*1 Tri- Granting New sideration of an Order Respon- filed Objection
al. No
dents; therefore, good appearing, cause that the
IT HEREBY ORDERED IS be, APPEAL
MOTION TO SUSPEND is, hereby GRANTED.
and pro-
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED shall be SUS-
ceedings this (60) sixty period for a
PENDED at which time
from the date of this Order filing Appeal Record
the due date for reset unless oth- this Court shall be
with by an of this provided Order
erwise
Court. simply question before the Court may do hereaf- the Court
stated: Whatever
ter, good today justice and are we not equitably estopped or otherwise
conscience reneging on our
precluded from suspended so Michaud, could rule on Judge sponte
his sua motion?
823 P.2d Syth, Cindy and
Thomas W. SYTH wife, plaintiffs- husband
respondents,
v. PARKE, D.C., and B.C. Rene
David L. wife,
Parke, dba Pend Or- husband Center, Chiropractic defendants-
eille
appellants. Cindy
Thomas W. SYTH wife, Syth, husband
plaintiffs-appellants, Welsh, Cosho, & Humphrey, Greener defendants-appellants. Boise, Idaho, for D.C., PARKE, Rene and B.C. L. David argued. Kathryn A. Sticklen wife; Parke, D. Cox David husband and wife, Cox, husband and B. and Patricia d’Alene, Idaho, Owens, Coeur & Howard Center, Chiropractic dba Pend Oreille Bruce Ow- R. plaintiffs-respondents. defendants-respondents. argued. ens 18437, 19367. Nos. Idaho, Supreme Court REHEARING ON Term, October d’Alene Coeur BAKES, Justice. Chief 20, 1991. Dec. July dated
By order
for re
petition
Syths’
granted the
additional
received
hearing. The Court
*2
briefing
argument
agency
oral
on the
trict court or administrative
shall
heard
petition
Appellants
jurisdiction
on
1991.
have
to take all actions neces-
October
requirements
Syths’ petition
rehearing
pri-
sary
for
asserts
to fulfill the
of the order
marily
original opinion
that our
was in er- of remand.”2
recognize that,
ap-
ror for failure to
while
13, 1989, by
The motion filed on October
original
pellants’
appeal
pending,
the
appellants Syths
the
did not seek a remand
Syths
Suspend
Appeal
filed a Motion to
the
give
“jurisdiction
the district court
to
13, 1989, requesting
October
Court
necessary
fulfill
re-
take all actions
the
“upon
stay
appeal
further action on the
quirements of the order of remand” under
grounds
the
and for the reasons that the
motion,
appellants Syths’
13.3. The
I.A.R.
appeal may
by
mooted
be
the fact
the
respondents
object,
to which
did not
Granting
currently
Order
a New Trial is
by
granted by an order issued
which was
way
by
under advisement
of the trial
Court, only stayed
the
of this
the
Clerk
Appellants
court’s own motion and
are
i.e.,
processing
appeal,
prepara-
the
presently waiting for the Court’s decision.”
reporter’s
tion of the clerk’s and
tran-
petition
rehearing points
for
out that
scripts,
briefing by
parties.
and the
the
on November
the Clerk of this
The order did not remand the case
granting
Court issued an order
the motion
requirements
district court “to fulfill the
suspend
appeal
period
sixty
for
Therefore,
the order of remand.”
the or-
days. Accordingly,
appellants argue
by
der issued
of the Court on
Clerk
that the effect of that order was to return
13, 1989, did
November
not reinvest
jurisdiction to the
district court to rule
jurisdiction
upon
trial court with
to rule
sponte
its own sua
motion to reconsider its
sponte
own sua
motion to reconsider its
prior
granting
order
a new trial in this
granting a
trial.
order
new
matter.
Furthermore, even if an order had
suspension
appeals
Motions for
are
13.3,
issued from this
under I.A.R.
Court
13.2,
permitted under
provides
I.A.R.
which
remanding the case to the district court so
that,
suspending
“An
appeal
an
will
upon
sponte
it could rule
its own sua
mo
any
state the duration and
conditions of
prior order
tion for reconsideration of its
suspension,
may
such
which
be terminated
trial,
granting
authority
there
no
a new
is
by
or extended
further order of
for a district court to reconsider an order
court. ...."1The
November
or
trial,
granting
opinion
as
issued
a new
our
by
suspended
ap
der issued
the Clerk
points
Spivey
in this case
out.
v. District
peal
sixty days,
any
did
but
not set out
(1923)
Court,
Costs on No ap- day period of time which to within attorney fees allowed. peal. trial was de- The motion for new September nied order dated McDEYITT, JJ„
JOHNSON and
concur.
42-day period with-
which reinstated the
an
should have been
which
BISTLINE,
concurs in the
Justice
reconsideration
filed. The motion for
BOYLE, and
opinion of Justice
now
days
not filed within ten
was
majority opinion
dissents to the
based on
trial,
motion for new
denying the
opinion
May
filed
the content of his earlier
approximately
days
90
after
filed
was
23,1991,121 Idaho
The Chief
petition
to reconsider.
provide
on the vast
jority opinion, has drawn
Nevertheless,
has been
such a motion
knowledge
prior cases which he has ac-
or amend
a motion to alter
twenty years
Supreme
on the
treated as
cumulated
59(e).
bench,
judgment pursuant
to I.R.C.P.
produced
the one case
Mitchell,
567 P.2d
98 Idaho
Obray v.
seemingly fills the bill for eradicat-
which
(1977).
1284
the result—of a
ing the efforts—as well as
Brauner.
K. Meredith and Wm. J.
assuming
motion
ron
Even
that Hamilton’s
Smith,
reconsider the court’s denial of the
W.E.
the Honorable
con-
motion for reconsideration could be
Judge,
the motion under
District
took
by the court as a motion to alter
sidered
21, 1985 filed
advisement and on October
59(e),
judgment under Rule
or amend the
he
decision wherein
considered
a written
filed
untimely
since not
Safeway
applicability of McDonald v.
days specified by I.R.C.P.
within the ten
Stores, Inc.,
P.2d 416
59(e).
not filed
‘Since the motion was
opinion
not
re-
had
been
entry
judgment, the
ten
within
for new trial was
leased when the motion
request-
power
grant
had no
denied.
first considered and
relief____
properly
ed
The motion was
furnished with a
The Court has been
*4
MacIntyre, 100 Ida-
denied.’
v.
Wheeler
transcript
argument
which
(1979).
286,
also
ho
See
Mr.
by Mr. Meredith and
presented
774,
Court, 37 Idaho
Spivey v. District
hearing.
extreme
at that
Of
McDaniel
Evers,
(1923);
Hamilton,
The also talks the register my dissent sary to because order issued the Clerk the Court “the extraordinary circum- presents instant case every Each and member the Court ...” court’s justify the district copy of 13 stances which received a of that order Novem- August man, opening the ber, acquiesced discretionary To a of us actions each view, my plaintiffs’ this is Motion for Reconsideration but 1991 written order. granting a trial reopened the the order new on one of those occasions when time re- purpose for the the court’s own motion quirements of the Rules should be con- argument prevent so as to man- additional liberally, as directed the manda- strued added.) injustice.” (Emphasis 1(a), tory language in I.R.C.P. “... to se- ifest speedy inexpensive deter- just, cure the 5, 1989, September It was not until every proceeding.” action and mination of notice of was filed. At the the first hearing, days before August ten presented appeal are The issues on this proceedings any appellate were com- the trial two-fold. The first is whether menced, po- recognized trial court opening granting the order court erred parties he error and advised the tential days more fourteen after new trial than August 1989 order. At opened had secondly, entry judgment, whether notice of filed the time the first ruling deny the trial court erred 5, 1989, original motion September unique motion for new trial. Under pending before the trial new trial was for case, of this I and unusual circumstances sponte motion court as a result of sua opinion that the trial court did am of the granting a new trial. opening the order respect. not err in either 13(b) expressly al- Appellate Rule majority opinion correctly sets forth mo- any lows a trial court “[r]ule procedural motions chronology added), (emphasis even for new trial” tion presented before the trial and orders appeal. Ac- filing of a notice of after however, purposes my dissent the error. cordingly, there was no following significant. July dates are On Notwithstanding my interpretation of the granted orally the trial court de- procedural governing rules applicable trial. Two fendants’ motion for new case, portions are posture of this there plaintiffs filed July later on agree. I majority opinion with which requesting the trial court to their motion First, beyond dispute that it is settled trial. its order a new reconsider for reconsidera- shall be no motion “there 1,1989, entered a August the trial court On the trial court entered tion of an order of granting a trial based on written order filed under Rule ... [ ] juror misconduct. 13; 11(a)(2)(B); 59(a).” I.A.R. See *7 telephonic confer- August a On Oakes, Excursions, Inc. v. Canyon Hells for re- plaintiffs’ held on ence was 123, (Ct.App.1986). 223 111 721 P.2d Idaho denied. which the trial court consideration majority that once agree I with the likewise addition, also the trial court at that time In trial court is perfected the an 60(b) motion asserted on the a Rule denied to take jurisdiction generally divested newly evidence. grounds of discovered case, in the H & V any further action However, minutes according to the clerk’s En- Engineering v. Board of Professional 25, hearing, the trial August the 1989 (1987); 646, P.2d 55 Idaho 747 gineers, 113 parties that he was orally advised the court Neibaur, 98 Idaho v. Security Bank First 1, August opening the 1989 sponte (1977); Canyon sua 598, Hells P.2d 276 570 granted 123, defendant a new Oakes, had Excursions, order which 111 Idaho Inc. v. transcript of that Unfortunately, obviously a (Ct.App.1986), trial. 223 721 P.2d Notwithstanding 13(b). us. also well hearing is not before It is qualified by I.A.R. having transcript, the reporter’s court once of a that a trial the absence established 25, hearing ordinarily August 1989 for new trial minutes of the on a motion ruled the to reconsider jurisdiction the trial court advised clearly state that does not have Court, 37 decision, order v. District opening Spivey parties that he was (1923); I.R.C.P. 774, P. 203 evidence of 219 trial. Further Idaho granting a new 60(b)(6) was 11(a)(2)(B), Au- and that opening court’s intent the trial court the trial to allow in the No- not intended 1, is manifest gust 1989 order original for its legal basis 13, it is stated reconsider wherein 1989 order vember motion for denying a granting 1989, decision 25, denied August the Court “[o]n
169
rules,
though
even
the Federal
side the
Trust v. Parker
new trial. First Bank &
already provided
(1986).
Procedure
Bros.,
30,
Rules of Civil
P.2d 950
730
imposing sanctions.
several methods for
However,
view,
my
the trial court’s
exercise its
allowing
In
a trial court to
action
opening
the order in the instant
powers,
the United States Su-
inherent
on,
of, any of
or in violation
was not based
“prior cases
preme
noted that
its
foregoing principles and was not
power
the inherent
have indicated that
reconsideration, which
form of a motion for
procedural
even if
can be invoked
court
11(a)(2)(B).
prohibited under Rule
clearly
con-
sanction the same
rules exist which
Rather,
ju-
recognized that
the trial court
Therefore,
while
duct.” Id. at
a valid
was not shown to be
ror misconduct
ordinarily rely on the rules
should
and, exer-
granting a new trial
reason for
“if in the
power,
inherent
rather than its
an in-
cising
power
inherent
to correct
his
court, neither
discretion of the
informed
the Au-
justice, simply opened or vacated
task,
up
nor the rules are
the statute
1,
gust
order.
1989
safely rely
its inherent
may
the court
not state
Although the trial court does
power.”
at 2136.
Id.
relying
any particular
it was
whether
Although
was the
the issue Chambers
legal authority,
procedure
rule of
or other
impose
power of a trial court to
inherent
memorandum
clearly
it is
stated
fees,
legal analysis is
sanctions
and order of November
decision
applicable
pres-
in the action
analogous and
reopened
the trial court
the United States
ently before us. While
granting a
trial on its own motion to
was discuss-
Supreme Court
Chambers
Clearly,
“prevent
injustice.”
manifest
federal
powers of the
ing the inherent
inher-
relying
the trial court was
courts,
courts are also vested with
state
prevent an
power to correct errors and
ent
Indeed,
gen-
powers.
as courts
inherent
injustice.
at least as
jurisdiction, state courts are
eral
Supreme
Court recent-
United States
to ensure
as the federal courts
well armed
ly
opportunity to reassert the im-
had the
justice
occurs within
walls
pow-
portance of the trial courts’ inherent
courtroom.
justice.”
in their roles as
ers
“Courts
Ida-
long recognized that
This Court has
—
-,
Nasco, Inc.,
U.S.
Chambers v.
the inherent
ho’s courts are imbued with
(1991),
2123,
111
acting under necessary corrective action
took exercising its inherent
open the order
power.
Accordingly, respectfully I dissent.
BISTLINE, J., concurs. BURGGRAF, Rep- Kay as Personal
Linda Stephen S. of the Estate of
resentative deceased; Kay Burg-
Burggraf, Linda Kay Individually;
graf, Linda
Burggraf, ad litem Ste- Guardian Kay Burggraf,
phanie Robert James Burggraf,
Burggraf, Linn and Jennifer children, Plaintiff-Respondent,
minor
v. CHAFFIN, Repre- as Personal
Jeannette the Estate of Walter
sentative of John deceased,
Chaffin, Defendant-Appel-
lant. CAIN, Representative as
Laurie Personal Cain, deceased; Gary Estate of Cain, Cain, Individually; Laurie Laurie Cain, Amy litem for
as Guardian ad child; Patterson; Cheryl Bruce
minor Patterson,
Patterson; Plain- and Brian
tiffs-Respondents, CHAFFIN, Repre- Personal
Jeannette the Estate of John Walter
sentative of deceased;
Chaffin, Burggraf, Robert V. Sr., Burggraf, dba Robert
aka Robert V. Burggraf Company, Burggraf R.V.
V. Company,
Co., Burggraf R.V. Robert Co.,
Burggraf Robert V. Construction Co., Burggraf
Burggraf Construction Co., Defendants-Appel-
Construction
lants.
No. Idaho,
Supreme Court of Term, Sept. 1991. Falls Idaho Falls, for Stephens, Idaho Thomsen & 26, 1991. Dec. argued. R. Thomsen appellants. Curt Bush, Falls and
Anderson, Pike & *10 City, King, Lake Wilcox, Dewsnup & Salt
