disability arising from his employment. In the event of his death, the hardships of his family in either event are the same.
It is difficult for a body of men and women as numerous as the General Assembly of Ohio to express precisely its purpose and intention when legislаting upon a subject as intricate and complex as that of compensation for injured employees or those who contract occupational diseases due to their employment. But, here, the General Assembly adopted a procedure logical in its nature; and language that left no doubt or ambiguity.
To achieve its object the General Assembly in Section 4123.68, Revised Code, classified as compensablе 24 specified occupational diseases. In the same section it set out the requirements of proof necessary to support an occupational disease or death claim.
The Genera] Assembly, in the same act, amended Section 4123.69, Revised Code, conferring certain rights and benefits upon employees who contract an occupational disease mentioned in Section 4123.68, Revised Code, and the dependents of those employees who die as a result of such disease. The pertinent language of amended Section 4123.69, Revised Code, is:
“Every employee mentioned in Section 4123.68 of the Revised Code and the dependents * * * of such employee shall be entitled to all the rights, benefits, and immunities * * * and regu*221 lations provided for injured employees * * (Emphasis added.)
Most certainly an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas is a “right” or “benefit.” Thus it is apparent that the General Assembly by the enactment of Sеction 4123.69, Revised Code, as amended, specifically granted to occupational disease claimants identically the same “rights” and “benefits” as are granted in injury cases.
With consistent logic and equal emphasis, the General Assembly in the same section used the following mandatory lanugage:
“The Industrial Commission shall have all of the powers, authority, and duties with respect to the collection, administration and disbursement of the State Occupational Disease Fund as are provided for in Sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code [workmen’s compensation statutes], providing for the collection, administration, and disbursement of the State Insurance Fund for the compensation of injured employees.” (Emphasis added.)
Again the General Assembly emphasized its purpose to accord to occupational disease claims the same rights and benefits as are accorded in “injury cases.”
It may well be observed that in numerous instаnces the Industrial Commission disburses funds for the payment of claims upon the finding and order of the Court of Common Pleas upon appeal. Prior to 1959, those employees who had contracted an occupational disease in their employment, as well as the dependents of those who had died from such occupational disease, had been denied their right of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas and denied the right to participate in the fund as ordered by the court. This injustice to the stricken employee as well as to his dependents upon his death, the General Assembly has endeavored to correct in plain, clear and unambiguous language.
In the majority opinion it is said:
“Thus, when the General Assembly provided in Section 4123.519 for an appeal ‘in any injury case,’ it certainly did not expressly provide for an appeal in an occupational diseasе ease. ’ ’
I am at a loss to determine how the General Assembly
Section 4123.519, Revised Code, sets out the procedure for appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. This statute is referred to in Section 4123.69, Revised Code, tоgether with other sections of the Code, which provide the same rights and remedies to both injured employees and those contracting an occupational disease.
In 1953, Section 4123.69, Revised Code, in part provided:
“* * * Section 4123.51 [appeals section] of the Revised Code, shall not apply to any case involving occupational disease.” (Emphasis added.)
There can be no doubt about the meaning of this language and its intent. However, in 1959, the General Assembly amended Section 4123.69, Revised Code, and struck out the abоve-quoted language. By this deletion, it is obvious that the General Assembly intended to permit appeals to the Court of Common Pleas by occupational disease claimants.
To fail to recognize the effect of such deletion is to do violence to a well recognized rule that when an amendment is made by a legislative body there is a purpose in such amendment. This court said in the first paragraph of the syllabus in County Board of Education v. Boehm,
“When an existing statute is repealed and a new and different statute upon the same subject is enacted, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to change the effect and operation of the law to the extent of the change in the language thereof.” (Emphasis added.)
Truly, the deletion of the pre-existing exception had some purpose. In State v. Barts, 132 N. J. Law, 74, 80, the court said:
‘ ‘ The rule of construction is that when a later statute omits words, particularly of limitation, included previously in the law, such omission is meaningful and was done with the full knоwledge and approval of its effect * *
'Industrial Commission v. Monroe,
In the per curiam opinion, at page 814, this court said:
“It would seem that any injury which the spirit and letter of the compensation act regarded as entitled to compensation should be placed upon the same footing as other injuries with respect to the right to have a denial of compensation reviewed upon appeal, but the Legislature has seen fit to provide otherwise, and we cannot deny its right so to do.” (Emphasis added.)
Not only has the General Assembly now stricken from the statute the exception upon which the Monroe case was decided but has by affirmative action declared that occupational disease claims shall be accorded precisely the same rights and benefits as “other injuries.” Seе also Arnold v. United States,
The people of Ohio adopted the workmen’s compensation amendment to the Constitution of our state (Section 35, Article II). The people spoke as follows:
“For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen’s employment, laws may be passed * # (Emphasis added.)
The people made nо distinction in respect to compensation between those suffering from injuries, or their dependents, and those suffering from occupational disease, or their dependents.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act must be construed liberally in favor of the employees and the dependents of the deceased employees. (Section 4123.95, Revised Code, and Bowling v. Industrial Commission,
The General Assembly having declared its intention both