OPINION AND ORDER
The United States Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command Contracting Center awarded a contract to Systems Application & Technologies, Inc. for aerial target flight operations and maintenance services, unseating the incumbent contractor, Madison Research Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Solicitation
On June 1, 2010, the Army issued a final Request for Proposals (“RFP”) to acquire aerial target flight operations and maintenance services in support of its subscale, ballistic, rotary wing, and ballistic missile target systems.
In the RFP, the Army specified that it would award the contract “to the responsible offeror whose offer, conforming to the solicitation, [was] most advantageous to the Government, cost or price and other factors ... considered.” Id. at 270. Proposals would be evaluated using three criteria: Techni-eal/Management, Past Performance, and Price/Cost. Id. The Technieal/Management factor was split into Technical and Management subfactors, with the Technical subfaetor being “significantly more important” than the Management subfactor. Id. Each subfactor had several elements. Id. at 270-71. Under the Technical subfactor, offerors would be evaluated on Technical Approach, Labor, and Sample Task elements. Id. at 270. The Technical Approach and Labor elements were “approximately equal in importance” and, taken individually, were “significantly more important” than the Sample Task element. Id. Under the Management subfactor, offerors would be evaluated on the following elements, listed in descending order of importance: Management Approach; Sample Task; Experience; and Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses. Id. at 270-71. Overall, the Techni-eal/Management and Price/Cost factors were weighted approximately the same and, taken individually, were “significantly more important” than the Past Performance factor. Id. at 271. However, the Technieal/Management and Past Performance factors, when combined, were “more important” than the Price/ Cost factor. Id.
According to the Source Selection Plan, in evaluating the proposals, the Army planned to assign adjectival ratings to each of the elements in the Technieal/Management factor reflecting the extent that each proposal would “result in effective and efficient' performance” of the contract. Id. at 1435-38. An “outstanding” rating indicated complete confidence in that result, a “highly satisfactory” rating indicated high confidence in that result, a “satisfactory” rating indicated reasonable confidence in that result, a “marginal” rating indicated that the proposal might have that result, and an “unsatisfactory” rating indicated that the proposal was unlikely to have that result. Id.; see also id. at 1436 (noting that an “outstanding” rating for the Labor element reflected complete confidence
A Technical Evaluation Committee, appointed by the Source Selection Authority, would evaluate the offerors’ proposals. Id. at 1428, 1431. The committee consisted of personnel with “a blend of technical, operational, and acquisition skills” who could provide “a thorough evaluation of the contractor technical proposals in accordance with the [SOW] and [the] source selection plan.” Id. at 1428. Per the Source Selection Plan, the committee’s findings were to be the basis for the source selection decision. Id. at 1432. Neither the Technical Evaluation Committee nor the Source Selection Authority were permitted to adjust those findings so that they would better fit an adjectival rating definition. Id.
Three elements of the Technieal/Management factor are of particular importance in this protest. The first of these is the Labor element. To assist in the Army’s evaluation, offerors were required to provide the following information in their proposals:
(a) The labor mix (i.e. job categories and hours assumed for each) for the SOW as a whole.
(b) Minimum and proposed levels of education, training and experience.
(c) ... [E]ach labor category and number of employees per category utilized to calculate the proposed direct labor dol-lars____
(d) ... [A] statement of minimum job qualifieations/standards for each labor category proposed____
(e) ... [R]esumes for each individual proposed for the following labor categories (or related contractor category). For individuals not presently employed, letters of commitment shall be included.
(a) Base/Program Manager
(b) Target System Supervisor/Leader
(c) Mechanic
(d) Avionics Technician
(e) TTCS Operator and Remote Control Supervisor
Id. at 267. The offerors were also required to report “the total number of personnel proposed” for each labor category described in the RFP, the total number of personnel proposed for labor categories other than the ones described in the RFP, and “the total number of personnel proposed to perform the requirements of the SOW.” Id. In evaluating the Labor element, the Army would examine “[e]vidence of the availability of sufficient personnel with the required skills, experience, and of the proposed labor mix to assure effective and efficient performance.” Id. at 270.
Also of importance are two elements of the Management subfaetor. Under the Management Approach element, the offerors were required to describe their plan “for organizing, staffing, directing and controlling the work to be performed,” id. at 268, and would be evaluated for the “overall efficacy” of their proposed approaches, id. at 271. Under the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element, the offer-ors were required to submit a participation plan for such businesses, id. at 268, and would be evaluated on the extent of such businesses’ participation, including, among other things, the extent that such businesses were explicitly identified, id. at 271.
The RFP provided that the contract would be subject to the Service Contract Act of 1965. Id. at 237 (incorporating Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 52.222-41). Accordingly, the successful offeror would be required to pay its service employees performing under the contract a minimum amount of wages and fringe benefits, as specified in the relevant wage determination. FAR 52.222-41(c)(l). The relevant wage determination for the contract was identified in the RFP, which set forth FAR 52.222-42, Statement of Equivalent Rates for Federal
Kratos and Local Lodge 2515 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers executed the CBA in June 2010, and it was to remain in effect from April 2010 to April 2013. Id. at 138, 164-65. On August 5, 2010, Kratos, which earlier that morning had received notice that the Army intended to extend its contract by five or six months, provided a copy of the CBA to the Army. Id. at 1393, 1423. Thus, on September 9, 2010, the Army issued Amendment 3 to the RFP to substitute a reference to a new wage determination, amending the relevant clause in the RFP to provide: “Reference Wage Determination No. 10-0110, Revision 1, Dated 8/17/2010.” Id. at 125-26, 237. The new wage determination, which was made an attachment to the RFP, provided that in accordance with the Service Contract Act, “employees employed by the contraetor(s) in performing services covered by the collective bargaining agreement(s) [were] to be paid wage rates and fringe benefits set forth in the current collective bargaining agreement and modified extension agreement(s).” Id. at 137. The CBA was included as part of the new wage determination. Id. at 138-66. Then, approximately two weeks after issuing Amendment 3, the Army issued Amendment 4 to the RFP, specifying that revision 13 of Wage Determination 05-2512, dated June 21, 2010, would apply to those labor categories not covered by the newly substituted wage determination. Id. at 167-68. The Army, in changing the wage determinations applicable to the contract in Amendments 3 and 4, did not change any related proposal requirements or evaluation criteria. Id. at 126, 168. It did, however, allow the offerors to submit revised proposals. Id.
B. Initial Evaluation of Proposals
Three offerors-SA-TECH, Kratos, and [... ]—submitted proposals in response to the original RFP and revised proposals in response to Amendments 3 and 4. Id. at 1999-2000. Upon evaluating Kratos’s proposal, the Technical Evaluation Committee assigned ratings of “outstanding” for the Teehnical/Management factor, both of its subfaetors, the Labor element, and the Management Approach element, and a rating of “highly satisfactory” for the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element. Id. at 1765-68. For [... ] proposal, the committee assigned ratings of “highly satisfactory” for the Technieal/Man-agement factor, the Technical subfactor, and the Labor element, and “outstanding” for the Management subfactor and all of its elements. Id. at 1769-72. And, with respect to SA-TECH’s proposal, the committee assigned ratings of “satisfactory” for the Tech-nieal/Management factor and the Technical subfaetor, and “outstanding” for the Management subfactor and all of its elements. Id. at 1775-78. The two “satisfactory” ratings for SA-TECH’s proposal were based on a “marginal” rating for the Labor element, due to the committee’s concerns about the lack of resumes and lack of demonstrated experience on certain Targets Management Office (“TMO”) operational systems. Id. at 1776-77. The committee recommended a discussion issue for SA-TECH related to these concerns. Id. at 1774.
Based on the findings of the Technical Evaluation Committee, past performance evaluations, and the total price proposed by each of the offerors, all three offerors were included in the competitive range. Id. at 1494-97. Subsequently, the Army sent discussion issues to each offeror. Id. at 2000. SA-TECH, in response to its discussion issues, supplied the missing resumes and explained the extent to which its “proposed personnel [had] demonstrated experience with all the TMO target systems or other closely related sub-scale aerial target systems.” Id. at 1299-1300. After discussions were closed, the Army requested final proposal revisions from the offerors. Id. at 193-94.
The Technical Evaluation Committee reviewed the submitted final proposal revisions and announced its findings in a Final Evaluation Report. Id. at 2000. Based on SA-TECH’s discussion responses, the committee increased SA-TECH’s Technical/Management factor, Technical subfactor, and Labor element ratings to “outstanding.” Id. at 1373-74. In its evaluation of SA-TECH’s proposal’s Labor element, the committee’s analysis included the following:
[...]
Id. at 1374-75. The committee made no adjustments to the “outstanding” rating it assigned to Kratos’s proposal for the Labor element.
In its evaluation of the proposals under the Management subfactor, the Technical Evaluation Committee discussed the individual proposed by the offerors to serve as the base manager.
[•••]
Id. at 1375. For Kratos’s proposal, it remarked:
[.•■]
Id. at 863. The committee assigned “outstanding” ratings to both SA-TECH and Kratos for the Management subfactor. Id. at 863, 1375. Finally, for the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element, the Technical Evaluation Committee continued to rate SA-TECH’s proposal as “outstanding” and Kratos’s proposal as “highly satisfactory.” Id. at 864, 1376.
D. Source Selection Decision and Contract Award
After the Technical Evaluation Committee submitted its Final Evaluation Report, the Source Selection Authority prepared a Source Selection Decision Memorandum. Id. at 1999-2000. Based on “the factors and sub-factors established in the subject solicitation,” her “integrated assessment of the proposals submitted in response to the solicitation,” and her “review of the applicable facts and the collective judgment, recommendations, and evaluations performed by the Technical Evaluation Committee,” the Source Selection Authority concluded that SA-TECH’s proposal provided “the best overall value to satisfy the Army’s need.” Id. at 1999. She then set forth, in great detail, her evaluation of the proposals.
As part of her evaluation, the Source Selection Authority described the Army’s adjectival ratings for each subfaetor and element under the Technical/Management factor.
The Source Selection Authority’s adjectival ratings were accompanied by narrative comments. Of importance here are certain comments she provided for three of the elements under the Technical/Management factor. For the Labor element, she discussed the experience of the personnel proposed for the contract. Addressing Kratos’s proposal, she remarked: “As the incumbent contractor, Kratos/WSS has inherent advantages,
[...]
Id. at 2005-06.
Also of importance are the Source Selection Authority’s comments regarding the Management Approach element. For both SA-TECH and Kratos, she reiterated the Technical Evaluation Committee’s comments concerning the proposed base managers. Id. at 2007, 2009. And, in her comments on the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element, she summarized the findings of the Office of Small Business Programs and assigned “satisfactory” ratings to both proposals. Id. at 2007-OS, 2010. In particular, with respect to SA-TECH’s proposal, she noted that SA-TECH did not specifically identify any small, minority, or disadvantaged businesses, but found that this failure was offset by its proposal to have such businesses perform specified services and provide specified materials. Id. at 2010.
After discussing the offerors’ proposals, the Source Selection Authority engaged in a tradeoff analysis. Id. at 2013-14. She concluded that there were “no meaningful distinctions between the non-cost portions of the proposals____” Id. at 2013. Expanding on her conclusion, she indicated that SA-TECH had a minor weakness in the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element and that Kratos was the only offeror with no weaknesses. Id. Then, with respect to the experience levels of the personnel proposed by SA-TECH and Kratos, she explained:
[•••]
Id. at 2014. She further remarked that “SA-TECH proposed to maximize efficiency and workforce productivity” through the supplementation of contract personnel with personnel from its other contracts and that SA-TECH’s approach was “geared towards creating a more productive, cost-effective workforce at an overall lower cost to the Government.” Id. Accordingly, the Source Selection Authority determined that the “priee/eost advantages of SA-TECH’s proposal out-weighted] the possibility of a learning curve impact,” id. at 2013, and concluded:
Based on the evaluation criteria and basis for award, SA-TECH’s overall outstanding technical/management rating and the lowest proposed/evaluated price/eost[ ] provides the Government with complete confidence for an effective and efficient performance with a low degree of risk.
Therefore, [SA-TECH] is determined to offer the best value to the Government for the base and all options, in the amount of $26,980,807.
Id. The Army awarded the contract to SA-TECH on February 1, 2011, and notified the unsuccessful offerors that same day. Id. at 1501-06. The award notification letters disclosed the contract award price, which was the price offered by SA-TECH in its final proposal revision. Id. at 1504, 1506. The letters also revealed the adjectival ratings for the proposals of both the unsuccessful offeror and SA-TECH for the Technical/Management subfactors and Past Performance factor. Id. Thus, Kratos discovered SA-TECH’s proposed price and that both Kra-tos’s and SA-TECH’s proposals received “outstanding” ratings for the Technical/ Management subfactors and a “low” rating for the Past Performance factor. Id. at 1504.
E. Kratos’s GAO Protest
Upon its timely request, Kratos received a debriefing from the Army regarding the contract award on February 17, 2011. Id. at 1509. Five days later, Kratos filed a protest with the GAO. Id. at 1508. It argued that the Army, by issuing Amendment 3, added a new requirement to the RFP, in that offerors were required to propose a labor mix in compliance with the CBA Id. at 1510. It alleged that the Army failed to consider the offerors’ compliance with the CBA when evaluating their proposed labor mixes and that SA-TECH should have received a lower Technical/Management rating than Kratos because SA-TECH, which did not submit any resumes or letters of commitment from members of the union, could not have pro
The Army requested that the GAO dismiss Kratos’s protest, arguing generally that Amendment 3 did not contain any language indicating that it substantively changed the RFP to mandate the labor categories or purported labor mix set forth in the CBA. Id. at 1779. It offered three specific grounds for dismissal. Id. at 1781-83. First, it contended that the protest was untimely because Kratos alleged a defect in the RFP introduced by an amendment, and prospective offerors alleging such a defect must file a protest before the proposal due date following the incorporation of the amendment. Id. at 1781-82. Second, it asserted that Kratos was not an interested party because Kratos was not the next offeror in line to receive the contract if the GAO sustained the protest. Id. at 1782. Third, it argued that Kratos did not state a valid ground for protest because Amendment 3 did not introduce a new requirement into the RFP. Id. at 1782-83.
After reviewing the Army’s dismissal request, the GAO attorney assigned to the protest found that the Army’s interested party argument lacked merit. Id. at 1915. Then, with respect to the Army’s other two arguments, he stated:
If the solicitation mandated that offerors adopt the labor mix contained in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the protester has timely protested that the agency failed to evaluate offerors in accordance with that requirement. However, if the solicitation does not contain the requirement that offerors adopt the labor mix contained in the CBA, then the agency is correct that the allegation that the agency failed to evaluate proposals on whether they satisfied that nonexistent requirement does not state a valid basis of protest.
Id.
Kratos responded to the Army’s dismissal request, advancing two arguments. Id. at 1916. First, it asserted that its protest was timely because it was not contending that the RFP was ambiguous, but that the RFP contained a requirement ignored by the Army. Id. Second, it argued that it met the minimum standard for protest: that its grounds were legally sufficient. Id. at 1917. The GAO attorney ultimately denied the Army’s request for dismissal, without elaboration. Id. at 1920. The day after the denial, SA-TECH requested permission to intervene in the protest and the entry of a protective order. Id. at 1660.
The Army issued a stop-work order on the contract on March 22, 2011. Id. at 1667. Thereafter, it provided the GAO, Kratos, and SA-TECH with the required agency report, which included a statement from the contracting officer, a legal memorandum, and documents related to the procurement such as the Technical Evaluation Committee’s Final Evaluation Report and the Source Selection Decision Memorandum. Id. at 1921, 1971-73. The principal argument advanced by the Army was that the CBA “did not contain a labor skill mix, but rather a handful of labor categories and prevailing rates,” and was only added to the RFP “to provide prevailing wage rates,” not to change the RFP’s “evaluation criteria____” Id. It therefore requested that the GAO deny the protest. Id. at 1923.
After receiving the Army’s report, the GAO attorney advised the parties that he was “dubious that the labor mix required under the CBA was incorporated into the RFP, but if Amendment 3 created a patent ambiguity, then the protest [was] likely untimely, and [the GAO] would not reach the merits of the allegations.” Id. at 1939. The GAO attorney invited SA-TECH and Kratos to address the issue in their comments on the Army’s report. Id.
SA-TECH responded to the Army’s report on April 4, 2011, contending that Kratos incorrectly interpreted Amendment 3 to incorporate the CBA into the RFP. Id. at 1670. Amendment 3, SA-TECH asserted, merely referenced the new wage determination and underlying CBA to establish minimum wage and fringe benefit amounts for certain, specified labor categories. Id. SA-TECH argued that the protest was both untimely and mer-itless, and that Kratos did not demonstrate any competitive prejudice. Id. at 1671. It therefore requested that the GAO dismiss or deny the protest. Id. at 1670.
After receiving and reviewing the responses to the Army’s report, the GAO attorney informed the parties on April 7, 2011, that he was “interested in whether, in light of the protester’s challenges to the agency’s technical evaluation, the agency [was] more inclined to continue to defend the protest or take corrective action.” Id. at 1940. Upon SA-TECH’s inquiry, he explained that he intended “to suggest ... that, on the face of it, the protester offer[ed] a straight forward argument as to why the agency’s evaluation of the technical portions of the proposals was unreasonable.” Id. at 1941. He elaborated that based on his experience, “an early indication of that assessment ... [could] assist an agency in determining appropriate next steps,” and that while some agencies proceeded to successfully defend their awards, “more frequently,” agencies “shared [the GAO’s] concern and responded accordingly.” Id.
SA-TECH responded to Kratos’s supplemental protest on April 11, 2011. Id. at 1944. It contended that the supplemental protest actually contained two new grounds—the Army’s alleged improper evaluation of proposals and the Army’s purported conversion of a best-value procurement into a lower-price, technically acceptable procurement. Id. at 1944^15. It then advanced four arguments. First, it argued that the supplemental protest in its entirety was untimely because Kratos knew the factual basis of its new allegations more than ten days before it asserted them in response to the Army’s report. Id. at 1945. It also contended that Kratos was not an interested party with respect to its allegation that the Army improperly evaluated the proposals because Kratos was not next in line for contract award. Id. at 1945-46. Third, it asserted that Kratos’s allegation that the Army improperly converted the protest was based on pure speculation. Id. at 1944,1946. Finally, it argued that Kratos did not plead or establish competitive prejudice with respect to either aspect of its supplemental protest. Id. SA-TECH therefore requested that the GAO dismiss the supplemental protest. Id. at 1962.
Later that day, the GAO attorney invited Kratos to respond to SA-TECH’s dismissal request and the Army to respond “only” to Kratos’s April 4, 2011 comments regarding the initial protest. Id. at 1974. In its response, the Army reiterated its position that the protest should be denied. Id. at 1991-93.
In an April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message sent to all of the parties, the GAO attorney addressed Kratos’s supplemental protest:
The agency rated the awardee Outstanding under the Labor element____ This rating seems unreasonable, given the definition of Outstanding and the concerns expressed by the agency.
We need not resolve the issue of whether that evaluation was reasonable or whether the protester timely challenged it, given the deficiencies in the source selection decision memorandum. The [memorandum] stated that “there are no meaningful distinctions between the non-cost portions of the proposals.” To substantiate this claim the [memorandum] recounted as follows: The main difference between the two of-ferors was that the protester had the incumbent work force under its employ and proposed them; the now-awardee “miti-gat[ed]” this advantage [...] personnel and by stating that they have a [...] on newly awarded contracts. These statements do not accurately reflect the agency’s final evaluation report, which, in often-quot[ed] language, says that the awardee [... ] but there is no guarantee of success, as evidenced by the lack of letters of commitment, and goes on to express considerable concern with the awardee’s proposal. The source selection fails to acknowledge and appreciate the concerns expressed in the evaluation of the Labor element, which serves as a key discriminator between the proposals. That the two proposals were rated the same for this element is highly irrelevant; regardless of ratings, the source selection must look behind those ratings to consider the distinctions uncovered in the evaluation. This source selection document fails to do that.
Had the agency said, we recognize the value of incumbency and the advantage of the reduced risk in the incumbent’s proposal, but that advantage is not worth the premium over the awardee’s proposal, we would in all likelihood deny a challenge to the best value trade-ojf. Those are not the facts here. Here, the agency denied that there were proposal discriminators—documented in its evaluation—and there was a trade-off to be made between, on the one hand, an incumbent who guaranteed to deliver an experienced work force, and, on the other, a lower-priced offeror who did not and about whom the agency expressed reservations. We would likely sustain the protest on that ground.
Id. at 1995 (third alteration in the original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
F. Proposed Corrective Action
The Army initially responded to the electronic-mail message that same day, indicating that the GAO attorney’s “discussion” was “clear” and that it did not anticipate “requesting] outcome prediction.” SAR 1. Then, in a letter dated April 22, 2011, the Army informed the GAO that it intended to take corrective action:
On February 22, 2011, Kratos ... filed their initial protest challenging the Army’s award to [SA-TECH] for aerial target flight operations and maintenance services. The initial protest alleged that the Army should have evaluated the Teehnical/Man-agement Factor in accordance with the “labor mix” incorporated in Kratos’ [CBA]. On April 4, 2011, Kratos filed a supplemental protest alleging that the Army inappropriately rated SA-TECH’s Technical/Management proposal as Outstanding and converted the best value determina*702 tion into a low price/technically acceptable evaluation.
After a review of the supplemental issues, the Army has determined that it is in its best interest to take corrective action. The Army intends to terminate the contract awarded to SA-TECH so that it can reopen the original solicitation. The solicitation will then be amended to explain the intention of providing Kratos’ CBA in the solicitation. If after the amendment is issued [and] the offerors wish to, they may revise their technical and cost proposals. The technical and cost proposals will be evaluated and, if necessary, the Agency reserves the right to conduct discussions. A new source selection decision will then be executed and announced.
AR 1996-97. The Army therefore requested that the GAO dismiss Kratos’s protest. Id. at 1997. The GAO dismissed the protest on April 25, 2011.
SA-TECH filed this protest on May 4, 2011, challenging the Army’s proposed corrective action. In its first claim for relief, SA-TECH contends that the Army’s decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the decision is based on an electronic-mail message from a GAO attorney that is itself unreasonable. Compl. ¶¶ 69-79. Accordingly, it requests that the court declare that (1) the contents of the GAO attorney’s electronic-mail message and the Army’s decision to take corrective action in response to the message are “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to precedent, unwarranted, and overbroad” and (2) its contract with the Army is “valid and not subject to corrective action” based on the GAO protest. Id. ¶ 79. In its second claim for relief, SA-TECH contends that the Army’s proposed corrective action lacks a rational basis and involves a violation of law, regulation, or procedure. Id. ¶¶ 80-87. Accordingly, it requests that the court declare that (1) the Army’s decision to take corrective action is “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to precedent, unwarranted, and overbroad” and (2) its contract with the Army is “valid and not subject to corrective action____” Id. ¶ 87.
In addition, under both claims for relief, SA-TECH requests that the court enjoin the Army from terminating its contract with SA-TECH and taking further corrective action, whether it is the action proposed by the Army in its April 22, 2011 letter or some other corrective action. Id. ¶¶ 79, 87. And, in the event that the court concludes that corrective action is appropriate, SA-TECH requests that the court declare that the Army’s proposed amendment to the solicitation and invitation to submit revised proposals is “arbitrary and capricious, contrary to precedent, unwarranted, and overbroad” and enjoin the Army from amending the solicitation and inviting revised proposals. Id. The Army has stayed the implementation of its proposed corrective action pending this protest.
Now before the court are the United States’ and Kratos’s motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The court heard argument on the motions on August 3, 2011.
II. THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
As an initial matter, United States and Kratos contend that the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal Claims”) lacks jurisdiction to entertain SA-TECH’s protest, arguing that the court’s bid protest jurisdiction does not extend to claims related to a procuring agency’s proposed corrective action. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court generally assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in the plaintiffs favor. Henke v. United States,
A. The Court of Federal Claims Possesses Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) to Consider SA-TECH’s Protest
Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
The ability of this court to hear and decide suits against the United States is limited. “The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood,
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement ... without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after the contract is awarded.
Id. § 1491(b)(1).
SA-TECH contends that the court has jurisdiction to entertain its protest because it is “objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract ____” The court agrees. As an initial matter, the body of decisional law addressing challenges to a procuring agency’s corrective action reflect that the bid protest jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) should be broadly construed. Some of these decisions concern corrective action that the procuring agency actually implemented; in other words, the contract was suspended or terminated, or the competition was reopened. In each of these protests, the deciding court either found or assumed that the Court of Federal Claims possessed subject matter jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims possesses jurisdiction to resolve a broad range of disputes that may occur during the procurement process. On its face, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) grants the court the authority to consider both preaward and postaward bid protests, and within those two all-encompassing categories, its language is expansive. The court may entertain objections to a solicitation, objections to a proposed award, objections to an award, objections related to a statutory or regulatory violation in connection with a procurement, and objections related to a statutory or regulatory violation in connection with a proposed procurement. Moreover, when Congress enacted the ADRA, there is no question that its intent was to consolidate the bid protest jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts, after a four-year period, with the Court of Federal Claims’ preaward bid protest jurisdiction so that there would be but one judicial forum
In this case, SA-TECH, as the contract awardee, is challenging the Army’s decision to take corrective action. Even though SA-TECH filed suit before the Army acted on its plan to take corrective action by terminating SA-TECH’s contract and reopening competition, there is no dispute that, absent this suit, the Army would proceed with its plan. The jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) applies to the entire procurement process. See Res. Conservation Grp., LLC,
The counterarguments advanced by the opposing parties are not persuasive. Both the United States and Kratos argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate SA-TECH’s challenge of the Army’s decision to terminate their contract because such a claim must be brought under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”). SA-TECH, however, is not merely challenging the Army’s plan to terminate its contract; rather, it is challenging the entire scope of the Army’s decision to take corrective action. The inclusion of contract termination as part of that plan does not divest the court of its bid protest jurisdiction. See Roxco, Ltd.,
B. Justiciability
In addition to urging that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain SA-TECH’s protest, the United States seeks the dismissal of SA-TECH’s protest as nonjusticiable for lack of standing and as not ripe for judicial review. The court’s jurisdictional and justiciability inquiries are distinct. Baker v. Carr,
1. SA-TECH Has Standing to Protest
“[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin,
“The standing issue in this case is framed by 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), which ... imposes more stringent standing requirements than Article III.” Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States,
There are two tests for demonstrating a direct economic interest. In the preaward context, a protester must show “a ‘non-trivial competitive injury which can be addressed by judicial relief.’” Weeks Marine, Inc.,
The United States argues that SA-TECH lacks standing to pursue its protest because “SA-TECH has yet to suffer any injury of any kind” and cannot “demonstrate a ‘direct economic interest’ in the Army’s decision because no final contract award has been made, and SA-TECH continues to maintain the award and may ultimately retain the contract.” Def.’s Mot. 16. The United States’ position cannot be sustained. SA-TECH unquestionably meets the first prong of the standing test because, as the current contract awardee, there is little doubt that it would be forced to compete for the contract for a second time once the Army reopens the competition—an action the Army intends to take, as represented to the GAO and this court. SA-TECH has also shown, under the second prong, that it has a direct economic interest in the reopening of competition and reaward of the contract, regardless
Furthermore, in almost every decision in which the standing of a contract awardee to protest a procuring agency’s corrective action was addressed, the court has concluded that the protester had standing. See, e.g., Jacobs Tech. Inc.,
2. SA-TECH’s Protest Is Ripe for Judicial Review
The United States also contends that SA-TECH’s protest is not ripe for judicial review.
In determining whether a claim is ripe for judicial review, courts must “evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs.,
The United States argues the SA-TECH has failed to satisfy the first prong of the ripeness test because the Army’s decision to take corrective action does not constitute a final agency action. More particularly, it contends that the Army’s decision to take corrective action will not be fully consummated unless and until the Army reawards the contract to an offeror other than SA-TECH and that no legal consequences flow from the Army’s decision to take corrective action because SA-TECH remains the contract awardee. With respect to the second prong, the United States asserts that SA-TECH would suffer hardship only if the Army awarded the contract to another offeror. The court is not convinced by the United States’ arguments.
The Army’s decision to take corrective action was memorialized in an April 22, 2011 letter to the GAO, in which it indicated that it had reviewed the supplemental protest and declared that it was “in its best interest to take corrective action.” AR 1996. This declaration is not tentative or interlocutory in nature. Rather, the Army represented that upon review of the protest lodged by Kratos, it would take corrective action. There is no indication that the Army would do anything other than what it proposed. In fact, the Army considered its decision to be final, as reflected by its specific request to the GAO that it dismiss Kratos’s protest because the proposed corrective action rendered the protest moot. Defense counsel subsequently confirmed at oral argument that the Army’s decision to take corrective action remains unchanged. He explained that if the court dismissed the protest as unripe, the Army would proceed with its plan of corrective action, terminating its contract with SA-TECH and reopening the competition.
SA-TECH has also demonstrated that the Army’s decision to take corrective action has caused a severe and immediate impact on its business. SA-TECH, the current contract awardee, has been unable to proceed with work under the contract, depriving it of the income it expected to receive. In addition, the Army’s proposed corrective action will result in the termination of its contract and require it to expend additional resources to reeompete for that same contract. Furthermore, now that SA-TECH’s contract price is in the public domain, SA-TECH will not only have to compete against the unsuccessful of-ferors, it will also have to compete against itself. Thus, if SA-TECH is successful in being awarded the contract for the second time, it will undoubtedly be under far less favorable terms. Clearly, withholding judicial review of the Army’s decision to take corrective action would create a hardship for SA-TECH.
The court’s conclusion that SA-TECH’s protest is ripe for review is in accord with other decisions addressing the issue.
III. THE PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Each party has filed a motion for judgment on the administrative record pursuant to RCFC 52.1, urging the court to enter judgment in its favor. In ruling on such motions, “the court asks whether, given all the disputed and undisputed facts, a party has met its burden of proof based on the evidence in the record.” A & D Fire Prot.,
A. The Army’s Decision to Take Corrective Action Constitutes a Significant Error in the Procurement Process
As previously noted, SA-TECH alleges three general grounds for its protest. First, it contends that the Army’s decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the decision was based on an electronic-mail message from a GAO attorney that is itself unreasonable. Second, it asserts that the Army’s proposed corrective action, standing on its own, lacks a rational basis and involves a violation of law, regulation, or procedure. Third, it avers that even if the decision to take corrective action is appropriate, the corrective action proposed by the Army is overly broad. The court concludes that SA-TECH’s first two protest grounds have merit.
In a bid protest, the Court of Federal Claims reviews the challenged agency action pursuant to the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4). Although section 706 contains several standards, “the proper standard to be applied in bid protest eases is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A): a reviewing court shall set aside the agency action if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ ” Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States,
Procurement officials “are entitled to exercise discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them in the procurement process.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi,
1. The Army’s Reliance on the GAO Attorney’s April 20, 2011 Electronic-Mail Message Renders Its Decision to Take Corrective Action Irrational
The first protest ground asserted by plaintiff—that the Army’s decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the decision is based on an electronic-mail message from a GAO attorney that is itself unreasonable—raises two threshold issues: was the Army’s decision to take corrective action premised on the GAO
To answer the first question, the court looks to the timeline of events reflected in the administrative record. Kratos lodged its supplemental protest on April 4, 2011. On April 7, 2011, the GAO attorney informed the parties that in light of the supplemental protest, he was interested in whether the Army would continue to oppose the protest or take corrective action. Then, on April 11, 2011, the GAO attorney invited the Army to respond to comments made by Kratos about its initial protest, but specifically requested that the Army not respond to Kratos’s supplemental protest. The Army complied with the request; its response did not address Kra-tos’s supplemental protest. On April 20, 2011, in the electronic-mail message at issue, the GAO attorney conveyed his impressions of Kratos’s supplemental protest. In a response sent that same day, the Army indicated that it understood the GAO attorney’s position. Then, on April 22, 2011, the Army informed the GAO and the other parties that, after reviewing the supplemental protest, it had decided to take corrective action. The Army’s April 22, 2011 letter constituted its first formal response to Kratos’s supplemental protest.
The timeline suggests two possible scenarios. One possibility is that the Army had been considering how to respond to the supplemental protest for more than two weeks, ie., from the time that it was first advanced by Kratos, and that its April 22, 2011 letter was the culmination of its deliberations. The fact that the Army did not address the merits of the supplemental protest before April 22, 2011, supports this scenario, as does the Army’s failure to mention the GAO attorney’s electronic-mail message in its letter. The other possibility is that the position taken by the Army in its April 22, 2011 letter was prompted by the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message. The brief period of time—two days—between the message and the letter supports this scenario. Given the ambiguity regarding the true basis of the Army’s decision to take corrective action, the court finds it reasonable to assume that the decision was based, at least in part, on the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message.
Assuming that the Army based its decision to take corrective action on the impressions conveyed by the GAO attorney in his electronic-mail message, the court must next determine whether it can review the message in the same way it reviews a formal GAO decision recommending corrective action. This appears to be an issue of first impression.
There is no question that a court, in deciding the propriety of a procuring agency’s implementation of corrective action recommended by the GAO, may review whether the GAO’s recommendation was itself rational. See Honeywell, Inc. v. United States,
In the present case, there is no formal GAO decision sustaining Kratos’s protest and recommending corrective action. Rather, there are only the informal and non-final impressions of the GAO attorney, expressed in an electronic-mail message, indicating that the GAO would likely sustain Kratos’s supplemental protest. Nevertheless, the court has a broad mandate to entertain bid protests and review government procurement decisions. If a procuring agency takes an action that is challenged in this court, this court has the responsibility to examine the basis for the agency’s action, regardless of what that basis might be. In other words, when determining the propriety of a procuring agency’s decision to take corrective action, the court may review the rationality of, as appropriate, the underlying formal GAO decision containing a recommendation that the agency take such action or the underlying informal suggestion by the GAO, or any other entity or individual, that such action might be proper. Thus, the court concludes that because the Army relied upon the GAO attorney’s electronic-mail message in deciding to take corrective action, and only because the Army relied upon the message, it may review the message to determine whether it was rational.
The threshold issues thus resolved, the court turns to the substance of the GAO attorney’s electronic-mail message. In his message, the GAO attorney reaches two conclusions. First, he opines that the GAO “need not resolve the issue of whether ... the protester timely challenged” the Army’s evaluation of proposals. Second, he indicates that the GAO would likely sustain Kratos’s protest due to deficiencies in the source selection decision. Both of these conclusions are irrational.
The GAO is empowered to entertain protests “concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or regulation” so long as the protests are filed in accordance with the governing statutes. 31 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2006). These statutes require the GAO to establish procedures for the “expeditious” resolution of the protests. Id. § 3555(a). Under this authority, the GAO adopted a regulation providing that the GAO “shall” dismiss a protest that is not timely filed, 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(e) (2011), unless it determines that the protest “raises issues significant to the procurement system” or finds that “good cause” exists to consider the protest, id. § 21.2(c). In other words, except under limited circumstances, the GAO may not entertain untimely protests because they are not filed in accordance with the governing statutes. The GAO’s own decisions support this conclusion. See, e.g., Patricia A. Thompson-Agency Tender Official, B-310910.4, 2009 CPD ¶ 24 (Comp.Gen. Jan. 22, 2009) (“Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict rules requiring timely submission of protests____ [T]he protest is untimely and, therefore, must be dismissed.”); Goel Servs., Inc., B-310822.2, 2008 CPD ¶ 99 (Comp.Gen. May 23, 2008) (“Our timeliness rules reflect the dual requirements of giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process. In order to prevent these rules from becoming meaningless, exceptions are strictly construed and rarely used. The ‘good cause’ exception is limited to circumstances where some compelling reason beyond the protester’s control prevents the protester from filing a timely protest. The significant issue exception is limited to untimely protests that raise issues of widespread interest to the procurement community, and which have not been considered on the merits in a prior decision.” (citations omitted)); Comet, Inc., B-270330 et al, 96-1 CPD ¶ 189 (Comp.Gen. Feb. 28, 1996) (noting that the protest regulations require the dismissal of untimely protests and dismissing supplemental protest grounds as untimely).
Here, the GAO attorney asserted that the GAO “need not” consider the timeli
The GAO attorney’s analysis of the Army’s evaluation of proposals suffers the same fate. In the Source Selection Decision Memorandum, the Source Selection Authority reported the findings from the Army’s evaluation and concluded that there were “no meaningful distinctions” among the noncost elements of the proposals. AR 2013. The Source Selection Authority acknowledged, however, that the proposals submitted by Kratos and SA-TECH were not identical: “[T]he main difference between the two offerors is that, as the incumbent, Kratos/WSS has the personnel with the specific TMO experience in their current employment and has proposed these employees for the follow-on ATFS requirement.” Id. at 2014. She then explained how SA-TECH’s proposal mitigated those differences.
[...]
Id. In other words, she most assuredly compared the ability of Kratos, as the incumbent contractor, to supply personnel with specific experience with SA-TECH’s proposal to supply personnel with general experience coupled with a plan to mitigate its failure to propose personnel with specific experience. She then concluded that the “price/cost advantages of SA-TECH’s proposal out-weighted] the possibility of a learning curve impact.” Id. at 2013. It is readily apparent that the Source Selection Authority, upon comparing the proposals of Kratos and SA-TECH, clearly determined that the two proposals were not meaningfully distinct in the area of personnel experience and concluded that the benefit to the Army of SA-TECH’s lower price was worth the possibility that some of SA-TECH’s employees would lack specific experience. Her conclusion is entitled to deference.
The GAO attorney did not afford the proper deference to the Army’s source selection decision. In fact, his electronic-mail message demonstrates that he completely misread the decision. He wrote:
*715 The source selection fails to acknowledge and appreciate the concerns expressed in the evaluation of the Labor element, which serves as a key discriminator between the proposals. That the two proposals were rated the same for this element is highly irrelevant; regardless of ratings, the source selection must look behind those ratings to consider the distinctions uncovered in the evaluation. This source selection document fails to do that.
Had the agency said, we recognize the value of incumbency and the advantage of the reduced risk in the incumbent’s proposal, but that advantage is not worth the premium over the awardee’s proposal, we would in all likelihood deny a challenge to the best value trade-off. Those are not the facts here. Here, the agency denied that there were proposal discriminators—documented in its evaluation—and there was a trade-off to be made between, on the one hand, an incumbent who guaranteed to deliver an experienced work force, and, on the other, a lower-priced offeror who did not and about whom the agency expressed reservations.
AR 1995. First, contrary to the GAO attorney’s observations, the Source Selection Authority did “acknowledge and appreciate the concerns” of the Technical Evaluation Committee regarding the experience of SATE CH’s proposed workforce; she set forth those concerns in her decision and explained that SA-TECH had sufficiently mitigated those concerns. The Source Selection Authority also “look[ed] behind [the] ratings to consider the distinctions” identified by the Technical Evaluation Committee; she both described the distinctions and explained why those distinctions were not meaningful. Third, despite the GAO attorney’s representations, the Source Selection Authority “ree-ognize[d] the value of incumbency” and concluded that the value of incumbency was not worth the price premium—in the Source Selection Decision Memorandum she acknowledged that Kratos, as the incumbent contractor, had personnel with specific experience and explained that the cost advantage of SA-TECH’s proposal outweighed the lack of specific experience of its proposed personnel. Fourth, the Source Selection Authority acknowledged the distinctions between the proposals of Kratos and SA-TECH, finding them not to be meaningful; she did not, as the GAO attorney stated, “den[y] that there were proposal discriminators[.]” Finally, contrary to the GAO attorney’s assertion, the Source Selection Authority described both a tradeoff between Kratos’s incumbency and SA-TECH’s mitigation efforts and a tradeoff between the proposed prices and the relative experience levels of the proposed personnel. All of these errors suggest that instead of applying the necessary amount of deference, the GAO attorney was substituting his judgment for that of the Army. He may not do so. Turner Constr. Co.,
Because the GAO attorney improperly declared that the timeliness of Kratos’s protest was irrelevant and completely misconstrued the Source Selection Decision Memorandum, the contents of the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message are irrational. As a result, to the extent that the Army’s decision to take corrective action is based upon the message, it lacks a rational basis and is therefore arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
2. The Army’s Decision to Take Corrective Action Is Irrational and Unlawful
Although it is reasonable to assume that the Army’s decision to take corrective action was based upon the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message, the administrative record also supports the possibility that the Army’s decision was not prompted by the message, but instead reflects a conclusion arrived at independently, after an analysis of Kratos’s supplemental protest. To the extent that the Army did not rely on the electronic-mail message, the court analyzes the Army’s decision to take corrective action as it would any other procurement decision and determines whether the decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court will thus
a. The Army’s Decision to Take Corrective Action Lacks a Rational Basis
The court first addresses whether the Army’s decision to take corrective action in this case has a rational basis. As with all procurement decisions, an agency has broad discretion to take necessary corrective action. See Jacobs Tech. Inc.,
The Army’s decision to take corrective action in this ease is set forth in one document: its April 22, 2011 letter to the GAO. The court's review of the Army’s decision is therefore limited to the rationale supplied in that letter. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
Kratos alleged in its initial protest that the Army, by issuing Amendment 3, required the offerors to propose a labor mix in compliance with the CBA and that the Army failed to consider the offerors’ compliance with the CBA when evaluating their proposed labor mixes. However, there is no basis for Kra-tos’s interpretation of Amendment 3, as consistently argued by the Army and suggested by the GAO attorney. The original RFP indicated that the successful offeror would be required to pay its employees a minimum amount of wages and fringe benefits, and that the relevant wage and fringe benefit amounts were described in the specified wage determination. After the Army and the incumbent contractor’s employees agreed to a CBA, the Army issued Amendment 3 to substitute a new wage determination as the relevant source for minimum wage and fringe benefit amounts for specified labor categories, and Amendment 4 to provide a source for minimum wage and fringe benefit amounts for proposed employees not covered by the new wage determination. There is no indication in Amendment 3 that the Army intended to do anything other than change the minimum wage and fringe benefit amounts that the successful offeror would be required to pay its employees; the sections of the RFP describing the proposal requirements and evaluation criteria were not amended.
That the CBA was included as part of the new wage determination does not alter the analysis; the purpose of the new wage determination was clearly identified as providing minimum wage and fringe benefit amounts that the successful offeror would be required to pay its employees. Moreover, the Service Contract Act does not require successor contractors to comply with any provision of a predecessor’s CBA other than the wage and fringe benefit provisions. See 29 C.F.R. § 4.163(a) (2009) (“The obligation of the successor contractor is limited to the wage and fringe benefit requirements of the predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement and does not extend to other items such as seniority, grievance procedures, work rules, overtime, etc.”). Thus, the Army’s decision to take corrective action in response to Kratos’s initial protest concerning Amendment 3 to the RFP is irrational.
In its supplemental protest, Kratos alleged that by assigning “outstanding” ratings to each factor for each proposal, the Army converted what was supposed to be a best-value determination into a lower-price, technically acceptable evaluation. It expressed particular concern with the Army’s assignment of an “outstanding” rating to SA-TECH’s proposal for the Labor element, an “outstanding” rating to SA-TECH’s proposal for the Management subfactor, and a purported “outstanding” rating to SA-TECH’s proposal for the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element in light of the Technical Evaluation Committee’s comments in its Final Evaluation Report and the Source Selection Authority’s comments in the Source Selection Decision Memorandum. As noted above, the Army has broad discretion to determine which proposal represents the best value to the government. See Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
As an initial matter, the Technical Evaluation Committee was entitled to apply its experience and expertise and assign favorable
Nevertheless, Kratos contends for the first time in its reply that the Source Selection Authority deviated from the Technical Evaluation Committee’s findings “to justify higher adjective definitions [sic]” in violation of the Source Selection Plan. Kratos’s Reply 28-29. Although the court does not look favorably on arguments first raised in a reply, Novosteel SA v. United States,
Accordingly, the Technical Evaluation Committee and the Source Selection Authority, in evaluating SA-TECH’s proposal, were empowered to assign an “outstanding” rating for the Labor element even though they reported some concerns with the experience level of SA-TECH’s proposed personnel. Such a rating meant that notwithstanding the noted concerns, the Technical Evaluation Committee and Source Selection Authority had complete confidence that SA-TECH could effectively and efficiently perform the work under the contract with its proposed labor mix, directly charged hours, and personnel. They could also assign an “outstanding” rating to SA-TECH’s proposal for the Management subfactor even though SA-TECH’s proposed [... ] lacked the same amount of experience as the [... ] proposed by Kratos, a rating that meant that despite the noted concerns, they had complete confidence that SA-TECH could perform the contract requirements effectively and efficiently. Similarly, the Technical Evaluation Committee and the Source Selection Authority could assign “outstanding” and “satisfactory” ratings, respectively, to SA-TECH’s proposal for the Participation by Small, Minority, and Disadvantaged Businesses element even though SA-TECH did not identify specific businesses. The rating ultimately assigned by the Source Selection Authority meant that she had reasonable confidence that SA-TECH could effectively and efficiently perform the contract requirements. All three ratings assigned to SA-TECH’s proposal reflected the Army’s determination that SA-
Furthermore, the fact that the Army assigned all three proposals the same ratings does not render the ratings per se improper. See United Concordia Cos. v. United States, 99 Fed.CI. 34, 42 (2011) (“That the [source selection authority] found [two offerors] to be equal in non-price factors, which coincides with their identical adjectival ratings for technical merit, proposal risk, and past performance, is not evidence of a lack of comparative assessment.”). Indeed, it is incumbent upon the procuring agency and reviewing court to look beyond adjectival ratings because “ ‘[proposals with the same adjectival rating are not necessarily of equal quality----Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States,
In sum, because the source selection decision was a rational exercise of the Army’s discretion and should therefore not be disturbed, the Army’s decision to take corrective action in response to Kratos’s protests is irrational. Moreover, to the extent that the Army determined, independently of GAO attorney, that the Source Selection Authority’s tradeoff analysis did not properly consider the differences among the proposals, such a determination lacks a rational basis. See supra section III.A1. Accordingly, whatever its basis, the Army’s decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
b. The Army’s Decision to Take Corrective Action Violates Procurement Statutes and Regulations
Although the court has determined that the Army’s decision to take corrective action lacks a rational basis, it briefly considers whether the Army’s decision to take corrective action also violates a statute or regulation. SA-TECH argues that the Army, in proposing corrective action, is violating the requirements that it promote and provide for full and open competition through the use of appropriate competitive procedures, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2006); FAR 6.101; award the contract to the successful offeror, FAR 15.504; and determine that the procurement did not comply with a statute or regulation, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(f); FAR 33.102(b). SA-TECH, in other words, contends that the Army’s proposed corrective action disturbs a contract award made in compliance with the applicable statutes and regulations. The court agrees. Because the Army properly evaluated the offerors’ proposals and rendered a source selection decision, its decision to take corrective action upsets a properly awarded contract and therefore violates the laws meant to guarantee fair competition in government procurements.
3. Summary
The Army’s decision to take corrective action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and unlawful, and therefore constitutes a significant error in the procurement process. Having so concluded, the court need not address SA-TECH’s alternative contention that even if the decision to take corrective action was appropriate, the corrective action proposed by the Army is overly broad. The court’s next inquiry, therefore, is whether SA-TECH is prejudiced by the Army’s error.
B. SA-TECH Is Prejudiced by the Army’s Decision to Take Corrective Action
If a protester demonstrates that there was “a significant error in the procurement process,” it must then show “that the error prejudiced it.” Data Gen. Corp.,
SA-TECH easily satisfies the prejudice inquiry. SA-TECH is the current contract awardee. Thus, the corrective action proposed by the Army would lead to the termination of a contract that SA-TECH already won. If the Army did not take its proposed corrective action, SA-TECH would retain its contract. It therefore has more than a substantial chance of being awarded the contract absent the Army’s error; it is 100% certain to be the contract awardee.
IV. DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SA-TECH has demonstrated that the Army’s decision to take corrective action constitutes a significant, prejudicial procurement error and that it is therefore entitled to a judgment in its favor. The court thus turns to SA-TECH’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Such equitable remedies are available to successful protesters under the Tucker Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (permitting the Court of Federal Claims to “award any relief that the court considers proper, including declaratory and injunctive relief except that any monetary relief shall be limited to bid preparation and proposal costs”). SA-TECH first seeks declarations that (1) the contents of the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message and the Army’s decision to take corrective action in response to the message are “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to precedent, unwarranted, and overbroad”; (2) the Army’s decision to take corrective action is “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to precedent, unwarranted, and overbroad”; and (3) its contract with the Army is “valid and not subject to corrective action” based on Kratos’s GAO protest. Because the practical effect of this requested relief is to prevent the Army from taking the proposed corrective action, it is “tantamount to a request for injunctive relief.” PGBA, LLC v. United States,
“Injunctive relief is appropriate if it ‘enjoin[s] the illegal action and return[s] the contract award process to the status quo ante.’ ” Turner Constr. Co.,
By demonstrating that the Army’s proposed corrective action constitutes a significant, prejudicial error in the procurement process, SA-TECH has succeeded on the merits. The court concludes that SA-TECH also satisfies the remaining three factors justifying an award of injunctive relief.
The first of these factors—irreparable harm—is satisfied because, absent an injunction preventing the implementation of
[U]nless the agency’s corrective action is enjoined, [the protester] faces irreparable harm from an unnecessary reeompetition for a contract it has already won. Without an injunction, [the protester] may lose the contract and the associated revenues. Even if [the protester] is able to retain the contract following the proposed resolieitation, [the protester] would have been forced to recompete in circumstances where its winning price had already been revealed to the competition.
In addition, the balance of hardships weighs in SA-TECH’s favor. If the Army was permitted to pursue its plan of corrective action, it would be required to spend time, money, and energy on terminating SA-TECH’s contract, amending the RFP, reevaluating proposals, issuing a new source selection decision, and reawarding a contract. In fact, no benefit accrues to the Army by allowing it to proceed with its corrective action plan when a properly awarded contract already exists. If both the protester and the government stand to suffer harm in the absence of an injunction, then it makes good sense to issue the injunction.
Further, the public interest is served by enjoining the Army from taking the proposed corrective action. This court has repeatedly recognized that there is an important public interest in fair and open competition in the government procurement process. See, e.g., Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v. United States,
As a final matter, the court must address the United States’ contention that the eourt should decline to grant injunctive relief on national security grounds. The United States makes the sweeping assertion that because the contract at issue involves the testing and evaluation of missile/weapons systems, the court should disregard the merits of the protest and deny injunctive relief. In considering a bid protest, the court is required to “give due regard to the interests
The Tucker Act requires that the Court consider the interest of national defense in its bid protest decisions. Nonetheless, “claims of national security ... are often advanced by the Government in challenges to procurement decisions. The Court will not blindly accede to such claims but is bound to give them the most careful consideration.” While the Court certainly must give serious consideration to national defense concerns and arguably should err on the side of caution when such vital interests are at stake, allegations involving national security must be evaluated with the same analytical rigor as other allegations of potential harm to parties or to the public.
Gentex Corp. v. United States,
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the court finds that injunctive relief is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
• The motions to dismiss filed by the United States and Kratos are DENIED;
• The motion for judgment on the administrative record filed by SA-TECH is GRANTED;
• The cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record filed by the United States and Kratos are DENIED;
• The Army is ENJOINED from implementing the corrective action it proposed in its April 22, 2011 letter to the GAO in response to the GAO attorney’s April 20, 2011 electronic-mail message and/or Kra-tos’s GAO protest; and
• The court has filed this opinion under seal. The parties shall confer to determine proposed redactions agreeable to all parties. Then, by no later than Wednesday, August 24, 2011, the parties shall file a joint status report indicating their agreement with the proposed re-dactions, attaching a copy of those pages of the court’s opinion containing proposed redactions, with all proposed redactions clearly indicated.
No costs. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Notes
. For simplicity, the court will refer to the awarding agency as "the Army.” And, in conformance with the parties' usages, the court will refer to plaintiff as "SA-TECH” and defendant-intervenor as "Kratos.”
. The court derives the facts in this section from the administrative record ("AR”), the two-page supplement to the administrative record ("SAR”), and the complaint ("Compl.”). SA-TECH appended three exhibits to its motion for judgment on the administrative record: an affidavit, one of its filings in Kratos's GAO protest, and a slide presentation. Its GAO protest filing is already included in the administrative record. See AR 1669-88. The court did not consider the other two exhibits because they were not included in the administrative record and were unnecessary for the court's review of the protest. See Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States,
. The administrative record does not contain the portion of the Final Evaluation Report that addresses [...] final proposal revision.
. The Source Selection Authority considered these comments under the Management Approach element in her source selection decision.
. The Source Selection Authority did not report any ratings for the Technical/ Management factor overall.
. As noted above, SA-TECH ultimately received a "satisfactory” rating on this element in the Source Selection Decision Memorandum.
. During oral argument, defense counsel reaffirmed the Army’s intention to take the corrective action that it described in its letter to the GAO and that caused the GAO to dismiss Kratos’s protest.
. Prior to 1982, the predecessor of the Court of Federal Claims exercised jurisdiction over pre-award bid protests under the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity for claims based on implied contracts with the United States. Res. Conservation Grp., LLC v. United States,
. See, e.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. United States,
. Two of these protests predate the 1996 enactment of the ADRA. See Firth Constr. Co. v. United States,
. See, e.g., ManTech Telecomms. & Info. Sys. Corp. v. United States,
. For a discussion of the bid protest jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts before the enactment of the ADRA, see Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States,
. The provision concerning 28 U.S.C. § 1491 discussed in the conference report was ultimately enacted in an amended form that gave federal district courts and the Court of Federal Claims concurrent jurisdiction over bid protests for four years, after which time the Court of Federal Claims, in the absence of congressional action, would have exclusive jurisdiction. See 142 Cong. Rec. SI 1848 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (containing the text of the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 that was ultimately enacted).
. Congress created the Court of Federal Claims under Article I of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a). Courts established under Article I are not bound by the "case or controversy” requirement of Article III. Zevalkink v. Brown,
. A protester must also demonstrate prejudice to succeed on the merits of its bid protest. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson,
. Kratos argues that one of SA-TECH's contentions—the impropriety of the Army's decision to amend the RFP—is not ripe for review. Because this argument is encompassed by the more general argument advanced by the United States that SA-TECH’s challenge to the Army’s proposed corrective action is unripe in its entirely, the court will not address it separately.
. During oral argument, in response to the court’s inquiry regarding whether the Army still intended to take its proposed corrective action, defense counsel stated that he had conferred with his client on this issue and that the Army indicated that it would proceed with the corrective action as proposed. Counsel then turned to Tina Pixler, the Army attorney who signed the April 22, 2011 letter and who was present at oral argument, for confirmation. Ms. Pixler nodded her head in agreement.
. Madison Services, Inc., relied upon by the United States, is distinguishable. In that case, counsel for the protester, the intended contract awardee, alleged that counsel for the procuring agency "notified" the protester "that a decision had been made to follow the GAO recommendation” set forth in the GAO’s decision sustaining the protest of an unsuccessful offeror.
. The decision in Bannum was based upon then-RCFC 56.1, which was abrogated and replaced by RCFC 52.1. RCFC 52.1 was designed to incorporate the decision in Bannum. See RCFC 52.1, Rules Committee Note (June 20, 2006).
. It is worth noting that during oral argument, SA-TECH's counsel indicated that once SA-TECH was awarded the contract, the incumbent personnel offered positions with SA-TECH accepted those positions, thus vindicating the rationality of, and the Source Selection Authority’s reasonable reliance on, its mitigation plan. Because this fact was not part of the administrative record, however, the court did not consider it in rendering its decision.
. The United States contends that the court must apply a different standard: that so long as the Army decided to take corrective action in good faith, the court must uphold the decision. In support of this standard, the United States cites four decisions of the Court of Federal Claims. See Def.’s Mot. 20 (citing Ceres Gulf, Inc.,
The origin of the good faith standard discussed in the remaining decisions sheds doubt on its usefulness in the Court of Federal Claims. The court in Ceres Gulf, Inc. quotes Seaborn Health Care, Inc., for the proposition that "[wjhere 'a decision to amend a solicitation and request revised offers is made in good faith, without the intent to change a particular offeror’s ranking or to avoid an award to a particular offeror, that decision will not be disturbed.’ ”
[Tjhe GAO has repeatedly held that ”[a]n agency may amend a solicitation, and request and evaluate another rounds of [best-and-final offers] where the record shows that the agency made the decision to take this action in good faith, without the specific intent of changing a particular offeror’s technical ranking or avoiding an award to a particular offeror.”
. SA-TECH also requests an injunction preventing the Army from implementing any other corrective action in response to Kratos’s GAO protest. Such an injunction would be overbroad. For one, there is no evidence in the administrative record that the Army believes another course of corrective action would be appropriate; it would therefore be mere speculation that the Army would attempt to craft another plan. Additionally, the court has held, as the basis for finding the Army’s proposed corrective action arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, that the grounds of Kratos’s GAO protest were meritless. Thus, any future plan of corrective action based on those grounds would contravene the court's holding.
. The disclosure of SA-TECH's price in the award notification letters, standing alone, does not constitute irreparable harm. The government is required to disclose the price of an awarded contract to the unsuccessful offerors. See FAR 15.503(b)(1) (requiring the procuring agency to provide unsuccessful offerors with a notice that includes "[t]he items, quantities, and any stated unit prices of each award”); FAR 15.506(d) (requiring the procuring agency to disclose ”[t]he overall evaluated cost or price ... of the successful offeror” during postaward debriefings). As the United States notes, if such disclosure constituted irreparable harm, the government would be hampered in its attempts to take corrective action to cure legitimate deficiencies unearthed during bid protests. See also Griffy’s Landscape Maint. LLC,
